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
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
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THE
FEEDING OF FIGHTING ARMIES.
FRANCO-GERMAN WAR OF
1870-71.

By LIEUT.-COLONEL THOMAS AUGUSTUS LE MESURIER
late of the Army Service Corps.

VOL. I.


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


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Map of the Seat of War, showing waterways in blue,
in pocket.

THE FEEDING OF FIGHTING ARMIES.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR.

CHAPTER I.

ORGANISATION OF THE GERMAN INTENDANTUR.

There was some surprise and no little consternation throughout Germany at the suddenness of the French declaration of war; the Prussian authorities were not, however, unprepared to face such a contingency, for its preparations had been made to meet the inevitable whenever that was forced upon them. Every effort had been made for many years past by the Prussian authorities to strengthen and consolidate the regular army of the country, as well as its reserve forces. The utmost attention had been given to every detail of army organisation, which alone could secure the homogeneity of the whole. The labour, time, and patience bestowed in the preparatory arrangements, were soon to be rewarded with the success they merited. The Prussian military authorities were perfectly well aware that France was unprepared to undertake so serious a war; the declaration of war, therefore, caused them some surprise, and possibly found them not entirely ready to repel so sudden an attack. However, the unreadiness of the French afforded them ample time to concentrate their forces along the threatened frontier. The north Germans were not left long in doubt as to the intentions of their southern brethren. Almost immediately after the outbreak of the war, the King of Bavaria declared himself in favour of Prussia; his people being so overjoyed at his decision that some fifteen thousand of them assembled at his palace to thank him for his determination. His example having been followed by the remaining States in the south, their armies were at once mobilised in support of the national defence. From the outset, united Germany was able to put into the field much larger forces than France could assemble; this was accomplished notwithstanding

•

the fact that the Germans had no larger population to draw upon than was the case with the French, but the main causes were the better organisation of the reserves in Germany, and the cut and dried military arrangements made in that country, which were well in advance of their requirement. The German equipment, their transport stores, and supplies were quite ready, and had merely to be sent to the points of concentration. On the other hand, the French equipments were most imperfect, the major part of their transport had to be improvised, their supplies had to be collected and concentrated along the frontier, and their reserves of stores were exceedingly defective. Consequently, Germany had the advantage in men and material from the commencement of the campaign.

The efforts of the German Government were at first directed towards the concentration of their troops along the frontier in order to repel the threatened invasion of the country by the French army. The railway lines of the land were utilised fully in carrying out this pressing requirement. Those lines were almost wholly employed upon this service from the 16th July to the end of that month, by which time the bulk of the German forces had crossed the Rhine. As a rule, the troops detrained at or near the Rhine, and marched the remainder of the way towards the frontier. The lines used by the North German Corps, according to official account, were the following:—(1) Berlin, Hanover, Cologne, to Neunkirchen; (2) Leipsic or Harburgh, through Kruinsen to Mosbach; (3) Berlin, Halle, Cassel, Frankfort, to Mannheim; (4) Dresden or Leipsic, Bebra, Fulda, to Castel; (5) Posen, Leipsic, Wurzburg, to Mainz; (6) Munster, Dusseldorf, to Cologne. The South German Corps employed the following lines:—(7) Augsburg, Ulm, to Bruchsal; (8) Nordlingen, Crailsheim, to Meckesheim; (9) Wurzburg, Mosbach, to Heidelberg. That authority goes on to state that twelve trains on a single and eighteen on a double line were considered a day's work, but the usual number of carriages per train were augmented. "No railway employes were called upon to serve with the colours until a later date, so that the railway service should not be short-handed at first." Those troops which were being mobilised in East and West Prussia, Pomerania, and Silesia were not allowed to move west of Berlin before the bulk of the troops, which were being mobilised nearer the frontier, had been carried to the Rhine. Von Moltke, in his *Franco-German War*, gives the following particulars:—"The orders for marching, and travelling by rail or boat, were worked

out for each division of the army, together with the most minute directions as to their different starting points, the day and hour of departure, the duration of the journey, the refreshment stations, and place of destination. At the meeting-point cantonments were assigned to each corps and division, stores and magazines were established ; and thus, when war was declared, it needed only the Royal signature to set the entire apparatus in motion with undisturbed precision." It will be seen, therefore, that the foresight of the German military authorities much more than repaid their efforts ; the troops were moved to the frontier with the utmost precision, and without any serious discomfort, and within the space of a fortnight. This marvellous triumph of administrative skill stood out in marked contrast to the somewhat faulty, although carefully thought out, railway arrangements of the French. The latter enjoyed the advantage of having taken the initiative, and would have thereby gained time at the outset, but the superior organisation of the German railway arrangements more than counterbalanced this advantage.

The mobilisation of the North German forces commenced on the 16th July ; Bavaria followed suit on the 17th ; Wurtemberg on the 18th ; and Baden on the 19th. The bulk of those troops may be said to have been mobilised and concentrated at or near the Rhine by the end of that month. At that period, large numbers of the reservists had yet to be mobilised, particularly those residing in the more remote parts of the north and south ; the Germans, however, managed to bring into the field by the beginning of August a force of about half a million of men, well armed and equipped, to which the French could not oppose much more than half that number. The North German forces on the frontier consisted at first of ten army corps, with the troops from South Germany ; these were, early in August, augmented by three more army corps. The Germans were divided into three separate armies : (1st) commanded by General Von Steinmetz, consisted of two army corps, with additional divisions ; (2nd) commanded by Prince Frederick Charles of Prussia, was composed of the Prussian Guard Corps, and of four more army corps besides other troops ; (3rd) commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, consisted of two Bavarian Corps, a Prussian Army Corps, and of several Wurtemberg and Baden divisions. The first was the smallest army ; it was accompanied by the King of Prussia and the General Staff of the Army, and was assigned the most northern position in the advance. The second was the largest army, and took the centre. The third

army was given the left flank in the advance. The 1st Army was moved by rail upon Cologne and Coblenz, and afterwards by road to Wittlich. The 2nd Army was sent by rail to Mainz and Mannheim, whence it was advanced to Nunkirchen and Homburg. The 3rd Army was concentrated behind the Klingbach, near Landau, but several divisions were left on the right bank of the Rhine, in case the French should attempt the passage of that river. It will be seen, therefore, that the front of the French army from Belfort to Thionville covered a distance of more than 100 miles ; whereas the front of the German army from Landau to Sarbrücken did not cover more than 60 miles. It followed, therefore, that owing to the scattered situation of the French Army Corps, the Germans were able from the outset to overwhelm the French by sheer weight of numbers.

Of course it is not an easy matter to mobilise half a million of men in different parts of a vast empire, and to bring those masses together at certain limited given points, but it is no easier undertaking to feed such a mass of men when they have been assembled at the points of concentration. This laborious work falls upon the commissariat establishment of the army, known in Germany as the Intendantur Department. This branch of the German administration was confided to Lieutenant-General Von Stosch, who was the Intendant General of the Army. Upon him and upon his department rested the liability to provide food and forage for the various German armies, wherever they might be sent.

The German official account makes the following remark in regard to the duties of the Commissariat :—" From the very commencement of a campaign a very great strain falls upon the authorities entrusted with the food supply of an army. The strategical concentration brings together large masses in a small area, whilst the railways are fully taken up with the transport of the troops and their trains."

When it is considered that the men of such an army would consume more than five hundred tons of food daily, and that the horses would require nearly three times that weight of forage per diem, it will at once be seen that the undertaking was simply stupendous, and could not have been accomplished had not the needed equipments been prepared well in advance, and a well-trained personnel organised on effective and liberal principles. Capt. Hozier, in his *Franco-Prussian War*, tells us that : " The transport which follows a Prussian army in the field, exclusive of the wagons of each battalion, the artillery, engineer, and

ammunition trains, and the field telegraph divisions, is divided under two heads. The first and larger portion is under the direction of the Intendantur Department, and is maintained solely for the supply of the food, forage, money, and extra clothing to men and horses. The second portion is also under the Intendantur, but is placed at the disposal of the medical department, and carries the medicines and hospital necessities for the sick and wounded, together with the means of carrying disabled men." To intensify the difficulties which exist in the working of this branch of army administration, our readers may be reminded that the department is beset with all sorts of hindrances. Such, for instance, as bad roads ; wagons breaking down ; horses being shot or maimed ; the blocking of roads by ambulances carrying the wounded to the rear, or by troops on the march ; the capture of convoys ; changes of orders in regard to the destinations of brigades or divisions ; conflicting orders ; lines of railway often not available for supplies ; stampedes, which may originate with the train, or by which the train horses may become infected ; destruction of magazines by the enemy or by fire ; failure of supplies in a district upon which dependance had been placed ; similar failures in regard to the supply of horses and vehicles ; opposition of the peasantry to the invading army, from which the Germans suffered enormously ; the destruction of supplies by the owners or their concealment ; it would be difficult to exhaust the contingent difficulties to which the commissariat of an army is exposed from day to day. The officers charged with such duties must be full of zeal, courage, energy and resource, and the supply and transport men must be devoted to the service in which they are engaged. So far as the English army is concerned, we may congratulate ourselves that neither the officers nor men of the Army Service Corps lack anything in these respects to ensure success to the British arms.

In order to provide for so large an army it became necessary to establish very large magazines of supplies immediately to the rear of the various armies ; this naturally necessitated the transfer of large quantities of supplies from all parts of the country to the frontier. As the several lines of railway were fully taken up during the first fortnight in the carriage of troops, no help could at first be derived from that source ; recourse was, however, had to conveyance by the Rhine and any other waterways which were available, as well as by vehicular conveyance over shorter distances. We are informed in the official account of the war that, owing to the short time permitted for preparation, great

difficulty was experienced at the outset. It is stated that twenty field ovens were at once constructed at each of the following places:—Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, Mainz, and Sarlouis, and the flour stores of the nearest peace magazines were placed at their disposal. Large bakeries for the army were also set up in houses near Frankfort on the Maine, and in Mannheim, and the bakeries established in the larger garrisons situated on lines of railway were enlarged and rendered capable, not only of supplying the current wants of the field troops, but also of manufacturing considerable reserves of bread, and large supplies of biscuit. In the corps districts the Intendantur secured a six weeks' supply of food, oats, and hay, which were forwarded to points within the locale of concentration of each corps; and a considerable part of the fortress-supplies from Cologne and Wessel was forwarded by steamer to Bingen and applied to the use of the field army. During the first few days of the concentration the Army Corps could only secure their supply of food and forage by taking it with them in the railway carriages, or by attaching separate wagons for that purpose; the troops were therefore ordered to relieve the commissariat as much as possible by supplying themselves from the district within the rayon of their position; a special 14 days' reserve of flour and oats was collected in a number of large magazines established on the railways to the west of the Rhine, which were kept full by replenishment after the issues. A six weeks' supply, forming a reserve of food, oats, and hay for seven Army Corps, was accumulated in Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, and Frankfort on the Maine; whilst Baden found magazines for its army in Heidelberg and Meckesheim; and Bavaria formed depôts at Gernersheim, Ludwigshafen, and Neustadt; and Wurtemberg at Bruchsal. It is obvious that the German Army Corps were then somewhat hard pressed for supplies during the first fortnight of the concentration on the frontier, during which recourse was had to the districts in the neighbourhood of each army corps, but this may have been done more with the intention of enabling the Intendantur to accumulate more reserves of supplies at the depôt magazines, as well as at those along the lines of railway, but it was not before the commencement of August that fifty through provision trains could be forwarded to the Rhine. Then there was another point—the corps transport could not have been completed much before the second week in August, for on the 4th August the Crown Prince determined not to await the arrival of the remainder of his transport before crossing the frontier, his

example being followed by both the first and second armies ; it follows, therefore, that the supply columns could not have been formed much before the middle of that month. The major portion of the transport would have been forced to march to the points of concentration, as there was at first no railway conveyance available ; some considerable time would therefore have been consumed in its mobilisation as well as during its advance. It is more than probable that the dearth of transport at the moment interfered exceedingly with the despatch of sufficient supplies from the advanced base depôts. The lines of railway beyond the Rhine would have been available to a certain extent, and they would naturally have conveyed the daily supplies of fresh bread to the corps at the front ; but large quantities of much needed equipments, ammunition, and stores would also have required transportation,—this alone would have given the few available lines of railway more than they could do.

In an agricultural country such as Germany, no real difficulty could have been experienced in collecting the supplies needed for the feeding of so large an army in the field. The official account tells us that "The districts in which the German armies were concentrated possessed for the most part abundant resources. In spite of that, the Rhine provinces could not be expected to furnish more than two days' food for all the troops which were about to arrive. This expectation was the less hopeful as the not over-abundant harvest of the current year still lay in part on the ground, and the prevailing drought both limited the power of the mills and the use of the communication by water." It will be seen, therefore, that the Intendantur was confronted from the very start with formidable difficulties, which had to be overcome in one way or another. Almost unlimited quantities could, however, have been procured from Austria, Great Britain, Russia, Holland, and Belgium, and these countries had to be drawn upon considerably during the course of the war ; there are good grounds for thinking that these sources were not tapped soon enough. The ports on the northern shores of the country remained practically open throughout the war, as the French Fleet in no sense kept up an effective blockade, and as a natural consequence Germany could still import what was required from abroad. The safer plan, of course, was to import through neutral ports, and then by water communications or by rail to their depôts. Germany was not therefore handicapped by any insurmountable difficulties, her stores and supplies were no doubt ample throughout the war, but the difficulty was in getting them to the con-

sumers. Reserve dépôts of supplies had been maintained in the country in peace times, and these were of inestimable benefit to the Intendantur in their initial efforts. Such dépôts are of far greater necessity when the position is insular; but the Prussian administration had taken every possible precaution whereby the pressure would become lightened on the outbreak of any serious war. The German soldiers' daily ration consisted of 1 lb. 10 ozs. of bread, 1 lb. $1\frac{1}{2}$ ozs. of meat, about $\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bacon, vegetables as procurable, $\frac{3}{4}$ oz. of coffee and salt, something less than a pint of the wine of the country, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ ozs. of tobacco. Commandant Heumann, in his work on the organisation of the German Army, gives us the following scale as being then in use:— "The daily ration on service is composed of the following: 750 grammes of bread, or 500 grammes of biscuit; 375 grammes of fresh or salt meat, or 250 grammes of preserved meat, or 170 grammes of pork; 125 grammes of rice, oatmeal, or hulled barley, or 250 grammes of preserved vegetables or flour, or $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilos. of potatoes; 25 grammes of salt; 25 grammes of coffee, roasted, with 15 grammes of sugar, or 3 grammes of tea; and a litre of beer or cider, or $\frac{1}{4}$ litre of wine or $\frac{1}{8}$ litre of brandy. The men were to have three meals a day; in the morning it consisted of a vegetable soup or of coffee, at noon the meal is composed of a meat or pork soup, and in the evening of cheese and coffee when the former could be afforded. During a campaign each soldier has to carry three days' rations (the iron ration), weighing about 3 kilos. The provision wagons of the army corps were to carry a ration per man, and the administration convoys were to carry four rations per man. The cavalry were to carry one day's food for the trooper, and a day's oats in reserve. The horse ration is of two kinds: Heavy ration, $5\frac{1}{2}$ kilos. of oats, $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilos. of hay, and $1\frac{3}{4}$ kilos. of straw; light ration, $5\frac{1}{4}$ kilos. of oats, $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilos. of hay, and $1\frac{3}{4}$ kilos. of straw."

The existing ration does not differ much from what was issued during the campaign, but no fixed scale could be adhered to where the movements were so rapid, the men had to accept what was procurable, more of one kind and less of another. General Pierron has collected, in his book on Strategy and Higher Tactics, the opinions of a large number of German, French and other authors. He gives us the following information in regard to the reserve supplies taken with the German armies in their advance. Each man carried three days' rations, which consisted of 1,500 grammes of biscuit, 375 grammes of rice, 75 grammes of salt and 75 grammes of coffee. Two wagons accompanied

each battalion of 1,000 men, laden with two days' rations of like proportions. The supply column wagons carried four days' supplies of bread or biscuit, dry vegetables, salt and coffee. And the reserve supply columns carried four days' supplies, consisting of flour and pork or bacon, and six days' oats. It was sometimes necessary to add preserved meat, dried vegetables, additional oats, and 3 lb. of hay per ration of oats. Thus we see that the German battalions could almost always depend upon thirteen days' provisions and at least six days' forage within reach of them. As these supplies were consumed they were made up from the magazines in rear by means of the supply columns. It is also stated that the reserved supply columns were composed of country wagons drawn by two horses, probably German originally, but supplemented by those commandeered from the French as needed. Pierron adds that in their advance the Intendantur always managed to procure fresh meat for several days. Heumann and Pierron do not agree as to the number of days' rations carried by the first line transport, but the latter is no doubt correct in stating that two days' food was carried.

Like the French soldier, the German is very fond of soup, than which nothing is more filling and comforting to an empty stomach. Capt. Hozier states that "an important help in victualling the troops was afforded by a novel description of food used in China. It consisted of the pease pudding, for centuries employed in keeping body and soul together amongst Celestials; a cheap article that does not deteriorate for a length of time, and contains a large quantity of nutritious matter in a small compass. To make it more palatable, the Germans improved upon the Chinese pattern by mixing smoked meat, chopped up small, with the pease. Whether boiled or cold it is equally good, and a small quantity will suffice a man for a day." Manufactories for the production of these sausages had already been instituted in Germany, and the supply was sufficient to meet every requirement. These sausages proved to be exceedingly portable and were of the greatest service throughout the campaign. Something of the kind is greatly needed in the British Army, but the soldiery should not consider such articles of diet from the point of view of palatability, but rather from that of their portability, their absorption of water, and their nutritive qualities. In a word—Would not such food be preferable to being starved into surrender by an enemy? Whether our iron emergency ration fulfils this requirement may or may not be open to question. There is certainly room for experiment, and we commend the

subject to the attention of the professional experts of the Army Service Corps, and of the army generally.

It is certain that the supply arrangements for the German armies were seriously impeded, during the first three weeks of the war, by the want of a sufficient transport to bring the supplies to the several encampments. As has been stated the railways were not then available, either to the Rhine or beyond that river; they were needed for the transportation of the men and ammunition of the several army corps. Owing also to the necessity for bringing men, ammunition, and equipments to the front at first, the army corps could not take with them more than the first line of trains, which consisted of a small portion of the supply column and the ammunition columns which were required for immediate use; in the case of the third army these trains could not advance until after the battle of Worth had been fought, when the train of the 2nd Bavarian Corps was advanced to Weissenburg, and those of the remaining corps could not be advanced beyond the Lauter.

The second line of trains, consisting of the remainder of the supply columns, field hospitals, and ammunition columns, which were not immediately required by the troops, had to be left behind at the several mobilising centres. These could not be brought forward before the second week in August, when the heavy work of the transportation of the men began to abate. It became obvious, therefore, that however full the advanced base magazines may have been, it was not possible to get the supplies to the men without a much larger service of supply columns than was then available. The movements of the several German armies, particularly the third, were so very rapid that the regular working of the supply columns could not have been got into thorough working order much before the middle of August, and probably not even then in the case of the third army. In the meantime the deficiencies in food had to be made up by requisitioning the surrounding districts, by foraging, and by the capture of some of the enemy's supplies. Capt. Hozier thus describes the German system of requisition:—"Every town or village occupied by German troops had to furnish a certain quantity of provisions for the soldiers and supplies for their cavalry, to be paid for by cheques, which were to be honoured at the end of the war by the vanquished. If Germany won, France was to pay; if France, Germany was to pay her own cheques, and any the French might draw on German ground. The superior officer alone could make requisitions, and if people were

uncivil or obstinate they were treated to some of the smaller horrors of war." It will be seen, therefore, that there was nothing mealy-mouthed about the Germans, too much sentimentality is out of place when hard knocks are being exchanged.

In submitting particulars of the organisation of the German Intendantur, we cannot do better than quote the words of some of those who have written upon that subject :—Spenser Wilkinson, in his book styled *The Brains of an Army*, gives us much information from the pen of Lieut.-Colonel Exner of the German Army. Colonel Exner informs us that the personnel of the Prussian War Ministry at Berlin consisted of 390 officers and officials, but that there were more than 800 in the French War Ministry. He also tells us that the War Ministries at Berlin, Munich, Dresden, and Stuttgart, for the Prussian, Bavarian, Saxon, and Wurtemberg contingents, were each directed by a general officer of superior rank. Also that there was no War Ministry for the Empire, and that all the orders of the Emperor, as well as all newly prepared or altered regulations, were conveyed through the Prussian War Ministry to the War Ministries of the other States, by which they had to be put in force in the Army Corps. He adds—"Upon the military intendance devolves the duty of regulating all matters relating to the maintenance, payment, and quartering of the troops. In war they have also to provide food, either through organised conveyance from home, or by off-hand purchases, or, in case of necessity, by requisition." Commandant Heumann gives more minute particulars of the organisation of the German Intendantur towards the close of the last century, when it did not differ much from what it was at the commencement of the war of 1870-71 :—"There are two classes of employés in the Intendance : the superior officers, who are much on a par with the French Intendance, provide the direction ; the inferior employés, who may be likened to our junior branch, perform the whole of the executive duties. The former class is selected, by means of an examination, principally from the Civil Service, but also from officers of the army having at least six years' service ; there are four separate ranks : 48 *assesseurs*, 50 *conseillers référendaires*, 40 *conseillers d'intendance*, and 20 *intendants*. The regimental officers were permitted to retain their existing titles, as well as all the privileges attaching thereto. The junior ranks were usually obtained from civil candidates, but principally from non-commissioned officers who had performed accountants' work in the army, as well as others, officers of 12 years' service were

also accepted if they could pass the examination. The juniors could be promoted to the higher branch if they were specially selected." He adds that the Army Corps Intendant corresponded with the War Ministry on all matters of importance, and was attached to and under the orders of the General Staff, but the Divisional Intendants were under the orders of their divisional commanders. It was an obvious error that an officer exerting the influence and power of a Corps Intendant should have perhaps held the rank of a captain or a lieutenant, but that disqualification does not appear to have exerted any influence to the prejudice of the highly important duties with which these officers were charged during the campaign. Upon all occasions they appear to have been supported with cordiality and vigour by the General and other officers commanding. At the same time it must be admitted that the officers of the supply and transport services of every army should have army rank appropriate to the importance of the duties with which they are entrusted, particularly as those duties bring them into the closest relations with all ranks both in times of peace and during a war. And it is a well-recognised fact that although the soldier may respect an officer for his real worth, the officer will take a higher place in the esteem of the men if he holds an indisputable and equal position with those of relative rank in the other branches of the service. On the other hand, the officer's status is lowered if he possess an ambiguous position, and the service suffers commensurately.

As has been already stated, the superior officers of the Intendantur were taken both from the Civil Service and the army, and that the juniors were drawn from the commissioned and non-commissioned officers of the same. A considerable number of them would therefore have passed through the Military Academy at Berlin. Mr. Spenser Wilkinson, in his *Brains of the Army*, gives us some interesting particulars of the curriculum observed at that institution. Besides the usual branches of studies pursued at such military schools, we note that three hours a week are devoted to military history during the first year, and four a week during the second and third years; and that three a week are given to general history throughout the three years' course. In the Order of Teaching, military history is thus reviewed: "The lectures upon military history offer the most effective means of teaching war during peace, and of awakening a genuine interest in the study of important campaigns. These lectures must not degenerate into a mere succession of unconnected descriptions of military occurrences. They must regard events

in their casual connections, must concern themselves with the leadership, and must at the same time bring out the ideas of war peculiar to each age." It is also noted that under General Staff duties, to which four hours a week are devoted during the last year's course, the following subjects are included :—"Railways and transport; the principles of the supply of armies in peace and war, the resources and means available for the purpose, and the methods employed." The practice tour, which concludes the course, is intended to test the capacity, knowledge, and endurance of each officer. The Order of Service issued by the late Emperor Frederick is based on the experience gained by that distinguished soldier during the Franco-German War, and will be found highly instructive. A few extracts which apply with force to the supply and transport services are quoted : "The object of the War Academy is to initiate into the higher branches of the military sciences a number of officers of the necessary capacity belonging to the various arms, and thus to enlarge and extend their military knowledge and to clear and quicken their military judgment." It is worthy of note that in the entrance examination for admission to the Academy, the classics do not constitute any part of the test subjects as is the case with our British candidates, and for which large numbers of marks are given. As both Greek and Latin are excluded in the subsequent studies of the students, it follows that some better men, so far as military science is concerned, may be excluded by those who, although good classics, may be inferior in those studies which are of real use to army officers.

We are indebted to Capt. Hozier for a description of the system under which the German transport was organised, he says : "The first portion, in charge of the Intendantur Department, consists, in the first place, of a certain amount of wagons, which are in time of peace always kept ready in case of war, and immediately on the mobilisation of the army are provided with horses and drivers from the military trains, who are entirely under the control of the principal officer of the Intendantur. Each army has a principal Intendantur officer; each corps has with its headquarters an Intendantur officer of high rank, and one of the next inferior grade is attached to each division. These officers, with their subalterns and assistants, form the first links of the chain by which a general draws food to his troops. The commissariat columns of each *corps d'armée*, which are always retained in peace ready to be mobilised, consist of five provision columns, each of which has 2 officers, 101 men, 165 horses, and

32 wagons. If the *corps d'armée* is broken up into divisions, a certain portion of these columns accompanies each infantry division, the cavalry division, and the reserve artillery, and to each of these divisions an officer of Intendantur is attached. The Prussian plan of thus giving each column a "Proviat Meister," with wagons, &c., under his command, and making him responsible, has been proved beyond all doubt to be the best in practical working—far superior indeed to the French Intendance, to the utter failure and break-down of which these earlier disasters are believed to have been due. Under the Prussian system of dividing the responsibility into sections, not only is everything more manageable and simple, but the blame can be laid on the right shoulders when anything goes wrong; whereas in a very cumbrous central organisation, like that of the French, it is difficult to make any single individual responsible. In the present war the Prussians were at a distance from their own supplies, and consequently compelled to maintain a long line of communication through an enemy's country, and were actually better furnished with material and food than the French." Capt. Hozier's opinions are formed not without practical experience, as he served for several years as an officer of the British commissariat. Everything was done to help the transport; the troops at first marched without camp equipments, excepting what was absolutely essential for cooking purposes, they had no tents, no waterproof sheets or blankets, their only extra covering night or day, being their overcoats. The same amount of care does not appear to have been exercised by the French administration, as we hear of several truckloads of sweetmeats having been sent to the front at the commencement of the war, probably the gift of some well-intentioned old ladies, who perhaps considered life insupportable without its sweets.

Lieut.-Colonel Exner gives us some details of the constitution of the German train in the *Armies of To-day*, which was edited by Spenser Wilkinson in 1893. The numbers were fixed upon the most economical lines, and in the light of the practical experience gained during the campaign of 1870-71:—"The German has 21 train battalions, of which 17 are formed by Prussia, 2 by Bavaria, and 1 each by Saxony and Wurtemberg. Each battalion includes a company composed entirely of men who are bakers by profession. They are in peace time employed in the military bakeries established in all large garrisons, where the bread for non-commissioned officers and privates is made. At mobilisations they furnish the material for field bakeries. The train organisa-

tions, which have to furnish the men and horses for the transportation system of the entire army, requires naturally a large number of men as soon as the army is put upon a war footing. For this reason their method of recruiting and drilling is entirely different from that of the other branches of the service. They draw fresh recruits twice a year, who, after being drilled for six months only, are placed in the reserve, only a limited number being trained for three years for the purpose of being trained as non-commissioned officers. In addition a number of non-commissioned officers and privates of the cavalry are each year instructed in the service and placed in the train reserve." He adds further that the system is divided into three parts :—Firstly, the transport of reserve clothing for the troops, and the baggage of officers and administrative officials ; secondly, the carriage of the provisions of the army ; thirdly, the transportation of the reserve supplies of ammunition. The sanitary detachments and field hospitals are also formed by the train battalion. The train of an army corps consists of 1,700 wagons and 6,000 horses.

Capt. Hozier also gives us a description of the working of the German supply columns, which will be read with interest :—“ The 160 wagons which form the commissariat columns carry three days' provisions for every man in the *corps d'armée* ; as soon as the wagons which carry the first three days' supply are emptied, they are sent off to the magazines in rear, replenished, and must be up again with the troops to supply the fourth day's food, for in the two days' interval the other wagons will have been emptied. As it is easier to carry flour than bread in these wagons, each *corps d'armée* is accompanied by a field bakery, which consists of 1 officer and 118 men, 27 horses, and 5 wagons, which are distributed among the troops as may be most convenient ; and as the horses of both the provision columns and field bakeries have very hard work, a *depôt* of 86 horses, with 48 spare drivers, accompanies each *corps d'armée*. These provision columns then carry three days' provisions, but in a country where supplies are not very abundant they can do nothing in the way of collecting food ; their duty is simply to bring provisions from the magazines where they are gathered together, and to carry them to the troops. It is evident, therefore, that as the army advances these magazines must advance also, and that means must be provided for keeping the magazines full. The collection of food in such magazines entails an enormous amount of transport ; this transport is obtained by hiring wagons and carts in the country where the war is being carried on, or in the

countries near it. Wagons hired in the country are also used for carrying forage for the horses of the cavalry and artillery from the magazines to the front, for the provision columns only carry food for the men." He then goes on to explain that sometimes requisitions were resorted to to fill the column wagons, but it was considered more expeditious to send them back to the magazines, and the supply was more certain. Germany was always regarded as the main source of supply, the surrounding district being regarded mainly as an adjunct; but it is certain that both Alsace and Lorraine were drawn upon very heavily from the outset, owing to the initial necessity for leaving the second line of trains, belonging to the three German armies, behind when the frontier was crossed. The French Army Corps had not been long enough in the occupation of the two departments mentioned to make any marked impression upon their resources, consequently the Germans were not invading a part of the country already wasted by the depredations of the French soldiery. There was, however, the fierce hostility of the inhabitants to be overcome, as well as the reluctance on the part of the peasantry to furnish supplies even upon payment, or upon written promises of payment. This hostility, which was frequently marked by overt acts, became a serious hindrance to the advance of the German corps, but the patient endurance of a brave and persevering soldiery gradually dominated the greater part of such opposition. The conduct of the German soldiery was beyond praise, they were conscious of the righteousness of their cause; they were defending the Fatherland from invasion; they had taken up arms to resist aggression; they could, therefore, afford to behave generously to a mistaken people, who were the tools of designing and unscrupulous men. Sometimes the Germans were forced to employ strong coercive measures in dealing with those who were guilty of certain acts of hostility, such as the shooting of stragglers or of exhausted men, or the attacking of convoys by Franc-tireurs, many of whom were in the habit of discarding their arms immediately after an attack, and presented themselves in the guise of harmless peasants. Such tricks must be severely repressed if an army in the field is to live at all.

It will be understood by every student of the art of war that the lines of communication constitute the principal means upon which the armies in advance may rely for their sustenance and support; they are, therefore, intimately connected with the supply and transport services. We cannot do better than quote the words employed by Major E. M. Jones in a footnote in his translation of Blumé's work on the war:—"The purpose of the

Prussian Etappen system is to provide, in the most effectual way, for the smooth and regular working of the supply and transport arrangements in rear of the army, and to prevent the strength of the latter being frittered away in detachments along the lines of communication. The purpose is attained by committing these duties to men specially detailed for them." After giving some details of the composition of the Etappen staff and of the duties entrusted to them, he concludes as follows:—"The duties of these officers were carried out on the system of individual responsibility under sufficient, but not excessive, control, which prevails in Prussia, and which has been not the least important factor in her remarkable success." There is no better principle than for the commander to trust the responsible officers serving immediately under him. Belief and trust in those officers cultivates a spirit of self-reliance and of dependence upon the support of the commander when such support is needed. At the same time the commander cannot afford to trust too implicitly upon any officer, as the success of his contemplated operation should not depend upon the reliability of any individual officer or officers, and he must, therefore, not be considered interfering or over-anxious if he should busy himself by looking closely after his staff. The dislike to seem doubtful of any one officer may hold the General back and prevent his looking into matters closely, and disaster may result; the safest and best principle is for the commander to busy himself with everything and everyone; he will quickly see where the closest attention is needed. The commander must of necessity possess an enormous capacity for work, and must be conversant with every detail connected with the operations in which his command may be engaged. The above remarks apply with greater force to the relations subsisting between the commander and his senior supply and transport officers than perhaps they do to any other branches, excepting the Royal Engineers, whose work, like that of the Army Service Corps, is purely technical and needs special training, study and experience, which very few commanders have had the opportunity for acquiring, and are consequently the more dependent upon such scientific officers. The onus of efficiency rests all the more heavily upon those officers, who should do everything in their power to render themselves worthy of the great trust which must of necessity be reposed in them by their commanding officers. From what has transpired in regard to the management of the South African Campaign, we have no reason to think that the British commissariat of the present day is in any degree behind that of any of our Continental neighbours.

The German system of transportation seems to have been framed on eminently business lines, the existing organisation having been utilised to its utmost capacity, the auxiliary transport being provided at first from the resources of the agricultural population living along both banks of the Rhine and the Moselle. Later on, the districts of France, through which the German armies had to force their way, were made to contribute to the necessities of the Germans by providing vehicles, animals and drivers. Sufficient transport was certainly procured from the outset to secure the German armies against any serious want of supplies, and to ensure their perfect mobility. The preparatory organisation had been ample and sufficient, and all that was needed was to augment the existing cadres by the acquisition of such German and French civilian transport as were procurable in the vicinity of the several armies. It is not without alarm that we contemplate the fact that the British army had hardly landed on the shores of South Africa before it became evident that a thorough reorganisation of our transport service was needed. The weak link in our transport service being the so-called regimental system, whereby a certain number of wagons, carts, horses and mules were incorporated in each battalion and regiment of cavalry, the drivers being provided by regiments. It was found that, with so extended a line of communication, the transport of the numbers of battalions guarding such line would have become ineffective and inoperative. A complete change became imperative, and General Lord Kitchener was specially detailed to reorganise the transport upon lines which would make the whole of the existing transport available for general army work. The regimental system had its merits, perhaps the mobility of a battalion may have been increased, but it was an obvious absurdity to keep a quantity of costly transport idle, when it was needed for other army work. The system may improve the mobility of units, but it is certainly exceedingly extravagant and wasteful of power. The writer has always been opposed to that system, even during peace times—to see a number of sleek, fat cattle eating their heads off in the regimental stables vexed his economical soul exceedingly. The amount of work done and the character of the work accomplished could not always bear the closest investigation. No doubt it was very convenient to have carts and horses at command, but the question is whether the game was worth the candle. We think not, and that view seems to have been taken by Lord Kitchener as well as by Lord Roberts himself.

CHAPTER II.

ORGANISATION OF THE FRENCH INTENDANCE.

In order to render the meaning of this treatise more intelligible, it will not be superfluous to relate briefly what were some of the principal causes which led to the outbreak of the war between France and Prussia—the latter power was at that epoch at the head of the North German Confederation, the other States composing it were Saxony, Hanover, Brunswick, Mecklenburg, and others of less importance. The South German Confederation consisted of Bavaria, Wurtemberg, Baden, Hesse, and Darmstadt. Dissensions had for a long time existed between the Germans of the Northern and Southern Confederations; the former were stronger in every respect, and the latter were therefore the more inclined to resent anything approaching dictation or compulsion, and there was perhaps a stronger motive which tended to keep these States apart—those of the North were Protestant and those of the South were for the most part Roman Catholic. These differences were not lost upon the French people, who fondly imagined that their co-religionists of the Southern Confederation would either take sides with themselves or remain neutral in the event of their becoming engaged in a war with the North Germans. Furthermore, there had been a longing, on the part of the French Government and people, for the Rhine as their north-eastern frontier; the conquests of the first Napoleon had extended beyond the Rhine, and they imagined themselves perfectly entitled to its left bank. There was, however, a difference of opinion upon this subject—King William I of Prussia considered that, as the coveted portion of his country was then inhabited and had for centuries been occupied by Germans, the French had no claim whatever to its possession, he therefore prepared his people to resist by force such a dubious pretension. No attempt had ever been made to disguise the objects and intentions of the French nation, in this instance they were distinctly open and above-board; the press of the country was, however, blatant as to what was going to be done, and the common talk of the boulevards and the cafés was of the prospective advance to the Rhine.

Before considering the preparations made in advance on the one side to attain its object, and upon the other to thwart it, it may be as well to consider some of the steps taken by the Prussian Government to become thoroughly acquainted with the preparations then being made in France for the attainment of its purpose. It was, at the same time, necessary to gain a practical knowledge of the railways, fortresses, agricultural products, vehicles, roads, as well as the general topography of the country. With these objects in view, young Prussian officers had been sent into France in various disguises, some as clerks to commercial houses, others as artisans and ordinary labourers. It is stated that some of the workmen employed on the works in certain of the frontier fortresses were Prussian officers in disguise, who thereby obtained valuable information in regard to their construction and armaments. The French do not appear to have adventured to the same extent, which is somewhat astonishing, as, for many years the invasion of Germany had been in serious contemplation. No doubt French spies were employed to some extent in Germany, but it is evident that the espionage of the Prussians was greatly in advance of that employed by the French. It is affirmed that the Prussian officers knew every inch of French territory, and actually knew more about the French army and the defences of the country than most of the junior French officers or some of the seniors. What wonder, then, that the Germans were so soon able to convert the war-cry of the French soldiery from "*à Berlin!*" to "*à Paris!*"

Notwithstanding the absence of sufficient preparation for war on the part of the French Government, there was no hesitation to intrigue with the King of Holland in 1867 for the transfer of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to France, in consideration of the payment of a considerable sum of money to replenish the privy purse of the Dutch Monarch. Upon the notification of the intention of the Dutch Government to effect this transfer, the Prussian Government became highly incensed, and an appeal was at once made to the Powers. The matter was finally settled at a conference held in London, when it was decided that the Duchy should be governed as before, and that the fortifications of Luxemburg should be razed. Some of Napoleon's advisers then wished him to declare war against Prussia, but he wisely refrained, knowing, as he then did, that the country was unprepared to enter upon so gigantic a struggle. In the meantime, efforts were being put forward to bring the French army into a condition to measure strength with its hated rival, and it was not long before another

pretext was found for a declaration of war. Under the impression that his army was sufficiently strong and well organised, in 1870, Napoleon determined to oppose the candidature of a Hohenzollern Prince to the throne of Spain. Upon the representation of the French Government, the King of Prussia consented to the renunciation of that candidature, but he declined to give any assurance as to his conduct in the future in regard to such succession. The French wanted too much, or, what is more obvious, they intended to pick a quarrel, if the Prussian Monarch refused to humiliate himself by "eating dirt." No ruler could have done otherwise, and it is greatly to the credit of the King that he submitted to the peremptory dictation of the Emperor in regard to the candidature, when he knew that Germany was prepared for war and France was not. The French Government, however, made a formal declaration of war on the 18th July, and active preparations for the approaching contest were at once instituted upon both sides.

The French army was quite unprepared to undertake a serious war with so formidable an antagonist as was the then German Confederation. Stores, arms, clothing, supplies and transport were all lacking, and what existed of any of these was in a lamentable state of disorganisation and chaos. Efforts had been made in the early sixties to improve the condition of the Intendence. That important department of the army was accused of being incapable and corrupt. If one may form some conclusion from the large number of officers who had been employed in the higher ranks and who were selected exclusively from the commissioned ranks of the army, one is led to believe that the department may have been employed as a happy home for some, if not the majority, of those who had found favour in the sight of their superiors. The figures had been as follows: in the higher grades from lieutenant-colonel upwards there were 134; in the lower grades, who were selected mainly from the non-commissioned ranks, there were 174 officers, only 50 of them being majors. There were, therefore, no more than 124 captains and subalterns to balance no less than 184 field officers; the disproportion speaks for itself. An effort was made to improve upon this arrangement of numbers before the war commenced in 1870—the senior grades were slightly decreased in number and the junior were augmented to an enormous extent, the numbers being raised from 174 to 1,086. The authorities evidently went from one extreme to the other, the last state being evidently worse than the first. So much for the attempted

French reformation of their incompetent Intendance. The fortune of war, however, placed the direction and working of the commissariat in a great measure in the hands of other than the legitimate Intendants; no doubt some of those who managed to escape the German prisons did excellent service for their country, as will appear in the course of the following narrative of events.

A stupendous effort was subsequently made by Marshal Niel to reform the French army, when he was the War Minister, between 1866 and 1869. Much was done by him towards the increase of the numerical strength and efficiency of that army, and in the direction of its better organisation. He proposed to divide the land forces of the country into: (1) the Active Army; (2) the Reserves; (3) the Mobile National Guard. Under this system France could have put quite a million of men into the field soon after the outbreak of any serious war. Unfortunately for the country Marshal Niel was cut off by the hand of death before he had been able to complete his scheme of reform; he died in August, 1869, and was succeeded by Marshal Leboeuf, who made a show of carrying on the dead minister's scheme. Owing partly to motives of economy, and probably through his inability to comprehend the absolute necessity for such a reformation, Leboeuf did very little towards its completion during the first year of his administration. As the war broke out before the conclusion of that year, the Marshal had almost completely wasted the valuable time which had been at his disposition. It must, however, be admitted that the French Prime Minister had expressed the opinion on the 30th June that the peace of Europe was never more assured; but that does not exonerate Leboeuf from blame for failing to carry out with vigour the system so ably inaugurated by his predecessor. The frontier fortresses, excepting Metz, Strasburg, and Belfort, were allowed to fall into disrepair. Corruption seems to have prevailed to a considerable extent in the French army; moneys voted for specific purposes were devoted to other objects which would not always stand the light of investigation. Favouritism was rampant, officers of ability were put aside for official or court favourites, and as a consequence the highest positions were often occupied by men totally unfitted for the duties devolving upon them. There was then an undercurrent of inordinate vanity pervading all ranks of the French army, it was fondly imagined that their troops were invincible, and that France had the bravest and most efficient army in Europe. In order to quiet his own conscience, Napoleon asked

his War Minister if all were ready for a gigantic war ; the reply being that everything was ready down to the last button. No statement could have been more misleading, as will be demonstrated further on. Whether Leboeuf was so self-sufficient, or was eaten up with conceit, or failed to appreciate his enemy, or was totally ignorant of the true state of the army, it is difficult to determine ; it is, however, clear that he was both incompetent and dishonest, and had no hesitation in misrepresenting to his master the actual state of affairs in order to conceal his own neglect and incapacity. Napoleon was not without blame in the matter, he should have ascertained for himself how matters stood with the army ; he was possibly carried away by the apparent fact that he had gained a great superiority over the German forces by the possession of the Chassepot rifle and the Mitrailleuse ; the Prussians were then without any machine guns, and the French rifle was much superior to the German. Napoleon seems to have allowed their superiority in this respect to discount too heavily the advantages possessed by the enemy in great numerical superiority, and in their enormous preponderance of artillery.

Some persons may think that numbers and weapons have nothing to do with the supply and transport services. The writer does not agree in such an opinion ; the safety of supplies and transport in the advance, or along the lines of communication, depends entirely upon the efficiency of their protection against the attacks of the enemy. It follows, therefore, that the success of supply and transport operations in time of war depends in a great measure upon the defences which may be provided. So also do victories or defeats affect, advantageously or adversely, the carrying out of these important duties in the field. The most perfectly conceived supply and transport arrangements may be shattered, and may be rendered almost abortive by a serious defeat ; the writer has therefore no hesitation in entering into the question of the relative military strength of both French and Germans at the commencement of the war.

It has already been stated that the French nation expected great results from their possession of the Chassepot rifle and the Mitrailleuse machine gun ; the Germans were armed with the needle rifle which was an inferior weapon. The Chassepot had been in the hands of the French soldiery as early as 1866, and was a more modern weapon than the needle rifle which was used by the Prussian army during the early fifties. The former was effective at from 800 to 900 yards, whereas the effective range

of the latter was not over 500 yards. They were both breech-loaders, but the Chassepot could be discharged much more rapidly than the needle rifle, its trajectory was low, it hit hard, and the powder charge of the former was much larger than that of the latter. The Mitrailleuse was introduced into the French army in 1868; but its existence was kept secret, the mechanism of the gun being known only to a few generals and three or four superior officers. It consisted of 37 barrels bound together like a fagot, open at both ends, and fed from a breech block; it was worked by two men. Upon the outbreak of the war the French were able to put into the field 144 Mitrailleuses. They were not so efficient as the machine guns of to-day, and were quickly mastered by the German artillery fire. Excepting that the Germans suffered heavily in killed and wounded during the first portion of the war, much more so than did the French, there does not appear to have been any greater advantage gained by the possession of the superior rifle. At the same time it has to be remembered that the French were almost always acting on the defensive, and for that reason alone the German losses must have been greater.

General Ambert, in his *History of the War*, seeks to exculpate Napoleon for entering upon this war with so much precipitancy, he says:—"The war was accepted by France, but provoked by Prussia. In declaring war the Emperor obeyed the sentiments of the public, which were expressed by the press of the country. * * * Could God pardon Bismarck for all the evil he had wrought upon earth? We should not blame the Emperor, who had been moderate, as he always was." Then he refers to the reply of King William to an address made to him by the Chamber of Commerce at Hamburg, in which he says: "No one knows better than myself who has to say the decisive word, what sacrifices will soon be required from the whole Fatherland." The argument is certainly not convincing and seems to intensify the case against Napoleon. The Emperor probably closed his eyes to the inefficient condition of his army, and allowed himself to be influenced by the voice of the public and the assurances of his Minister. It was intended that the powerful French navy should take a prominent part by the invasion of the northern German seaboard, but it was never found possible to spare the 30,000 soldiers who were destined to land. The operations of the fleet did not, therefore, give any employment to the German troops who had been assembled to repel such an attack, the majority were accordingly withdrawn for service in other parts. Napoleon's original

idea was to invade Germany at some point below Strasburg, his object being to overawe the South German Confederation. There had been differences between Prussia and this Confederation, and the Emperor hoped that the interposition of a powerful army might prevent them from making common cause with the Northern Confederacy; furthermore, as has been stated, the people of South Germany were, for the most part, co-religionists of the French, which, it was thought, would influence the former more than it did. Had Napoleon succeeded in carrying out his scheme of invasion, possibly South Germany might have refrained from joining in the conflict, but it is not easy to forecast.

The great frontier fortresses of Metz and Strasburg had little more than their ordinary garrisons at the outbreak of the war, and it at once became necessary to concentrate large armies at those points if the scheme of invasion was to be carried out. To effect this object, the available railways of that part of the country had to be employed entirely upon that service. We will now quote extensively from the work of M. Jacquemin *sur les chemins de fer en 1870-71*. The lines of railway employed were (1) that from Paris to Strasburg with branch from Frouard to Metz; (2) Paris to Mulhausen, Colmar, and Strasburg; (3) Paris to Soissons, Reims, Charleville, and Thionville. It was estimated that (1) could run 24 trains daily, (2) 18 trains, and (3) 18 trains. The entraining commenced on the evening of the 16th July, when no less than 45 trains were despatched to the frontier. The trains were despatched as follows on the days named: 17th, 49; 18th, 54; 19th, 62; 20th, 50; 21st, 55; and 22nd, 74. Soldiers were allowed 18 inches of space laterally, so that a 1st class carriage could take four on each seat, and a 2nd class, five. 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th class carriages were employed, plank seats had to be fixed into the latter. It took three trains to carry an infantry regiment of about 3,000 officers and men, with their horses and wagons or carts. It is much to the credit of the civil and military railway management, that within the first ten days the following numbers were conveyed to the frontier—186,620 men, 32,410 horses, and 995 wagons laden with munitions. The men were supposed to carry with them rations for the whole journey, and the horses were provided with hay for the same and half a ration of oats to be issued upon their detraining. The arrangements had been most carefully made, and the railway officials had taken care to have an ample supply of rolling-stock accumulated at the Paris termini. Other lines of railway were of course employed in bringing troops to Paris from the south and

west, but some regiments would have been sent direct to Strasburg, Belfort, and Chalons, and it is evident from the numbers given that almost the whole of the forces passed through Paris or went forward from Chalons.

Notwithstanding the care exercised by the French authorities, great disorder was exhibited by the troops at the railway stations at Paris, Metz, and Strasburg. M. Jacquemin states that the first regiment to entrain at Paris arrived at the station at 2 p.m. on the 16th, although it was not due before 45 minutes past 5 p.m. The second regiment arrived at 3 p.m., and it was not to leave before nightfall. The regiments were followed to the station by crowds of people, whom it was found impossible to exclude, and who constantly shrieked "*à Berlin !*" The greatest disorder ensued and the men betook themselves to the neighbouring *Cabarets*, whence many of them returned intoxicated. He further states that parties of men arrived at the station in charge of non-commissioned officers, who could exercise no authority over them ; numbers were left behind *en route*, and were oftentimes lost to the army. Some 5,000 of these men, towards the end of August, endeavoured to pillage a number of laden railway trucks at Reims, after having searched for their regiments in vain, in despair they gave way to desperate conduct. He further adds, that great confusion prevailed at Metz, where stores were frequently discharged which should have gone elsewhere. Hay was also discharged at that station when quantities were being sent from the Metz dépôts by rail to other parts. Everybody commanded at Metz and Strasburg, and the railway people frequently found themselves confronted by contradictory orders, or by others which were impossible of accomplishment. It is surprising that so much was achieved under the existing state of things. The entraining of the men seems to have been managed very well—the men were drawn up on the platform in two lines with their kit bags in their hands ; they were then divided, without regard to companies, into sections corresponding with the capacity of the carriages to be occupied ; each section was commanded by an officer and non-commissioned officer ; the horses, baggage, and wagons were first loaded, and at the sound of a bugle the men entrained. A *Times* correspondent more than confirms M. Jacquemin's statement, he says that the civilians treated the soldiers to too much drink, and as a result about one-half of the troops entrained were drunk before their departure. It is evident that the anxiety which at first prevailed to get men to the front, at any price, resulted in the neglect of the authorities to send forward

sufficient reserves of stores and supplies. Such a body of men and horses as was concentrated on the frontier within the first fortnight, would not consume far short of one thousand tons of food daily, only a small proportion of which could be procured on the spot and for only a short period. M. Le Faure, in his *Histoire de la Guerre*, states that there were ninety dépôts of supplies established throughout France. He confesses that the condition of things otherwise have clearly proved that the food was absolutely insufficient, for before the 4th September the Government was forced to contract at ruinous rates for supplies. De Failly reported from Bitche on the 18th July,—“According to the reports we are in want of everything.” The Intendant at Metz on 20th July, reported that he had “no sugar, no coffee, no rice, no brandy, no salt, and very little pork or biscuits.” He again wrote on the 25th July: “Everywhere *matériel* is asked for, ambulances, medical comforts, cooking pots, canteens, &c., of which I am absolutely without any supply. Not one *corps d’armée* has the *personnel* strictly necessary for service.” General Douay wrote from Belfort, 31st July, “the 7th Corps has no reserve of supplies, it lives from day to day.” M. Le Faure gives the following admonition: “There should always be preparatory studies, and the first duties of a chief, who has to lead soldiers, is evidently to keep himself *au courant* of all that has been done prior to his appointment, in order that he may be able to rectify any faults which may have been previously committed.” According to Colonel Rustow, the Army Contracts must have been an afterthought, as tenders were not received for supplies before the 28th July.

It does not say much for the efficiency of the administration that such a state of affairs should have existed upon the outbreak of the war, and particularly after the assurance given to the Emperor by his War Minister. However, some French authors give the administration great credit for the zeal and patriotism which manifested itself amongst the War Office officials—they may have been trying to make up for the neglect of the past. There was evidently a great absence of method in some of the war departments, for we read of men of the reserves being sent to stations entirely remote from their regiments. In one instance some 9,000 recruits were sent by mistake to Marseilles, and the general commanding wired to know what was to be done with them. As he had no barrack accommodation for them he proposed to ship them to Algeria, as there were some available ships in port. It was fortunate that he was stopped

in time, otherwise a large number of hospital attendants who were among the number, would have been sent away from the army which had so much need of them within the following fortnight. Another instance will fully demonstrate the dreadful mess made of army affairs by the administration:—General Michel wrote to the War Minister from Belfort, on 21st July: “I have arrived at Belfort but cannot find either my brigade or my general of division. What am I to do? I have no idea where my regiments are.” Faults will always happen at the commencement of a war, and sometimes throughout the operations, but the blunders committed by the French administration were beyond anything heard of before or since, and we hear of no punishments meted out to any or even the worst offenders. Certainly Marshal Leboeuf resigned his office after the defeat at Worth, but that was only because he was threatened with an interpellation by the Chamber of Deputies.

Apart from the absence of proper current arrangements, the work of the past had to a large extent been grossly neglected. The fortresses of the country had been allowed to decay, they had not been kept up to date in regard either to armaments or construction. Some repairs, according to Rustow, were done to the works at Metz, Strasburg, Belfort, and Langres, but the remainder of the frontier fortresses were sadly neglected. Such places as Sedan, Mézières, Montmédy, Thionville, Nancy, Phalzburg, Bitche, Schlestadt, Colmar, and Mulhausen should have been put into a thorough state of repair, and should have been well garrisoned and supplied. Troops and mobile guards were thrown into these fortresses, but the duration of the several sieges was so short that only in one instance, at Phalzburg, did the supplies fail. At Soissons there were actually five months’ supplies for a division in hand when it capitulated. Belfort and Bitche were the only places which were able to hold out, and it was only after the fall of Paris that they capitulated after receiving instructions from the Provisional Government to surrender. As it was in contemplation to carry the war into the enemy’s country, it was of the first importance to concentrate large stocks of stores, supplies, and transport at most of those frontier fortresses, and to pour enormous reserves into such places as Laon, Reims, Chalons, Vitry, Chaumont, and Langres. This precaution appears to have been almost wholly neglected. Capt. Hozier, in his *Franco-Prussian War*, states:—“An element of very considerable weakness in the French system was to be found in what is called the administration of the army, better known in England as the

commissariat. In time of peace it is difficult to learn the art of supplying an army in the field. In time of peace the delivery by contracts is perfectly simple, regular, and easy. In war, everything—time, place, and demand—is urgent, difficult, and irregular. The only method of dealing with so many unforeseen contingencies is not by military routine, but by a ready and complete knowledge of business.” Then he goes on to point out that the Intendance monopolised the whole business of the army, which was centralised instead of being decentralised as was the case with the Prussians. The French were organising while the Prussians were marching. He also points out that the Prussian system for providing transports for each corps may be extravagant, but it enables each corps to take the offensive at the outbreak of the war, whereas the French had to organise and detail the transport for each corps before it could take the field. It will be seen, therefore, that there was an utter absence of sufficient preparation on the part of the French authorities to enable their army to assume the offensive, much less to invade a country bristling with a well-armed and well-equipped soldiery.

At the outbreak of the war France was supposed to have an army of some 400,000 regulars. A large number of these were detached, 30,000 were concentrated at Cherbourg ready to embark in the fleet destined to invade the northern shores of Prussia; there was an army in Algeria, as well as the garrisons of Paris, Marseilles, Toulon, and other places; consequently, not more than 250,000 men could be concentrated on the frontier before the commencement of hostilities. These men were distributed as follows: 1st corps at Strasburg; 2nd as St. Avold; 3rd at Metz; 4th at Thionville; 5th at Bitche; 6th at Chalons; 7th at Belfort; and the Guard's Corps at Nancy. It will be seen, therefore, that only two corps were where the major portion of the army was required for purposes of invasion; this was owing mainly to the necessity which existed for sending the corps forward hurriedly, and to the fact that the railway system favoured the concentration of greater numbers towards the Saar, rather than upon the upper Rhine. As the order for the calling out of the reserves was issued on 17th July, it followed that the corps in advance and in the fortresses should have been speedily increased, but some time had elapsed and many battles had been fought before the French could count upon over 300,000 men in the field. France was quite unprepared, both in men and *matériel*, to undertake such a gigantic war, and it was a disgraceful

exhibition of misgovernment that a brave and patriotic people should have been plunged into a war with such precipitancy.

As we have seen the French had entered into the war without any adequate preparation in regard to their supply and transport services, and, if we are to credit the statements of some Frenchmen, the efficiency of most of the other administrative branches were equally faulty. General Ambert, in his *Après Sedan*, informs us that the younger officers of the general staff had received a very imperfect training, they had been used to copying orders, letters and circulars, which caused them to lose all pride in their profession. The probabilities are that the desire to place friends had induced the generals to multiply offices by relegating to officers, duties which should have been performed by clerks. He does not mention the generals in a very favourable light; he says that the generals were rarely seen with their aides-de-camp, the necessary instructions and orders being given by the latter so that *le repos* of their seniors should not be disturbed. He goes on to say: "We must draw a thick veil over certain weaknesses of which some of the ministers of the Empire were guilty. Promotions to the higher grades of the army were given without regard to service, without considering the work done by the officer, or the estimation in which he was held by his subordinates, nor were his character or motives taken into account. Such conduct naturally dissipated the military ardour of those holding the commands in the army of 1870." Other generals give similar testimony. General Ducrot states:—"I commanded the Strasburg division for five years. When I arrived, I reported what were the reserves of all kinds. There was a *depôt* of artillery and a considerable arsenal, and a magazine of camp equipments. In the arsenal I found 2,000 cannons, of which only four or five hundred were serviceable, the remainder consisted of obsolete bronze ordnance. There were even some stone shot of the time of Louis XIV, and an enormous quantity of flint-lock guns. I represented to the Minister of War that this was a very dangerous condition for a fortress situated so near the frontier." An idea may be formed of what the efficiency of the other frontier fortresses must have been when Strasburg was allowed to fall into so deplorable a condition. Such mismanagement is calculated to encourage ignorance, apathy, negligence, and immorality in the vicious, and to stifle all ambition to do their duty in those who had at heart the interests of their country.

It is not surprising, therefore, to read the highly condemnatory reports of some of the French generals, who were employed

during the war. Maxim Lecomte, in his *Souvenirs*, gives some account of the fugitives he encountered at Hirson after the capitulation of Sedan: "The moral disorder which reigned was even greater than the material derangement. All seemed to despair of any safety for France, all became accusers; the generals blamed the soldiery; the soldiers the generals; the officers accused those in command of negligence and incapacity, many of them went so far as to think some of the generals had been guilty of treason. Many of the generals put up at the same hotel; I observed them closely, and it seemed to me that the words attributed to a Prussian prince were correct:—'The French are lions commanded by asses.' One of them spent more than half the day in attentions to his person; like a *petit maitre*, he had his hands manicured, and his moustache waxed. He had time to occupy himself with such trivial details while France was perishing! I was assured that one of the sentries I saw at Hirson actually effected his escape by seizing the horse of a wounded trooper. This large influx of troops caused the viands to disappear, and for the moment we were threatened with a veritable famine, and many of those residing at Hirson had to go to bed supperless." It is stated that when General de Wimpffen met the Emperor after the battle of Sedan, he accused his generals of not carrying out his orders and thereby causing the catastrophe. General Ducrot, who was present, at once jumped to his feet and demanded to know whether the remark referred to himself, and then proceeded to hurl counter-accusations at de Wimpffen's head. Another general is stated to have taken his *chef* into Metz with him; a second is credited with the audacity of having had some four tons of personal baggage carried into the field. The baggage regulations, according to General Ambert, do not appear to have been clearly worded. Officers were expected not to take into the field more baggage than was *absolutely necessary*, and it was enjoined upon them that they were not to wound the feelings of the soldiery by living in a luxurious style. The caution does not appear to have been unnecessary, particularly among the seniors. At the same time the writer fully admits that the officers commanding must always be well cared for to enable them to accomplish their duties satisfactorily, but there are limits to everything of the kind. If these regulations are a sample of the remainder of the instructions to the army, it is not surprising that throughout the campaign there was great laxity of discipline amongst the French soldiery.

With the administration in so a chaotic a state, it cannot be

wondered at that the Intendance was in a deplorable condition. General Ambert gives some information on this point by quoting several valuable expressions of opinion from competent authorities. Count de Palikao states that "long before the war, the Intendance had notified that there was nothing in the magazines. Under the pretext of economy no notice was taken of the demands of the Intendants." In this we have another instance of the damage done by a bastard economy, from which our own country has suffered so recently. Intendant-General Blandeau stated in evidence before a commission :—"When I visited the parc at Vernon in 1869, I saw that some 7,000 or 8,000 vehicles would have to pass through one exit, such a thing would be impossible on mobilisation, as it would require several months to clear the store, and I do not exaggerate when I say it would take six months." This warning appears to have been accepted, as it is stated that some of the reserve vehicles were removed to other stations before the outbreak of the war. Before the same court, Intendant-General Vigo-Roussillon deposed as follows :—"In the month of March, 1869, I saw, like many others, that war with Germany was coming; it seemed probable, as with Italy, we were destined to enter into the operations of war with insufficient means. Without pretending to be a Cassandra, one could see the necessity for warning those who had the destinies of the country in their hands, of the impending danger through the absence of sufficient preparations. My foresight was inopportune. I was accused of giving encouragement to the enemy, and letting him know the weaknesses of our organisation." In 1867, Commandant Foy wrote :—"Do not forget the lessons of the last war. Within twelve hours of the declaration of war, the Prussians invaded the enemy's territory, for the simple reason that they had prepared their *corps d'armée* well in advance of their being required." These were not the only warnings received by the French Government well in advance of the declaration of war. They were suppressed by a negligent and corrupt War Office, and the Emperor was assured by his Minister for War, according to Rustow, that "not a single trouser-button is wanting." After the Crimean War the French administration was regarded in this country as a pattern for our own; luckily wiser councils have prevailed, and Germany has been considered more worthy of imitation. It is now a matter for sincere congratulation that this country did not accept the French as our supposed superiors in army administration; their utter collapse during the campaign of 1870-71 has more than proved the fallacy of such an idea.

My readers will readily understand that the stupendous duties involved in the accumulation, the storage, the preservation, and the distribution of the enormous masses of provisions, stores, and forage needed for an army of 400,000 men required a well organised force of subordinates to undertake such detail duties. When it is considered that so large an army would require daily at the least one thousand five hundred tons weight of provisions, stores, and forage, the magnitude of the operation will be more easily appreciated. In this particular the French army was lamentably deficient; there had certainly been some schools established for training the non-commissioned officers and men of the administration, and the clerks, butchers, bakers and artificers were all qualified men, but the peace establishment was too restricted for war purposes, and men of that type could not be improvised in a week or a month; indeed, there were no experts available for training them if there had been time to effect their training. All the trained men were required for work in the field, and their numbers had to be augmented by soldiers taken from the ranks, or by men drawn from civil life. Colonel Pierron quotes from the evidence given by General Davoust before a commission:—"At the commencement of the war of 1870, the French Intendance desired to pursue its former mistakes; it wished to do everything for itself, create magazines, requisition and distribute; the Divisional Intendants had at their disposal only two or three executive officers *à pied*, and a few non-commissioned officers and men of the administration. The convoys kept up with our columns with much difficulty. On their arrival at the bivouacs, often very late, their task commenced; they had not the spare time to requisition the villages in the neighbourhood, and were therefore unable to utilise the resources of the surrounding country. Placed as they were between the demands of the fatigue parties sent to draw their rations, and the convoys which were constantly late, they became distributors, not providers, of what it was possible to secure." He deplored the hardships entailed upon the soldiery, who were often unable to procure any rations whatever, and had to return again and again to the issuing station before they could procure any food or forage. As a natural consequence the soldiers were angered and became insubordinate, and the country was pillaged by them for miles around. Nothing is more likely to destroy the fighting capacity of an army or to affect the morale of the soldiery so much as the want of sufficient food. When, however, the necessity is understood, no good soldiers will refuse to face such a hardship with

cheerfulness. We call to mind the march of the British army under Lord Roberts to Paardeberg, when the soldiers, owing to the loss of the supply column, had to march on half rations. It is stated that when Lord Roberts was told that only half rations could be provided, he said :—" They will do it for me ! "—and they did. But such exceptions only prove the rule—the commissariat must be efficient and sufficient in personnel with every army in the field, if a successful issue to a campaign is desired.

CHAPTER III.

PRELIMINARY OPERATIONS OF BOTH ARMIES.

So soon as the German Army Corps had crossed the frontier, and the second line of trains had been carried to the front, the Landwehr battalions, which were considered little inferior to the German regulars, commenced their movement towards the Rhine. This force constituted a reserve army of some 400,000 men, who were available for garrison duty, guarding prisoners, besieging and occupying fortresses, and in the maintenance of the lines of communication, also in the augmentation of the fighting line, or in filling up gaps caused by the heavy losses which resulted from severe fighting. When the French abandoned their project of landing an army on the Prussian coast, a large number of regulars and Landwehr were at liberty to move towards the frontier. Jules Claretie, in his *France Envahie*, gives a graphic description of the officers of the Landwehr, some of whom he met in Luxemburg in 1866, during the war with Austria. He says, "Their conversation was not of the coming war, they spoke of private affairs, of the commercial houses they had left, of the farms without hands to till them, of American orders received which could not be executed, and of the rates of discount. The majority were business people whom M. Bismarck had torn from their offices and had thrust into the field with swords in their hands. They did not complain; they hoped for glory." Such were the citizen officers of Prussia, and they reflected the feelings of the men of the Landwehr. The organisation of the French guard mobile was in striking contrast to that of Germany; they should have numbered more than half a million of men, but their numbers did not approach a moiety of that total, and it was not until M. Gambetta undertook to raise an army that this force became at all conspicuous. M. Quesnay, in his *Armée du Rhin*, tells us that he saw several battalions of guard mobile detraining at Mourmelon without arms, greatcoats, utensils, or camp equipments. Many were without food, their two days' rations having been imprudently consumed on the journey, and it was not before evening that they could be provided with more. This fact demonstrates clearly that from the very outset the men were

under no sort of control, and the officers were of little use if they could not manage to keep the men from eating their reserve rations *en route*.

At the outset the Germans had no more than three separate armies, but when the investment of Metz was assured, a fourth army, composed mainly of Saxon troops, was constituted, and placed under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony. This represented a force of more than 500,000 men in the field, half that number being employed in the investment of Metz. It was naturally an easier matter to feed the troops investing Metz than it was to feed those moving forward to invest Paris. Those investing Metz on the eastern side were not more than 20 miles from the nearest base depôt at Saarlouis, and as these troops would have been in touch with the troops on the northern, southern, and western sides of Metz, it was only a question of further transport after the supply columns had reached that army. The Rhine was used with advantage in supplying Cologne and Coblenz, whence most of the supplies for Saarlouis were drawn; the railway lines to or approaching that depôt were of great service in carrying supplies from Cologne, Coblenz, Bingen, and Mainz to that point. The Moselle also afforded water communication for a considerable portion of the way from Coblenz to Saarlouis. It is not improbable that supply columns would have worked from Saarbruck and Saarguemund, as well as from other smaller advanced depôts. Mr. J. Stephens Jeans tells us in his *Waterways and Water Transport*, that the Rhine is navigable for 435 miles, and has a traffic of 5,500 vessels. He also states that the Moselle is rendered navigable as far as Thionville by means of canalisation. It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that supplies were sent by water as far as Trier, that kind of transportation being much less costly than that by road or rail, and less likely to interfere with the movements of troops. Many other rivers and canals would have been used in Germany throughout the war for the transportation of stores, supplies, and munitions of war. The hospital arrangements of the Germans were excellent; field hospitals accompanied each Army Corps; the wounded were sent by rail to Landau, Mainz, and Coblenz, where large base hospitals were established. The number of these had to be multiplied exceedingly, owing to the enormous amount of casualties which were speedily to occur in the hard fighting with which the campaign was opened. The situation was aggravated by the large numbers of French wounded who were usually left on the field of battle, for whom the Germans were forced to

care. The German ambulance seems never to have sufficed to meet the emergency, and the four-wheeled wagons of the country had to be employed as well, which unhappily added greatly to the sufferings of the wounded. A *Daily News* correspondent gives the following account of the wounded passing through Weissenburg after the battle of Worth :—"Then came the convoys of wounded moving to the rear. Sufferings had made them brothers in misfortune. The Germans and Frenchmen mingled with such opposite ideas about the Rhine in their heads all the while, sat or lay quietly side by side, as if they were old comrades. The only enemy, and the common enemy, too, was the jolting wagon." However perfect the arrangements made in advance may be, they cannot provide for every contingency which may arise in the field ; in this instance the German killed and wounded during the first fortnight of the fighting amounted to over 50,000 men. Who could have foreseen so enormous a slaughter within so limited a period ? Those who criticise military operations should pause before they too hastily condemn others for the want of prevision in making arrangements. Then again there is another side to the picture :—How often, in most countries, has a too timorous, or perhaps popularity seeking government vetoed a part of the expenditure, which was considered an absolute essential by its military experts, in making the preliminary arrangements for undertaking a serious war ? The blame for such want of prevision usually falls on the shoulders of the military authorities, and is often allowed to rest there, to the lasting disgrace of those who should have had the manliness to acknowledge their shortcomings.

We will endeavour to follow the progress of the war without entering into much detail in regard to the various sanguinary battles which were fought immediately after the assembly of the French and Germans on either side of the frontier. The French being the aggressors were more prompt in the assembly of their forces on the frontier, and had adequate preparatory arrangements been made, their original plan of invading Germany might have become an accomplished fact. The army of invasion had unhappily not been collected, as it should have been, at Strasburg. Marshal McMahon was at that place with the 1st Corps, the 7th was certainly at Belfort, some 70 miles further south, but four Corps were assembled in and around Metz, and two other Corps being held in reserve at Nancy and Chalons. The Emperor endeavoured to correct this error in the concentration by directing Marshal Bazaine to invade Germany further to

the northward, but his generals pointed out that such a step could not be taken in face of the fact that the army was without the necessary food and equipments for such an undertaking. M. Le Faure, in his *Histoire de la Guerre*, states that altogether there were ninety dépôts of supplies established in France. "The condition of things has clearly proved that the supplies were absolutely insufficient, for before the 4th September the Government was forced to contract for and accept inferior supplies at ruinous rates." Rustow tells us that, "when the French army stood on the frontier, then, and only then, the French generals commenced to calculate and to consider. It is an unexampled fact, and yet wholly true, that the tenders for the supplies of the army were only given in on the 28th of July, and that even then there was no meat tender which was deemed fair." We must take leave to differ with Rustow. The fault did not lay with the generals, excepting Leboeuf, who was the War Minister, but with the administration, which in France is largely composed of army officers, but the generals in command of the troops had little if any responsibility for the existing condition of affairs. Such is the inexperience of some historians, newspaper correspondents, and even of some of those who are soldiers, of the actual working of the administration, that they are apt to put the saddle on the wrong horse. M. Le Faure explains what should have been done in the following words: "There should always be preparatory studies, and the first duty of a chief who has to deal with soldiers is evidently to place himself *au courant* of all that has been done prior to his appointment, in order that he may be able to rectify any defects which may have been committed." This remark applies to all officers placed in positions of trust, or of command—the words are few but they deserve repetition.

The administration may not have been so much to blame as may at first sight appear, there were circumstances, over which they could not exercise absolute control, which stood in the way of a proper initiative. The railway system of France had been constructed without the expenditure of much thought upon the military necessities which might arise when it was needed for the transportation of troops and *matériel* towards their frontier. The lines radiated from Paris towards all points of the compass, and it became necessary for a very large proportion of the troops and *matériel* to pass through Paris *en route* for the frontier. This detour was often productive of serious delay, of confusion at the Paris termini, and was a source of annoyance to both officers and

men. The latter could not understand the reason for such vexatious delays, and they naturally became discontented and often insubordinate—a frame of mind in which no soldiery can take the field with advantage to their country. The fact that the railway system favoured the concentration of larger forces around Metz than it did in the direction of Strasburg in no degree excused the War Ministry for their faulty concentrations—South Germany was to have been invaded and the bulk of the forces should have been despatched towards that frontier. Nothing can effectually remove the stigma attaching to such gross and deplorable blundering on the part of the French authorities.

The French Intendance was obviously seriously handicapped at the start by want of foresight, and by the absence of any adequate preparations on the part of their seniors at the Quai d'Orsay. Jules Claretie, in his *France Envahie*, gives some valuable information as to the way in which the Intendance, as well as the soldiery, managed to minimise the very great difficulties of their environment:—"On both sides of the frontier the same movements, the same spirits, and the disposal of *matériel*, the disposition of men and stores which are among the most important preliminary arrangements for a campaign. These duties were performed by the Intendant and Sous-Intendants, who are charged with feeding, lodging, and transporting the hundreds of thousands of soldiers who were assembled. Their activity astonished me. When a great victory is gained, these officers are not credited with any share in the success. They appear to do nothing beyond their very onerous duties, which are usually barely recognised. But to conquer the enemy is not more difficult perhaps than to feed the soldiers." He gives the French soldier a high character for helpfulness:—"He is his own officer, his own cook, his own intendant, and his own doctor. He is full of resource in all that relates to camp life, he unites the ingenuity of the monkey with the valour of a hero. He has everything, songs and sewing thread. The soldier understands the art of economising rations when the transport needs help. Before starting on a march he anoints his feet with lard, thus saving his feet, which might otherwise become incapacitated through blistering." He also states that the Prussian general commanding at Mainz got himself into hot water for telling the men that they were not going to encounter badly commanded Austrians, but redoubtable adversaries. According to Mr. Jeans, the administration took advantage of the good waterways afforded. Paris is connected with Havre by the River Seine,

and with Nancy by rivers and canals, it had also direct water communications with Southern as well as Northern France. The total length of canals in France in 1886 was almost three thousand miles. It does not, however, appear that the administration took sufficient advantage of the water routes available, for the writer has not come across much mention of the employment of that means of communication in any of the many works which he has consulted in compiling this narrative.

Canals and rivers constitute an admirable means by which supplies and stores may be readily carried to points of concentration, or to their immediate neighbourhood. The progress by canals is of necessity slow, when unduly expedited the banks sustain injury, and may soon become so damaged as to be rendered almost useless. Canal boats can be hauled or propelled at the rate of three miles an hour with safety, but when that rate is greatly exceeded a wave is raised at the bow of the boat and the banks are washed and worn away. Consequently water communications, although generally slow, may afford very great help to an army in the field, at least they can relieve the roads of a large amount of traffic and free them for the advance of the troops. There is also another advantage possessed by water over land transport—much heavier loads can be hauled by horse traction by water than by land. By this means horse-power could be economised, which is always of the utmost importance in the field, where the transportation of forage constitutes a serious impediment to mobility.

Louis Napoleon had determined upon the invasion of Germany, and nothing short of that could satisfy him. In fact that idea had become so engrafted upon the minds of the authorities that maps of Germany only had been despatched for the use of the officers of the French army. When it became evident that South Germany could not be invaded owing to the massing of the Army Corps too far to the northward, the Emperor gave Marshal Bazaine the command of the several army corps assembled around Metz, and directed him to advance towards the Rhine. Upon being assured by that general that the supplies and equipments were insufficient, and that such an advance must result in inevitable disaster, owing to the want of any sufficient preparatory arrangements, the Emperor had to content himself with a simple demonstration towards Saarbrücken. An advance had already been made by the 4th Army Corps under L'Admirault from Thionville, on the 27th July. Ludovic Halévy, in his *L'Invasion*, gives some account of this operation. After complaining of the

inactivity of that Corps which had been assembled by the 21st July, he gives the following description of their departure at daybreak on the 27th:—"The heat was intense, the dust awful, and the air hot and heavy. The tents were struck in slovenly fashion, the horses were laden without method; the badly horsed wagons were laden clumsily, the baggage being thrown in pell mell. Saddled horses broke away from their picket-posts. Troopers mounted their horses leaving most of their equipment on the ground. The officers stormed to no purpose. The ranks were formed. The trumpets sounded. The army marched, glad to abandon the wretched encampment." This corps eventually encamped at Sierck, and subsequently joined Bazaine at Metz. We may accept this account of the disorganised condition of a *corps d'armée* as not being overdrawn, coming as it does from a Frenchman who was on the spot, and had no grounds for misrepresentation. It is really lamentable to think that, to satisfy the ambition of a single individual and to satisfy the unreasonable longing of the French nation, their army should have been forced to engage so formidable an enemy, particularly when it was encumbered by a faulty and defective organisation.

It may not be irrelevant to regard the cautious procedure of our English generals upon the occasion mentioned below:—When it was in contemplation to relieve Kimberley during October, 1899, the first steps adopted towards that necessary operation were the accumulation of large stocks of provisions, forage, ammunition, war stores, hospital stores and appliances, besides an enormous transport train at De Aar railway junction, which was the proper strategic base for the advance of an army over the Orange River into the Free State. The French Government had overlooked or neglected so obvious a preliminary arrangement as a prelude to their contemplated invasion of South Germany, and as a natural consequence the operation had to be deferred indefinitely. We will take another instance as illustrative of the utter folly of the French authorities to contemplate an invasion of Germany without much preparation. General Sir Robert Napier caused large stocks of supplies to be concentrated at Senafé before he would march his army of about 6,500 towards Magdala. Finding that sufficient supplies could not be concentrated on the plateau before the rainy season would commence, he determined to advance with an army of 3,700 men, and it was with great difficulty and some risk of starvation that the smaller force could be marched to their destination, and were got back to the coast after a short but successful campaign, only just before the rainy season commenced.

Mon. Jules Claretie states as an instance of the good-fellowship which so often prevails amongst combatants, that he saw the men of both armies at Sarguemines bathing in the narrow river within a few paces of each other; others could be seen sitting upon either bank contentedly fishing as a pastime, pending the commencement of hostilities. He unburdens his soul in the following words:—"Let us pause for a moment to form some idea of where we are going; for, dragged into this war against which we protested from the first day, we were carried away by that patriotism whose influences are imperceptible whenever the Fatherland is in danger, but we had not the wisdom to demand whither we were being hurried. Where are we going? Perhaps to destruction! All war is full of uncertainty! War is calculated to develop the evil side of man's nature! Wherefore are things as they are?" He then goes on to describe the light-hearted manner in which the advance into Germany was carried out by the Emperor and his generals. He describes it as partaking of the character of a grand review; numbers of marshals and generals surrounded by their brilliant staffs advancing with evident signs of confidence and gaiety, some of them being accompanied for some distance by carriages filled with ladies. So soon as the French divisions had crossed the frontier, the Emperor turning to one of his staff said,—“We are now in Prussia. The first step is taken. I am satisfied.” The confidence of the officers was contagious; both officers and men believed firmly in the efficiency of the mitrailleuses, which they affirmed would do all the fighting for them. A voltigeur was heard to exclaim, “With these, we have only to fold our arms and collect the dead.” The French were aware that the Germans had only a very small force at Saarbrücken, which may account in some degree for their gaiety of demeanour in the advance to crush so insignificant a force. A rude awakening was in store for them—there was no display of gaiety after they had encountered a foe at that time superior to themselves.

So great was the want of initiative that officers in charge of supplies refused to part with them without direct orders from Paris. When the order arrived the troops were probably miles away and could not avail themselves of the permission given. Intendants were suddenly appointed to districts, which they found without any reserves, nor did they receive any orders whence reserves were to be procured. He concludes by stating that the only reserves he was aware of consisted of a week's biscuits for the troops in the field. There were certainly large

reserves accumulated later on, but the want of a sufficient supply of money and the lack of method in their concentration rendered them of very little use to those troops who were so much in need of them. On the other hand, we read of small ill-fortified towns on the frontier and in the interior being supplied with sufficient to feed a division for months; some of these capitulated at once upon the advance of the German armies, and the supplies so stored fell into the hands of the enemy. One has only to study the precise situation, as depicted by some French writers, to understand how abject was the condition of the army organisation. The system, if there was any, was faulty, the officers lacked that initiative which alone could repair the blunders of an ignorant and stupid executive, consequently the unfortunate men had to suffer in the first place and the country in the second.

On the morning of the 2nd August, Frossard's *corps d'armée* advanced upon Saarbrücken. So soon as the German colonel saw that the French intended to attack his small force seriously, a retrograde movement in good order was commenced and he withdrew towards Saarlouis, from which direction reinforcements could be looked for in the event of the French continuing their advance. As has been already stated, the Emperor's military advisers considered that Germany could not be invaded in the existing condition of the French initial preparations, and it was no doubt for this reason that no further advance was made; the army had advanced about ten miles beyond the frontier, which had to satisfy the ambition of Louis Napoleon for the time being. Henri Manjeot gives a description of the causes which led to the serious disasters which overtook the French army during the progress of the war. He was of opinion that one of the principal causes was the fact that the land transport for the supplies, munitions, and ambulance was neither sufficient nor suitably organised to be able to meet the requirements of the troops. It will be seen, therefore, that owing mainly to the absence of a proper organisation of their transport the French were unable to follow up the trifling advantage gained at Saarbrücken. Napoleon, however, did not hesitate to send a message to the Empress, worded in grandiloquent language, in which he mentioned the "Baptism of Fire" undergone by the Prince Imperial. He adds that they were both under fire, the bullets and cannon balls falling at their feet. When the Prince picked up a bullet as a souvenir, some of the soldiers are said to have wept on beholding such marvellous fortitude. The description is dramatic, and is worthy of its author.

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Another short illustration of French character at this epoch may afford food for reflection to those wishing to study the characteristics of that people. Jules Claretie, in his *France Envahie*, informs us that on the arrival of the very few German prisoners at Metz, there was much excitement amongst the populace and soldiery. The prisoners were threatened with violence, and the cry of "*A mort les Prussiens!*" was heard on all sides. The prisoners regarded the demonstration with some signs of contempt, one of whom could not help smiling, whereupon a brutal carter hit the prisoner across the face with his whip to the great indignation of the crowd. A short voltigeur of the guard at once jumped into the cart and seized the burly ruffian by the throat, and forced him, much against his will, to bow repeatedly to the prisoners as they passed. This act was applauded loudly by the crowd. The citizens as well as the soldiers of this unhappy city were soon to experience the horrors of a lengthened environment, accompanied by the sufferings entailed through the want of a sufficient supply of food to support life.

One is almost forced into a belief that the foregoing account of the French preliminary arrangements must be fiction rather than fact, but, alas, there can be no question as to what actually did occur. Incredible as the facts appear to be they are nevertheless the honest, outspoken truth, and will constitute a warning to all vain-glorious commanders who regard their own selfish ends as more desirable than the good of their country and their peoples. Never was a proud and mighty nation so humbled through the folly and incapacity of its rulers than was the French nation at the outbreak of this war. A bad beginning made a worse ending in this instance—the French never seemed to be able to recover the ground they had lost in the false start, struggle as they did manfully they could not recover from such flagrant betrayal. May the lesson learned in France be taken to heart by others, and may they avoid the grave error of unpreparedness for whatever may overtake their own Fatherlands. The French nation had been duped by a man who, throughout his whole career, proved himself to be animated by no higher aims than the gratification of his own inordinate ambition and his remarkable vanity. He surrounded himself with many who were of a similar type, consequently display occupied the place of efficiency, and the people were deceived into the belief that magnificent Court functions and stately parades meant power and preparation. When the Emperor elected to embark upon this highly hazardous enterprise, he had visions of becoming a second Buonaparte

without having any knowledge of the art of war beyond what was of a most superficial character. His Minister of War, although a Marshal, was almost equally ignorant, and the majority of those entrusted with the management of the army at the Quai d'Orsay proved themselves to be almost equally inefficient. There had been no whole-hearted efforts made by most of those in authority to fit themselves for the due performance of the duties they had undertaken. Apathy, indifference, and lassitude characterised the majority, and what wonder when such an example was given by the very highest in the land. France, through the innate patriotism of her people, has emerged triumphantly from this serious ordeal, and is to-day one of the greatest, if not the greatest military power in Europe.

How marked was the contrast between the German military movements as compared with those of the French. There was no feverish haste in the bringing forward of the German Army Corps, everything was done with deliberation, and demonstrated how thoroughly every movement had been carefully thought out in advance. In these operations we have a striking exhibition of the power of brain over matter. No doubt mistakes were made, but these arose mainly from the fact that as the German General Staff were aware that France was entirely unprepared to undertake a war of such magnitude, it was not anticipated that so sudden a declaration of war would have been made. Then the rapid succession of victories rendered it very difficult to keep pace with the advance of the troops and the pursuit of the beaten foe. Success is almost as demoralising to troops as defeat, at least, that is the aspect which it sometimes assumes to the administration. Any sudden changes, whether arising from victory or defeat, dislocate to some extent the prearrangement of the supply and transport. The German soldiery suffered to no inconsiderable extent in the early stages of the war from these causes, but as the war progressed their sufferings were dissipated mainly by a hard-working and provident Intendantur.

CHAPTER IV.

THE BATTLES OF WEISSENBURG AND WORTH AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES.

During the last two weeks of July and the first week of August the armies of both North and South Germany were being mobilised, that is to say, the principal portion of that arduous undertaking was accomplished within those three weeks. The 3rd Army, which was commanded by the Crown Prince of Prussia, was composed of two Army Corps from Bavaria, the divisions from Wurtemberg and Baden, and of the 5th and 11th Prussian Army Corps, there were also contingents from Saxe Coburg Gotha and other small duchies. This army was soon afterwards augmented by the addition of the 6th Prussian Army Corps, which gave an effective of some 250,000 men, which was no inconsiderable number to supply in the field. As there were also large forces of cavalry and artillery, besides the transport and ambulance animals, the forage required daily would have entailed enormous labour in its collection and distribution. The number of horses employed with so vast an army could not have been less than 50,000, and perhaps considerably more, when the local transport is taken into account. Taking the daily average consumption of food and forage for man and beast at 3 lbs. and 18 lbs. respectively, the weight consumed would be nearly 1,000 tons for this army alone. If oxen were driven and slaughtered in the field for the men there would have been a reduction in weight of over 100 tons daily. This stupendous undertaking had to be grappled with by the German Intendantur at a time when the first line transport had alone to be depended upon, as the second line had not then arrived. However, the army continued to remain within easy distance of its advanced base depôts up to the 3rd of August, when the Crown Prince was ordered to advance across the French frontier. When the 5th and 11th Corps had joined the army, the Prince felt more confidence than if he had had to depend solely upon such untried troops as the Bavarians and Wurtembergers. The Palatinate upon which this army had at first to depend for the greater part of its provisions and forage was inhabited by about 200,000 inhabitants,

the influx of such large numbers of men and horses would, therefore, have taxed its resources to the utmost. Capt. Seton, in his *Operations of the North German Troops*, says that :—"During these days arrangements had to be made by provisioning the Army Corps" (the 8th) "itself under whatever circumstances might take place, whether of advancing to the frontier or of receiving the French on the Rhine, as also other corps arriving to operate in that part. On the 18th an order was received from the War Minister directing provisions to be secured for two Army Corps in Coblenz and Cologne, and twenty baking ovens to be built at Saarlouis and Coblenz respectively ; also, that baking bread should commence forthwith at the latter place and at Cologne. On the following day the same authority directed twenty field bakeries to be established at Bingen, and half the disposable flour in Coblenz and Cologne to be used ; also that an auxiliary magazine should be found for victuals, oats, and hay at Trèves, the wants being at once satisfied by the Intendance."

It very soon became apparent to the French authorities that their line, stretching for about 100 miles, was very much too extended, and that it should be contracted, as the German advance showed a front of not more than 40 miles. Marshal McMahon's Corps had been concentrated at Strasburg with the intention of invading South Germany, but that plan was entirely frustrated by the absence of any concerted action or of adequate preparation. Under these conditions it was useless to keep the largest Army Corps inactive when the country was threatened with invasion on a gigantic scale. To meet the danger the 1st Corps was moved towards Hagenau, where it would be more in touch with the 5th Corps at Bitche. General Ambert tells us in his *L'Invasion*, that McMahon's intention was to have taken his Army Corps into the Vosges, so as to secure the railway communications between Strasburg and Bitche, and where he hoped to present a formidable front to the enemy. He had at first no intention of occupying Weissenburg—strategy had, however, to give way to necessity. According to Dick de Lonlay and General Boulanger, Weissenburg held large magazines of supplies and a bakery, and the chief Intendant of McMahon's Corps pointed out that if they were allowed to fall into the hands of the enemy he could not possibly feed the *corps d'armée*. Upon this representation the Quartermaster-General of the army ordered McMahon to reoccupy Weissenburg. It was obvious that the Germans would have been aided very materially by the possession of a fortified town containing large magazines of supplies, and

with a bakery establishment which would have constituted a ready-made advanced dépôt for the 3rd Army. This was probably the weightier reason for sending a division to reoccupy Weissenburg. The loss of the supplies could have been repaired without any very great exertion, as the whole of northern, southern, and western France was open to the supply service, and numerous lines of railway converged upon Strasburg, which was only about fifteen miles south of Hagenau. There is always the danger that any one branch of the service may consider itself all-important. In this instance the Intendant evidently did not see any reason why the supplies which had been collected at Weissenburg should be abandoned. It was hard upon him, and upon his officers and men, but the loss was clearly not irreparable. The loss of the convoy at Waterval Drift on the 15th February, 1900, was a case in point. Lord Roberts considered it better to sacrifice the convoy rather than permit his army to be detained when it was in hot pursuit of Cronjé and his army. The result justified his decision, although his men were compelled to make forced marches on half rations. There are, however, cases when such a loss could not be sustained without imperilling the safety of an army. A division under General Douay was therefore detached to occupy that town, which is about fifteen miles in advance. The position was one of great danger, as the third German Army was on the point of crossing the French frontier at this very place.

The Crown Prince directed his army to advance upon the Lauter on the 3rd August, his right being extended beyond Bergzabern, and his left resting on Lauterburg. On the following morning Bothmer's Bavarian division crossed the Lauter and led the attack upon Douay's isolated French division. Other divisions followed, and the town of Weissenburg was carried by assault after a severe bombardment by the German artillery, the French division being practically overwhelmed by numbers. The French fought well, and withdrew from the field in excellent order after losing some 1,200 in killed and wounded and 1,000 prisoners out of an effective of less than 8,000 men. The French had been taken completely by surprise, which does not say much for their system of outposts. In the diary of the Emperor Frederick, edited by H. W. Lucy, we read:—"On the reverse slope we found two camps of *tentes d'abri* with provisions and dinner still untouched; General Douay's little dog creeping around his master's dead body; the chattering French doctors knew nothing of the Geneva Convention, having no brassards with the red cross,

and crying only '*Procurez nous notre bagage!*' The Turcos were thorough savages." Capt. Hozier, in his *Franco-Prussian War*, gives some interesting particulars of this engagement. In the attack on the Geisberg he says:—"When the order to storm was given the Bavarians went at it without flinching. A storm of balls rained upon them. Whole ranks were swept away, but the rest rushed on without a pause. No single shot was fired in return. They trusted entirely to the bayonet, and the instant they gained the crest they swept the French before them by sheer weight of numbers. The German advantage of weight was very great, as was afterwards found by weighing some prisoners; two Germans on an average weighed nearly as much as three Frenchmen." He goes on to say that most of the prisoners were captured in a cave, where they refused to surrender, and the Germans were forced to rush and throw them down before they would give in. He says the Turcos behaved infamously:—"Many of them after asking for and receiving quarter, stabbed with their sword bayonets the soldiers who had spared them, or snatched up the muskets they had thrown down and treacherously shot the victors." How history repeats itself! The barbarous Boer has behaved in precisely the same way to our troops as the incensed Turco did to the German soldiery.

The Crown Prince had left his train from 10 to 15 miles behind the River Lauter as a precautionary measure, it was left at Appenhofen, Billingham, Rohobach, Hagenbach, and Rhein-zabern. So far as was practicable the trains were posted as nearly as possible to the rear of their several corps so that they might follow these by the direct roads. The arrangement was most carefully thought out before it was adopted, and this is the more amazing as the Crown Prince and his Generals were perfectly well aware that they had only one Army Corps in front of them, there was, however, the possibility that McMahon might have been joined by the 5th Corps which was then at Bitche; but it is certain that the Crown Prince would have received early intimation of any movement on the part of that Corps; in any case McMahon could not have attacked his army of 125,000 men with more than 80,000 men. Yet, notwithstanding the advantage of his position, the Crown Prince neglected no precaution to secure his supplies at a safe distance, and to keep his lines of retreat unencumbered by his transport. After the battle of Weissenburg there does not appear to have been any advance of his trains on the following day, the 5th August; it is more than probable that the Germans found that owing to the large quantities

of abandoned supplies found at Weissenburg they would have had more than sufficient to fill the haversacks of the men for their further immediate advance.

The Crown Prince moved his army for about eight miles beyond the Lauter on the 5th, towards the Sauer with a front of over five miles. McMahon had concentrated the remainder of his *corps d'armée* at Haguenau by the 4th August, and had at once advanced upon hearing of the engagement at Weissenburg ; by the morning of the 6th his corps was concentrated on the Sauer with a front of less than five miles. Hozier says:—"The Crown Prince had been kept admirably informed of the strength and position of McMahon ; but the latter, with utter disregard of the consequences of such want of foresight, and in spite of the surprise at Weissenburg, although he knew that the Prince was marching upon him with an army flushed by victory, had no idea of that army's strength, and was even unaware of its exact whereabouts or proximate approach, until within a few minutes of the hour at which he saw its vanguard appearing on the summits of the hills, exactly over his own ground, and about a mile and a half distant from him. He had no scouts or spies thrown out, no organisation of outposts, none of the precautions usually adopted by a leader of armies to warn him of his enemy's vicinity." He then goes on to say that the French were convinced that they would not have to fight more than two German corps. When McMahon saw by what superior numbers he was confronted, he wired for orders, and was directed to "attack them." It would be well if the French were to bear in mind the disasters which overtook their own country in 1870-71, which resulted chiefly from the absence of sufficient preparation, but was really attributable to the incapacity of some of their commanders. If they looked back, perhaps they would not be so ready to condemn their neighbours for similar want of foresight at the commencement of the Boer War. It is certain that the press of this country never reproached the French for the absence of any adequate preparation. Our sympathies were always enlisted on the side of the French, most probably because they were being vanquished.

Capt. Hozier's description of the battle is full of graphic details, but in a book which pretends to deal mainly with the supply and transport services, it would be obviously out of place to touch very fully upon any of the very numerous battles of this campaign. As the fierce fight at Worth demonstrated very conspicuously the courage of the French soldiery, as well as the tenacity of the Germans, we may be excused for quoting some

of the particulars given. The battle raged for over eight hours, the engagement being precipitated by an affair of outposts. "The most sanguinary part of the strife commenced at the foot of the hills occupied by the French. In the vineyards the Zouaves and Turcos had taken up their positions, and they possessed the twofold advantage over the impetuous advance of the Germans, of being under cover, and of being in a position to take good aim at their foes; the Germans at the same time being entirely exposed, and compelled to fire almost at random." The following instance of bravery is given:—"A French officer who was wounded, found himself reduced to eleven Zouaves, asking his men what they thought should be done, they all replied, 'We are going to defend ourselves'!" Pushing on they fought their way through the village to the open, by which time his numbers had been reduced to three men. It is questionable whether the display of so much bravery is expedient; the surrender of these few brave Zouaves would have eventually restored a number of brave men to their country, and the damage they were enabled to inflict upon the enemy could hardly compensate France for the destruction of so many brave sons; there is, however, the satisfaction of knowing that they covered themselves and their country with glory. Such an ambition cannot be otherwise than commendable. It raises the status of a country and of its people in the eyes of the remainder of the civilised world. It ranks among the loftiest kinds of self-sacrifice, as it requires courage of the highest order for its development, not as in the case of martyrs a quiet resignation. Where men have bravely faced almost certain death in the performance of their duty, as some of our noble, lion-hearted officers have done during the progress of the war in South Africa, what wonder then that their countrymen and countrywomen, our kinsmen in America, and the whole of the people of our Colonial Empire should be proud to own that they are of the same blood as such heroes. And we are not without the sympathy and admiration of our German brothers-in-arms, who have by their prowess, courage, and self-devotion during 1870-71 demonstrated before the world what a united brotherhood can accomplish. We do not for one moment doubt that the unity of purpose now being displayed by the Anglo-Saxon race in all parts of the world will succeed in rescuing our fellow countrymen from the toils which have been so skilfully spread by the Transvaal oligarchy and the Africander Bond for their destruction. We have diverged from our main subject, but it must be allowed that self-sacrifice is also demanded

in very large measure, if not in a greater and more continuous degree, from the officers and men of the supply and transport when employed on active service—this may perhaps constitute a sufficient excuse for the digression.

The fighting on both sides continued throughout the day, the French exerting every nerve to push back the overwhelming mass of Germans; they were, however, outmanœuvred by the Germans, who fought with equal pertinacity. Capt. Hozier says, "Any advantage which they had in the superior range of the Chassepot over the needle gun they threw away, by advancing—rushing would be the better word—so near their enemy that they were placed upon an equality with him. In numbers, also, they were less than one to two." At about 3 p.m. fresh troops were hurled against the French right which was crushed and broken, and that magnificent army was transformed into a mass of fugitives. "A fierce charge of the French Cuirassier regiments against the 5th and 11th Prussian Corps was made at the close of the fight, in the hope of either retrieving the day or at all events of facilitating the retreat of the remainder of the army. But it ended, as such charges of heavy cavalry must almost of necessity do in the face of modern artillery and the breach-loader, in the all but annihilation of the daring horsemen." A final stand was made at Neiderbronn which enabled the broken forces to effect their escape towards Bitche and Saverne, a number also taking the road to Haguenau. The Marshal with his staff accompanied those who fled towards Saverne. Hozier gives the following figures as representing the French losses: 36 cannon, 6 mitrailleuses, 2 eagles, innumerable arms, their entire baggage and treasure, and two railway trains containing provisions. Von Moltke tells us that 2,000 draught horses were captured, and Boulanger states that 158 wagons were also taken. Hozier adds:—"It was significant of the luxury which was too prevalent in the French army, that among other trophies was a gaudy collection of ladies dresses and female finery." It is essential to make mention of such incidents in order to discourage their repetition.

Those who have any knowledge of the supply and transport services know how seriously a disastrous retreat affects those arrangements, however well they may have been conceived. It is well, therefore, to study carefully the extent of the disorganisation of the French army which resulted from the serious defeat it sustained at Worth. The effect of that defeat upon the supply and transport organisation will be more easily gauged from a study of the retreat of the French. Capt. Hozier gives a

translation of the account given at Haguenau by the correspondent of the *Vienna Wehr Zeitung*, who wrote as follows:—"About four o'clock a riderless horse galloped into the town, then a second, and a third; but the first intimation of how the day had gone was brought by a cuirassier, who came spurring through without cuirass or arms, his horse covered with foam and blood. Next arrived an artillerist on an unsaddled horse, his face distorted with inexpressible alarm. Some minutes later a mob of twenty horsemen hurried past, among whom two Zouaves clinging upon one horse were conspicuous; the others were cuirassiers, in every stage of fright and terror, some wildly swinging their sabres; others as if out of their wits, flogging their poor exhausted horses, some without saddles, most of them without arms. One cuirassier halted his horse just before me, loosened his cuirass, threw off his helmet, next his heavy sword, lastly his weighty breast-plate, and then, laughing contentedly, rode leisurely on. A pause of some fifteen minutes followed. The townsmen had all fled inside the gates. Presently, up galloped a field *gendarme*, halts his half-dead horse and calls out 'shut the gates instantly, the Prussians are at my heels.' The field-watch turned white. I exclaimed, 'what madness! Haguenau is an open town. There can be no defence, and if the Prussians are really at hand, the best thing for the town is to open the gates as wide as possible.' His face brightened up. The tumult however became greater. Among a crowd of cuirassiers some lancers were mixed up; then came hussar uniforms. The road becomes thronged; unmounted horses gallop apart as if driven on by panic; on all sides are swarms of artillerymen in their shirt-sleeves, many of their horses with the traces cut, ridden by infantry or artillerymen, but having no officers with them. While this motley crowd of cavalry was galloping through, a train rushed past laden with infantry. All the wagons were filled—on the roofs, hanging on by the handles, with half their bodies in the air, on the gangway boards, some fully accoutred, some half naked, no wounded. By five o'clock the rush of horsemen began to abate, and then came a stream of conveyances, four or five carriages all completely harnessed, yet without their guns. Then jolted and rattled past a broken ammunition wagon filled with Turcos; next a peasant's wagon filled with bedding and household gear, but no owner; a Zouave led the horses; two frightfully wounded Turcos lay on the top, a cluster of unarmed soldiers of all arms clung round it. Now followed infantry on foot. It was about half past five: still no officers. In dense swarms came the *chancellerie* cars.

the carriages of three general brigades, the archives of a division, four or five empty ammunition trucks, every kind of ambulance wagon, all packed with uninjured soldiers." The rear was closed by an orderly party of forty cuirassiers, under the command of three officers.

The effect of so disorderly a retreat upon the supply and transport arrangements of the 1st French Army Corps can be better appreciated when it is understood that Haguenau was the advanced base of supplies for that Corps. The consequences of the prevalence of such frightful disorder was to prevent the Intendance from removing much, if any, of the supplies and stores which had been accumulated at that post. Any available transport discovered in the town would have been forcibly appropriated by the panic-stricken soldiery, who were seeking to push on to Strasburg as quickly as they could. It is creditable to the French to learn that there were not much more than a dozen officers distributed amongst this crowd of several thousands of fugitives. This fact would account for the entire absence of any order in the retreat, and of the absence of any subordination during the hurried flight. What makes matters worse was that, owing to the fact that his cavalry divisions had not come up on the morning of the battle, the Crown Prince could not pursue the French before the 7th of August, when large forces of cavalry and artillery were sent to follow up the fugitives. A marked feature of this retreat is the assumption of authority by the field *gendarme* who ordered the gates to be closed. What would be thought in England of a provost who dared to give any such order on his own responsibility? We incline to the belief that as a consequence of the enormous civil power vested in the French *gendarmerie*, these officials are apt to carry into the field with them a far too exalted idea of their powers and authority. Another instance may be quoted in support of this contention. After the defeat at Weissenburg a mounted *gendarme* was sent to turn back a train of wagons which was moving towards that town. Galloping up to the leading wagon, he, in a very excited manner, ordered the driver to turn back, and threatened to brain him with his sabre if he did not do so at once. As the drivers were peasantry it would not have been surprising had a stampede been created by such conduct. What chance could an Intendance have under such circumstances? It is not surprising, therefore, that large quantities of supplies and stores fell into the hands of the invaders at the opening of the war, when they were so greatly needed by the Germans owing to the difficulty ex-

perienced in bringing their second line transport into the field. Furthermore, the first line of trains would not have moved to the front until after the battle of Worth had been fought, the forward movement on the 5th having been hastily and unexpectedly accomplished. The Crown Prince did not intend to engage the enemy before the 7th, when he expected to be reinforced by his cavalry divisions. Fortunately for the French the battle was precipitated on the 6th, and the pursuit could not be taken in hand before the morning of the 7th, after the French had obtained more than a whole night's start.

General Boulanger gives an excellent account of the French retreat towards Saverne in his *L'Invasion Allemande*:—"One lot of refugees took the Bitche road where the 5th Corps under du Failly was posted, but the greater number took the road to Saverne, these included the marshal and his staff. A brigade of infantry under Fontagnes performed the duty of rear guard. The cavalry preserving some sort of order pushed on hastily towards Saverne, which they reached by 2 a.m. The remainder of the column marched in the greatest disorder, abandoning at almost every step ammunition carts, wagons, and ambulances carrying wounded men, as well as those who fell exhausted by the way. The rear guard, however, collected some of the stragglers so far as was possible, and recovered some of the wagons. By 7 a.m. the greater part of the fugitives had reached Saverne. McMahon at once sent a despatch to Canrobert at Chalons asking for supplies and ammunition for his defeated army. Although Canrobert's army was then living from hand to mouth, that General did not hesitate to send him a few thousands of cartridges, and all the bread and biscuit he had at the moment. In the meantime the men and horses would have starved had it not been for the kindness of the town's people, who at once brought all that was necessary to meet the immediate necessities of the famished troops." The army, after some attempt at a reorganisation, by battalions, squadrons, and batteries, pursued its retreat upon Saarburg. The mounted troops marching by road via Phalzburg and the infantry keeping to the railway line passed through the tunnels piercing the Vosges, and emerged at Saarburg on the morning of the 8th; Boulanger thinks McMahon was blameworthy for not destroying the tunnels and for abandoning the defensive positions afforded by the Vosges Mountains. McMahon stated that he was disinclined to destroy the tunnels as he might have required them later for his own purposes. There is an evident disinclination to destroy one's own property

in time of war. Our omission to blow up Laing's Nek tunnel worked us irreparable harm, as it enabled the Transvaal Boers to carry their ammunition and supplies with greater facility to the front.

Dick de Lonlay gives us a vivid picture of this retreat in his *Francais et Allemands*, he gives us the following particulars:—
“As night overtook the fugitives, they passed through many villages, the windows and doors of the houses being carefully secured. Without food or rest the panic-stricken crowd pressed on until daybreak when they reached the village of Bouxwiller, where the inhabitants were most kind in giving provisions and wine to the large number of soldiers who had reached that place during the night. It was no wonder that the poor men were completely exhausted for they had been engaged with the enemy for nine hours consecutively, and had marched a distance of quite eighteen miles, owing to the round-about-way the roads took through that mountainous region. The road was crowded by the soldiers of all arms who were pushing on to Saverne. Foot soldiers on horseback, cavalrymen on foot, cuirassiers without either cuirasses or helmets, the wounded dragging themselves along, sometimes with the assistance of a comrade. Large country wagons passed, packed with soldiers who stood on their feet, some of them having fallen asleep although so uncomfortably placed. On the confines of Saverne, an attempt was made to establish some sort of order. Colonels waited for their officers and men and got them to fall in. The staff officers directed the various corps to their points of assembly. Suddenly a train arrived at the station. The first six open trucks contained a large number of wounded men who were lying in the blood which flowed from their wounds, which was dripping on to the track. A long line of closed carriages followed, containing a number of less seriously wounded men. The lookers-on were melted into tears on beholding so sad a sight.”

From these graphic accounts of the panics which succeeded the early defeats of the French army, it is obvious that the officers had signally failed to arrest the determined flight of the soldiery from the battlefields. The soldiers had lost all confidence in their leaders, who had shown such marked incapacity at the outset of the campaign. How could they be expected to stand by such men in the hour of their misfortune, which was the result of their inability to perform the duties with which they had been entrusted. No one has a better opportunity of judging of the capacity of the officer than has the soldier,

and the latter is not often wrong in his estimate of the former. Disgust, distrust and contempt were manifested in the acts of the soldiery during these flights, which are so vividly described by those who were eye-witnesses of those events. If an officer is desirous of impressing his men with a firm belief in himself, he must place his men in the first place and himself in the second. This was certainly not the case, at that epoch, with the majority of the French generals, whatever the company officers might have been to their men.

It is very evident that the serious reverses which had overtaken the French armies, and the loss of such large quantities of supplies at Weissenburg, Haguenau, and along the lines of railway had seriously crippled the Intendance; and what is most remarkable is that even at Chalons no reserves had been accumulated. This camp had been occupied for many years, and was the seat of the annual manœuvres, in which the reservists of the land took part. One would have certainly expected to find large reserves of ammunition and supplies at so central a dépôt. The truth becomes more and more apparent that France had made no preparations whatever to meet the requirements of the gigantic war upon which she had so lightly entered.

CHAPTER V.

FURTHER MOVEMENTS OF BOTH ARMIES.

The Crown Prince, who commanded the 3rd Army, had had to do all the fighting at the commencement of the campaign owing probably to the fact that there was only one *corps d'armée* in front of him, whereas the 1st and 2nd Armies were confronted by five corps, who were supported by the large force which was being mobilised at Chalons. The German commanders therefore moved cautiously, the 2nd Army under Prince Frederick Charles was, by the 29th July, encamped on the line of Alsenz, Gollheim, and Gunstadt, within easy reach of the main dépôts at Bingen and Frankfort, as well as those more advanced at Mayence, Worms, and Homburg. The absence of a portion of the transport, which did not reach the army before the second week in August, made it necessary to depend mainly upon the lines of railway for the supply of the 230,000 men, of which this army was composed. It is not surprising to learn that by the 4th August the army had not advanced more than 35 miles towards Saarbrücken, and was extended between Tholey and Ottweiler, the outposts being advanced as far as Neunkirchen. It is observed that the principal portion of the cavalry divisions were collected about St. Wendel, which was on the line of railway from Bingen, where the horses could be fed with greater facility. St. Wendel is situated at about 17 miles from Saarbrücken, and a force operating from that point could strike in almost any direction. Von Moltke gives the following description of this advance:—"The 2nd Army, protected on its south flank by the 3rd Army, had moved to the westward, while the corps that had remained behind were brought up by railway. Its front column had, on the 5th, reached the line between Neunkirchen and Zweibrücken, marching unchecked through the defiles of the forest-zone of Kaiserlautern. The 14th Division of the 7th Corps reached Saarbrücken first, towards noon on the 6th. General Frossard had left the night before, and had retired with the 2nd Corps on Spicheren, where were thrown up entrenchments. The 3rd, 4th, and 5th Corps were in position to his rear, at distances of from two to four miles, and the guards were not more than five miles behind." The Intendantur of the German armies had not had

any very serious difficulties to cope with at first, beyond the fact that the second line of trains could not be brought to the front ; the lines of railway, however, made up this deficiency in part, and the supplies and transport captured from the French by the 3rd Army at Weissenburg and Worth, must have been of the utmost assistance in supplying the existing deficiencies of the German commissariat. That department would find itself much more heavily taxed as the German armies advanced further and further into the enemy's country, particularly in face of the determined though passive opposition which was certain to be encountered from the unarmed peasantry. Ambert describes the hatred of the people in the following terms :—" The peasantry escaped from the forests during the night, and approached the enemy with caution, spying out their movements ; the Germans were not regarded by them as a brave soldiery, but were considered to be barbarous incendiaries and plunderers. The looks which escaped them were full of hatred, implacable hatred, which the fathers would transmit to their children, and which would shock posterity. With peasants burning with rage came the mothers carrying little children in their arms, and old people tottering along with the help of their sticks. The women in tears as they protected the heads of their children with kerchiefs, the old men pale with rage uttering cries of vengeance. A shepherd's dog on returning to the farm, not finding his sheep, instinct impelled him to attack those German soldiery who were about to carry off the farm supplies ; he bit two of the men, and naturally received his quietus from a bayonet thrust. The master carried away by his fury, attacked the soldiery and was driven off by blows from the butts of their rifles. Kneeling beside his dog, he lifted him in his arms and carried him away. All were not so fortunate. It is said that in other parts numbers of the peasantry were murdered." What makes this opposition still more remarkable is the fact that the people of that part of France were of German extraction, Alsace having been annexed by the French some two hundred years before the war.

As was stated the French had retired to the heights of Spicheren, where Frossard had entrenched his troops. On the morning of the 6th August, the 7th German Army Corps was advanced to Herchenbach, and the attack was developed about 1 p.m. Capt. Hozier gives an interesting description of this sanguinary but gallantly contested battle. The French appear to have been taken somewhat unawares, being engaged in cooking and in cleaning their accoutrements. A formidable attack was

made on the left flank of the French, where heavy losses were sustained by the latter, who made a counter attack and obliged the Germans to act on the defensive. At last, after heavy fighting, the French were forced to retire from Stiring. A formidable attack was also made upon the French right, where the Germans lost heavily, probably about nine to one. On being strongly reinforced the French were forced back upon Forbach, which was carried by assault soon afterwards, when the French were compelled to beat a hasty retreat, which was covered by the darkness then setting in. The road taken in their hasty flight was marked by numerous wagons of provisions and clothing; the woods were filled with hosts of stragglers wandering about purposelessly (altogether 2,000 prisoners were taken); and large stores and quantities of goods of every description fell into the hands of the Germans. Among the stores were several railway vans full of confectionery. The object of providing confectionery for the French soldiery is somewhat problematical. We could understand the provision of acidulated drops, when the men are exposed to great heat and when there is certainty of a scarcity of water. The probability is that the confections were sent by a ladies' committee, or by a large manufacturer. There is no doubt that sugar appeases hunger, it is often used on the line of march by the Germans. The losses in this battle were exceedingly heavy. Romagny gives them as follows:—French, 300 killed, 1,700 wounded, 2,000 missing; Germans, 1,000 killed, 4,000 wounded and missing.

The French were unable to retreat upon St. Avold, as the Germans commanded the road leading in that direction, they were therefore forced to retreat upon Sarguemund. The German pursuit was not pressed, owing to the darkness and the good order of the retreating French. Claretie describes the retreat in the following words:—"The soldiers, dusty, blackened with smoke, proud, wounded but not conquered, marched without complaint; others carrying their heads high, with flashing eyes, were ready to recommence the interrupted fight. The army decimated, but still in good order, marched towards Puttelange, regiment by regiment, showing from time to time terrible but glorious gaps. After a night of marching and fatigue, succeeding a day of hard fighting, still they moved forward in good humour, laughing and cracking their jokes." This was evidently seen by the writer, and speaks well for the *morale* of the French soldiery after a serious reverse. It is in striking contrast with the conduct of the troops and civilians at Metz, when the news of the disaster

reached that city. Capt. Hozier says "a spirit of despair for a time seems to have seized both officers and men. The former considered that all was lost to France; and amongst the latter '*Tout est perdu*' was the motto which within a few days had replaced the boast of a military promenade to Berlin. A panic also seized the civil population; the disposition to exaggerate, so inherent in French minds, had already created imaginary dangers; and the Germans being momentarily expected, all the carriages and vehicles were chartered to convey the alarmists and their families far from the seat of war; the Emperor himself was preparing for departure. Later in the day after it had been decided that the bulk of the army should march to the west to join McMahon's army, the equipages of the Emperor and some officers of his staff actually left the town. Amongst the lower classes the excitement reached almost to madness; bands of men paraded the streets clamouring for revenge, and stopping any looker-on who had a foreign appearance. Several English and American correspondents were roughly handled by the mob, and the authorities were compelled to put them under arrest to protect them from the infuriated people, who fancied they saw in them Prussian spies." Large numbers of locomotives and railway carriages were abandoned by the French at this battle, and were captured by the invaders, who promptly utilised the rolling-stock; a regular service of trains being organised between Saarbrücken, Forbach, St. Avold, and Saarguemines. This line of railway, in extension of the German lines from Trier, Coblenz, Bingen, and Mannheim, must have been of inestimable benefit to the German Intendantur in the advance of the 1st and 2nd Armies towards Metz.

Von Moltke tells us that "the general of the 3rd German Army did not know of the disorderly condition of the defeated enemy, nor even the direction of its retreat. It was supposed that the French would rally on the other side of the Vosges for renewed resistance, and as it was impossible to cross the mountains except on a narrow front, the German advance was very cautious, and by short day marches only. Though the distance between Reichshofen and the Saar is only six miles in a straight line, that river was only reached in five days." It will thus be seen that the 3rd Army only reached the Saar on the 12th August. The slow advance was primarily due to the investments of several fortresses in the Vosges, and may to some extent have been owing to the necessity for replenishing the first line transport, as well as the bringing forward of the second line of trains. This

army was now moving away from its bases of supplies, which were mainly situated in Bavaria, Wurtemberg and Baden. On the 13th the march of the army was diverted towards the Moselle, which was reached on the 16th. Owing to the advance of this army to so great a distance from its bases of supply, it became necessary for it to depend in large measure upon the local resources of the country. The following order was therefore issued by the Crown Prince: "The inhabitants will have to supply all necessities for the support of the troops. Each soldier will receive daily 750 grammes of bread, 500 grammes of meat, 250 grammes of pork or bacon, 30 grammes of coffee, 60 grammes of tobacco or 5 cigars, $\frac{1}{2}$ litre of wine, or 1 litre of beer, or 1-10th of brandy. The rations to be furnished daily for each horse will be 6 kilogrammes of oats, 2 kilogrammes of hay, and $1\frac{1}{2}$ kilogrammes of straw. In case the inhabitants prefer an indemnity in coin, it will be 2 francs for each soldier daily." Requisitions were to be made solely by duly authorised persons, and official receipts were to be given for everything taken. This seems to have been regarded as a mere matter of form, as the Germans did not subsequently take any steps to redeem them. The 3rd Army had been reduced by the removal of the Baden division, which had been detached for the purpose of laying siege to Strasburg. Another division was besieging Phalzburg. It followed, therefore, that this portion of the army could still draw supplies from the bases in South Germany. About this time a 4th Army was created under the command of the Crown Prince of Saxony, which was composed mainly of the 12th Army Corps from Saxony; two other corps were subsequently added. The duty of supplying the bulk of the provisions needed by the 3rd Army in its perilous advance was entrusted to this army for the time being. For that purpose a large depôt was created at Saarunion, which was centrally situated, although not on a line of railway. The country roads would have had to have been employed for the purpose of tapping the line of the 3rd Army's advance at such points as could be reached from this supply depôt, which was situated quite 40 miles away on its right flank. The strength of the 3rd Army would not have been drawn upon to any considerable extent for the maintenance of its lines of communication, as its rear was secured by the divisions detached for the investment of Strasburg and Phalzburg, and by its cavalry so soon as that force had reached Chateau Salins, as then the Crown Prince was in touch with the 2nd Army. There is very little doubt that the 3rd Army was hard pressed for supplies during its nine

days' march ; the defiles of the Vosges lay on its right, and interrupted its communications with its reserve dépôts. The population was highly antagonistic both covertly and openly, and the surrounding country had already been drawn upon heavily by McMahon's army, so much so that it was sometimes necessary for the German soldiery, out of pity, to give away a portion of their rations to keep those upon whom they were billeted from starving.

The movements of the various French Corps are in marked contrast to the regular and almost machine-like marches of the German armies. Rustow gives very excellent reasons for the shortcomings of the French, he says : " The Germans took the trouble to learn French, and see thoroughly what there was to be seen. The French, on the contrary, only looked at what pleased them ; and in spite of the numerous Alsacians who had entered the French army, but proportionately few officers were to be met with who could speak or understand German. It excited wonder and astonishment in France, when the Germans proved that they understood so thoroughly the geography and statistics of the empire. And yet this should have been no cause for astonishment ; and the attainment to such understanding did not require the use of spies." He goes on to show that the French officers had at hand the same means of procuring information as the Germans had, but they appear to have entirely neglected to inform themselves of such matters, either in Germany or in their own country. McMahon's retreat was conducted in the most happy-go-lucky fashion ; his baggage and supplies had had to be abandoned, and he was forced to depend on the country for supplying his army, as well as upon such supplies as Canrobert could afford to send from Chalons to meet him on his line of retreat. At Saarburg his force had been increased by part of the French Corps from Belfort, and he was afterwards joined by Du Failly's Corps, so that the numbers requiring food were considerably augmented. St. Barthélemy, in his *La Guerre*, makes some severe remarks upon the absence of system which was apparent in the French army :—" Requisitions had to be employed. But that system of feeding the army on the country naturally failed. The soldier, already worn out by fatiguing marches and battles, felt his strength desert him when the hour for soup came round and there was none to satisfy his appetite. He complains, protests, he is indignant, he fears treason, and he becomes a beggar or a thief. From that moment the army is lost." Another account of this retreat is given by Ludovic

Halévy, in his *L'Invasion*. He quotes the words of a *chasseur à pied* :—" Overcome by fatigue, officers and men slept on the wet ground without any covering. Cold and hungry they managed to get a little biscuit. At Lembach were stored some reserves of supplies and forage ; these were thrown into a number of carts taken from the peasantry. Arrived at Saverne, he managed to get food and rest in a gentleman's chateau. The house was lighted up, the ladies and the servants being busily engaged in providing creature comforts, as well as mattresses upon which the tired soldiery might sleep. Numbers of cuirassiers, Zouaves, linesmen, dragoons, and artillerymen were already fast asleep. On their departure the following morning each man was presented with a loaf of fresh bread which had been baked during the night by their kind entertainers." Boulanger states that on the arrival of the troops at Puttelange, the Intendance was unable to grapple with their duty of feeding the army, and simply avoided its responsibility by making an allowance of 7½d. per man in lieu of the daily rations. The country was exhausted, but fortunately some potato fields were found in the vicinity, and the troops helped themselves. He says that from that time marauding was recognised as a necessity in the French army, and was quickly followed by indiscipline, waste, and plundering.

There was not, however, enough foresight employed in all the preparations made for the perfect equipment of the armies. The hospital arrangements were at first somewhat faulty, but that is easily accounted for by the fact that over 45,000 wounded Germans had to be provided for during the first three weeks of the war, as well as the very large number of wounded French soldiers who fell into their hands and had to be attended to. Owing to the non-arrival of the major portion of the trains, the Germans had to content themselves mainly with the wagons of the country for the transportation of the wounded after Weissenburg and Worth. These vehicles were four-wheeled springless, rough conveyances, intended for the transportation of agricultural products, the sides of these vehicles were constructed of wicker-work or poles, each was drawn by two horses. The conveyance of wounded men in improvised ambulances of this description would have increased the sufferings of the injured, and would have added to the complications likely to arise from wounds. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives a vivid account of the situation :—" Then came the convoys of wounded moving to the rear. Suffering had made them brothers in misfortune. The Germans and French mingled, with such opposite ideas about the

Rhine in their heads all the while, sat or lay quietly side by side, as if they were old comrades. The only enemy, and the common enemy, too, was the jolting wagon. As we neared Worth there was a constant stream of wagons bringing down wounded men. Prussians and Bavarians, Turcos and Frenchmen, bore the agony of the road with equal silence. It was rare to hear a cry, though the poor fellows' faces showed much pain. They were sadder to see in their blood-stained bandages, with suffering still about them, than the men who lay grimly on the hill sides. Worth itself was a reserve hospital, and all the inhabitants were either nursing the wounded or burying the dead." From the above account it is plain that although some few ambulances may have reached the 3rd Army, the greater part of their hospital equipments, including medical comforts and appliances, were still upon the right bank of the Rhine. Prompt measures were, however, at once adopted, both by the German Medical Staff and the Red Cross Societies, to remedy these defects. Bedsteads, mattresses, bedding, medicines, surgical appliances, bandages, lint and medical comforts of every kind and description arrived by every train from neighbouring dépôts and from the interior. To ease the limited accommodation the wounded were distributed in the towns and villages in the immediate neighbourhood of Worth, and those capable of removal were despatched by rail to Berlin and to other large cities. The situation of the wounded after Forbach was much on the same lines as it was after Worth. The greatest credit is due to the German authorities and societies for their very humane treatment of the French wounded—they were treated quite as well as the wounded Germans.

Before proceeding further with the movements of the several armies, we may as well consider the situation of the French prisoners, 10,000 of whom had been captured at the battles of Weissenburg and Worth. An interesting account is given by a *Times* correspondent of these prisoners, he says:—"My ride brought me to a corn-field by the road of over five acres, bordered by the road on one side, and by an orchard, with a regiment of Lancers with picketed horses, on the other, the railway to Landau at the end, and a line of Prussian infantry all round. In this field there were 1,200 men, in all the uniforms of the French army, nearly all soiled, bedrabbled with mud, penned in by the sentries, around each of whom there was a little group of these gossip-loving prisoners talking as well as they could, while their comrades were engaged in cooking the ration of meat, just issued to them, with that skill which the French soldier is so proud of

in his own camp. I did not like to ask many questions, but they cheerfully answered when spoken to, and my stock of cigars was soon exhausted. But there were the trains below hurrying hundreds of their comrades from French soil to German prisons, and their turn was soon to come." Capt. Hozier gives a further account of the progress of the prisoners through Germany:—"On 6th August, a first batch of 600, part of those taken at Weissenburg, were lodged in the casemates of Grandenz. On their passage through Berlin, Frankfort, and other places these prisoners were lionised, and treated with the utmost kindness by the public, which stared at, talked to, and good-naturedly cheered them by thousands. The Frenchmen were regaled with huge piles of bread and butter and other delicacies, and with unlimited supplies of sausages, cigars, tobacco, wine, and beer. The ladies who supplied the viands, as well as the officers and many of the privates forming the escort, spoke French fluently, to the great surprise of the prisoners." It is well to consider the characteristics of every nation; such generosity is worthy of imitation and should be a guide to others similarly situated. It is not without some degree of pride that we may regard the Germans as amongst our best friends on the Continent. We are connected with them by ties of consanguinity and faith, and we may surely hope that the earnest desire for the promotion of civilising methods, which are inherent in both countries, may be the means of cementing the good understanding existing into a more comprehensive and assertive line of action in the future.

The French Intendance was already in a deplorable condition. Its organisation, so faulty in its inception, had completely broken down, not apparently from any want of exertion on the part of its members, but as a consequence of the almost entire absence of preparatory measures in anticipation of the gigantic undertaking which the Government had engaged in with so little prevision. What little preparation was made, seems to have been confined to victualling a number of the smaller fortresses of the interior, which could not and did not offer any serious opposition to the invading armies. The fortresses on the frontier seem to have been almost entirely neglected, both in regard to their works and armaments, as well as their supplies and munitions. Metz, Sedan, Mézières, Montmédy, Strasburg, Belfort, Bitche, Phalzbourg, and Thionville were almost destitute of supplies. Shortly before the threatened investment of each place, supplies were hurried to a greater or less extent into most of these fortresses, but this was generally undertaken too late, except in a couple of

solitary instances when the garrisons were able to hold out. Owing to the scattered position of the numerically inferior French army, the Germans were able to gain successive victories at the very commencement of the campaign by hurling overwhelming masses of German troops against the strong French positions. One of the results of these victories was to enable the Germans to capture the large quantities of supplies and transport which had been collected at Weissenburg, Worth, and Forbach, besides several lines of railway with their rolling-stocks. Such losses would not have been irreparable had any sufficient concentration of supplies, munitions, and transport been made in the interior of the country, but it was not so, and the troops suffered accordingly. As the correspondent of the *Daily News* aptly expressed the position, he wrote thus :—"What moral influence can a general such as McMahon have in his army, when the men, even the most uninstructed, see with their own eyes the mismanagement of the whole undertaking! What can men think of their general, and with what heart can they combat to invade a hostile country, when food, straw, and hay, and all that is requisite for an army, is wanting them in their own country? How is it possible that the general officers immediately under the commanders in this miserable war can execute with zeal and punctuality the orders they receive, when a general like McMahon is heard to say, after having fought for so many hours, that he must stop because they have no more ammunition? The fact is that the morale of the army has greatly suffered." The lessons learned by the French, and paid for so dearly, should be read by all present and future generations with the object of pushing and advancing the knowledge, which should be acquired in time of peace, of the resources and topography of other countries, so that in the event of a war we may neither underrate the enemy nor be unprepared to meet him. But above all things we English should have a complete knowledge of the resources and topography of our own country as well as that of our Colonial Empire.

The well thought-out system employed with the German army stands out in marked contrast to the hastily conceived methods of the French, and this is perhaps more marked in the supply and transport services. At the same time it must be admitted that in some very few instances the utmost capacity for good organisation was displayed by more than one French officer; we will endeavour, further on in this treatise, to record some of these highly creditable exceptions. The correspondent of the *Daily News* with the German army, gives some particulars

of what he saw for himself :—" A more perfect system of organisation it is difficult to imagine. The columns of provisions creep like great serpents over the country. * * * It is essentially a civilised war in these respects. Both fruit and vegetables are taken along the wayside, horses are pressed into the service, soldiers are quartered on the people, and large supplies of food are demanded from the local authorities. The railway is to be used as far as practicable to lighten the traffic on the roads, and everything is to be pushed forward as though time were counted by hours and not by days." One of the most serious evils, with which most armies have to contend is the "time-enough" officer or man. No greater fallacy exists as the "plenty of time" argument, which is so often advanced by the indolent. An excellent maxim for an army in the field, as well as in quarters, is that there is no time like the present. The present time is never available in the future, and is therefore so much working time saved.

Dr. Russell, in his *Last Great War*, gives a lifelike description of a German Intendant :—"The most to be feared was the Intendant, an iron man on a rampaging horse, in dark uniform frock, with velvet facings, looking out severely on the world through a pair of much magnifying spectacles. Then came wrath, despair, gnashing of teeth, and howlings. 'You will, within six hours, bring a contribution of two millions of francs to the military chest; send in 500,000 cigars, 10,000 pairs of shoes, 20,000 bottles of Burgundy and Bordeaux, 6,000 bottles of Champagne, 2,000 oxen, 10,000 sheep, &c., &c.' To all remonstrances the Intendant has two forms of reply. The first: 'It must be done, and in six hours'! The second: He pointed out that the city has so many thousand inhabitants, and could therefore produce the quantities demanded. He then stated that he was merely following the lead given him by Napoleon, who in all his campaigns lived upon the country. He concluded by saying that the supplies and money were to be delivered by 3 p.m. that day." There was no trifling with the Intendant for he had 300,000 men at his back. We are not accustomed to employ such harsh measures in the British service. Our system is to pay at once when such a course is possible, but to pay invariably at some future time, and we often pay too liberally. We might take some useful hints from our Continental friends in this particular, which would no doubt render war less of a burden upon the unhappy tax-payer.

It is undoubtedly very desirable that the inhabitants of the

invaded country should be treated with as much consideration as may be possible, but the troops should not be allowed to suffer through such clemency. For instance, if an army was marching through an enemy's country, and was beset by the enemy's forces on either flank in its advance, it would become a manifest absurdity to refrain from foraging for supplies and transport along the flanks, and it would be obviously wrong to punish men for even looting on their own account, particularly if they were making a forced march on short rations. Discipline must of necessity be maintained, but it is un wisdom to see everything that may be done by the men, they should be permitted to help themselves rather than that they should march on empty stomachs. In circumstances of that kind the enemy's resources would simply be protected in order that they might eventually fall into their own hands, than which nothing could be worse.

CHAPTER VI.

BAZAINE ON THE DEFENSIVE.

After the battle of Forbach on the 6th August, the 1st and 2nd German Armies remained in their positions until the 11th, as it was necessary, before a further advance was made, that the 3rd Army should be in touch with the 2nd ; this useful interval being employed by both armies in advancing their cavalry, and in the concentration of their forces, as well as in bringing to the front large numbers of the Landwehr. No mention is made of the creation of supply bases on French soil until a somewhat later date, when a number were organised ; these must have been formed soon after the 12th, they were for the supply of the 2nd Army, which had advanced to no inconsiderable distance from the advanced German dépôts, the nearest of which at Saarbrücken was nearly 50 miles away, obviously too great a distance for its supply columns to cover. There was, however, a line of railway from Homburg towards Pont à Mousson, which would have been available to the invaders. The 2nd Army followed this line in its advance, and upon gaining the banks of the Seille on the 13th, troops were sent forward to occupy that place. During the march no opposition was offered by the enemy. This army was destined to attack the troops assembled around Metz from the southward, as well as to co-operate with the 3rd Army in preventing the junction of the Chalons Army with the Corps at Metz. The 1st Army was advancing to attack the forces to the eastward and north-eastward of Metz, and by the 12th had reached the line of Boulay-Marange, with its cavalry at Bettange, Gaudreville, and Fouligny. This army would have been in an excellent position for drawing supplies, as its supply columns would have had to cover no more than twenty miles in carrying forward provisions from Saarlouis, the nearest advanced dépôt. The line of railway from Homburg may have been of some assistance, but it is more than probable that its rolling-stock was not more than sufficient to meet the requirements of the 2nd Army. A line had been projected towards Thionville, but this had been completed only as far as Carling, which was situated some ten miles to the rear of the centre of this army, and would no doubt have been of the greatest use in the removal of the wounded to the base hospitals after the

sanguinary battles in which this army was so soon to become engaged. No serious difficulty could have been experienced in providing supplies for that army, which was situated near its advanced dépôts at Saarlouis and Saarbrücken, and the base dépôts at Cologne, Coblenz, and Bingen were at no very great distance beyond, and were connected with the former by lines of railway. The more bulky forage rations were, as has already been stated, procured locally as far as was practicable, and it is not at all likely that at that time any real difficulty was experienced by the Intendantur in procuring sufficient local transport and forage to meet the needs of the troops, particularly as the whole of the country between Metz and Strasburg was practically denuded of French troops after the 7th inst. The Franc-tireurs had not yet been organised, later on they became a serious menace to the lines of communication, and to those charged with the duty of collecting supplies. There can be no doubt that large reserves of forage would have had to be maintained with each army, but whether these were accumulated in the district or brought up in part by rail, is of very little consequence. There is generally a profound silence in regard to matters of detail, but it is now readily admitted that few detail arrangements are beneath the notice of the general officer or the military historian.

General Boulanger, in his work *L'Invasion Allemande*, makes a point of the following :—"The Intendant Sulzer, in charge of the 1st Army, held the rank of lieutenant only, which failed to indicate the high functions confided to him in his official position. He had quitted the more active branch of the military profession when a lieutenant, to take service in the Intendantur, and had gradually gained high rank in that department whilst still holding subaltern rank in the army." He points out that this fact clearly demonstrates the subordination of the military administration in the German army to the command of the troops. The supply and transport services must of necessity be under the orders of the general commanding that particular division or brigade with which the officer in charge may be doing duty ; the same is the case with every other arm or branch of the service. It is certain that although the rank of lieutenant may have lowered Intendant Sulzer in the eyes of some of the soldiery, it would make no difference to the superior officers who knew with what important duties that officer was charged. The position was a false one and required amending. Before combatant rank was accorded to the supply and transport officers in the British army there

were never any serious professional difficulties encountered, they were purely of a social character. Certainly a non-combatant officer may have been regarded by some of the soldiery as "a sort of paper general," but he was always treated with the utmost courtesy by the general commanding, who was always ready to receive him and consult with him upon all matters relating to his department. And it may be added that it was only on rare occasions that the general ever directed a member of his personal staff to represent him in any interviews of the kind. So far back as the Peninsular War we find Lord Wellington making an objection to the second senior commissariat officer, who would have succeeded the Commissary-General, he wrote thus of him:—"I could not do business with him for an hour." If General Boulanger assumed or intended to assert that the German Intendantur was in any degree subservient to the combatant branch, I think he was mistaken, as the indications are strongly in favour of the assumption that the utmost cordiality and co-operation subsisted between the staff and the departments of the army; otherwise the campaign could not have gained for the Germans such very great success as it did, which resulted from the harmonious working together of all arms. Furthermore, the officer in supreme command of the supply, transport, and cash of the German armies was a Lieut.-General, Intendant General Von Stosch, who was recognised as one of the Head-Quarter Staff.

Marshal Bazaine expressed some fear that his retreat might be cut off towards the west as the cavalry outposts of the 2nd Army had already occupied Pont à Mousson and were as far in advance as Mars la Tour, he therefore decided on the 14th August to evacuate Metz, leaving a strong garrison to hold that fortress, and determined to effect a junction with the forces under McMahon, who was about to march from Chalons towards Sedan, viâ Rethel. Early on the morning of that day the baggage wagons began to move out of Metz, and the unusual stir attracted the attention of the vedettes of the 1st Army. Upon hearing of the movement Steinmetz at once advanced several corps. The 2nd, 3rd, and 4th French Corps were encamped to the eastward of Metz, these at once advanced to repel the German attack. A very sanguinary battle was fought at Colombey between 4 p.m. and nightfall, the result being that the French were forced to maintain their positions, and the delay gave Prince Frederick Charles additional time in which to get more of his army across the Moselle. As has already been stated, Napoleon left Metz

on the morning of that day with the intention of going to Verdun. M. Quesnay, in his *Armée du Rhin*, gives an account of the 6th Corps transport meeting him at Mars la Tour :—"The Emperor was on horseback accompanied by his son, who found themselves mixed up with the Corps transport during the afternoon. The wagons had been drawn up on one side of the road to permit the easy passage of the Imperial cortège; at the junction of the road where the house was situated which was to be used as his temporary abode, the Imperial carriages were somewhat hustled by the throng of wagons. A sad spectacle, the Imperial cortège in the midst of a very mixed convoy." He goes on to say that the Intendant of the 6th Corps had been sent to Verdun that day to prepare for the arrival of that corps which was to have marched on the 17th, who reported that the country was then quite free from the ubiquitous Uhlans.

The whole of McMahon's Corps did not reach the camp at Chalons before the 19th August; the infantry had come by train from Neufchâteau, but the cavalry and artillery had to march by road, the operation taking up three days of most valuable time. Capt. Hozier gives us a very lamentable description of the camp at Chalons :—"Here a large number of the guard mobile had been organised, they were quite ignorant of the nature of the Chassepot with which they were armed, and little if any time remained to give them any instruction, they were therefore little better than an undisciplined mob of men. It is not surprising to read that the camp was the hotbed of vice, drunkenness, and disorder. Cassell's history of the war gives an account of the pillaging of supply trains at Chalons, which will indicate the temper of the soldiery as well as their want of subordination :—"For more than two hours the railway station was pillaged by some 400 stragglers, many of them belonging to the artillery. They smashed and opened 150 goods wagons, and threw out on the line barrels of wine, gunpowder, cartridges, shot, shell, biscuits, rice, bales of clothing, coffee, salt meat, and other provisions. These they sold to hucksters who waited outside. Among other articles was a part of the Emperor's baggage. His shirts sold for 4 sous each; loaves of sugar brought 50 centimes only, and bags of coffee a franc." When such things were possible with disciplined and undefeated soldiers, what may not have occurred with those who were only partially disciplined, or with those who had sustained such crushing defeats. McMahon had been given command of the Chalons army, which then numbered some 150,000 men. Accompanied by the Emperor he marched on

Reims on the 21st August, having destroyed quantities of forage and other supplies which could not be carried with the army. Arrived at Reims on the 24th, it became necessary to secure a fresh supply of provisions, it is evident that the men carried no more than three days' rations with them, which is an unusually small quantity for a French soldier, who is often laden with 10 days' bread. It is more than probable that the bread supply at Chalons was defective, and no considerable reserve supplies could have been accumulated at that great rallying point for the French soldiery. The Prince Imperial here left his father and gained the Belgian frontier, where the Emperor considered he would be far safer than with the army, or even in Paris. This was the preliminary step towards the inevitable downfall of the Empire. The army continued its advance towards Sedan, and sought without effect to open communications with the Metz army. Capt. Bonnet gives us some particulars of this hopeless march. After remarking upon the laxity of discipline and the want of knowledge in the commanders, he goes on to say:—"The rain and consequent bad roads disorganised the men and rendered them discontented; the want of supplies, and the continual blocks caused by the supply transport, which did not assure them of much, if any, support, such circumstance naturally tended to destroy the insignificant remains of discipline." How differently adverse circumstances affect different people! We do not think that the British soldiery would under similar trials part with their discipline, on the contrary the tendency would be to weld the men more closely together. History records this characteristic, and we are proud to believe that our fellow countrymen would again do in the future as they have done in the past. He goes on to say that "the Prussians always surprised us with the rapidity of their marching; when it was possible for us to advance, we always found them in front of us. Without rest our men marched night and day."

After the defeat at Borny on the 14th August, Bazaine did not again attempt to resume his march towards the westward before the early morning of the 16th, when his troops in advance at Vionville commenced moving. The Germans had not wasted the precious moments; during the 15th, the 2nd Army was pressed forwards towards the Moselle in support of the division of infantry at Pont à Mousson and the cavalry division at Thiancourt, both of which were also advanced. The following morning the cavalry division was enabled to intercept and hold back the van of the French army in its advance, being supported by an

infantry division—the French troops in movement were thrown into confusion and driven back upon those following them. The fight was maintained for several hours, as the Germans were greatly inferior in numbers at the commencement. So soon as German reinforcements got up, the French were forced back notwithstanding the arrival of additional troops. It is said that the French were ignorant of the fact that the Germans were so far in advance, and that they sent an Intendant to make arrangements at Trouville for the supply of the army on its march, not being aware that the German cavalry scouts had occupied that place on the 15th. The battle was contested with great courage and obstinacy on both sides, particularly after the arrival of large reinforcements during the afternoon. Rustow estimates the losses of the French at 23,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners, and the Germans returned themselves as having lost 17,000 in killed and wounded, being at the rate of 1 out of every 26 men engaged.

Bazaine had not abandoned his intention of forcing a passage for his army towards the westward, but he had to bury his dead and attend to his wounded during the 17th, and had to replenish his supplies and ammunition. Steinmetz with the greater part of his army was watching the movements of the French on the eastern and southern sides of Metz, he could not, therefore, withdraw more than a small portion of his troops guarding that part. During the delay the German Corps of the 2nd Army was extended to the westward of Metz, having been augmented by the 7th and 8th Corps, as well as by some divisions of the 1st Army. Their front extended for a distance of nearly 10 miles to the westward of Gravelotte, and the French occupied an excellent position behind that place, with a front of less than 8 miles. The battle was contested for nine hours, and reflects much credit upon the French, who fought with great courage and resolution, considering that they had to resist the onslaught of nearly double their numbers. That army was forced to retire upon Metz, where it had to take shelter under the guns of the outlying forts. M. Poullin, in his *Places perdues*, gives the following account of the retirement of Bazaine's troops: "Dissatisfaction became general at the thought of a retreat which resembled a flight. Bazaine thought a further advance impossible, the enemy not being demoralised as was generally imagined. To continue the march was to expose the army to certain defeat." Cassell's *History of the War* gives the result in the following words:—"The defeat confined Bazaine to Metz and to its outlying forts,

and filled the country with dismay. Vigorous efforts were at once put forward for the defence of Paris. The Germans had evidently outmarched their supply columns in their hurried advance, for we are told by the same authority that, after the battle, the King and Bismarck had great difficulty in getting anything to eat or drink, 'some black bread and vile wine' were consumed with relish by both. Bismarck was glad to find an unoccupied bed in the attic of a cottage which was used for some of the wounded." In such circumstances what must have been the situation of the soldiery? It is more than probable that the great majority bivouacked that night when the fighting ceased with very little if any food to refresh them, the fighting having continued up to dark. A light emergency ration would have been of the greatest comfort to men under such circumstances. The sort of ration needed is something light, compact, highly nutritious, and which could be consumed in its raw state, or which might, with the aid of hot or cold water, be converted into a palatable and sustaining beverage, or into a comforting and tasty soup. Such a ration would have been invaluable to our own exhausted troops at the Modder River battle.

When it became apparent that the Army of Chalons could not retire upon Paris as Marshal McMahon desired, but was directed to march to the relief of Bazaine by the Ministers at Paris, there was no longer any necessity for the 3rd Army under the Crown Prince to continue its advance to the westward, his army was therefore directed towards the north in support of the 1st and 2nd German Armies. On its march the 3rd Army had captured a large supply of provisions and forage corn at Luneville, which was at once made use of as a field dépôt; on this change of front that dépôt would have become of no use to his army. Difficulties of this kind are of necessity constantly being created in the field, and the army should recognise the trials to which a commissariat in the field is thus subjected; if such trials were intelligently appreciated, we would have less of those unfounded complaints which are so frequently hurled against the commissariat during a campaign. In this particular instance the 3rd Army would have had to depend upon the railhead at Pont à Mousson for its munitions, instead of upon Saarunion, Luneville, and other places. That army had been intended to move upon Chalons, and afterwards to advance on Paris, supported by the 4th Army under the Crown Prince of Saxony. The change of direction from due west to due north would naturally have hampered the prearranged commissariat plans of

operation. It is therefore desirable that large quantities of supplies should not be advanced too far—the advanced base depôts should be kept well stocked, and the commissariat officers should prepare themselves in advance for almost every possible or impossible move which might be made. Disappointments should not dishearten them, even in the event of their being blamed for anything which no human foresight could have anticipated. The success of a campaign may often depend upon the courageous working of the officers and men of the supply and transport services. It is not surprising, therefore, that at this epoch considerable difficulty was experienced in supplying the 3rd Army which was on the extreme left of the German forces. The corps on its right being nearer to the supply depôts, would naturally have fared better. The *Daily News* correspondent, who was with this army, gives some account of its march :—“ It is essentially a civilised war, but fruit and vegetables are taken along the wayside, horses are pressed into the service, soldiers are quartered on the people, and large supplies of food are demanded from the local authorities. All foreigners have this notion that troops should be quartered on the conquered people, who find their visitors in food. The luckless village which lies near the road is eaten up by thousands of unwelcome guests, and other more remote villages escape with a trifling loss.” It is stated that upon the advance of the German armies the French peasantry fled from the neighbourhood and took refuge in Metz, Reims, Rethel, and other towns in the vicinity, the Germans were therefore forced to help themselves largely in these deserted districts, where an abundance of vegetables and fruit stuffs were procurable for the trouble of gathering, but the people would have carried off the greater part of their flocks and herds and probably large quantities of portable supplies. The Germans lost no time on the march; the correspondent of the *Daily News* states that “ the poor dusty fellows kept up with horses and carriages for twelve or fifteen miles at a swinging pace, and in full campaigning order.” The majority of their supplies must, at this time, have been sent from Germany, but there could not have been much difficulty in procuring sufficient forage locally for the horses. Having ascertained that the French troops had evacuated all the villages in the neighbourhood, the Crown Prince in accordance with his instructions commenced moving northward, and by the 27th August had reached the neighbourhood of St. Meneshould. The army must have advanced with great rapidity, for it was in the neighbourhood of Buzancy and Le Chesne by the 29th, a

distance of at least 30 miles must have been covered within two days.

The siege of Metz which resulted from the success at Gravelotte, and was never in contemplation by either belligerent, caused a considerable change in the disposition of the armies of both nations. The German 1st Army was absorbed partly in the 2nd Army and partly in the 4th Army, the former being charged with the reduction of that fortress. The 4th Army had supplied the 3rd in its advance on Chalons, and it no doubt still continued to afford subsistence to that army as it was nearer to the dépôts. Like the 3rd Army, it turned towards the north so soon as it had been ascertained that Chalons had been evacuated. This army moved on the right flank of the 3rd Army and had reached Stenay by the 28th August, where it was soon in touch with and engaged the outposts of McMahon's army on that day at Nouart. The splendid marching of these two armies is thus described by the correspondent of the *Daily News*:—"They tramp along in light marching order; their knapsacks carried in wagons which followed at a distance. They rushed into cottages for water, or for a glass of wine if any could be found. Tired and thirsty the Prussian regiments thronged through Chemery on the 31st August. As each battalion neared the Prince's quarters the drums rolled out, the men held up their heads, and went by as at a review at Berlin, but every one seemed to have been rolled in dust-bins previously. Dusty as they were the infantry had a fine appearance. They all seemed to understand the need of hard marches, and to be buoyed up with the hope of complete victory." The same writer refers to the supply and transport of those armies on the line of march:—"There are miles of hay wagons—a good omen for cavalry horses. Farther on are other miles of bread wagons, of bacon and beef wagons. Horned cattle are led along by the score to become beef in due time; clothes and equipments, medicines, and blankets are brought rumbling into France." Although orders had been issued both by the King and the Crown Prince that the troops should be fed by the people of the country, the Intendantur took care to carry forward ample reserves of everything. It should also be noted that, whereas the Germans marched light and were relieved of all impediments, the unfortunate French soldier had to carry several days' rations, when they could be procured in advance, besides his portion of a *tente d'abri*, his cooking utensils, and his knapsack. The Germans marched without tents, depending upon a bivouac fire when they could not obtain the shelter of

a roof. Before proceeding further with the narrative, it will be as well to consider the actual position of the Army of Chalons.

This army was composed of four French army corps, the 1st, which had been defeated at Weissenburg and Worth, the 5th, which had remained inactive at Bitché, the 7th, which had marched from Belfort, and a new corps, the 12th, which was composed principally of Gardes Mobiles and marines. The Gardes Mobiles were very raw militia, the majority of them never having seen a Chassepot before one was put into their hands for immediate use. Their discipline was of the very worst, so much so, that when General Trochu left Chalons for Paris, he took eighteen battalions of these men with him, as it was not deemed advisable to trust them in the field. The very greatest jealousy prevailed amongst the General officers, each was afraid that another might outstrip him on the pathway to glory, and as a consequence troops were held back when their presence would probably have turned the scale in favour of the nation. Certainly if De Failly had supported McMahon at Worth, so crushing a defeat could not have been inflicted. There were many other similar instances. At that epoch, the French Generals appeared to consider that the army was made for them, not them for the army. This is an evil which may easily force itself into any service, owing to the innate selfishness of mankind as a general rule. Self-seeking accomplishes an immensity of harm, and should be stamped out with an iron heel. We may congratulate ourselves upon the fact that the British race, equally with the French, has always exhibited a patriotism which has claimed the admiration of the world, and never more so than in the Boer War. It is, however, necessary that we should be on our guard not to allow self in any way to interfere with our duty to our King and Empire. The Emperor and McMahon had no very reliable troops to depend on in the contest with the highly disciplined forces of the Germans. The march from Reims was commenced on the 22nd and ended on the 31st August when Sedan was reached. The army corps had to follow different routes; the 1st marched through Attigny, and the 5th and 12th both passed through Rethel by separate roads, and the 7th marched directly through Vouziers. Deducting the halts the corps covered distances of about twelve miles daily, not bad marching for troops so heavily laden and so indifferently fed. The successful feeding of the several corps depended much upon their traversing separate districts, particularly under the existing circumstances, as has already been stated, most of the peasantry had taken refuge in

the large towns and had left very little behind them. It is not surprising, therefore, that discipline was at a very low ebb when the several corps reached the neighbourhood of Sedan. Capt. Hozier, in his *Franco-Prussian War*, tells us that in the notebook of an officer was found the following :—" 27th August, there is no distribution of rations ; we have, however, reserve biscuits to last us to the 28th. Both men and horses are quite worn out by marching over tilled ground softened for several days by almost incessant rain. In a village we passed through the inhabitants gave all the bread and other food they have to our soldiers, some of whom were absolutely begging for it." It is perfectly clear that the French Intendance at this epoch was in woeful plight. The responsibility for such a condition rested more upon the officialism of the Quai d'Orsay than upon the officers of that department. The fact, that the camp at Chalons was wholly unprovided with any reserves of supplies, and that Sedan at so crucial a moment was destitute of any provisions for the large garrison to whom its safety was confided, requires no comment ; those facts condemn the authorities at headquarters, who did not lack time to despatch sufficient supplies to those particular depôts. The Intendants in the field appear to have had quite enough to do to collect supplies, and to feed the troops from day to day. It is quite true that the destination of McMahon's army was for a time very uncertain, but its movements were fixed by the Government, and the authorities were alone aware of its destination.

McMahon's army had reached the Meuse in the early morning of the 30th August. De Failly's corps was to cover the passage of that river. We are told by Von Moltke that the General had determined to give his men a meal after their hard night's march :—" Precautionary measures seem to have been altogether neglected, though he must have known that the enemy was near at hand ; and at half-past one, while the officers and men were at dinner, the Prussian shells dropped into the lines of the incautious enemy." This determined attack of the Germans forced McMahon to withdraw in the direction of Mouzon, which was afterwards carried by the enemy. The French lost 1,800 in killed and wounded and 3,000 prisoners, and the Germans are stated to have lost in killed and wounded 3,500 men. Von Moltke goes on to describe the further retreat of the French :—" Though pursuit immediately after the battle was prevented by the intervening river, the retreat of the French soon assumed the character of a rout. The troops were worn out with their efforts by day and night in con-

tinuous rain, and with but scanty supplies of food. Thousands of fugitives crying for bread, crowded round the wagons as they made their way to the little fortress which had so unexpectedly become the central goal of a vast army." The result of this important battle was to force McMahon's army to seek the shelter of Sedan, without any hope of forming a junction with Bazaine. No other course seems to have been open to the French commander, who had then to operate with an army exhausted by heavy marches, hard fighting, and short rations, which had been in a state of indiscipline from the outset, and was now demoralised by defeat. He might certainly have retreated into Belgian territory, but this would have involved a further march of from ten to a dozen miles, which his men were physically unable to accomplish. The ingloriousness of such a proceeding would have been hateful to the *amour propre* of a proud nation and army, but as subsequent events proved, it would have been the wiser course to have adopted.

CHAPTER VII.

SURRENDER AT SEDAN.

McMahon's army had been pushed back by the 3rd and 4th German Armies until the French found themselves cut off from any possible chance of co-operation with Bazaine, which was the chief object of the Committee of National Defence. In effect the four French Army Corps found themselves held up tightly against the Belgian frontier, they certainly had a second-class fortress to fall back upon, but Sedan had no outlying forts, and was of no practical use to an army of 140,000 men, furthermore, it had not been provisioned even for the small garrison which would have been needed to defend it. The French Intendance made an effort to repair this absence of foresight by sending forward train-loads of supplies and a number of wagon-trains, some of which managed, through the effective work done by the French cavalry, to get to their destination. Dick de Lonlay tells us that Colonel Thornton of the 7th Chasseurs on finding a large number of wagons laden with supplies and munitions at Carignan exposed to the attack of the German cavalry on the 31st August, promptly divided the train into three parts, despatching each by a different route to Sedan, and covered their retirement by extending his men to the rear. He adds that 800,000 rations had reached Bazeilles by train on the morning of the 1st September, but at the first attack made by the Germans the stationmaster appears to have lost his head, and in his fright sent on the major portion of the train to Mézières, with 600,000 of the rations, which was an actual loss of over four days' supplies for the whole army. Rustow, in his *War for the Rhine Frontier*, gives a very interesting account of the operations of the German cavalry:—“The Saxon division of cavalry, after it had crossed the Meuse on the 31st August at Prouilly, remarked from the Bois de Vaux a quantity of trains standing in the railway station of Carignan ready to be despatched. Its batteries at once opened fire upon them, and then descended the left bank of the Chiers towards Douay. When in the neighbourhood of Brevilly, French wagon-trains were seen on the highway on the right bank of the Chiers. The cavalry regiment of the Saxon Guard at once crossed the river in pursuit, but could not overtake the convoys, as it met

with a fire of musketry from the French infantry and from the inhabitants of Pouru St. Remy. The 1st Saxon Regiment of Uhlans, No. 17, on the other hand, succeeded in penetrating into Douzy, after the horse artillery battery had shelled the place, and captured 40 wagons, the railway trains, and a number of prisoners." From these statements it is obvious that the enterprise of the German cavalry operated very prejudicially upon the efforts made by the Intendance to repair the blunders for which they alone were not responsible. The vacillation at the Quai d'Orsay, as well as in the French generals, rendered the supply almost an impossibility. No one seems to have been able to form an idea where the army might be on the following day or the day after. To the very last moment it was a question whether McMahon would fall back upon Sedan, or upon Mézières, or whether he would persist in his efforts to form a junction with Bazaine. But this constitutes no excuse for the almost entire absence of a reserve of supplies at Sedan. In the existing circumstances every fortress on the north-eastern frontier should have been amply provided with ammunition and supplies, as they were the only hope left to France by which the further invasion could have been stayed and perhaps prevented.

By the morning of the 1st September nearly the whole of the French had crossed to the right bank of the Meuse, the troops most in advance were in occupation of Bazeilles, the remainder being distributed to the right and left of Sedan. The subsequent movements of the two German armies cannot be better described than by quoting the order of battle published by the King of Prussia, which was carried out to the letter by both the German commanders. It read as follows:—"The army of the Meuse (Crown Prince of Saxony) will prevent the French left wing from escaping to the east between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier. The 3rd Army (Crown Prince of Prussia) will continue its march northward and attack the French wherever they may make a stand on the left bank of the Meuse; for the rest, it will operate against their front and right flank in such a manner as to hem them in between the Meuse and the Belgian frontier." The fighting throughout this battle was most severe on both sides, the French being numerically inferior, and having to fight for their very existence, made them fight with a greater determination. On the other hand the Germans were flushed with victory, and felt the obligation resting upon them to accomplish as much as had been previously done in the former engagements of the war. The fight for Bazeilles was exceptionally

bloody, each force being successful by turns. It is said that the inhabitants took part in the contest, and that even some of the women joined in the battle. The fight from house to house was very obstinately contested, but eventually the Bavarians succeeded in driving the French out of the place. The fighting in other parts of the field was equally severe, and was engaged in with the greatest courage and determination by both sides. Eventually the French Army Corps found themselves completely cut off from any retreat over the Belgian frontier, which had been regarded as a *dernier ressort*. As a matter of fact General Ducrot who had succeeded McMahon in the command of the army after that officer had been wounded, had intended to have massed the bulk of his army to the north of Sedan with the object of securing a safe retreat over the Belgian frontier in case of dire necessity. He was, however, thwarted in this design by the arrival of General Wimpffen, who was senior to him, and at once claimed the command. This officer considered that the French army would occupy a more advantageous position by occupying the high ground surrounding Sedan. It is certain that this horseshoe formation must have enabled him to detach reinforcements with facility from one part of the field to another. However, before nightfall he was driven from his position and his men had to seek a refuge under the walls of Sedan. The situation was desperate, as the Germans were in occupation of the surrounding heights, and the French were driven into a hole without means of escape. Some few thousands, however, managed to effect their escape across the frontier, but that was not possible for a whole army so situated. Seeing the hopelessness of the situation, Napoleon ordered the hoisting of a white flag on the walls of Sedan in token of surrender. The losses in this battle are variously estimated—the German killed and wounded are given as from 9,000 to 13,000, and the French from 15,000 to 30,000. In any case the French loss was more than twice that of the Germans, owing to the dominating fire of the artillery of the latter.

On the morning of the 2nd September Napoleon sent General Wimpffen to negotiate the terms of the surrender of the French army. That officer was very averse to agree to the almost unconditional surrender demanded by the Germans. If the terms were not agreed to at once he was informed that the guns would re-open fire, he was consequently forced to accept the only terms procurable, by which the soldiers became prisoners of war, the officers being allowed to retain their swords and personal property.

It cannot be regarded otherwise than as a breach of faith that the French troops generally destroyed their regimental colours, sometimes with the sanction of their commanding officers, although by the terms of the capitulation all flags, eagles, cannon, &c., were to have been delivered to the German Army. Colonel Henri de Ponchalon, in his *Souvenirs de la Guerre*, gives an interesting account of the surrender. He says that in his intense disgust at the turn of affairs, he broke his sword and threw the pieces into the ditch of the fortress. The general in command very properly ordered the distribution of the money remaining in the army chest, each officer receiving a month's pay, and each soldier ten francs. He continues :—"In the evening I returned to the hotel. I noticed sitting opposite to me at the table an Intendant, whom I observed had secreted a ration loaf of bread under his serviette ; on my asking him for some he surreptitiously gave me a small piece, and informed me that on the following morning, when the men were marching out of Sedan, each officer would receive a ration loaf, but the poor soldiers were to have nothing." This incident illustrates the fact that the supplies in Sedan were almost non-existent. Another account given by M. Amanieu, who was attached to the French Ambulance, establishes the lamentable position of the French Intendance at Sedan. He wrote :—"Our cook employed all his arts to enable us to swallow without disgust the horse-flesh, which for some time had deserted its luxuriant pastures and its happy freedom. Our bread came from Belgium. The horse-flesh was slaughtered and issued by the Intendance who had exceedingly heavy duties to accomplish, the feeding of the hundred-thousand mouths shut up in Sedan; their work deserves the utmost recognition. The prisoners who passed by thousands before our ambulances appeared to be half famished. We gave them meat, bread, wine, and water, and when we had nothing more to give, we concealed ourselves so as not to witness their terrible sufferings." It should, however, be remembered that the sufferings may have been more apparent than real, for the French troops had been marching and fighting hard for the past three days, and had given themselves up to drunkenness, rioting, and disorder of the worst description during the whole of the previous night, when Sedan had been converted for the time being into an *inferno*. Von Moltke tells us that "as they were absolutely destitute of supplies the commandant, of Mezières allowed them the use of the railway as far as Donchery." Much of the hardships experienced by the soldiery of McMahon's army would have arisen from the fact that that army

was destitute of anything like a sufficiency of transport, and the soldiers for their own preservation were forced to carry large quantities of bread and biscuits when those supplies were procurable in quantities ; in some cases men carried, in addition to their equipment, heavy loads of bread and biscuit—as much as twenty pounds weight being carried when it could be procured.

The Emperor left Sedan on the morning of the 2nd September with the intention of surrendering himself personally to the King of Prussia, he was, however, met by Count Bismarck on his way to Donchery, and was treated by that diplomatist with every mark of consideration. On the afternoon of the same day, that remarkable and historic event took place, the meeting of the two monarchs. This meeting is excellently described in the diary of the Crown Prince translated by H. W. Lucy. The interview is thus described :—After some complimentary remarks about the fortune of war, the Emperor protested that he had deferred only to public opinion when he rushed on the war, the King retorted that it was the fault of those whom he had made his counsellors. Asking Napoleon if he had any negotiations to propose, he replied that as a prisoner he could make none as he had no influence with the Government which was in Paris. The King then offered him Wilhelmshöhe as a residence, which offer was accepted. Napoleon was much disappointed when he was informed that he had been confronted by only the 3rd and 4th Armies, he being under the impression that the 2nd Army was also present. “ When Napoleon caught sight of me he gave me his hand, while with the other he dried up the big tears trickling down his cheeks.” The Crown Prince added in his diary under date the 8th September: “ France is now our natural enemy for all time, and therefore her enfeeblement is our business.” Again on the 2nd October he wrote : “ Queen Victoria, who follows our deeds with touching interest, has telegraphed to His Majesty exhorting him to treat with magnanimity France’s peace proposals, but without being able to recommend any practical means to that end.”

Before concluding the account of the surrender of Sedan it may prove of interest to give Colonel de Ponchalon’s narrative of his escape from the German Guards :—Marching out of Sedan on the evening of the 3rd September, they marched through Bavarian soldiers lined up on either side of the road towards Glaire. Observing a miller walking alongside the regiment, the colonel, then a captain, asked him if he would part with his clothes for a consideration. He agreed to this, and kept on the alert. Arrived at Glaire, which was full of German soldiers,

the captain managed to slip into the miller's house unperceived, where he changed his uniform for a suit belonging to the miller. After covering his face, hands, and clothing with flour, his disguise was complete. Being almost famished, he gave the miller some money to get food. That worthy soon returned with an excellent *fricassée* of chicken, some wine and rum. Bread was not procurable, but he had his ration loaf. Having determined upon what they should say on being questioned, the officer, the miller, and his son left the house after nightfall. They had to cross a bridge guarded by Bavarians, but they were watching the French soldiers who were still marching through, and failed to observe the party of civilians, who thus gained the left of the field of battle, which they feigned to be leisurely inspecting. After crossing the battlefield they came upon a force of Germans on the march towards Mezières. Here the men picked up an ox, a cow, and a horse, the latter was slightly wounded, and had escaped from the Germans. On reaching the frontier the officer was saved. He was, however, quickly recognised as an officer and should have been interned, as thousands of others had been, but his disguise was so complete that he was accorded the benefit of the doubt. He soon made his way to Namur and thence to Paris, when he was posted to the 23rd Regiment of the line, and took part in the defence of that city during its memorable siege.

It will be readily understood that the sudden change of direction in the advance of the 3rd and 4th German Armies from due east to due north was very trying to those officers and men who had charge of the lines of communication, the utilisation of the existing railways, and more especially in regard to the working of the Intendantur. According to the official account, magazines had been established as far east as Bar le Duc by the 26th August, and by reason of the change of direction, magazines had to be formed at Clermont and on either side of the Meuse nearly the whole way to Sedan. The 6th North German Corps was left behind at Vouziers, both to secure the left rear of the advancing armies, and to guard their lines of communication as well as the magazines established and supplied along that route. These lines had been threatened to some extent by General Vinoy's *corps d'armée* which was on its march from Paris in support of McMahon's army; it did not, however, reach the neighbourhood of Sedan before its capitulation. This army had to make a considerable detour to escape the German corps in the occupation of Rethel, and to succeed in effecting a safe retreat upon Paris. The 4th Army, or as it was usually termed the army of the Meuse,

depended mainly upon Pont à Mousson as its advanced main dépôt. This dépôt, as well as those at Nancy and Bar le Duc, was fed by the lines of railway passing through Saarguemond and Saarbrücken. Requisitions were employed extensively throughout the district of the Vosges, wagons being engaged in bringing in the supplies so obtained. These operations were considerably impeded by the holding out of several smaller fortresses, by which some lines of railway and many roads were rendered of little or no use to the invaders. Those which affected the communications and supplies most seriously were Verdun, Toul, Strasburg, Bitché, and Phalzburg. It was no light matter to supply two large armies advancing rapidly from the base dépôts, with a force of nearly 200,000 men, and with an enormous artillery and cavalry, the latter would require enormous quantities of forage daily. It has also to be taken into account that another large army, that surrounding Metz, had to be fed from practically the same district at the same time. It is not surprising to read the following statement made by Von Moltke at this epoch:—"In spite of long and sometimes forced marches in bad weather, with little by way of supplies beyond what could be requisitioned, the army of the Meuse on the east, and the 3rd Army on the south, were now close in front of the combined forces of the French." Dick de Lonlay gives a more pronounced opinion of the scanty resources of the German Intendantur at this period in his description of the treatment of the French prisoners who were collected on the plateau of Iges near Sedan. He wrote as follows:—"The wretched prisoners found themselves in the open air, without covering, without food, and in a most insanitary position." He charges the authorities with endeavouring to reduce the courage and strength of the French soldiery by a systematic starvation. He says it was not until the 5th September that the Germans, upon the reiterated insistence of Generals Ducrot and Lebrun, at length issued half a biscuit to each of the prisoners, which was to last for two days. He adds that within forty-eight hours 4,000 of these men died from hunger and exposure. It is also stated that 10,000 of the captured horses died of hunger. Although there may be some exaggeration in the descriptions given, it is evident that a brave enemy, as the Germans were, would not have subjected men or animals willingly to torture. The inference is that at this period the German troops themselves were very hard pressed for provisions and forage, and the circumstances point to this conclusion. They had been forced to advance with the utmost rapidity, as McMahon had gained the advantage of four days

in his departure from Chalons, they would, in their hasty advance, have outmarched their supplies, and as the surrounding country, which had been deserted by its inhabitants, could afford them very little support, they would have been very indifferently supplied for the few days succeeding the capitulation of Sedan.

The Germans had to face the serious undertaking of transporting the 80,000 French prisoners from Sedan into Germany. The only line of railway which might have been made available was commanded by the fortresses of Montmedy and Thionville, it therefore became incumbent upon the unfortunate prisoners to march by road until conveyance by rail was procurable. De Lonlay gives a full account of the transportation of these men. The following routes were selected the more direct by way of Stenay, Etain, Gorze, Remilly, and Forbach, and the longer by way of Buzancy, Clermont, St. Mihiel, and Pont à Mousson. They were despatched in parties of 200 or 300 at a time, some 6,000 leaving daily. The guards were provided by the 1st Bavarian Corps, which would account in some degree for the rough treatment experienced by the prisoners. He says that when the poor fellows fell by the way from exhaustion, the Bavarians struck them with the butts of their rifles until they rose and continued their weary march. He further states that their inhuman guards refused to allow them to receive any of the refreshments kindly proffered to them by the inhabitants of the villages through which they passed. He quotes the opinion of the correspondent of the *Daily Telegraph*, who is stated to have condemned the hard and cruel manner in which the French prisoners were treated by their conquerors :—" Words fail to describe the barbarous scenes which occurred before my eyes." He states also that when the prisoners reached available lines of railway, they were transported in open wagons in which they had to stand, as there were no seats, many of them dying by the way from sheer exhaustion. The prisoners were distributed amongst many of the large frontier towns, such as Cologne, Coblenz, Ulm, Mayence, Inglestadt, Homburg, and Dantzic ; but a very large number were sent to East Prussia and to other parts of the interior. The correspondent of the *Daily News*, writing on the 3rd September, says :—" The prisoners taken in the battle have gone away in strong detachments, guarded by German troops, and those who were upon the rainy muddy roads to the rear last night, as was the present writer, saw columns of Frenchmen tramping briskly along with the German escort marching by their side in the worst of humours at being so employed. I

have seen many women to-day cooking for the prisoners, and trying to push through the crowd to bring them small dainties." The passage of these prisoners and their escorts entailed very heavy work upon the Intendantur, who had to form a number of supplementary dépôts in addition to those already formed at Pont à Mousson, Remilly, and Forbach. Much of the sufferings which were endured by the prisoners was not preventable, for the utmost foresight could not have anticipated the capitulation. But it is more than probable that the Bavarians had old scores to settle on account of their heavy losses at Weissenburg, Worth, and during the severe fighting at Bazeilles, and it is quite possible that they may have been harder upon the French prisoners than North Germans might have been. Furthermore, the French had reckoned upon the neutrality of the South Germans, and even went so far as to hope that they might join them against their northern countrymen; the Bavarians would no doubt have felt somewhat disposed to resent such an assumption, and perhaps allowed their angry feelings to outrun their discretion. It was undoubtedly a mistake to relegate such a duty to the Bavarian soldiery, whose southern blood is hot and far more apt to indulge in reprisals than might have been the case with the more cool-headed and more humane North Germans.

The writer has no intention to find any fault whatever with the organisation or working of the German supply and transport services, his object has been to demonstrate by what great difficulties those services were seriously impeded, and how these devoted men managed to accomplish their very trying and arduous duties. The German organisation appears to have been complete in every detail. Inspector-Generals of Etappen followed each army in its advance, established the lines of communication, and guarded them with their Etappen troops; they were also responsible for the establishment of the necessary hospitals and magazines to the rear of the army. These duties would have needed the employment of very large numbers of officers and men, particularly as the German armies were then operating in the enemy's country more than 100 miles beyond their own frontier. The keeping open of hundreds of miles of railways and roadways, the efficient protection of convoys, of prisoners, and of the sick and wounded, of supply columns, of ammunition trains, and of communications generally in such an extensive and hostile country was not easy of accomplishment, particularly in the face of the open hostility of the inhabitants, and in face of the fact that a considerable number of both large and small fortified

towns were still held by the French forces. There is very little doubt that at this epoch the German troops suffered great hardships, but it is also evident that the troops bore their sufferings with a stoicism which is worthy of imitation. We hear of no grumblings or complaints, the men knew that circumstances were against them, for although their arms had been eminently successful, the rapidity of their advance had been the direct cause of the greater part of their hardships. There was also the serious obstruction to transport caused by the removal of such large numbers of wounded men to the rear, as well as the removal of masses of prisoners towards the frontier; the roads would have been blocked to the supply columns for hours at a time, which must have affected the feeding of the men and horses to a serious extent. Some writers on the war complain very bitterly of the requisition system employed by the German Intendantur, they maintain that the peasantry and the country dealers were plundered without any compensation. Receipts were given as a rule for what was taken, but there was no intention whatever of paying for what had been thus appropriated, in the event of the Germans coming off victorious, there was always the chance of the holders of the receipts being settled with by the government of the country; but it is not at all probable that these unfortunate people, who afterwards became German subjects, ever received any consideration for the stores and supplies which were taken from them so arbitrarily.

The treatment to which the inhabitants of Alsace and Lorraine had been subjected by the invaders caused them to have recourse to retaliatory measures. By the middle of August several corps of *Franc-tireurs* had been formed in this part of the invaded country, and their operations in the mountainous districts of the Vosges caused the German commanders much anxiety, and some serious losses in men and material. The men were organised into companies under experienced officers, who trusted principally to chance for the subsistence and housing of their men, but Mezières was used by a number of corps as a recognised base. As these men usually operated in small numbers, the difficulties in the way of their supply were not serious. They were more or less successful in their attacks upon the advanced and rear guards of armies on the march, upon convoys, and were very well adapted for cutting off foraging parties or stragglers. The successes gained by the partisan warfare waged in the Vosges, caused others to follow the example thus given, and *Franc-tireurs* began to take service in all parts of the country, particularly

in the northern departments. There was soon a force of many thousands of these irregular troops rampaging over that part of the country which was being invaded by the German armies. The mobility of these troops was very great for they moved about without baggage or reserves of any kind, when their ammunition was nearly exhausted a fresh supply could be procured from a neighbouring fortress or camp, and no doubt many of their enterprising commanders would have secreted reserves of supplies and ammunition at various points in the surrounding district. It will readily be understood what a serious menace to the operations of the supply and transport such a force would become, as well as to the lines of communication. Romagny gives us an example of the daring of such troops :—" On the night of the 28th August, 50 men commanded by a lieutenant left Mulhouse, and crossed the Rhine into Baden. At Nuremburg they cut the line of railway, destroyed the telegraph lines, and succeeded in capturing seven German boats, which they carried over to the French side of the river." This incident was announced to the French Chamber in the following grandiloquent language : " A free corps has invaded Baden territory. This morning the Baden railway train is missing." The French Government had then to make most of even insignificant successes, as the people were highly dissatisfied with the initial stages of the campaign, and the obvious absence of any successes.

CHAPTER VIII.

SIEGE OF STRASBURG.

The various sieges undertaken by the German forces during this war are full of interest and instruction to the student of military history, and particularly to the members of the supply department. As a rule the prolongation of an effective resistance depends mainly upon the possession of a sufficient garrison, efficient armaments, a good supply of ammunition and projectiles, and above all upon an ample food supply. If a fortress should be lacking in any one of the aforesaid particulars, the defence will have, sooner or later, to be abandoned. We have now to consider mainly the food supply necessary for the defence of all beleaguered cities. It may be accepted as a general rule that, where there is the probability that a siege will be pressed closely, it will be necessary to calculate the food supply upon a very liberal basis, for it must be remembered that the very arduous work which the troops are called upon to perform requires that they should be well and liberally fed. On that account alone very large reserves should be accumulated well in advance of the environment of the fortress. It may, however, be accepted as a safe axiom that too large a supply of food can hardly be collected, provided always that it can be preserved from deterioration or complete destruction.

The first points which require immediate attention of the supply officer are the following :—The present and prospective numbers which may have to be fed ; the quantities of supplies and forage held at the moment, and the quantities needed to make up the requisite reserves ; the immediate collection of such additional reserves ; the preparation of storehouses for their reception ; and the necessary accommodation for the security of cattle during the siege. There will also be many important matters of detail connected with the preparation and distribution of supplies, particularly if the civil population has to be fed, which arrangements should be formulated well in advance of the necessity for bringing them into operation. Every effort should

be made in good time to get rid of "useless mouths." This is too often neglected upon sentimental considerations, which so frequently turn out to have been ill-advised if not positively inhuman. The tendency is to permit the incursion of large numbers of people from the surrounding districts, the majority of whom would come under the denomination of "useless mouths." Accidents of this description are very apt to upset the most careful calculations of the responsible officers. Stringent measures should therefore be adopted well in advance where practicable, and such people should be forced to take refuge in other parts of the country where invasion is not imminent. It is impossible to enumerate all the precautions which would be adopted in preparing for a siege, but sufficient has been said to show how much thought and preparation is needed before any fortress can be considered as in a position to withstand a siege. It will be found that the study of the preparations made by the French may add considerably to our knowledge of the subject. We cannot, therefore, do better than commence with the siege of Strasburg, which was the first fortress of importance besieged by the invading German armies.

It will be remembered that, after the defeat of McMahon's army at Worth, a large number of fugitives took the road towards the south, many of these passed through Haguenau in the utmost disorder, some of them managing to rejoin his retreating army, others made the best of their way to Strasburg and other places. It was imagined that the German forces would at once march upon that city, but it was not until four days afterwards that the Baden division, under General von Werder, appeared before that fortress. His force was insufficient to cut the communications entirely, as the Crown Prince could not afford to detach more than one division from his army, which was then advancing towards the camp at Chalons. By the 23rd August von Werder's force was augmented by two Landwehr divisions and by a powerful siege train, his force then numbering some 60,000 men. The fortress was commanded by General Urich, who was then nearly 70 years of age. He had seen much active service, and had commanded a brigade in the Crimean War. The garrison consisted of about 16,000 men, but these were assisted in the defence by the national guard belonging to the city and by the whole of the male population. Strasburg was scarcely a fortress of the first order, its works were on a grand scale and were strengthened by extensive inundations which were drawn from the waters of two small rivers passing close to the city. The

armaments were abundant, but at least half the guns were of obsolete pattern, there were, however, a number of rifled guns mounted on its walls or bastions.

General Boulanger, in his work *L'Invasion Allemande*, gives us some important particulars in regard to the indifferent preparations made by the French government for the defence of this very important frontier fortress, he says:—"The Intendant in charge went to Paris as early as May, 1870, to complain of the insufficiency of the preparations which had been made for the defence of Strasburg. General Ducrot, who was then in command, made similar representations. The Emperor gave the following reply: 'If your opinions and those of General Ducrot are correct, it must be admitted that the War Minister is the only one ignorant of this state of things, for assuredly, if they are what you suppose, he would have been the first to mention the matter to me.'" He adds further that the Intendant was informed that the 10,000 men to be sent from Lyons and Marseilles for the augmentation of the garrison would be provided with their full camp equipment. These men actually arrived at Strasburg without any baggage, their departure being so hurried that they could not bring it with them. M. Bodenhorst, in his *Siege of Strasburg*, informs us that some of the casemates were unfit for the occupation of the soldiery owing to the want of both air and light, and that the barracks were not more than sufficient for 9,500 men. It will be seen, therefore, that the soldiers had very inadequate accommodation, and must have suffered accordingly during the siege. There are, however, very few sieges on record during which the soldiery conducted themselves with greater courage and devotion to their country, and in which the civil population endured the sufferings and privations, by which they were surrounded, with greater stoicism. Fortunately for all, the siege was of short duration, extending for no longer than one month and a half.

A very good account of the preliminary arrangements made by General Uhrich is given by Capt. Hozier in his *Franco-Prussian War*. We now quote from that work:—"The General at once took steps to negotiate with the townspeople in regard to the defence of the city. A council of war was assembled, all the members unanimously agreed to defend the city to the very last. It was found that the supplies for the troops were abundant, they amounted to 180 days' bread, and other provisions for 80 days, but the quantity of live-stock was very limited. Capt. Hozier says nothing about the supplies required for the civilian

population, but it is evident that in a town containing 85,000 inhabitants there must have been considerable supplies in the local storehouses, and those who had the means would no doubt have secured from two to three months' private stores. We are, however, informed by M. Dickharts that by the commencement of September fresh meat had become difficult to procure, and that horseflesh cost two francs the half kilogramme (about a pound), fresh vegetables had disappeared, and they had to depend upon dry vegetables, a large stock of which had been laid in. Neither milk, butter, nor eggs could be procured except at fabulous prices. The situation will be better understood when it is explained that Strasburg was closely invested, and as there were no outlying forts no grazing ground was available outside the city walls; consequently horses and cattle could not be expected to thrive under such circumstances. Cellars were used for the storage of supplies, so as to preserve them from the effects of the heavy shell fire. The aged people and women and children were urged to leave the town, but loose characters were turned out. The city was summoned to surrender on the 9th August, but the French commander declined to entertain the proposal. He at once issued a proclamation reminding the people of their duty, which was concluded in these words:—"If Strasburg is attacked, Strasburg will be defended so long as a soldier, a biscuit, or a cartridge is left. The brave can rest contented, the others may leave."

It was not until the 12th that the bombardment of the city commenced; however, on the following day the General sent out a small number of cavalry and infantry to forage for supplies and to ascertain the strength of the enemy, they succeeded in bringing in 100 oxen and some supplies. The bombardment was commenced in good earnest by howitzers and other heavy guns, which were in battery beyond the range of the guns of the fortress. Before proceeding with the bombardment, General Werder offered to allow the infirm men and the women and children to leave the city, but as the French commander did not care to make a selection, he declined the offer, and unfortunately did not notify the inhabitants of the impending heavy bombardment which was about to be opened. For three days the town was bombarded with the result that no less than 600 citizens were wounded. In reply to the request of the French commander, General Werder sent in supplies of lint and bandages for the unfortunate people. The citizens took refuge in cellars, which in some cases became death-traps when the shells managed to enter

them. On one occasion a shell from a mortar penetrated a house of six storeys and exploded in the cellar. Dickharts says that when the houses were burnt by the shell fire, the inhabitants to the number of 12,600 had to seek shelter in the cathedral, the theatre, and other public buildings, some even took refuge in the sewers, and others occupied temporary shelters erected against the walls of the ramparts. The health of even the most robust suffered; the dampness of the cellars, and of the outside shelters, and the want of sleep, greatly aggravated the sufferings of these unhappy people. Still there was no demand to surrender the city. M. Bonnett, in his *Chalons à Sedan*, states that the town was provisioned for a garrison of 9,000 men with three months' bread and two months' meat, but he adds that the garrison became augmented by reinforcements and fugitives from Weissenburg and Worth to a total of 23,000 men. He states that on the 21st August General Uhrich asked that the women, children, and old men might be permitted to leave the town, but that his request was refused. This statement does not quite agree with what Capt. Hozier tells us. His information is to some extent confirmed by subsequent events. About the middle of September a number of Swiss delegates arrived at Strasburg with the object of removing some of the unfortunate citizens. General von Werder was willing to permit the departure of a certain number of old men, women and children, but as the ultimate surrender of the place would be hastened by the daily consumption of the available reserves, he naturally declined to do more than true humanity required. About 1,400 of these unfortunates were permitted to leave for Switzerland.

The end was now fast approaching, on the 2nd September, we are informed by Marcel Poullin, that General Uhrich had informed the Minister for War of the very serious condition of the garrison. In reply he was informed as follows:—"Cross the Rhine during the night, and throw yourselves into Baden, now destitute of troops, and re-enter France higher up. Act promptly and without any loss of time." General Palikao appears to have quite overlooked the fact that the bridge had been destroyed, and that the Germans had mounted 45 large pieces of ordnance on the right bank of the river behind Kehl. Nor does he appear to have realised the close nature of the investment, the advanced parallel being then within about 500 yards of the walls of the city. Rustow gives a very full account of the German siege operations; we extract the following:—"The German artillery had, on the 24th September, 229 pieces of ordnance in their batteries, among which

were 83 mortars. They had since the commencement of the attack thrown 193,722 shot and shell into the town and fortress, 6,249 for each day, 260 for each hour, 4 to 5 for every minute." On the 27th September the white flag was hoisted by order of General Uhrich. Capt. Hozier states as follows: "All that remained of the citadel, at one time deemed by its possessors almost impregnable, were huge masses of rubbish produced by the incessant fire from the batteries of Kehl on the one side and the bombs thrown from those near Schiltigheim on the other." The same writer describes the enormous destruction to the city in the following words:—"In the choir was lodged the special glory of Alsace—its library, the finest on the Rhine, in which the archives, antiquities, topography, and early printing collections were treasured. All perished. Since the apocryphal burning of the library of Alexandria, perhaps no equally irreparable loss has occurred. The stately picture gallery in the Kleberplatz was gutted from basement to roof; the archiepiscopal and imperial palaces, as well as other fine mansions near the minster, were much damaged; the bridges over the canals were entirely smashed, and the houses in the Quai de Bateliers, &c., were all greatly injured. The cathedral was to all external appearance uninjured. The spire, though it had been struck in more places than one, was as attractive a spectacle as ever. No less than 448 private houses were entirely destroyed, and out of the 5,150 in the town and suburbs nearly 3,000 were more or less injured; 1,700 civilians were killed or wounded, and 10,000 persons made houseless. The estimate of the total damage to the city was nearly £8,000,000."

From the above account it will be seen that the brave inhabitants of the town and the devoted garrison had to face a terrific cannonade, which not only destroyed their property in wholesale fashion, but also placed their lives in the utmost jeopardy. It is true that they were not reduced to any serious straits for the want of supplies, they certainly had had to take to eating horse-flesh towards the end of the siege, but were very soon without those dairy products which are so essential for the feeding of the children. They had certainly to endure great hardships, but there was no starvation, and the surrender resulted solely from the certainty that the breached works would be carried by storm, and the French commander did not wish to expose the suffering inhabitants to such an ordeal. It must be allowed that the victors were very moderate in their demands, but the German commander no doubt recognised the fact that General Uhrich

was negotiating in behalf of those who would very soon become German subjects. Only 3,000 Germans marched into the city, and there were no marked demonstrations on the part of the victors. On the other hand, the inhabitants, who were of German extraction, behaved in a becoming manner towards their conquerors; but to this day the inhabitants of Alsace, to a considerable extent, still cling to France, and many of the young men even now leave that district to take service in the French army. Possibly the exclusion of the French language and other coercive measures, which may have been introduced with too much harshness, have made numbers of the Alsatians act somewhat differently to what they might have done had the changes been less emphatic and more gradual.

The siege operations were conducted in the most humane manner by the German force investing the city. General von Werder did everything that it was possible for him to do to mitigate the evils incident to a bombardment. The cathedral was protected from the artillery fire as far as was practicable in the face of such a terrific cannonade, and no more damage was done than was unavoidable. The Germans no doubt felt that they were firing upon a people who were of German descent, and that the city, its monuments, and its people, were on the point of again being taken into the mother country. Nothing could have exceeded the consideration shown to the wretched inhabitants, some of whom, it is said, sympathised with the Germans; they were given lint and bandages, and many were permitted to leave the beleaguered city. The following order, published by the German commandant, demonstrates the great moderation of the conquerors:—"The state of siege still continues. Crimes and offences will be punished by martial law. All weapons are to be immediately given up. All newspapers and publications are forbidden till further orders. Public-houses to be closed at 9 p.m.; after that hour every civilian must carry a lantern. The municipal authorities have to provide quarters, without food, for all good men." The German commander had an important duty to perform which was the reduction of the place, and that had to be accomplished as speedily as possible, for the fortress of Strasburg was impeding the direct railway communications between central and south Germany and Paris. He was, therefore, forced to push his attack, and it was not until the breaching of the wall had been accomplished that the fortress was at his mercy. This fact accounts fully for the vigour of the bombardment. If the French commander desired to spare the inhabitants, it was

quite within his right to capitulate sooner. He was perfectly well aware that so long as he could hold out, he was doing good service by detaining 60,000 of his country's foes, and was preventing the easy passage of supplies to the forces invading the country with the intention of investing its capital.

We do not however think that the French commander adopted the best means towards that end. Immediately on its becoming apparent that Strasburg would be speedily invested, he should certainly have got rid of a much larger number of the women and children; he appears only to have insisted upon the departure of a very few, and what was worse he permitted the rural inhabitants of the surrounding districts to flock into Strasburg. No doubt numbers of the well-to-do people left the city for the interior of France, but the whole of the useless mouths should have accompanied them. There is not the least doubt that their sufferings could not have been greater, nor would they have been ruined so effectually as they were in the doomed city. General Uhrich assembled a *Conseil de Défense*, which consisted of his Brigadiers, his battalion commanders, and his Intendant. Steps were taken for the organisation of the Mobile and National Guards. As most of these were raw troops much had to be done to fit them for their duties, but no steps appear to have been taken to bring any large additional quantities of supplies into the town. The country people would no doubt have brought in their cattle and some supplies, but there does not appear to have been any serious effort made to get in large stocks. Again, the mayor of the city and the council appear to have been consulted as to the desirability of defending the place, but no consultation appears to have been held between the civil and military authorities as to the economical use of the stocks held in the city and for their proper distribution. We know however from a municipal report made on the 16th September that seven restaurants had been established for the poorer people, where free meals were given, and that up to that date no less than 126,088 meals had been provided. Economical kitchens were also established where a better class of meal could be procured for a small payment. These appear to have been established by the municipality. We hold to the opinion that where the civil population is so large as it was at Strasburg, that the civil authorities should co-operate with the military in determining the steps to be taken for economising the reserves for both civilians and military, and this is absolutely essential from a disciplinary point of view when a city is under martial law. Apart from that, it is necessary that citizens should

be properly rationed when a state of siege is proclaimed, otherwise waste would result and some people would fatten while others starved. The question of payment for rations issued would have to be settled by the circumstances of each case, but without method the limits of the powers of resistance could never be attained. It is certain that no amount of prevision in this direction would have enabled Strasburg to hold out for any longer period than it did, but that is no reason why proper measures in regard to the reduction and feeding of the civil population should not have been adopted in making every preparation for holding out to the utmost. Furthermore, the local military and municipal authorities could never have contemplated the concentration of so enormous a besieging force as was actually brought against the place. Their obvious duty was to have made arrangements to prolong the resistance to the utmost by a careful organisation of their defensive means in men, guns, ammunition and supplies.

We now turn to the siege of Phalzburg, a fortress situated in the Vosges, a few miles to the northward of the main line of railway running from Paris to Strasburg, and is within striking distance of the tunnels piercing that range of mountains. It was therefore very essential that this fortress should be captured or blockaded. Phalzburg was commanded by Commandant Taillant, who had a garrison of about 1,200 men composed of regulars and mobiles, the latter being destitute of arms and equipments; the garrison was also augmented considerably by fugitives from Worth. On his march upon Chalons the Crown Prince endeavoured to carry this fortress by a *coup de main*. He halted before it on the 10th August and commanded its surrender, and on the refusal of the commandant subjected the place to a vigorous bombardment from his field guns. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us an account of the bombardment; he wrote: "Now a puff of white smoke goes up on the left and a fierce rush through the air tells of a passing shell. It falls into the town; but we cannot help a wish that the shells may only damage public property, as shriek after shriek through the air tells of their passage. The French gunners have manned their pieces and reply in excellent style. Flash after flash comes out from the old rampart. There is a constant whistling and shrieking across the space between, and a flying up of dust among the German guns, or a crash from the roofs of the town, as one side or the other makes a hit. One column of smoke, then another: it is

clear that the houses are burning, but not so clear that the French guns are silenced. They fire more slowly than their assailants, and seem to aim rather high. But there is heavy metal in the booming reports which come from the Phalzburg ramparts. It is a good defence." M. Poullin, in *Nos places perdues*, gives an account of this bombardment from another point of view. He tells us that during the whole night of the 13th a terrible cannonade was opened by 48 guns; houses were set on fire, the bell of the church fell with a portentous clatter. The inhabitants took refuge in either cellars or casemates. The streets became dangerous from the furniture thrown from the burning houses, as well as from shot and shell. In reply to a communication from the Crown Prince to spare the further destruction of the town, the Commandant replied:—"Continue your attack, you will accomplish the ruin of the city, but you cannot have either our walls or our guns, behind which you will find us if you succeed in destroying Phalzburg." The Crown Prince could not detain his army any longer, nor could he wait for siege guns, he therefore left a considerable force before the place and continued his advance.

M. Poullin gives some interesting information in regard to this remarkable siege. He says:—"That the munitions were ample; they consisted of three millions of cartridges and 38,000 rations of flour and biscuits, besides a good supply of shot and shell. The supply of tobacco is stated to have failed on the 21st August. A report having reached the garrison on the 8th September that Bazaine was marching to their relief, the fire upon the investing force was redoubled. But no Bazaine arrived." He gives a somewhat dramatic incident, which was no doubt improvised to raise the drooping spirits of the citizens:—"A young girl belonging to the city mounted the ramparts and lighted the fuze of a projectile which was at once fired at the Germans." Sorties were made from time to time mainly with the object of replenishing their stock of fresh meat, which had become nearly exhausted. In this way numbers of oxen, horses, pigs, and poultry were brought in during August and September, but by the end of that month the lines of investment were drawn somewhat tighter, and the difficulty of obtaining food from the district became greater. The food supply, therefore, became increasingly difficult. The hospitals were full, many of the soldiers and some of the citizens augmented the numbers as dysentery had become very prevalent. Notification had been sent in of the surrender of Strasburg, and the Commandant was called on to capitulate to avoid a more serious bombardment—no doubt some of the

siege guns from Strasburg had arrived. His reply was as follows : " We are soldiers ; we are making war upon you ; kill us, as we kill you, but spare the people who do you no harm." About the month of October the fortress was reduced to great straits for want of food. M. Poullin further tells us that the ration of horse-flesh had to be reduced to 125 grammes per man for two days, less than 4½ ounces, and that people went into the fields outside the walls to dig up potatoes at the risk of their lives. The clothing of the men was in rags, and was no protection against the cold weather, which was coming on rapidly ; there was not sufficient fuel to create warmth, and by the end of November the whole of the flour reserves were exhausted, and bread had to be manufactured from what could be requisitioned from the inhabitants, as well as from the sweepings of the flour stores. The sick and wounded were dying in large numbers, the remainder presented a very attenuated appearance with sunken eyes and wasted forms. An examination of the stocks demonstrated the fact that they could not be made to last beyond the 13th December, Commandant Taillant therefore decided to destroy his *matériel* of war and surrender on that date. The following defiant message was then sent to the German commander :—"Our gates are open, you will find us disarmed but not vanquished."

The siege of Phalzburg was dependent entirely upon the duration of its supplies. As the fortress did not yield until it had sustained a siege of four months, the defence may be regarded as a triumph, but this was not accomplished without the display of the utmost self-denial on the part of both the citizens and the garrison. And it is evident that the very best arrangements must have been instituted from the very first in economising the reserves of supplies held by the garrison and the town. It is all the more creditable to the commander as the sudden influx of the fugitives and soldiery from Petit Pierre would have tended to hamper his supply arrangements.

CHAPTER IX.

SIEGE OF BELFORT.

It is satisfactory to note that at length France was able to hold her own against the enemy, thanks to the ability displayed by the commandant of Belfort, Colonel Denfert, and its mayor, as well as to the gallantry of the troops and the patriotism of the inhabitants. The memory of the siege of this fortress in 1813, when the inhabitants and the garrison suffered great hardships from the want of supplies, no doubt made the leaders look carefully after the arrangements for its present defence. M. Mény, the mayor, gives us very minute particulars of the preparations made to withstand a long siege, and copious extracts are taken from his publication. M. Robert, in his *Souvenirs of Belfort*, describes the two chief actors in the defence of the fortress in the following terms:—"Colonel Denfert was one of those few men who do their whole duty for the satisfaction of their consciences solely, by the perfect accomplishment of their duty." He mentions the mayor in the following terms:—"M. Mény had been mayor of Belfort since 1855. The siege gave him the opportunity of displaying his brilliant qualities of courage and devotion. He was seen everywhere when there was duty to perform, reassuring the populace and raising their courage. His commanding figure, always clad in a light coloured heavy cloak, was to be seen whenever there was anything to be done, giving to the inhabitants an example of bravery, devotion, and generosity." The description given of the civil and military leaders goes a long way towards proving the absolute necessity that exists, under similar circumstances, for having men in command who are not only capable but also trustworthy and devoted to the service of their country. There were not many such occupying prominent positions in the French civil and military services at the outbreak of the war, which in no inconsiderable degree contributed towards the annihilation of the French army. Incapacity, jealousies, indecision, recriminations, self-indulgence, and vanity stamped the majority of the French commanders. On the other hand, the company officers and the soldiery were as a rule conspicuous

for bravery and devotion; they were patient in the face of grave misfortunes and of indifferent leadership, and they were patriotic to the tips of their fingers. The French armies were undoubtedly crushed by the superior weight of the German artillery, and by the courage and enterprise of their cavalry, but their Chassepot was a far better weapon than the German needle-rifle, and it is certain that with more competent leadership things would have assumed a very different aspect at the outset of this very disastrous campaign.

Belfort was at that epoch a first class fortress, situated in the most southern part of the department of Alsace. The town had a population of about 7,500, but by the time the Germans laid siege to the place on the 3rd November it had become reduced to about 4,000, in consequence of the departure of large numbers to other parts. It was not until the end of October, after the fall of Metz, that the King of Prussia determined upon the annexation of the departments of Alsace and Lorraine; it therefore became a necessity to capture this fortress, and prompt measures were at once adopted for its reduction, particularly as troops could then be spared owing to the fall of Metz. Otherwise, this fortress did not affect the lines of communication of the German armies operating around Paris, with their bases; its beleaguerment might have been left to a later period of the war had it not been for the consideration above mentioned. The city was defended by its walls and citadel, which latter rises to a considerable height above the town, the suburbs were protected by entrenchments as well as by seven outlying forts. The garrison consisted of some 17,000 men, drawn principally from the Mobile and National Guards; there were about 350 cannon distributed throughout the citadel, ramparts and forts, about half being of modern construction. The place was therefore well found in *matériel*, and munitions were held in large quantities. This was evidently considered an important command and had been entrusted by M. Gambetta, who had been appointed War Minister, to an engineer officer, Colonel Denfert, who was probably better qualified for such defensive work than many of his seniors. The result proved beyond question the wisdom of the selection.

The question of supply very early engaged the attention of the authorities. The municipal arrangements were made by the mayor, who had collected large quantities of provisions for the supply of the 4,000 mouths, for which he was responsible. Large numbers of soldiers had passed through Belfort on their way from the southern dépôts to join the forces operating further north;

the resources of the town were therefore taxed to a considerable extent in providing food for something approaching 100,000 men who had passed through. Notwithstanding this heavy drain upon the resources of the city and its district, the mayor had managed to collect supplies sufficient to last the civil population for a period of 145 days from the commencement of the investment. It is not very clear whether the stocks laid in by certain private individuals are included in these figures. However, the townspeople were required to lay in stocks of from two to three months' supplies for their households, and this order was observed by all to the utmost of their ability. The municipality laid in a reserve of 490 sacks of flour of 100 kilos., each of which was calculated to yield 140 kilos. of bread. Only a percentage of the inhabitants could, in the face of such precautionary measures, require assistance, and those only of the very poorest classes; a very considerable reserve would therefore have been constituted in case of necessity, particularly as it was considered that the majority of those who might require help would be women and children, whose ration on the average would not exceed 500 grammes or $\frac{1}{2}$ a kilo. Then the wheat held by the bakers and shops was estimated at about 500 sacks, but this would in a sense have constituted a reliable reserve unless it had been seized by the authorities, which does not appear to have been done. Buying and selling was permitted to go on as usual. The municipality, however, purchased 103 head of cattle, and it was estimated that the townspeople had 213 more, the majority, if not the whole, being milch cows. It was calculated that these animals would yield an average of 450 kilos. of meat, which at a daily ration of 250 grammes would give 142 days' rations for the whole of the inhabitants. Large quantities of potatoes and salt were also laid in. The municipality sold the meat to the butchers at 130 francs the 100 kilos., less than 50s. a 100 lbs., and they were not allowed to charge more than 70 centimes for 500 grammes, equal to about 6½d. a pound. Flour was also sold to the bakers at 53 francs the 100 kilos., a loaf of 3 kilos. being retailed at 1 franc 40 centimes, or at the rate of about 2d. a pound, the cost of manufacture being taken into account.

The Sous-Intendant, M. Chamorande, appears to have exerted himself to lay in large reserves for the 17,000 soldiers. A herd of no less than 870 oxen, 104 sheep, and 24 calves were collected, and there were in addition some reserves of salt meat and pork, which gave over a million rations of meat of about 9½ ounces per man, which would last for 145 days. Flour and

wheat had been accumulated to last for 156 days, that is allowing each man about $2\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. a day which included soup bread. Vegetables for 198 days allowing 60 grammes per man. Coffee for 322 days, the ration being 16 grammes per man. Sugar for 160 days, at 21 grammes per man daily. Wine and brandy for 108 days, wine at 25 centilitres a man, or one-fifth of brandy. It will be seen, therefore, that the French soldier had over 3 lbs. of solid food per diem, the greater portion being bread. Salt also constituted a part of the ration, but it was reduced from 16 to 12 grammes. M. Dussieux in his description of the siege of Belfort gives somewhat different figures. He says :—"The garrison had rations for 180 days. A herd of 970 cattle and 104 sheep had been collected together with four months' forage for them. The inhabitants had everything for 90 days in their houses, and there were also the quantities held by the merchants and the municipality. The supplies were ample." The forage for the cattle was no doubt intended to meet the necessity which might have followed a close investment, in which case the grass in the neighbourhood of the town could not have been made available. It is certain that the cattle were able to graze during the greater part of the siege as the outlying forts kept the enemy at a respectful distance.

Towards the end of October a German division, under General von Treskow, was directed to undertake the reduction of Belfort. He took a position before that fortress on the 3rd November, and on the following day a messenger was sent to inform the French commander that if the place was not surrendered at once the town would be reduced to ashes. Colonel Denfert replied that he and his men were determined to fulfil their duties to the French Republic. Owing to the extent of the works surrounding the fortress it required a very much larger force to cut off its communications completely, the garrison and the inhabitants were at first only partially blockaded and could communicate with a portion of the surrounding district, and it was not until December that a bombardment was commenced. The investing force had to be considerably augmented, and heavy guns had to be brought up before an effective fire could be opened on the 3rd December. M. Dussieux tells us that "Colonel Denfert directed the defence of the place both day and night. There was no constituted council of defence, but the chief officers of the garrison assembled every morning at the governor's quarters to consult and receive orders. In his inaugural address he said : 'In the situation in which we find ourselves, citizens and soldiers, we have only our

duty—to conquer or die.’” The people had generally to seek the shelter of their cellars during the bombardment, the poorer folk who did not possess cellars had to take refuge in the Hotel de Ville and the church. On the 4th December a forage barn with most of its contents was destroyed by the shell fire. It was fortunate that a large stock had been accumulated elsewhere, but by that time the number of cattle would have sensibly diminished and the consumption would have been much less. The capture of the village of Danjourtin on the 8th January was the most disastrous event of the siege, as the Germans succeeded in capturing 700 men of the mobiles.

Von Moltke tells us that about this period the investing force was increased to 23,467 men, with 707 horses, and 34 field guns, the main army being assembled to the south and east, only a few battalions being posted on the north and west. Vigorous efforts were at once instituted with the object of reducing this fortress. On the 20th January a furious attack was made on Perouse, which cost the Germans nearly 200 officers and men killed and wounded. Again on the night of the 26th January an attack was made on les Perches, which resulted in a loss of nearly 450 Germans. Von Moltke goes on to say that “the situation of the garrison of the fortress had become most critical. Ammunition could only be fetched under the enemy’s fire, and water could only be procured from Vernier. The town had suffered terribly from the prolonged bombardment. Nearly all the buildings were damaged. The fortifications showed no less visible signs of destruction, particularly the Castle. Under these circumstances General von Treskow summoned the commandant after such a brave defence to surrender the fort, with a free retreat for the garrison.” The bombardment had been continued up to the 13th February, when Romagny tells us the Germans had 205 siege pieces and 54 field guns in positions around the fortress. The French commander did not feel himself justified in accepting the terms offered without consulting the members of the Provisional Government. An armistice was therefore agreed upon, and a French officer was despatched to Basle to communicate with the Government at Paris. The following despatch was sent to him by the Provisional Government :—“The commandant of Belfort is authorised under the circumstances to consent to the surrender of the place. The garrison will march out with the honours of war, and carry with them the archives of the town. The troops will join the nearest French post.” The garrison marched out on the 17th and 18th February, leaving behind them

340 cannon, 22,000 rifles, six weeks' supplies, besides large quantities of projectiles and other munitions of war. The French losses were heavy, 2,500 killed or died of wounds, and 1,600 sick and wounded in hospital. The civilians lost 300 killed and wounded. The German losses were about 3,000 killed and wounded. The siege lasted for 103 days, but for the first two months the communications were not entirely cut off.

There were evidently some difficulties in arranging the terms of the capitulation—the Germans were willing that the garrison should march out with all its baggage and arms, but no stipulations appear to have been entertained in regard to the civil population. The despatch from Paris was silent on that point. The Germans were naturally averse to granting any conditions for the inhabitants, whom it was considered would at once become German subjects. That was, however, avoided in the final peace convention, as Belfort was permitted to remain French, on account of its heroic defence. This fact redounds greatly to the credit of the German conquerors, but the situation of Belfort was such as to require the Germans to part with only a very small portion of Alsace to enable them to meet the worthy aspirations of the courageous inhabitants of Belfort. In referring to the terms of the capitulation the mayor remarked sententiously that “Despite the insistence of our two plenipotentiaries, they were obliged to do otherwise than they desired, and we were sacrificed.”

We are given an interesting account of the monetary arrangements made during the siege by M. Dussieux :—“By the 22nd December the money in the military chest had become exhausted, and the treasury had nothing but bank-notes which could not be changed. M. Grosjean created a forced paper currency to meet the want, which was called *bons de siège*. The soldiers were paid in this currency. At first there were objections to its acceptance, but the merchants very soon were glad to take it. This currency was faithfully redeemed after the Peace. When the *bons* were exhausted the local money-lenders very improperly took advantage of the opportunity to effect loans to the troops at a profit of 26 per cent. Large quantities of tobacco had been stored in the military magazines, the sale of it to the soldiery and inhabitants enabled the authorities to procure sufficient money to pay the troops. Many of the officers expressed their intention of not drawing any pay in order to relieve the pressure, and were willing to accept payment at a more convenient season. None of them received any pay after December, they had therefore to depend entirely upon their rations for their subsistence. Towards the

close of the siege supplies of all kinds were sold in order to procure sufficient money for the payment of the troops. This step was probably not taken until the positive termination of the siege was practically determined upon, by which time it is not improbable that the supplies held by the civilians had become in a great measure exhausted, particularly as the mayor had already stated that he counted upon the military supplies as a *dernier ressort*. Before concluding these remarks it may be as well to note that there does not appear to have been published a single word enjoining economy on the civilians in the use of their stocks. The troops were rationed as were also the needy civilians, but those possessed of their own supplies could use them as lavishly as they cared to. They were under no restrictions as was the case with the soldiery, who received fixed rations only. Such details need the closest attention of the authorities at the outset, otherwise they are apt to create friction when introduced at a later date. In a word, we hold that the use of their own supplies by the civilians should have been carefully supervised by the authorities.

It is a fact that notwithstanding the brilliant success gained by Colonel Denfert and his garrison of raw troops, there were to be found in France a number of men who could attempt to pick holes in his brilliant achievements. It was said that Denfert should have harassed his enemy more than was done, that more sorties should have been made, and that he acted too much upon the defensive. No doubt a vast amount of jealousy had been occasioned amongst the French generals, as Denfert was an engineer officer and had never before commanded a large body of men. That so junior an officer, a lieutenant-colonel, should have been given the command of a first-class fortress situated on the frontier, in preference to a general officer, was a bitter pill for them to swallow, and there is little doubt that they and their friends did all they could to minimise the extent of the great services rendered to his country by this zealous and capable officer.

In so isolated a situation it is not surprising that the French commandant was satisfied to act wholly on the defensive. He had nothing to gain by sallying out, the little injury inflicted upon the enemy was easily repairable, not so his own losses, he therefore wisely husbanded his resources. He was not forced to raid in order to capture supplies, for his prevision had prepared the garrison and the inhabitants for every eventuality. Sallies and the consequent sacrifice of life are only warranted when the

position of the enemy has to be ascertained, or when a troublesome work has to be captured and destroyed, or when it becomes necessary to organise raids to procure supplies, or when active hostility may have the effect of employing a larger number of the enemy who might thus be prevented from operating elsewhere. None of these conditions applied to the siege of Belfort, and we hold, therefore, that Colonel Denfert was right in his conduct of the operations, and that his detractors were wrong and unpatriotic in seeking to reflect upon the conduct of this gallant officer.

This was eminently a command for an engineer officer, particularly as Colonel Denfert had been quartered at Belfort for over five years, and had therefore an intimate knowledge of its fortifications. It was natural that Gambetta should have selected an officer so well qualified for the post, and his selection was more than warranted by the results. M. Dussieux gives Colonel Denfert great praise for his conduct of the siege; he wrote thus:—"The commander adopted the system of never concealing anything from the people or the garrison and always adhered strictly to the truth. On the 4th November he therefore published the exact terms of the German commander's demand for the surrender of the place, in which he had pointed out that the lives of the inhabitants would be in danger from the fire of his cannon." Such treatment naturally evoked the patriotic sentiment of the people, who refused to allow their safety to influence the decision of the French commander. This conduct was in marked contrast to that of General Uhrich, who feared to acquaint the people of Strasburg with the fact of an imminent bombardment, consequently many lost their lives through the lack of adequate preparation. We cannot conclude our remarks on this interesting dispute better than by quoting the words of that eminent military expert, Colonel Rustow of the Swiss army, who wrote:—"The Government of the Republic named as commandant of Belfort, Denfert-Rochereau, *chef de battalion du génie*, who at the same time was promoted to colonel. The choice thus made was an excellent one, which certainly cannot be said for all the selections made at that time. Colonel Denfert had for many years conducted the works before Belfort, knew the place and its weak points thoroughly, and was moreover an undesigning, quiet, thoughtful man, who only concerned himself about his country, not about the Empire." The latter opinion as to Empire may have been a deduction influenced in some degree by the Republican tendencies of the writer. We incline to the belief that no patriot, who had the good of his country so much at heart as Colonel Denfert, could be insensible

to the position his country would hold before the world at large, had he failed in his duty to her.

It will be remembered that the Crown Prince in his march through the Vosges had established large dépôts at Luneville and Nancy; these towns were on the line of railway between Strasburg and Paris. When the 3rd German Army commenced its advance, after the fall of Sedan, towards Paris, it became a necessity that the fortress of Toul should be reduced, as it stood in the way of the direct transit of supplies and stores from those dépôts to the advancing army. Until this fortress was reduced, stores and supplies had to be off-loaded east of Toul, and conveyed by a circuitous route past that town, and loaded on to another train to the westward. The delay and cost of such an undertaking will explain the anxiety of the Germans to capture the place. Toul, like Nancy and Luneburg, appears to have been used as a base dépôt for the French army in its contemplated invasion of Germany, it was therefore provided with large stocks of supplies. In that respect, therefore, Toul was amply provisioned for the garrison in occupation. The garrison was composed of about 2,500 men, which were for the most part guard mobiles. The fortress was well armed, a fair proportion of the guns being rifled. There were no outlying forts, the town was defended mainly by its ramparts and bastions, it was consequently much exposed to the bombardment of an enemy. Commandant Huck was in command, and it is highly creditable to him that he was enabled to hold out for a period of six weeks with a small garrison against a German Army Corps.

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By the capitulations of Strasburg and Toul, the Germans had now secured for the army corps operating on the southern and eastern sides of Paris, an uninterrupted communication

between these forces and their bases in South Germany. This blocking of the railway had become a serious hindrance to the German Intendantur, which had been forced to have recourse to requisitioning the inhabitants of the districts in the neighbourhood of the besieging armies. Very little dependence could be placed upon such a precarious means of supply when the feeding of such large numbers of men and horses had to be secured; nothing short of an uninterrupted supply from Germany could render the provisioning of the armies secure. Requisitions for supplies from the surrounding districts were all very well as an aid, but not as a dependence. The full possession of this line of railway rendered the work of the Intendantur more certain and more secure; and the German commanders could count upon ample reserves and could make their dispositions without the fear of being thwarted by a failure in either the supply or transport services.

The Russo-Japanese war gives an illustration of the great difficulties experienced in the maintenance of a line of communication. The Siberian and Manchurian Railways are the only lines connecting the Russian armies in the Far East with their bases in Russia, and as the Siberian line runs in close proximity to some two or three thousand miles of the Chinese frontier, it follows that a very large army indeed is needed to guard both lines from the attacks of marauding bands of Chinese who may be in sympathy with the Japanese. A number of attempts have been made to impede the working of those lines of railway, and the Russian Government has been obliged to maintain a force of some 200,000 men along that line for its protection, as in the event of their being cut at any material points, the existence of those armies at the front might be jeopardised, as the surrounding districts cannot afford supplies or forage for any appreciable period. Dependence can be placed only on the supplies and ammunition required for the armies operating in Manchuria which can be forwarded by means of the Siberian Railway. If the sea route were open to Russia it would take too long for the consignments to reach their destination. There is absolutely no alternative route.

CHAPTER X.

VARIOUS SIEGE OPERATIONS.

Immediately after the fall of Strasburg, General von Werder commanding the Baden army was charged with the reduction of the minor fortresses still holding out against the German forces, he was also required to keep in check the numerous small bodies of Franc-tireurs which had infested the mountainous districts of the Vosges, and had become a serious menace to the German lines of communication. Among others von Werder turned his attention to Bitche, which had held out with great tenacity, but all his efforts were unavailing, the resolute commander declined to yield. The fortress, although of only third-rate importance, was greatly desired by the Germans as being situated close to the frontier, and owing to its being on the frontier line of railway which connected Strasburg with Treves. This line of railway would have become invaluable for the distribution of troops, stores and supplies, as the German base depôts, after the fall of Metz, were pretty well in alignment along this railway. The continued possession of Bitche by the French must have hampered the Intendantur very greatly in their supply and transport arrangements with North Germany.

Situated as it was in a mountainous district, Bitche could not very easily be cut off entirely from the outside world, unless the investing forces were large and powerful. The works consisted of a fort, an entrenched camp, and the town fortifications. The garrison was composed of 800 linesmen, 250 artillerymen, about 1,000 fugitives from Worth and Weissenburg, and a number of Gardes Mobiles and National Guards. There were mounted on the works 2 rifled 24 pounders, 6 rifled 12 pounders, and 5 27 in. mortars, the remainder of the cannon were of an obsolete pattern. It will be seen, therefore, that the place was not well armed, although the supply of powder and of projectiles was abundant. The town with its 2,700 inhabitants was entrusted to Commandant Teyssier, who more than justified the confidence reposed in him. Marcel Poullin gives us an admirable account of this gallant

defence; we therefore quote largely from his *Places perdues*. As early as the 8th August Colonel Kellermann appeared before the place and demanded its surrender. The French commandant replied thus: "Go to those who sent you and say that Frenchmen do not surrender before they have fought." Prior to this the commandant had assembled a council of war, when a system of defence was formulated; the auxiliary forces were organised, the hospital and ambulances were got into good working order, and the actual reserves of ammunition and supplies were ascertained. The entrenched camp was to be defended by 60 Turcos, with a few men belonging to other corps. Several detachments were sent out to bring in cattle, supplies, and forage, the railway dépôt being converted into a magazine. Three months' supply of flour, meat, coffee, sugar, and rice were collected, but the stocks of salt and oil, &c., had to be very carefully regulated, as they were held only in small quantities. The wine and brandy in hand was reserved for the sick, but when the soldiery were employed at heavy work they were given a ration of brandy. The only money in the military chest, some 300,000 francs, was reserved to meet contingencies. It is obvious, therefore, that both officers and men had accepted the situation, and were willing to fight and work without pay.

So soon as the demand for the surrender of the place was rejected, the German commander placed his guns in battery, and opened the attack on the 8th, which was succeeded by another on the 23rd August. This was followed by a serious bombardment which lasted from the 11th to the 22nd September. During these bombardments the Germans threw no less than 20,000 shells into the place. On the 11th August a German supply column was captured near one of the gates of the town, the escort being under the impression that the town was occupied by their troops. This was a fortunate circumstance, as during the heavy bombardment large quantities of supplies had been destroyed by the fire of the enemy. It is also stated that some of the German shells penetrated the subterranean chambers at the Chateau, and killed a number of the German prisoners who were confined therein. A second attempt was made to induce the garrison to capitulate, and the threat to bring 20,000 men with heavy siege artillery having no effect, it was happily determined to reduce the siege to a simple blockade. The vigilance of the besiegers being meantime considerably relaxed, a countryman, hearing that his compatriots were suffering from the want of salt, determined to convey a supply to the fortress. Having laden himself with as much salt

as he could carry, he managed to elude the sentries, and presented himself at one of the gates of the town one early morning. It was then arranged that he should be paid at fixed rates for all the supplies he could introduce. As the man knew the locality well, he was able to smuggle in many head of cattle, as well as considerable quantities of flour, sugar, and salt. These supplies had to be purchased at distant places, otherwise suspicion might have been aroused. By this means the failing resources of the garrison were saved from the exhaustion which must infallibly have ensued had it not been for the enterprise of this patriotic individual. It will readily be understood that the feeding of 5,000 persons would have entailed no inconsiderable daily cost, consequently the importation of supplies from the outside, which had to be paid for in cash, brought about the rapid dissipation of the reserve funds held by the commandant. The urgent necessity for the collection of more money at once became apparent, agents were therefore sent out to procure funds in order that the purchase of supplies might be continued. Money was obtained in various ways, and the feeding of the troops and the inhabitants was continued. Poullin does not give us much information in regard to the feeding of the citizens, but the same arrangements appear to have been made at Bitche as were employed at Belfort, where a number of butchers and bakers were employed in the distribution of supplies, for he states that a local baker was good enough to make free issues of bread to the very poor. He mentions that during one of the sorties the French captured an engineer who had been employed on the fortification works at Bitche—he was at once tried and shot as a traitor to his country.

Negotiations were opened with the garrison by the Germans about the 5th February, but the commandant declined to sign any articles without positive instructions from the existing government of the country. A French officer was therefore given safe conduct on the 9th March to the seat of government, whatever or wherever that might be. Paris had surrendered and the French army was completely conquered, so that any further resistance was useless; but after so effectual a defence the French commander did not feel disposed to subject his men to the indignity of a surrender, even with the honours of war, without positive orders to that effect. Upon the return of the officer with orders for the evacuation of the fortress, the French garrison was permitted to march out with all the honours of war, taking its arms, colours, baggage, and camp equipment, and it

proceeded to join the most accessible French garrison in the interior of the country. The courageous defence of this post reflects great credit upon the French commander and his troops, who were ably seconded by the inhabitants of the town.

As many different points have been raised in connection with the various defences, we believe that much information may be gained, from a supply point of view, by the examination of the methods employed or neglected in the preparatory stages and the subsequent conduct of some of the sieges. Although the siege of Schlestadt was of very short duration, and did not therefore give much opportunity to the Intendance, it affords lessons which should not be lost to the supply service. This fortress is situated on the River Ill, some twenty odd miles to the southward of Strasburg; it contained at that time a population of about 10,000, with a garrison of some 2,000 or 3,000 men. The town was strongly defended by fortifications on the Vauban system, and was protected by a wet ditch—it was generally regarded as impregnable. The Germans deemed it advisable to send a division of their army to reduce the place without loss of time; owing to its situation and importance it was essential that this town should be brought under German rule as quickly as possible. Like most of the other fortresses in France, Schlestadt had been sadly neglected—the guns were not mounted, the place was not provided with a sufficiency of ammunition and supplies to withstand a siege, the walls required to be repaired, and casemates had to be constructed. The negligence of the French authorities was all the more remarkable in this instance, as the contemplated invasion of South Germany was intended to have been made at some point between Strasburg and Schlestadt. Under the circumstances that fortress should have been one of the first to have been put into a proper state of defence. In this particular instance their flagrant negligence recoiled upon their own heads, and Schlestadt was lost to them after a few days' bombardment. It was to little purpose that the gallant commander, Count de Reinach, did everything that was possible to bring the fortress and its garrison into a condition of defence, but with so small a force and with a populace which considered itself neglected, it was no easy matter to evolve an effective resistance.

Early in October a large force had been assembled before that fortress, and the German commander demanded the prompt surrender of the place. The Count's reply was curt and somewhat ungracious: "Sir, tell your general that I have nothing to say in reply to his summons; my cannons will speak for me." The

bombardment was opened on the 20th, and continued with great violence up to the 23rd. M. Poullin describes the bombardment as having inflicted great losses in killed and wounded, not only upon the soldiery, but also upon the men, women and children of the town, "who were unable to escape from the perpetual rain of iron projectiles." In giving a description of the night of the 23rd, he says:—"The firemen were unable to fight against the conflagration caused in all parts of the city by the fire of the enemy, the place was converted into a veritable hell. The walls of the city were destroyed and the cannons upset; death and destruction were on all sides. At 6 a.m. on the following day the mayor, in the name of the inhabitants, implored the commander to surrender the place." Serious rioting had broken out during the night and was still proceeding; public buildings were being plundered both by the insubordinate soldiery and the disgusted citizens, and a powder magazine was in serious danger for some time. In view of the condition of affairs the French commander saw that further resistance was impossible with such wretched material; he therefore ordered a white flag to be hoisted on the church tower. The soldiery as usual believed themselves betrayed, and at once proceeded to take vengeance by smashing their rifles and spiking their guns, and by throwing both powder and projectiles into the ditch. The disorder was very quickly put down by the German soldiery who had taken possession of the town, and the garrison was sent across the Rhine as prisoners of war.

In order to secure its lines of communication in the advance of the German armies through French territory, it was essential that all fortified towns of any importance on the routes of their advance towards Paris should be secured. One of the most important of them was the fortress of Verdun, which was situated in the direct line between Metz and Chalons, and was therefore of the utmost importance to both the invaders and the invaded. Its importance to the French was certainly less after the fall of Sedan and the capitulation of Metz. The fortress was considered in a state of siege as early as August, although no serious attack was made upon the place before October, it had been continually watched by both cavalry and infantry detachments. The town contained about 12,000 inhabitants, who could themselves muster a considerable force of national guards. These were greatly augmented by the fugitives from the many battlefields in its neighbourhood, until a very respectable garrison of some 6,000 men had been gradually assembled. It is not a matter of surprise

that the Emperor, when he passed through Verdun on his journey from Metz to Chalons, asked where the garrison was which had to defend that fortress. It was conspicuous by its absence at that early date. M. Daudignac gives a short description of the passage of Napoleon through Verdun:—"The Emperor passed through this morning surrounded by numbers of marshals and generals, whose presence was no doubt needed elsewhere; he was followed by a travelling kitchen, and had with him a stud of some 250 magnificent horses. There were smart valets and other servants, besides magnificent equipages and other paraphernalia, which occupied at least a kilometre of the road. The solemn silence of the citizens demonstrated sufficiently their entire disapproval of the exhibition. The Emperor was accompanied by two regiments of Chasseurs d'Afrique, and by a squadron of guides, besides his escort of the Imperial Guard. None of these troops should have been spared for such a purpose, when the army of Metz was being so gravely threatened." This description does not impress one with the conviction that Napoleon emulated the first of that name as a military commander, the close attention given to comfort and gastronomic details did not proclaim the enthusiastic soldier who is devoted above everything to the duty he owes to his country. The picture offers a sad spectacle of those who regard the service of their country as simply a means to an end, that end being self. The sequel to this successful adventurer's career should act as a warning to any who may seek to set themselves above the duty they owe to their country and their compatriots. This unhappy man died in comparative obscurity, hated and shunned by most of his countrymen as the direct author of the gigantic misfortunes which almost ruined their country.

The Emperor of the French had evidently taken the field without counting the cost to himself personally, and he had taken every precaution to minimise the hardships of campaigning to himself and his *entourage*, by providing as many of the comforts of the palace as could be brought with him into the field. Had the contemplated invasion come off, and had the military promenade continued beyond the opening day of this disastrous campaign, there might have been some sagacity in bringing into the field the mass of fulsome luxury with which the field was taken. There is no doubt that had the conditions been reversed, the Prussian King, the Princes, and the German Generals would have been made most welcome to participate in the munificent preparations made by the Imperial Court for their entertainment. How great a contrast

was exhibited on the part of the German commanders. They had, from the King downwards, taken the field practically as the emergency found them. There was no thought of travelling kitchens, chefs, champagne and such dainties for the staff. Every effort was directed towards bringing forward sufficient ammunition and supplies for the men, and comforts for the wounded. What was good enough for the men in the ranks was good enough for the King, the Princes, and the Generals. It is to be hoped that the contrast may be regarded with profit by many a future commander, and that such superfluities as cooking ranges, champagne, and drink of any kind (excepting, perhaps, a flask of brandy), chefs, condiments and luxuries of every description, should be rigidly excluded from the field equipment of every officer in the field.

There is another side to this painful subject—luxuriousness in the officer communicates itself to the men. If the latter do not receive all that they think themselves justly entitled to, they become discontented and the service suffers accordingly. The men cannot complain if they are treated in precisely the same way as their officers are in regard to rations. It is therefore highly necessary that the general officers should cut down the weight of field baggage permitted to officers to the lowest possible limit, in order that little, if any, extra food and drink could be carried. Any purchases made in towns or from sutlers for present use could not and would not be objected to. Some people imagine that they cannot do without this, that, or the other—the field is no place for such individuals, they would be far better at home than campaigning. Real soldiers are wanted in the field, not luxurious folk or weaklings, and the sooner that lesson is taken to heart the better will it be for all armies. Field work is hard work, and the men who undertake it must be constitutionally and physically fit to undergo its hardships.

The French general in command took immediate steps for placing Verdun in a condition to withstand any serious attack which might be delivered at any moment, owing to the immediate presence of large bodies of the enemy's troops in its vicinity. Von Moltke describes the situation of this fortress as follows:—“The place was made impregnable by high walls and deep moats; but, on the other hand, it was surrounded by hills which commanded and defiladed it, and at the foot of these hills, villages and vineyards favoured an approach to within a short distance of the outworks. It was armed with 140 guns and abundantly victualled, and the garrison, which had been supplemented by

to the position his country would hold before the world at large, had he failed in his duty to her.

It will be remembered that the Crown Prince in his march through the Vosges had established large dépôts at Luneville and Nancy; these towns were on the line of railway between Strasburg and Paris. When the 3rd German Army commenced its advance, after the fall of Sedan, towards Paris, it became a necessity that the fortress of Toul should be reduced, as it stood in the way of the direct transit of supplies and stores from those dépôts to the advancing army. Until this fortress was reduced, stores and supplies had to be off-loaded east of Toul, and conveyed by a circuitous route past that town, and loaded on to another train to the westward. The delay and cost of such an undertaking will explain the anxiety of the Germans to capture the place. Toul, like Nancy and Luneburg, appears to have been used as a base dépôt for the French army in its contemplated invasion of Germany, it was therefore provided with large stocks of supplies. In that respect, therefore, Toul was amply provisioned for the garrison in occupation. The garrison was composed of about 2,500 men, which were for the most part guard mobiles. The fortress was well armed, a fair proportion of the guns being rifled. There were no outlying forts, the town was defended mainly by its ramparts and bastions, it was consequently much exposed to the bombardment of an enemy. Commandant Huck was in command, and it is highly creditable to him that he was enabled to hold out for a period of six weeks with a small garrison against a German Army Corps.

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It is satisfactory to learn that the German commander gave special instructions that so far as was possible that magnificent monument of the sixteenth century, the cathedral, should be preserved from injury during the bombardment, and this was the more creditable as under no circumstances could Toul have become German property. After the capitulation, we are told by Hozier that the most amicable relations subsisted between the German soldiery and the French citizens; he says:—"Instead of bitter feelings on the one side and the exaltation on the other, which are commonly exhibited, both parties, when the gate was opened, seemed to meet like the best of friends. As there were many Alsations among the garrison, besiegers and besieged at once entered into conversation, shared the contents of their flasks with each other, and but for the stringent rules separating prisoner from conqueror, would doubtless have made a jovial night of it. The anxious families had passed the last days chiefly in their cellars, the windows of their houses being thickly covered with manure" (to prevent the glass splintering when struck). "Pale faces were visible everywhere, but the habitual French elasticity and cheerfulness were soon manifested, the inhabitants being gladdened by the thought that the siege was ended, and life and health were no longer endangered."

By the capitulations of Strasburg and Toul, the Germans had now secured for the army corps operating on the southern and eastern sides of Paris, an uninterrupted communication

to the position his country would hold before the world at large, had he failed in his duty to her.

It will be remembered that the Crown Prince in his march through the Vosges had established large dépôts at Luneville and Nancy; these towns were on the line of railway between Strasburg and Paris. When the 3rd German Army commenced its advance, after the fall of Sedan, towards Paris, it became a necessity that the fortress of Toul should be reduced, as it stood in the way of the direct transit of supplies and stores from those dépôts to the advancing army. Until this fortress was reduced, stores and supplies had to be off-loaded east of Toul, and conveyed by a circuitous route past that town, and loaded on to another train to the westward. The delay and cost of such an undertaking will explain the anxiety of the Germans to capture the place. Toul, like Nancy and Luneburg, appears to have been used as a base dépôt for the French army in its contemplated invasion of Germany, it was therefore provided with large stocks of supplies. In that respect, therefore, Toul was amply provisioned for the garrison in occupation. The garrison was composed of about 2,500 men, which were for the most part guard mobiles. The fortress was well armed, a fair proportion of the guns being rifled. There were no outlying forts, the town was defended mainly by its ramparts and bastions, it was consequently much exposed to the bombardment of an enemy. Commandant Huck was in command, and it is highly creditable to him that he was enabled to hold out for a period of six weeks with a small garrison against a German Army Corps.

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came to tell him that an officer was lying mortally wounded in an adjoining wood, and asked him to administer the holy sacrament. This he did without loss of time, when the dying officer desired to give him some messages to relatives in Paris. Having to note down the address, as it was growing dark, it became necessary to get a light. The soldier fortunately had a candle end in his knapsack, which was produced and lighted. As it was being held by the soldier between his and the Abbé's head, one of the many bullets which were flying around thickly, struck and extinguished the light before the priest had time to make the note. There was nothing for it but to relight the candle and make hurried memoranda. They were, however, forced to lie prone on their stomachs for a quarter of an hour, the fire being so heavy, after which the Abbé managed to return to his other duties. The battle was continued up to mid-day on the 1st September, but Bazaine's army failed to effect its purpose. The losses were severe on both sides, some 3,000 being killed and wounded on either side. This defeat and the surrender of the army at Sedan effectually confined Bazaine's army to Metz and its surrounding forts.

Up to that date Bazaine had not abandoned the idea of escaping from Metz. It was now evident that that intention had to be permanently abandoned, and every attention had to be directed towards the prolongation of the resistance, in the hope that a relieving force might be organised sooner or later. At the least, there was the opportunity for detaining a large German army before Metz, which could not be made available for operations in other parts of the country, and this was manifestly to the advantage of the French, as the German army of investment had to be numerically superior to those being contained. In order to reduce the numbers as much as possible, the German commander fortified every village within the lines of environment, which extended a distance of at least twenty-five miles; forts, batteries, breastworks, entrenchments, &c., were thrown up so that the positions could be held by fewer men against any attacks made by the enemy. Von Moltke, however, states that the strength of Prince Frederick Charles' army was only 150,000 men, but we are told by Rustow that this army was reinforced by General Kummer's division, which consisted of a brigade of infantry and a division of Landwehr; there is very little doubt that the investing army was augmented to over 200,000 men. The investing forces do not appear to have greatly exceeded those of the beleaguered troops in numbers, but it is not improbable that the superior field artillery of the Germans,

which played so prominent a part in the capture of the French army at Sedan, was a powerful factor in the investment of Metz. The inhabitants of Metz were never subjected to any bombardments, as the outlying forts were situated at from one to two miles beyond the ramparts of the city, and as the heaviest guns used were rifled 24 pounders the German projectiles could not reach the city walls, as their batteries had to be constructed at a considerable distance outside the forts. The investment resolved itself into a close blockade, which a powerful relieving army might have forced had there been one in existence, but, unfortunately for the French their only army was held at Paris, and the army of the Loire had not then been created. It will be seen, therefore, that the siege of Metz became, so far as France was concerned, a question of holding out with the hope of eventual relief and with the object of detaining a large number of the enemy before the place for as long a period as might be possible.

It may be contended that Bazaine might have cut his way out through the lines of environment, but his experience of his want of success in the attempts made to cut his way out at Vionville, Gravelotte, and Noisseville was amply sufficient reason for his not wishing to expose his army to such fearful losses to no purpose. Moreover, the German lines of investment were formidable, and were backed up by other works to the rear. The escape of the French army was practically impossible, its duty was to hold out as long as the supplies and ammunition would permit. It followed, therefore, that the only sorties undertaken during the siege were those organised for the purpose of bringing in additional supplies for the use of the beleaguered forces. These expeditions go to prove the absence of forethought on the part of the generals and the responsible officers in making arrangements for the defence, for the simple reason that the supplies, which it became necessary to send large numbers of men to capture in the neighbourhood, should have been brought into Metz long before the place was invested. To understand the exact position of the Intendance at the outset of the siege, it must be clearly understood that the French army occupying the forts and entrenchments consisted of five army corps, and aggregated from 120,000 to 150,000 men, the numbers having been variously stated; in addition there was the army of from 8,000 to 10,000 men for manning the works of the fortress; and lastly there were the people of the town, inclusive of the National Guards, who were augmented by a large number of the country people from the environs, but were discounted by those who fled from the

city before the actual fighting commenced, the numbers, however, could not have been less than 60,000 souls at the beginning of the siege ; it stands to reason that at least one-seventh of these would have been men, as all the women and children who could get away would have sought safety in flight. General Coffinieres had been appointed to the Military Governorship by the Emperor, this gave him command of the garrison, and to a certain extent of the civil population. His Intendance was separate and distinct from that of the interned army outside Metz, also the municipality charged itself with the supply of the civil population. The five *corps d'armée* under Bazaine had their regularly organised transport and supplies attached to each, but it is to be regretted that it was deemed necessary to destroy a large quantity of provisions and forage to prevent its falling into the hands of the enemy after Gravelotte. It will be seen, therefore, that there were three separate and distinct supply organisations at work during the siege of Metz, indeed there may be added to the number the arrangements made by the better class of citizens to provide their several households with the means of subsistence for periods varying from one to three months. Consequently there were four different classes of buyers competing in the markets of Metz at one and the same time, than which no arrangement could have been worse.

As was the case in almost every other frontier fortress, the French Government had made no arrangements for placing Metz in a proper state of defence. There were fortifications, forts, guns, and large stocks of ammunition, but the supplies had not been collected in any quantity or in any methodical manner ; there were large stocks of breadstuffs, but the supply of cattle, forage, preserved meat, sugar, salt, coffee, and vegetables, was most defective. The bulk of the supplies which were found in Metz at the commencement of the siege were there more by accident than design, they had been despatched from Paris and other towns for the use of the various armies in the field, those for the Chalons army were naturally not sent forward after the capitulation of Sedan, therefore the Metz army gained considerable advantage by the retention of those supplies. Sedan capitulated with its army on the verge of starvation, so that there were no losses of supplies as a consequence of that surrender. No credit was due to the Government or to the administration for the accumulation of the large stocks of breadstuffs, as this was owing mainly to the fact that the biscuits supplied to the French navy were manufactured very largely at Metz, where

there was a factory for that purpose. When, however, it is remembered that the inhabitants and soldiery in and around Metz aggregated nearly a quarter of a million, and that number would consume nearly 200 tons of breadstuffs daily, that is to say, at the ordinary rate of consumption of the French people, which is taken as about 2 lbs. a head per diem, it will be seen that the consumption was stupendous. It is a well authenticated fact that for the first few weeks of the siege Bazaine would not permit any reduction in the soldiers' ration of bread, which was a kilogramme per man in the field, inclusive of the soup bread. When however it became apparent that there was no hope of breaking away, the Marshal consented to a reduction of the bread issue to 700 grammes, = to about $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs., and subsequently to 500 grammes = to more than 1 lb.—greater reductions had to be made towards the end of the siege.

It is obvious, therefore, that so far as the military were concerned, no sufficient efforts were made at the commencement of the siege to economise the consumption of the soldiers' rations. Double rations were issued as usual to the officers, and it is not surprising to hear that they were in the habit of giving their horses ration bread to eat. A general can commit no greater mistake than by conciliating the soldiery through their stomachs, except when supplies are abundant and the prospects are good. When the situation is disastrous or even doubtful, he cannot adopt measures too promptly to stave off or to avert altogether the impending catastrophe. In this instance, Bazaine could have prolonged his resistance by two months at least, had he adopted prompt measures for economising both the civil and military consumption from the very outset. Bazaine should unquestionably have reduced the officers' ration at once, no man could consume nearly $4\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. of bread daily. His duty was plain, but for fear, no doubt, of offending his officers, or for the sake of popularity, he neglected that duty. When it became obvious that there was no possibility of his cutting his way out, or of his being relieved, Bazaine should have at once reduced the bread ration of the men, who were in such large numbers that the fatigue work could not have fallen heavily upon them. Indeed, the field work was extremely light as the German army was satisfied to contain the force without attacking it much. Bazaine evidently desired to maintain his popularity with his officers and men, and did not hesitate to sacrifice the interests of his country to further that end. Solicitude for the welfare of the soldiery may be carried too far, and it becomes vicious and dishonest

when a general pampers his men in order to gain a bastard popularity with them at the expense of his country. Under no circumstances should the soldiery be pampered, such treatment unfits them for hard work in the field, and the mobility of the transport is affected by the additional weight of plum puddings, jams, wine or beer, &c., which has to be carried. Such luxuries in moderation are all very well in camp, or after the soldiery have been on short rations in the field.

The civil population of Metz, variously estimated at from 50,000 to 70,000 men, women and children, was managed no better than the army, so far as the economical use of supplies was concerned. They were certainly directed to provide themselves with provisions to last for three months, otherwise they were directed to leave the city, but no steps appear to have been taken to ascertain that families had complied with the order, nor were any people expelled for non-compliance. Indeed, thousands of country people were at the last moment, between the 10th and 15th August, permitted to seek refuge in the city. An order was issued, so M. Prost states, that none should be allowed to remain unless they were provided with supplies for 40 days, but the civil authorities were too weak-kneed to insist upon the expulsion of any not so provided. Thus, at a most critical moment, the civil population was seriously augmented by thousands of useless mouths. Many of these people brought in quantities of cereals, and numbers of cows and oxen, but some were in an almost destitute condition. M. Prost estimates the increase at 22,000, by which the population of Metz became augmented to 70,000. This gentleman was a member of the Municipal Council, his statements are therefore worthy of credence. He states that instead of turning their attention to bringing into the city all the cereals and supplies which were then procurable in the neighbourhood, the council set to work to ascertain what breadstuffs were held in Metz. It was ascertained that the city mills contained 14,000 *quintaux metriques*, about three million pounds of cereals, and that the shops contained about 5,600, and the private granaries about 15,000 *quintaux*, which afforded supplies of bread to the whole population for over 70 days. This was allowing quite $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. daily to the whole of the 70,000 men, women and children. Then there were the 90 days' supplies held by a very large number of the people of the place, the majority of whom probably never drew upon the city reserves, except perhaps at the end of the siege. Considering that the siege lasted for only 80 days, one is forced

to the conclusion that an enormous waste in breadstuffs was permitted by the civil authorities during the first two months of the siege. Then it must not be overlooked that other large stocks were in existence within the city walls. M. Poullin gives us the following figures as the reserves on the 20th August for the 70,000 inhabitants :—"Rice and beans 5 days, sugar 15 days, salt 6 days, coffee 26 days, wine 7 days, brandy 8 days, pork $\frac{1}{2}$ day, oats 12 days, and meat 10 days." Besides these, large quantities of supplies are said to have been collected at the *gare de l'Est* railway storehouses, which the company managed to secure from pillage. These provisions and merchandise were held in trust, but the former were utilised so soon as their use became imperative.

There is no doubt that the policy, or rather the absence of policy, in the management of the provisioning of the inhabitants of Metz, was marked by lamentable want of the foresight which is so essential where success is desired. The inhabitants were certainly required to provide themselves with provisions to last them for three months, but the supplies so provided were left entirely at their own disposition. When it became apparent that there was no probability of the place being relieved by an army from without, and that a long siege was inevitable, the Governor and the municipality should certainly have taken every precaution towards securing a lengthened resistance. It must be clearly understood that the attempts made by Bazaine's army to break through the German lines were intended merely to extricate the field army from its situation, and were in no sense connected with any desire to surrender Metz or its outlying forts. The operations of Bazaine, therefore, had no direct bearing upon the resistance Metz was capable of offering to the enemy. Consequently his success, or want of success, should not have influenced the authorities at Metz in the preparations which their duty required them to make, those arrangements should have been instituted and completed irrespective of the action of Bazaine's army. By the force of circumstances, that army was compelled to take part in the resistance offered by the beleaguered city, but that was an accident which was fatal to the general defence of the country, and was a questionable benefit to the besieged as will be seen in the course of this narrative. We hold, therefore, that the urban authorities should have adopted prompt and efficient measures independently of the action of the field army. On the contrary, they appear to have been halting in their arrangements pending the success of Bazaine's army. It was more by accident

than design that the large stocks of cereals were held at the city mills, the granaries, and with the dealers, therefore no credit is due to the authorities for much prevision on that account. Beyond the accumulation of private stocks no effort appears to have been made to increase these reserves ; in fact, we know that several sorties were undertaken with the object of bringing in supplies which were known to exist in the immediate neighbourhood, and it was known that quantities of supplies were concealed in the surrounding villages, large quantities being discovered by the Germans, but some of them were brought in surreptitiously during the siege. Why were not these supplies brought within the walls before it became too late to do so ? There was evidently a lamentable supineness on the part of the Governor and municipality at the outset, or they did not comprehend what was their duty. It is clear that the provisions held by the dealers and by private individuals should have been commandeered at once and should have been transferred to the custody of responsible agents, whose duty would have been to distribute the provisions according to the orders of higher authority. By such means only can economy be ensured and waste be prevented, and, what is still more important, can the maximum of resistance be secured.

The blame for the actual condition of the provisioning of Metz rests primarily upon the Military Governor, General Coffinieres, who appears to have influenced the municipality to too great an extent. He is described by Capt. Hozier as a "large built, kind hearted man, about sixty-three years of age, but of no great vigour of mind. Like most officers of the engineers and artillery, his political proclivities were towards Republicanism rather than Imperialism." M. Prost gives us a great deal of information in regard to the proceedings of the municipality throughout the siege ; and there is abundant evidence to demonstrate how weak that administration was. The prefect and mayor received orders from the Governor on the 12th August to exclude all refugees who did not bring with them 40 days' supplies. We are told that feelings of humanity prevented those functionaries from carrying out their instructions strictly. Consequently some thousands of refugees were permitted to take refuge in and around Metz who were totally unprovided with provisions. Large numbers of the refugees, however, brought quantities of supplies and cattle into the place, which accounts for the large number of cows estimated to be within the walls of the city, which was said to have been from 1,200 to 1,500. On the 30th August the Intendance had decided to requisition all these cattle for the

use of the army, but upon the representation of the citizens that the milk was needed for the children and the old people, the order was withdrawn at the request of the municipality. Sentiment seems to have entered too largely into the deliberations of the council at the commencement of the siege, and Coffinieres does not appear to have been free from a like weakness, for he informed M. Bouchette, the inspector of mills, that he considered it best to use the reserves in hand, and to leave the supplies belonging to private individuals in their own hands, so that the former might be at the disposition of everybody. In other words, whoever possessed the means could purchase as much and more than they required, the others might go hungry or be dependent upon charity. This was not the way to prevent waste, or to make the provisions in hand last as long as possible. The weakest decision of the council was arrived at on the 15th August—it was resolved that dependence should be placed on the military resources when their supplies were exhausted, of the extent of which stocks they expressed their complete ignorance.

The municipality did, however, adopt measures for preventing any serious privations amongst the citizens. There were 84 bakeries in Metz, these were permitted to purchase flour from the council's stores, and the bread was to be sold to the people at fair rates. At first the prices were not fixed, and M. Prost says the bakers did not abuse the trust reposed in them. Meat was very scarce from the commencement of the siege, the prices rising from 1 fr. 50 c. a kilogramme, to 2 fr. 50 c., and in the first few days of September to 3 fr. and 4 fr. a kilogramme. Between the 22nd August and the 3rd September the council sanctioned the opening of twenty horse-butcheries, when horseflesh became the only animal food for the poor. The town market was kept going during August, as we are told that the council felt very indignant that the Intendance of the field army had purchased large quantities of grain in the market place on the 29th. A commission was appointed on the 25th August by the council to supervise everything connected with the feeding of the citizens. The butcheries and bakeries were open during certain hours every morning for the sale of meat and bread, the indigent being given *bons* which entitled them to free issues. The citizens had to wait outside the shops *en queue*, first come first served. It does not say much for the foresight of the council that on the 13th September the commission reported that the public supplies were nearly exhausted, and it was recommended that the 15,000 *quintaux* in the private granaries should

be taken over by the city for consumption. The price fixed by the council was 36 fr. per sack of 100 kilos., which was the market value at the moment. On the 10th September the citizens were required to give up all the forage they possessed, excepting what might be required for feeding their animals for 30 days. The forage was to be delivered into the council's stores within three days, when 45 fr. a quintal for oats, 35 fr. for hay, and 20 fr. for straw would be paid. But failing delivery within the three days, only 30 fr., 12 fr., and 10 fr. would be paid respectively. The arrangements made, although somewhat late, seem to have been sensible and suited to the immediate requirements of the citizens, but there does not appear to have been any effort made either by the Governor or the municipality to impress the people with the idea that the most rigid economy in the care and consumption of supplies was imperative. In the proclamation published by the authorities on the 13th September, no reference is made to the necessity for the economical employment of the supplies held by the people, or in regard to the demands made upon the municipal resources. The people are called upon to vie with each other in defending Metz, but the *pièce de résistance*, the supplies, were entirely lost sight of in this appeal to the patriotism of the citizens.

As has been already stated General Coffinieres was in command of the garrison of Metz, which consisted of 8,000 regular troops, who were augmented by the National Guards. He does not appear to have commanded the troops in the occupation of the outlying forts, these seem to have been regarded as a portion of the field army. This was another of those anomalies which were so abundant at the outbreak of the war; it is certain that if the field army had broken away, the garrisons of the forts would have been under the command of General Coffinieres. As it was, he had nothing to do with the forts, and it is stated that one or more of the forts had an abundance of supplies in reserve when the army capitulated. Owing to this division in the command, for although Bazaine was senior to Coffinieres, the former recognised that he held no command within the city walls, and yet, notwithstanding this admission, he was constantly interfering with the arrangements made by the Metz authorities. There was his peremptory demand for the cattle within the walls, which was only withdrawn, for the moment, before a strong remonstrance. Then again, the Intendance of the field army did not hesitate to purchase supplies in the Metz market, when their stocks were large and when it was impossible for the townspeople to procure

further supplies from outside. Such conduct not only enhanced prices but also deprived the garrison and citizens of a certain portion of the reserves upon which dependence had been placed. The most flagrant job, however, was when General Coffinieres was persuaded to write to the mayor on the 13th October to inform him that the military magazines were empty, and that it was not possible for the army of the Rhine, which had hitherto protected the city from bombardment, to continue its resistance without bread. He concluded with the following remark :—"The sacred laws of humanity obliged the city of Metz to come to the aid of the army, of the garrison, and of the sick and wounded." He then went into figures as to the municipal stocks and consumption, and the quantities needed for the army, and arrived at the conclusion that the stocks in hand would afford six days' consumption for the whole. The first issue to the field army was made on the 15th October, but on its being ascertained that large stocks of flour had been secreted by several army corps, notably by the 3rd, General Coffinieres ordered the issue to be discontinued on the 17th. There was evidently a palpable fraud practised upon the municipality, as the army of the Rhine was able to hold out, certainly upon greatly reduced rations, for a further eleven days, and even then it is believed that the forts still contained large reserves.

The investing army was naturally in a much better position in regard to its supplies, the country to the eastward and to the southward was open to it, and the lines of railway and the telegraph lines were at its disposition. The whole of Alsace and Lorraine had practically come under German rule, there were certainly a few fortresses still to be subdued, and the attacks of the *Franc-tireurs* were at times very embarrassing, but as a whole they were able to use the surrounding country as though it had already been incorporated with the Fatherland. In order to bring the forces attacking on the western and southern sides of Metz into touch with North Germany, a military line of railway was constructed between Remilly and Pont à Mousson, which was open to traffic before the end of September. The German army surrounding Metz had thus secured direct railway communication with its own country, which assured to that army unfailing supplies of provisions and forage. The surrounding districts were drawn upon largely for supplies, certain zones being set aside for each army corps to draw upon. By such an arrangement the Intendantur of each corps became acquainted with the resources of their particular zones, and what was not procurable

in that district could be demanded from one of the advanced base depôts. Then again, there was no chance of two or three men working over the same country either together or in succession. Supply columns were no doubt extensively employed both in bringing supplies from the base depôts as well as from the surrounding country, the lines of railway being used for the conveyance of troops and for stores and supplies intended for the armies operating further afield. The correspondent of the *Daily News* gives some interesting particulars of what he saw as to the treatment of the investing army:—"The men are packed closely in the houses, occupying lofts, passages, sheds, and every other available shed or cover. The officers occupy two châteaux, both of which were beautiful residences before war laid them waste. The feeding is homely, and eaten in homely fashion. The men employ themselves in seeing to the rations, in conducting the cooking of the dinner, and in smoking in the bright sunshine. Dinner is rather a discursive meal; you imagine you have finished it when you have eaten of the rice, the soup, and the mincemeat in your own particular room, but going the round you find another mess devoting their attention to plums and ham, and you join in of course. Then you go a little further and find the inmates of another room topping off with chocolate or coffee, or a *petit verre*. After dinner is the siesta. The quarters are then as quiet as in the dead of night." This extract gives the reader an idea of the sort of life lead by an investing army, when the beleaguered are not too active in their offensive operations, as was the case with the French army defending the fortress of Metz.

CHAPTER XII.

SURRENDER OF METZ.

Marshal Bazaine had not been able to make any special supply and transport arrangements for the large number of men who so suddenly came under his command, in consequence of the collapse of the projected invasion; he had to depend entirely upon the arrangements already made, such as they were, by the corps commanders. The defeat of the 1st Army Corps at Worth compelled Napoleon to confer the command of the remaining corps which were concentrated around Metz upon Bazaine, who had formerly been in command of the 3rd Army Corps. It followed, therefore, that these five corps had nothing more to depend upon during the siege than what they possessed when forced to fall back from Gravelotte. Upon taking the field each corps was no doubt provided with whatever supplies could be got together by the Intendants in charge. Marshal Bazaine draws a lamentable picture of the state of these corps at the commencement of the war:—"The whole organisation of the French army for war service had to be created; the destination of regiments, the formation of brigades and divisions, the organisation of the Intendance, the parks, and the hospital services, and the appointment of all grades of staff officers had to be determined. The supplies were far from sufficient, and the arrangements made with the contractors were not carried out."

At the outbreak of the war the Intendance was very badly officered, the numbers being too few to admit of the appointment of the requisite number of officers to all the brigades and divisions. Bazaine certainly never expected to have had his army so held up, otherwise he would no doubt have taken steps to secure an abundant supply of provisions, but so confident was he of being able to force a passage that he sent his Intendant-General Wolff to Verdun to make all the preliminary arrangements for the retirement of the army upon Chalons. This officer was unable to return after the defeat at Gravelotte, and the charge of the supplies for the whole of this large army devolved upon a sous-intendant, M. Martiny, who is stated by Bazaine to have been active, zealous,

and intelligent. It was estimated that in the magazines at Metz and in the railway station there were more than six million full rations of breadstuffs—the other supplies were far from abundant, but the army corps had a considerable quantity of provisions and forage in their supply column wagons. Bazaine was evidently not popular with the army. M. Poullin tells us that he avoided visiting the camps outside Metz, and that great indignation was expressed against him for the alleged suppression of a despatch said to have been sent by McMahon, informing him that he was on the march to Montmedy by way of St. Menehould. We incline to the belief that if the French army had no greater fault to find with Bazaine, that officer did not give them much to carp at. The fact was that the army was disgusted with the want of success on the part of their generals; the rank and file had fought with the greatest bravery, but military talent was conspicuously absent in the upper ranks. Indeed, Bazaine had done far more for his country than any other commander, for although he had been unable to break through the German legions, he had inflicted enormous loss upon them, and this was more than any other officer had accomplished.

We have little information as to the reserves of provisions and forage which were laid in for the garrison of Metz. The military magazines in the town were amply stocked with breadstuffs, but the reserves held seem to have been made available for the field army as well as for the garrison. When Bazaine chose to exert his authority he did not hesitate to issue orders to Coffiniere, and the probabilities are that the army reserves held in Metz were drawn upon extensively by the army lying under its walls. The forts appear to have been provisioned independently of the garrison, and this was necessary, as owing to their situation at from one to two miles beyond the ramparts, it might have become difficult to supply them from the city during a close investment. With troops entrenched in front of them, as was the case in this siege, nothing could have been easier than the maintenance of communications between the town and the outlying forts, but under other circumstances the communications might not have been so easy. It has already been stated that the commander of the fortress does not seem to have exercised any control over the forts, the Marshal appears to have considered them for the time being as a portion of the works defended by the army of the Rhine. In any case the garrison troops would have been entitled to share with the civilians any and all of the reserves of provisions which were within the city walls.

We know from the letter written by General Coffiniere to the mayor on the 13th October that the military magazines were then completely empty ; it is probable, therefore, that the garrison had subsisted entirely upon those reserves up to that date. The Intendance must have experienced serious difficulties in carrying out their orders, if they had received any ; the situation must have been full of embarrassments for that department. The expectation was that Bazaine's army would at once leave the immediate neighbourhood of Metz, and there was evidently no necessity that any preparations should be made for victualling that army from the resources of the garrison. It was not until the 19th August that the inflexible hand of fate determined that that army should not depart from Metz, but it was then too late for anything to be done to meet this overwhelming contingency, and the best that was possible had to be done with what was within the lines of environment. Unfortunately for France, the best was not done. Although there was a reduction in the meat issue, owing to the failure of the reserves of cattle, full bread rations were issued up to the 15th September, when a reduction of one-third was made. Had the reduction been made at once, the army would have saved sufficient breadstuffs to last it for another two weeks. A further extension of the duration of the siege for a fortnight would have been of the utmost importance to the French at that time, when their military resources were gaining strength daily ; on the contrary, a huge army of 200,000 men was thus let loose a fortnight earlier to overwhelm the newly-formed armies. At that moment even a week's time was of the utmost importance in consolidating the strength of the reorganised French armies. Had Bazaine and his generals, and their Intendance appreciated the duty and devotion they owed to their country, not two weeks, but five or six could have been given to the newborn armies of France wherein they would have had time to consolidate and to become more powerful, and would have had a far better chance of resisting the attack of the victorious soldiers of Prince Frederick Charles' army. We do not pretend to attribute the calamity to anything more culpable than gross ignorance of what was required of the commanders, upon whom their country had conferred high and lucrative appointments. We should none of us lose sight of the fact that when we accept the emoluments of high and responsible offices, we owe everything we can give in return—our talents, our time, our energy, our devotion, and even our lives.

We are given an interesting account of this siege by M.

Quesnoy in his *Armée de Rhine*, and the following particulars are extracted :—"The reality of our situation became each day more distressing ; we thought of our food, the resources not being very large ; of the forage for the horses which was almost exhausted. The poor beasts got hardly what was necessary, and on the 14th September the rations were considerably reduced ; we feared a great mortality, and already they had to bury the dead animals deeply as there were no disinfectants. We had unfortunately no longer any means to salt horseflesh, the salt being almost exhausted." He gives an account of the first sortie on the 22nd September :—"A party was sent out to forage for supplies at Lanvallier, a number of train and regimental wagons were sent to load up forage and wheat, which were known to be stored in the village. This operation was expeditiously conducted, but did not succeed upon the first attempt owing to the heavy rifle fire of the Germans ; it was necessary to make a second attempt when the fire was held in check by our riflemen. We brought in fifty wagon-loads of forage and made a dozen prisoners." The second sortie on the 7th October was made in great force, some writers contending that Bazaine hoped to penetrate the German lines and break out towards the north. However, M. Quesnoy gives the following account of this unsuccessful attempt :—"Owing to the increasing want of supplies it was determined to make a raid upon some farms, the great and little Tapes, which were situated some four miles outside Metz. A large force of men and a train of wagons were got ready for the enterprise. Starting at 11 p.m. the French artillery and riflemen were soon engaged with the German batteries posted at Saulney, Semecourt, and Bellevue. The wagons were left in a field near the Maison Rouge. On reaching the farms it was found that the Germans had already removed all the harvested crops, the sortie was therefore in vain. The train sustained a heavy fire which caused some disorder, but under the protection of the rear guard it effected its retreat in safety." This sortie was evidently undertaken in desperation ; the commander saw nothing now before him but surrender or starvation, and one supreme effort seems to have been made to get some additional supplies if any were procurable. It is said that 45,000 French soldiers were engaged, and that their losses were 1,100 in killed and wounded. The Germans appear to have lost more heavily, which is not surprising as the attack was undertaken during the night, and the Germans would have been surprised to some extent. Then again, the French were working from interior lines and were able to concentrate a large number of

men at any given point, but the Germans could do nothing before the attack was delivered. Furthermore, the latter were working upon a very extended front with less than ten thousand men to defend each mile of circumvallation.

At the commencement of the siege there were about 30,000 horses and mules with the field army. The supply of forage appears to have lasted until about the middle of September, for it was on the 10th of that month that the citizens were required to deliver all the forage they possessed, excepting one month's supply for their own animals. About this time the Intendance made use of 5,200 quintals of wheat and 5,150 quintals of rye as food for the horses. These quantities, which would yield something less than two and a half million of pounds in weight, would not have provided food for the horses, which probably did not then exceed 25,000, for more than a dozen days, that is allowing not more than 10 lbs. per horse daily. On the other hand had these cereals been kept for the men, they would have fed the army and the civilians for another week, or perhaps longer. Surely such a step was most improvident, it would have been better to have reduced the bread ration a quarter of a kilogramme, and to have increased the ration of horseflesh to a kilogramme, so that the horses might have been consumed more rapidly, and so much more corn saved; furthermore, the horses would not have lost so much weight had they been killed and eaten at an earlier date, and an economy in horseflesh would have resulted. Towards the end of the siege, when the horses were little more than skeletons, and the issue was 750 grammes per man, it took nearly 1,000 horses to supply the daily consumption of horseflesh. On the 12th October, after considering the question of the food supply, a municipal committee passed the following resolution:—"We must at every sacrifice prolong the lives of some of the horses to be used in some degree for the feeding of the men. We must preserve all the forage procurable, not hesitating to employ everything which may seem to nourish the horses." It is difficult to understand such appalling stupidity. So long as forage, that is fodder, was procurable, it was desirable to keep as many horses alive as was possible, but to issue what could be used as human food for the prolongation of the agony of these poor animals, which were being done to death by starvation, surpasses belief. One is almost inclined to think that the wiser course would have been to kill and bury those which could not be eaten or kept alive on the existing stocks of fodder. The Abbé Meissas tells us that as early as the 23rd September the horses were perishing

from starvation, as there was not a vestige of grass remaining anywhere outside the works. He observed that the horses picketed out fed off the tails of their neighbours for want of something better to eat, but it was a peculiar circumstance that the manes were not touched. He adds that on the 5th October, the issue of forage was 1 kilo. of oats for troop and 2 kilos. for officers' horses, and 1 of straw or hay only could be issued to each horse daily. This ration aggregated less than 4½ lbs. weight daily per troop horse; it is absurd to suppose that any good purpose could be attained by pursuing such a course, the lives of the horses could not have been preserved for any length of time on such wretched rations, and they certainly had not been effective for weeks. Surely it would have been far wiser to have killed and eaten them. The prices charged at the butcheries for horse flesh per kilogramme, for inferior 60 cents.; best (exclusive of filets), 1 franc; choice, 1 franc 50 cents. Horses' brains sold from 1 franc 50 cents. to 7 francs a kilogramme. Colts' flesh from 1 franc 50 cents. to 4 francs 50 cents. Asses' flesh at 4 francs 50 cents. Mule flesh at 4 francs 50 cents. *Filet de cheval* from 3 to 5 francs the kilogramme. The highest prices quoted were paid in October only.

Serious differences arose between the municipal authorities and the army of the Rhine. When the town was requisitioning wheat at 36 francs the quintal, the Intendance was purchasing it at 45 francs, pretending that oats were being purchased. The fraud was established by a seizure made at one of the gates of the city, early in October, when a protest was filed against the infringement of the rights of the city. After the reduction of the soldiers' ration of bread to 500 grammes, the men from the camp made a practice of purchasing bread at the city bakeries, which resulted in some serious collisions between them and the citizens. A stop was put to this by refusing the soldiers admission to the town up to mid-day, but this did not effectually prevent the traffic. Some civilians were found corrupt enough to purchase largely from the bakers in order that they might resell to the soldiery at enhanced prices. The bakers naturally complained that they could not meet the demand, and other steps had to be adopted. The bakers were divided into three classes: the 1st class were to receive four sacks a day, the 2nd, three, and the 3rd class two sacks. Cards were issued to each family or individual describing the maximum quantities they were each entitled to receive daily. Adults of either sex were entitled to 500 grammes, children from 4 to 12 years of age 250 grammes, and those from 1 to 4 years

were allowed only 125 grammes daily. Thus for the first time, at the beginning of October, after the siege had been going on for six weeks, an attempt was made to stop waste. It is lamentable to contemplate what an immensity of good might have been rendered to poor afflicted France had her sons in Metz appreciated the situation better. The institution of judicious arrangements from the outset would have enabled the army of Metz to have held out for a further period of from six to eight weeks. Indeed we are told by M. Amanieu, that on the 27th October Bazaine was informed by his Intendant that with what could be collected from the citizens of Metz, there would be sufficient supplies to last for another eight days. He tells us that Bazaine replied as follows :—" And what help do you think that would give ? The situation would not be changed ; the negotiations are proceeding ; it is only left to complete the terms and get out of the place." M. Amanieu adds : " Eight days ! Which might have been the salvation of France. Prince Frederick Charles would have been obliged to remain before Metz, and during that time d'Aurelles might have raised the siege of Paris." There is no doubt that had a careful search been instituted by the council, large quantities of supplies and forage would have been found hidden in many parts of the town. The council was pleased to issue stringent orders but took no pains to see that they were enforced. On the 7th October, when the citizens and the soldiery were on the verge of starvation, they merely gave orders that those having wheat or flour should declare the quantities they held before the mayor not later than the 10th. They were to be paid at the rate of 30 francs for wheat and 40 francs for flour. In the event of their not making the declaration, the flour or wheat would be seized and not paid for. Such trumperry proceedings in the face of a grave situation, were unworthy of either sensible men or patriots. On the 30th September there were remaining in the city magazines more than a million and a half pounds of breadstuffs, which were sufficient to last the citizens for another month, but it is certain that before the end of October both the garrison and the field army made considerable inroads upon those stocks. On the 9th October the bread ration generally was reduced to 300 grammes, and the issue of horseflesh increased to 750 grammes.

With regard to other supplies, owing to the destruction of large quantities of groceries and biscuits after Gravelotte, the field army's reserves of these articles had become considerably diminished. Coffee, sugar, and salt were gradually reduced in the soldiers' ration, and finally disappeared, the small stocks

remaining being probably reserved for the sick and wounded. The dealers in the city seem to have been able to supply vegetables, such as potatoes, beans, and onions during September and October, but the high prices charged ensured very limited demands. Sugar sold at from 6 to 20 francs the kilogramme. Eggs at from 6 to 9 francs a dozen. Milk from 1 to 2·40 a litre. Butter was quoted at from 8 to 20 francs the kilogramme. Rabbits sold at 15 francs, and hares at 45 francs—a few of these may have been killed by the soldiers, who would have been tempted to part with them for money. Candles were very scarce and must have been regarded as a superfluity, as much as 8 to 11 francs apiece being paid for some in October, and as much as 3 francs for dips; it is not improbable that some of them were bought to be eaten. Chickens, which are so prized in the French *cuisine*, rose to the almost prohibitive rate of 20 francs each.

It was evident that none but the rich were able to live even fairly well during the last days of the siege of Metz, but the poor had to content themselves with very small rations. The smallest ration of bread issued to the citizens was, to adults 300 grammes, about 10½ ozs.; this reduction was made only ten days before the capitulation was signed. The Abbé Meissas tells us that the army bread at this time, the ration being only 300 grammes, was composed of all kinds of ingredients of a very problematical description drawn from the family of cereals, but he congratulates himself that it was not sour like that of the Prussians. The ration of horseflesh appears to have been increased to 750 grammes towards the termination of the siege; the weight of the whole ration, inclusive of bone, did not therefore exceed 2½ lbs. in weight. The ration at that time consisted simply of bread and horseflesh, but it should be remembered that the men had neither much work nor had they any hard fighting to do. Salt had failed in September, so that this unpalatable food could not be disguised for want of that seasoning. There is, however, another side to this painful picture, it is certain that many of the dealers in Metz secreted quantities of their stocks in order to secure high rates as the times became harder. This position is confirmed to some extent by several eye-witnesses, who observed that after the surrender many of these dealers exhibited ample stocks of all kinds for sale. It is to be hoped that they had over-reached themselves to some extent by holding those stocks too long; they certainly would not have found the German soldiery willing to pay extravagant prices, if they paid at all.

From the Emperor downwards an unsoldierlike feeling had pervaded the higher ranks of the French army. It had been determined that the hardships of campaigning should press as lightly as was possible upon a select few, and no expenses were spared towards that end. We have already seen that the Emperor was accompanied into the field by a huge train of vehicles, including a travelling kitchen, horses, and a host of valets, grooms, chefs, and other servants, besides an enormous staff. The Crown Prince in his diary refers to him thus :—"Napoleon no longer safe in Sedan is anxious about his carriages and baggage wagons * * * I suggest Wilhelmshe as residence for Napoleon ; I dissuade them from asking the Emperor to go up the hill, in face of the troops, as humiliating ; recommend the King to ride to the Emperor at Bellevue, where are the Imperial carriages and *fourgons*, servants and postilions *à la Longjumeau*." This rugged soldier hardly disguises his contempt for him of the feather-bed type. It is not surprising that so effeminate a lead should have had a pernicious effect upon some of his generals. The *Times* correspondent wrote as follows :—"I am positively informed by the man, in whose father's house Leboeuf lived during the siege, that he had a dairy and poultry yard to the very end, and that he and Bazaine, and the superior officers lived in luxury to the last. They paid exorbitant prices for the delicacies of the table, and always succeeded in procuring them ; and I was indignantly informed by a vivacious citizen, that only a week before the capitulation, a friend of his had sold Bazaine a *pâte de foie gras* for 500 francs. The total amount spent in the city by the army was estimated at one hundred and twenty millions of francs. The townspeople were utterly scandalised by the flagrant immorality of their defenders, who seemed to have preferred cafés and the society of the *demi-monde* to do duty in the trenches, and who to the last denied themselves no enjoyment or luxury which money could purchase or the town afford. To listen to the *bourgeoise* of Metz, who had the best of opportunity of judging, this demoralisation was by no means confined to the higher ranks. Doubtless it began there, but the taint soon extended beyond the Marshals ; and the vices which had become fashionable in the Court were soon initiated in the camp." Probably a large portion of this expenditure was incurred by the Intendance, but enormous sums must have been expended by the generals, the officers, and the soldiers. How a dairy and poultry yard could have been maintained in the midst of the French soldiery can only be accounted for by their being maintained ostensibly for the benefit of the sick and

wounded. The shame of even such a thought is repugnant, but the fact requires explanation somehow.

The Germans were in clover compared with the French soldiery; they were little more than an army of observation, the look-out work had no doubt to be very diligently performed, which it undoubtedly was, otherwise the French would have seized every opportunity for inflicting losses upon the enemy. There was little room left for enterprises on the part of the French commanders. We incline to the belief that at this epoch the army of invasion was evidently much pressed for a sufficient supply of soldiers. As many as possible had to be sent forward to the armies besieging Paris, and the long lines of communication had to be held by ample forces; the French prisoners in Germany had also to be guarded. Metz took up the attention of over 200,000 men, and quite 100,000 were employed in laying siege to small places; it will be seen, therefore, that the Germans had their hands very full. An incident related in Cassell's *History of the War* will reveal the precise situation at that epoch:—"The victualling of an army in the field is always a difficult task; and the German army before Metz underwent a misfortune in this respect. A provision column destined for that force, consisting of 192 wagons, was attacked on the 20th September at Konigsmacher, on the Lorraine frontier, by a body of French soldiers. The wagons were escorted by only seven men of the Landwehr infantry, a very weak guard, considering that there were very few Prussians in that part of the country. The Landwehr endeavoured to retreat; but the villagers joined in the attack and barricaded the road with ploughs and harrows. The wagons, which were loaded with bacon, bread, oats, and other provisions, were seized, and two of the escort captured. Only 49 out of the 300 wagoners made their escape to Treves, with 13 horses." Exploits of this description had rather the effect of raising the spirits of the French than of doing the Germans any serious harm. The investing army before Metz was never troubled for want of food. The capture was probably effected by a band of Franc-tireurs, many of whom had their headquarters at Mezières. It was not until after the fall of Strasburg that troops could be spared to keep these marauders in check.

Capt. Hozier gives us some interesting particulars of the last days of the siege. He thinks that the citizens were better off than the soldiers of the field army, the *avant postes* being often without victuals for 48 hours, through the carelessness and neglect of the Intendance. The number of sick and wounded

rose from 15,000 in September to 23,000 in October. Desertions were rife amongst the soldiery, and on the 15th October some 800 of the half-starved citizens attempted to enter the German lines but were driven back. On the 27th October Coffiniere issued a fulsome proclamation to the citizens, and Bazaine published a general order on the same date, in both of which the compulsory surrender was acknowledged to have been due to the imminence of starvation. The arms of the French army were laid down by corps on the 28th October, and the following day the German troops took possession of the fortress. Great indignation was expressed both against Bazaine and Coffiniere by the soldiery and the citizens; as usual they considered themselves betrayed, and the former would have been lynched by the infuriated inhabitants had he not affected his escape to the German lines.

We cannot enter very fully into the charges made against Bazaine. He was very generally considered to have been a traitor to his country, and to have negotiated with the Germans having a single eye to his own personal advantage. That contention has, we think, not been fully established against him. He was certainly unfortunate, but the greater part of his misfortunes were due to the ignorance and incapacity displayed by those charged with the organisation of the army prior to the declaration of war, and subsequently to the non-success of the French generals in the field; the defeats of McMahon were the primary causes which confined Bazaine's army to Metz. Once there, he found it impossible to extricate himself, after having failed in the most gallant attempts to do so. It must not be forgotten that, for the last month and a half of the siege, the French soldiery were existing upon about 2 lbs. weight of food daily, whereas the Germans were well fed; it followed, therefore, that after the battle of Noisseville, on the 31st August, the French lost their last chance of escape, for how could half-starved men hope to cut their way through men who were well entrenched, well fed, and in the full vigour of life? Had the French succeeded in breaking through the lines of investment, they must have succumbed under the arduous marching, and must have been captured.

When it was apparent that all chance of escape was gone, Bazaine would have acted more wisely had he turned his attention to the husbanding of his supplies. There he seems to have failed, for we are told that he could hardly be induced by his Intendance to reduce the ration of bread towards the commencement of the investment, and then he would only sanction a reduction of the

ration from 750 to 700 grammes, equal to about $1\frac{1}{2}$ lbs. In the British service this is considered a large bread ration, but as the French are smaller men than the British, they need proportionately less food, consequently the bread ration was larger than was absolutely required. Had Bazaine reduced the ration at once to 500 grammes, he would have gained twelve days more bread for the soldiers and civilians. Again, had he increased the ration of horseflesh from 350 grammes to 500, or even 750, the horses would have been reduced more rapidly, and their feeding, which consisted to a large extent of wheat, rye, and oats, would have been largely saved towards the feeding of human beings. A greater saving would also have been affected if Bazaine had charged himself, as the officer commanding, with the duty of seeing that all the existing supplies in the city and its environs were placed under the charge and control of the Intendance, under whose orders the whole of the distributions should have been regulated. Bazaine evidently lacked the firmness needed for such an undertaking, he desired to conciliate the soldiery and the officers, whom he permitted to draw double rations. As is often the case in similar circumstances, he wished to avoid dictation to the civil authorities, and when he did pluck up sufficient courage to dictate to them, he very quickly backed down before their protest, and finally refused to command within the walls. The commanding officer is unquestionably the senior present. He has no power to divest himself of the obligations which the position imposes upon him, particularly when no higher authority can be referred to; he must accept the situation like a man, and do his duty unflinchingly and to the very best of his ability.

Very great exception is taken by many French writers, both civil and military, to the surrender of the French colours upon the capitulation of Metz. It is true that Bazaine had to condescend to employ a subterfuge, in order to secure the colours from the various regiments. Generals commanding were ordered to collect the standards of the regiments serving with them, and to deliver them to a staff officer who would have them conveyed to the citadel at Metz, where they would be destroyed. They were not burnt as was promised, but in accordance with the terms of the capitulation, were handed over, with other war material, to the German representatives. For this act Bazaine was accused of being in league with the Germans, and appearances were certainly against the Marshal. It is not, however, improbable that having in mind the conduct of the French regimental commanders at Sedan, where the colours were torn into ribbons by those in com-

mand and distributed to the officers and men, he felt justified in making use of a subterfuge to prevent his being forced into breaking faith with the Germans. The commander knew best how much reliance could be placed on the sense of justice in his own officers and men, and acted in accordance with that conviction. It was also contended that in a general order he stated that "according to military usages, places and armaments will be returned to France when peace is signed," and that promise was never kept. No doubt the order was issued in the hope that the usages would be observed, but he was clearly unable to bind the enemy to accept any such condition.

General Coffiniere was very properly blamed for neglecting to provision Metz, in his quality as Governor, before the investment of the place was accomplished. His defence was exceedingly weak, as he endeavoured to establish the position that no one, excepting a war minister, was entitled to order the provisioning of a fortress, and he attempted to shield himself behind the fact that he was not the senior officer present, and that if the provisioning should have been ordered locally, the only officer who could have given such an order was Bazaine. He then goes on to suggest that it was never anticipated that the army would have been detained before Metz, and that even as late as September Bazaine was hopeful of being able to break out. He seems entirely to have lost sight of the fact that whenever it suited his purpose he ignored the authority of Bazaine; that was done very notably when he countermanded the issue of breadstuffs to the army out of the city reserves, when it was discovered that several corps had secreted stocks in camp. It is perfectly sure that Bazaine's time was fully occupied in concerting measures, during the first two weeks of August, which had for their object the withdrawal of his army from Metz, consequently the whole of the arrangements connected with the defence of that fortress devolved upon Coffiniere, whose duty it was to make the necessary arrangements to place it in a position which would render it capable of withstanding the most determined efforts of the enemy. As a matter of fact, that officer did nothing in the direction of provisioning the fortress when it was possible to effect that object, which was during the early part of August. Apart from his duty as the military governor to see that the fortress was amply supplied, he owed it to his country to bring within the walls of the city all the animals, provisions, and forage which were in the neighbourhood of Metz, and which would have helped the enemies of his country. It is one of the first duties of a command-

ing officer to remove or destroy, as required by the circumstances, everything which may help his adversaries. Had this been done there would have been no necessity to undertake the sorties of the 27th September and the 7th October, in which the French losses were so heavy. The neglect of a manifest duty by an officer is apt to recoil with enormous force upon the innocent but unfortunate soldiery. For that reason alone severe punishment should invariably be inflicted upon any officer who is responsible for blundering in such fashion. Another flagrant omission on the part of General Coffiniere, was his neglect to inform the council, with whom he was in daily communication, before the 13th October of the deficiency in the military supplies; had he apprised them earlier of the actual state of the army supplies, steps might have been taken sooner towards the economising of the city's reserves. This officer proved himself to have been unfit for the position he occupied, and his excuses aggravated his conduct immeasurably.

CHAPTER XIII.

ADVANCE TO PARIS.

It will be remembered that when it was ascertained that Marshal McMahon had marched from Chalons towards the north with a large army, the advance of the 3rd German Army and the army of the Meuse upon Paris was temporarily arrested, and those forces were required to wheel towards the north in order to prevent the possibility of any serious attack being made upon the army of Prince Frederick Charles which was then investing Metz. After the defeat and capture of McMahon's army at Sedan these two German armies became available for the continuance of that advance which had been stayed for the moment. Neither of them had got beyond the immediate neighbourhood of Rethel in the north and of Chalons in the south, but it will be thoroughly understood that such large armies could not have advanced through an enemy's country without having effected the most careful arrangement of their lines of communication with their respective bases. It should be borne in mind that these armies had moved more than one hundred and fifty miles from their most advanced base dépôts in Germany, and although magazines had been created along the lines of their advance, and large stocks of provisions and forage had been captured from the French, notably at Weissenburg, Luneville, and Nancy, yet the supplies were not abundant; but when it is considered that these armies numbered over two hundred thousand men with about forty thousand cavalry and artillery horses, besides the enormous number of animals required for the ammunition reserves, the supply and transport, the stores, and the ambulances, some idea may be formed of the stupendous nature of the difficulty experienced in providing a sufficiency of supplies. Furthermore, the army besieging Metz having about the same number of men, but with less than half as many transport horses, had practically to have the first pull at the supplies and forage arriving by rail from the frontier. No doubt the strictest rules prevailed, under which the army of Prince Frederick Charles was not permitted to interfere with any supplies destined for either the 3rd Army, or the army of the Meuse, but practically everything despatched from North

Germany had to pass through Pont à Mousson, which was in the hands of the army surrounding Metz. The situation was due to the fact that the only French line of railway then available to the invaders was that running from Saarbrücken to Courcelles, which was the most direct route from Mannheim and Mayence. A new line of railway was under construction between Remeilly and Pont à Mousson, but this was not completed before the 23rd September, five days after these two armies had reached the environs of Paris. They would therefore not have received much, if any, benefit from that line during the advance. Stores and supplies for the 3rd Army would no doubt have been sent by rail as far as Remeilly, and thence by road to Commercy via Pont à Mousson. Those forwarded by rail from Pont à Mousson, Luneville, and Nancy, or which were forwarded from South Germany, would have had to be off-loaded east of Toul, which was held by the French up to the 23rd September, and after being carried round the northern side of the fortress, could again be loaded up for conveyance by rail to the posts more to the westward. Both armies had to obtain their stores and supplies much in the same way; the railway lines to Reims, Rethel, Laon, Chateau Thierry, Chalons, Bar le Duc, Nogent, and to other places, which soon fell under the control of the Germans, facilitated their rapid distribution. At the same time much delay and inconvenience was caused by the destruction of bridges, culverts, and railway lines, as the French troops retired before the rapid German advances.

We will now consider the methods adopted by the German General Staff for the security of their lines of communication in the advance of the two armies upon Paris. This highly important duty was confided to the Etappen Staff and troops. The latter are composed of the Landwehr battalions, and of a few squadrons of reserve cavalry. The Etappen Staff and troops follow up the advancing army, and occupy such posts as may be considered necessary for securing the lines of communication, for the establishment of dépôts for supplies and stores, for the creation of hospitals, for the regulation of the railway traffic, the telegraphs, and post-offices, for the maintenance and repair of roads, and finally their duty is to protect the rear of the army from attack by the inhabitants in their immediate vicinity, and to collect supplies and transport for the advancing army as well as for themselves. The Etappen Inspector moves forward one day behind the Headquarter Staff. He is apprised of every contemplated movement and of the requirements of the army.

Under him are placed several heads of departments : the Etappen Intendant, whose duty it is to see to the passage of food, ammunition, and stores, and to their collection, storage, and preservation ; the head of the Etappen police, who maintains order amongst the troops and citizens, serves and enforces requisitions for supplies, transport, and materials ; the Etappen surgeon, who is in charge of the hospitals and ambulances, and is charged with the collection of an adequate supply of instruments, medical appliances, medicines, comforts, &c. ; the heads of the railways, post office and telegraphs have their respective charges, for which they are held wholly and solely responsible. An Etappen commandant is appointed for each post. He is assisted by a more or less numerous staff according to the importance and size of the station. A railway corps is attached to each army, its duty being to repair and maintain the railway lines and rolling-stock, as well as to regulate the traffic under the Etappen staff.

The Etappen troops were moved forward as the two armies advanced to the westward, and up to the time those armies were ordered to alter their direction, these troops had occupied a large number of posts in the wake of both armies. The most advanced post for the 3rd Army was at Vitroy, within less than twenty miles of Chalons ; this post was supported by Bar le Duc, Ligny, and Colombey. The latter was situated furthest south to protect the left rear of the advance as well as the advanced lines of communication. Behind these were Frouard, Nancy, St. Nicolas du Port, Luneville, Marsal, Saverne, and Brumath, and on the frontier were Hagenau, Karlsruhe, Seltz, Neiderbrunn, and Weissenburg. The most advanced Etappen posts of the army of the Meuse were Beuzancy, Varennes, and Clermont, which were backed up by Dun, Damvilliers, Etain, and Fresnes. The posts at Thiaucourt and St. Mihiel served to keep up the communications between the two armies. The Etappen troops were at the same time investing Phalzburg and Toul, and were also observing Verdun and Bitche. If the map of France is consulted, it will be seen that the two armies were advancing in parallel lines towards the west when the sudden change of front to the north was made ; both armies had marched with broad fronts in order to render the supply of such large numbers of men and horses less difficult, particularly as the districts reserved to each army had to be depended upon mainly for forage, and to some extent for provisions and transport.

The Provisional Government had considered it advisable to order McMahon to march to the relief of Bazaine's invested

army, notwithstanding the fact that these two formidable armies were then on the march to attack him. It was probably thought that McMahon would have little chance of achieving any success against such formidable foes, and that it was better that he should endeavour to join forces with Bazaine's army when the two French armies would have attacked the two large German armies in succession with a better chance of success. Had McMahon's advice been acted upon, which was that his army should fall back upon Paris, the French nation would have saved a hundred thousand regulars for the defence of their capital ; as it was, the Government scheme gave no help whatever to Bazaine's army. In the meantime the Government was doing everything in its power towards the organisation of an effective resistance at the capital, and in the augmentation of the troops in the field. About the middle of August General Vinoy was directed to organise the 13th Corps d'Armée ; the army was to consist of three divisions, two were to be recruited in Paris, and the third in Reims. This army was formed and organised so rapidly that it was able to advance by the 29th August, or to be more correct Blanchard's division was able to move on Mezières, the second under Maudhuy being left at Reims in support, and the first under Exea being in course of completion at Reims. This army consisted mainly of young soldiers, there being only two regiments of the line available which constituted part of the first division. It will be seen, therefore, that Vinoy's corps was not to be depended upon, as the majority of the rank and file were conscripts, and the officers were generally inexperienced ; but McMahon's army had to be succoured in the dangerous position into which the folly of the Government had plunged it. Vinoy arrived at Mezières with the first division of his army on the night of the 31st August, several trains having been employed in the transportation of that force. It will be seen, therefore, that that line of railway was intact up to that date. His position was most precarious—McMahon's army had been driven to seek shelter around the walls of Sedan and was in imminent danger, a junction was therefore impossible. Mezières was simply a small fortified place without outworks, and could not be much better defended by a division than by a few hundred men. It was true that ample supplies of provisions were held by that fortress, as, in consequence of the rapid advance of the German armies upon Sedan, some train-loads of supplies had to be sent there lest they should fall into the hands of the enemy. In this way the famishing forces around Sedan had been deprived

of over a million rations of provisions. So soon as Vinoy became aware of the position of McMahon's army, he determined to retire upon Paris with the utmost despatch.

Some 10,000 fugitives had arrived during the night of the 1st September at Mezières from Sedan. These were directed to take a north-westerly route through Rocroi and Avesnes, to gain Saon. E. Deschaumes describes their flight graphically in his *Retraite Infernale*. He says:—"The fugitives hurried towards Avesnes in very disordered columns. The flight of this mob across the department of Aisne plunged the peasantry into grief and consternation. They will not readily forget the stampede of these men; soldiers of all arms, Zouaves and Turcos mounted upon stolen horses, artillerymen riding draught horses who were trailing after them the remnants of their harness, which had been cut loose by their sabres." It is obvious that Vinoy could make no use of so disorganised a rabble; he, therefore, wisely determined to get them out of harm's way, and sought to cover their flight with his division of young and inexperienced soldiery. He was, however, in a very serious dilemma: a victorious enemy was ready to advance upon him from the south, and the 6th German Army Corps at Attigny threatened his direct line of retreat upon Paris; no time was to be lost, his arrangements were made with the utmost secrecy, the men were to carry four days' rations in their haversacks, and were to be prepared to march at 1.30 a.m. on the morning of the 2nd September. Under these circumstances it was not possible to make use of the line of railway, and Vinoy, being anxious to save his men a wide detour, determined to risk a direct retirement upon Rethel.

In the early morning, after a night-march of nearly twenty miles, the enemy's patrols were seen to their front. It was soon discovered that Rethel was in the occupation of the 12th Division of Van Tumbling's Corps, and it became necessary for Vinoy to retrace his steps for some few miles to march round by Novien-Porcien upon Chateau-Porcien. So soon as General Hoffman had discovered that this detour had been made, he determined to advance his division with the object of cutting off Vinoy's retreat. On the evening of the 2nd, a large German force had assembled on the heights of Ecly, by which movement Vinoy's line of retreat upon Chaumont-Porcien was seriously threatened. A bold move was needed, and that Vinoy was determined to risk. Lighting his camp fires, and keeping them burning brightly, he and his men stole away silently at 1.30 a.m. on the 3rd September, and gained Chaumont-Porcien without their departure being

discovered. When it is considered that the French division had covered nearly thirty miles during the previous twenty-four hours, it is most creditable that the troops were still able to march a distance of nearly ten miles during that night. The men seem to have sustained exhausted nature by a liberal appeal to their reserve stock of provisions, as we are told by Commandant Rousset in his book on the war, that the General was forced to make a halt at this place so that the soldiers might get something to eat, for which they were almost wholly indebted to the villagers. He adds that the General ordered vehicles to be got ready in the villages through which he proposed to march, to pick up stragglers, as many of the men had become exhausted or footsore from the hard marching. The roads are described as knee-deep in mud owing to the heavy rains. Vinoy then pushed on to Montcornet where the pursuit was abandoned. Moltke gives some account of the German pursuit of Vinoy's division; he says:—"The Prussian cavalry had, early in the day, discovered the French line of march, but when this important information reached him General Hoffman had left Eclly. He had already started to look for the enemy at Novien-Porcien, where he was naturally to be expected after his first night-march, but at half-past nine had found the place deserted. Thus during the forenoon the German and French divisions had crossed on the road at a distance of about a mile apart. The thick weather had prevented them seeing each other. General Vinoy got, this day, as far as Montcornet, in what condition may be imagined. The 12th German Division had persevered in its westward march, but had only come up with the rear of the fast retreating enemy, and took up quarters at Chaumont-Porcien. This march of the enemy ought not indeed to have remained unobserved and unchecked under the eyes of two cavalry divisions, but these were, it must be owned, called off at an important moment."

The French division was thus able to extricate itself from a very perilous position after having fought several rear-guard actions with the pursuing enemy. Expecting further pursuit by the enemy, Vinoy still continued his rapid retreat, pushing on to Montcornet, which he reached by the evening of the 3rd September. The division had covered about fifty miles since the morning of the 2nd, which, considering the badness of the roads, was not an insignificant feat for young soldiers. The worn out soldiery were glad of a night's rest after marching day and night during the past two days. M. Yriarte, in his *Retraite de Mezières*, tells us that they availed themselves of some stacks

of straw wherein they could obtain much needed rest of body and repose of mind. He says, the peasantry very foolishly supplied the men with drink along the line of march, which caused many to fall out in an intoxicated condition. He also states that sufficient vehicles could not be procured for picking up those who were exhausted from one cause or another, owing to the spoliation of the district by the enemy's Uhlans. As Vinoy went by rail to Saon to see to the retirement of his 2nd Division from that place, it is pretty certain that the 3rd Division was no longer in danger; it followed him to Saon, starting at 4 a.m. on the 4th September. The men, who were completely exhausted, would no doubt have been sent on by rail, but the majority had to toil over another fourteen miles of heavy road. The 1st Division under Exea had retired from Reims to Soissons on the 4th, and on the following day had fallen back upon Dammartin by rail. By the 9th September Vinoy had managed to concentrate the whole of the 13th Corps d'Armée at Paris, the many lines of railway available being utilised for that service. It is more than probable that owing to the rapid retreat of the 13th Corps sufficient time could not be found for the destruction of the lines of railway, and the exhausted condition of the men would probably have prevented their being employed upon work entailing so much physical force. Certainly a number of tunnels and bridges were destroyed, lines of railway were pulled up, and highways were blocked, but this occurred more in the vicinity of Paris than in the country districts. The advance of the army of the Meuse, whose advance followed Vinoy's line of retreat, was therefore not rendered so difficult as it might otherwise have been if the retreating French forces had had more time at their disposal.

General Vinoy had achieved his purpose and had saved to France the only force of regular troops still able to take the field, the remainder were shut up in Metz, Strasburg, and other fortified places. That officer acted with great courage and with the promptitude which was so essential to success. He evidently marched without any baggage, excepting of course some reserves of ammunition; the men carried their rations for four days' consumption—it is surprising that more were not carried, for the French have often carried in other campaigns as much as fifteen days' biscuit; however, that is of small importance in face of the fact that, before they had been two days on the line of march, their reserves of provisions were almost exhausted, and the villagers had to be depended upon mainly for supplying their wants. We can only conclude that old soldiers were generally more careful

of their stocks than were the young conscripts. The latter probably either consumed their rations greedily on the march, or threw portions of them away to avoid carrying them ; this could have been easily done during the night-marches. Such a probability points to the necessity for the exercise of the utmost vigilance on the part of company officers and non-commissioned officers in order to check any such conduct on the part of inexperienced soldiers. Great credit is, however, due to both the officers and men for having covered about seventy miles of bad roads within a period of less than three days, almost without sleep, and whilst being subjected to frequent attacks from strong forces of pursuing cavalry and artillery. M. Deschaumes thus describes the retreat :—" Vinoy was forced to change his route more than once to escape from his pursuers, who threatened to surround him. He had to employ every artifice of war ; pretending at night to prepare bivouacks, lighting the fires, and decamping in the middle of the night, when the enemy counted on falling upon him and defeating him the following morning. Paris depended on the army of Vinoy for its assistance, and as a nucleus upon which to reconstitute its army. The strategy employed by Vinoy was of the utmost importance to the country."

It will be remembered that the 3rd German Army had taken the left in the advance on Paris, and the army of the Meuse had taken the right, but in the attack upon McMahon's army at Sedan, their positions had become reversed through the force of circumstances. It is obvious that the armies meant to return to their original positions when the advance upon Paris was to be recommenced. The arrangement of the lines of communication, the depôts, the personnel, &c., of one army could not have met the requirements of the other. It therefore became imperative that the 3rd Army should cut across the army of the Meuse so that it should regain its former position on the left of the advance. The 3rd Army, having detached its 11th and 1st Bavarian Corps to look after the French prisoners captured at Sedan, commenced its march on the 3rd September towards the south. On being informed that the French were concentrating at Reims, the Crown Prince sent peremptory orders for the 6th Army Corps to march upon Reims from Rethel. This was very fortunate for Vinoy, who was thus relieved from any further pursuit by that corps. This movement conducted by one large army across the line of march of another strikingly illustrates the remarkable organisation possessed by the German armies ; and it is certain

that there was no confusion or interruption of any consequence upon the movement of that army, as some of its corps had advanced considerably over forty miles by the 4th September. The army of the Meuse moved out on the same day, but none of its corps had covered more than thirteen miles by the same date ; this was probably owing to the necessity which existed for offering no obstacle to the advance of the 3rd Army, which had to cover very much more ground before it could come into line with that force. It was not before the 8th September that the two armies succeeded in getting into their proper positions for the contemplated movement towards Paris. During the four days' march none of the corps of the 3rd Army covered more than seventy miles of road towards the south-west, and within the same period the army of the Meuse did not move more than half that distance towards the westward, but several of the corps of both armies had halted for a day or more during that period. Hence it will be seen that the 3rd Army were judiciously allowed to regain its former relative situation in regard to its lines of communication before the general advance upon Paris was recommenced.

At this epoch the German Intendantur must have been severely taxed to feed the large armies in the neighbourhood of Metz, as well as those concentrated at Sedan, besides the mass of French prisoners who had to depend upon that department for their food ; the number of men requiring to be fed could not have been less than half a million, without counting the enormous number of horses for which forage had to be provided. When it is remembered that so large a number of troops would require nearly one thousand tons weight of provisions daily, besides large quantities of ammunition, stores, forage, and other material, the enormous strain upon one line of railway can be appreciated. The trains running from Bingen and Treves to Saarbrücken had to proceed upon one line of railway towards Metz, that line being open only as far as Courcelles. From that point the stores and supplies going to the armies at Sedan had to be sent by road, a distance of about eighty miles. It is not surprising, therefore, that the German Intendantur was at first quite unable to feed the one hundred thousand French prisoners, who were so unexpectedly thrust upon them. We know that the French troops at Sedan were in a famishing condition when the German artillery compelled them to accept an unconditional surrender. Arrangements could not be made off-hand for feeding so great a number of men in addition in the ordinary requirements of the large German armies, and it is more than probable that those armies

pushed forward with small reserves owing to the hurried nature of their advance. The Intendantur would no doubt have depended mainly upon the supply columns following that advance.

The sudden wheel towards the north would have completely disorganised all the supply arrangements made for an advance westward. It is not surprising, therefore, that the starving prisoners had to kill their horses and eat them to avoid starvation. The German commanders were forced to apply to the French commandant at Mezières to forward supplies from that fortress for the use of the prisoners. So soon as the two armies marched away from Sedan, the serious strain would have been, to a considerable extent, removed. The 3rd Army would have been marching towards the dépôts formed in advance by the cavalry, and the army of the Meuse could have been tapped by the roads running in a north-westerly direction. The direct roads from Sedan would have been relieved of the enormous mass of transport, which, in such rainy weather as had prevailed, must have rendered them almost impassable. The road-makers and repairers would have had plenty of work on their hands at this period of the campaign. It should be understood that it was most risky, if not impracticable, to get convoys through to the northward of Metz, owing to the fact that the French garrisons still held the fortresses of Thionville and Montmedy. Hence it became necessary to make the wide detour in sending stores and supplies from Treves to Sedan. Had the convoys been able to proceed by the more direct route to Sedan the distance by road would have been about forty miles and by rail about sixty, but in this instance, owing to the occupation of those fortresses by the French, a detour had to be made around the south of Metz and double the distance by road and rail had to be covered. We earnestly hope that we have made the actual situation clear to those who may take an interest in studying the difficulties of the German Intendantur, which might at any moment crop up with another army in the field, even when the utmost foresight has been expended in the endeavour to secure the success of the supply and transport arrangements connected with any campaign.

Another very serious hindrance was much in evidence about this period. The Franc-tireurs had begun to menace seriously the lines of communication as well as the convoys *en route* to their destinations. Governors had been appointed in Alsace and Lorraine, and special troops had been placed under their orders, but their organisation had not sufficiently matured to cope with this growing danger. Much of the time of these officials and their

troops were taken up at first in reducing the peasantry to a state of subjection, but neither sufficient time nor men could be spared to cope successfully with these marauders. It was not till after the fall of Strasburg on the 28th September that men could be spared to clear these bodies of irregular soldiery from those provinces. The Franc-tireurs were organised in all parts of France, their arms, ammunition, and clothing being paid for by public subscription ; they were accordingly very popular with the people of the land. They were armed with Chassepots, and having neither artillery nor baggage, were very mobile. They were fed and housed for the most part by the peasantry. After an engagement their uniforms were quickly removed, and the clothing of the peasantry was donned. The Germans had consequently much difficulty in distinguishing between the combatants and non-combatants. Orders were eventually issued to the German soldiery that no quarter was to be extended to these men, and that they were to be shot down wherever encountered. These irregular troops certainly succeeded in doing an immensity of harm to isolated convoys, and to small detachments of the enemy, so much so, that General von Werder had to be detailed with a large force for their suppression ; this was never, however, completely accomplished during the progress of the war.

CHAPTER XIV.

PROGRESS OF GERMAN ADVANCE.

As we are about to consider the difficulties encountered mainly by the administration of the German army in the advance of the two armies upon Paris, it may be as well to take into account the character of the German soldiery as a body; a knowledge of their characteristics will enable the reader to understand how almost insuperable difficulties were grappled with and overcome. We all know that the German race is remarkable for its courage, its discipline, its patient endurance, its patriotism, and for its excellent physique. We do not think that any writer has given a truer account of these marked features than has Mr. Alanson Winn in his book on "What I saw of the War." He makes mention of one of the many reasons which were the causes for the removal of General Steinmetz from the command of the 1st Army. He wrote as follows:—"A field *gendarme*, in his greatcoat and with drawn sword, suddenly appeared at the door and shouted, with rough voice, 'turn out.' Yes, General Steinmetz had ordered that the soldiers should join the bivouac, to make their beds, not on the ground, but in the mud—not a murmur, not a word. One poor fellow looked piteously at me for intervention. He tried to rise from his bench, but his knees would not bend straight. The *polizei* motioned him sternly to be quick. A thought struck me. I walked gravely up to the soldier, seized his pulse, felt it for a minute—not much to feel, poor fellow!—placed my hand on his heart, shook my head, and then remarked to the *polizei*, in the best German I could muster, that it would kill the man to force him into the wet. The *gendarme* demurred at first, but eventually, taking me for a doctor, left, and great was the poor fellow's gratitude to me for enabling him to sleep on a hard table instead of the cold damp ground." Another instance will suffice to further illustrate their character:—"Presently I saw, for the first time since I had been with the Prussian army, a soldier partially intoxicated. He was carrying two bottles under each arm; and occasionally putting them down, took a drink from a fifth, which he carried in his hand * * * presently we came upon a curious sight. Round

the corner of a street, issuing from an unpretending house, we saw a tide of Prussian soldiers, each having as many bottles as he could carry. We made for the house, and forcing our way through the outpouring soldiers, entered the shop, or rather store. My companion, who speaks admirable German, at once addressed them, remonstrating with them for lowering the Prussian repute for honest and orderly conduct. There were at this time some forty soldiers of all sorts in the shop; and can it be believed that these fine fellows, who had been in bivouac for the last twenty nights—who had been wet through night after night, and at the best had had nothing but red wine to drink, left the shop with scarcely one dissentient voice?" Mr. Winn reported the matter to the town commandant, who placed a guard on the house and assured the woman that she would be paid for what had been consumed by the soldiers.

The same writer gives us a vivid description of a German bivouac:—"I said above that this was a beech wood. Now any one knows that it is a characteristic of these trees, where they grow thickly, to destroy the underwood. These proved no exception to the rule; and when we first saw the wood at eight o'clock in the morning, in looking into it one's eyes rested on nothing but the peculiar aspect of the bare and smooth trunks. In an hour's time this scene was completely changed; every trunk seemed to have at its base a splendid growth of undercover, and it was not until you came close up to and walked through this undercover that you found it to be an indisputable fact that the Prussian soldier was practically acquainted with the classical proverb, 'Necessity is the mother of invention.' Here were the snugest houses conceivable—waterproof to a reasonable extent, and arranged in nice little streets. The scene was a busy one. The men had, most of them, got over their night's wetting, and were furbishing at their loved needle-rifles, second only to themselves in its power of wear-and-tear. Whenever they could get branches, the troops always made these little villages in an incredibly short space of time, and we often came upon snug little dwellings made by the division that had preceded us." It will be seen, therefore, that no tents whatever were carried by the German troops on the line of march, and the officers had evidently to find shelter for themselves the same as the men. We hear of Count Bismarck after Gravelotte seeking a night's rest in the attic of a cottage, the basement of which was occupied by wounded men. The carriage of camp equipment would have entailed such an increase in the transport that it became imperative from the

very first to abandon any intention of carrying tents with the men on the line of march. Whenever such a thing was possible the soldiery were housed at night, otherwise they had to bivouac as best they could, not infrequently having to lie on the bare and often wet ground. Mr. Winn mentions many sad deaths from hard marching, wet bivouacs, and insufficient food at the commencement of the German advance into France. As in all such cases, the physically weak are always the first to fall under the relentless hand of death. So much for the glamour of glorious war, but it often becomes the only arbitrament by which the fate of nations can be determined.

The Germans adopted no half measures in securing the safety of their armies in their passage through what was a highly antagonistic population. Rigorous measures had to be enforced from the outset, otherwise outrages would have increased and multiplied before they could have been checked by stern repression, which would often assume an appearance of cruelty when adopted to put down abuses which had been allowed to augment. The Germans wisely anticipated outrages on the part of the people, and gave the inhabitants due notice of what they might expect in case they indulged such proclivities. The *Times* correspondent wrote on this subject from the seat of war as follows:—"Their military administration is most vigorous, and its apparent severity prevents bloodshed and secures their long line against attack. It is death to have arms concealed or retained in the house. It is death to cut a telegraph wire, or to destroy anything used for the service of the army. What can a disarmed population, however hostile and venturesome, attempt against even small bodies of armed men who always move with caution, and against troops who do not make night marches unless in large bodies. The Prussian cavalry are everywhere. There is no neglect, no *insouciance*; nothing is left to trust." We think that a most important lesson is inculcated by the German commanders in their treatment of the French inhabitants. Most generals commanding are apt to lean too much to the side of leniency, and governments are inclined to act much in the same way; both however lose sight of the fact that any weakness of that kind is likely to be regarded as being dictated by fear, or by a want of confidence in their power to enforce drastic measures. Consequently the enemy is encouraged and the resistance is often seriously augmented. Nothing affects the supply and transport in the field so much as a weak policy in the administration; the inhabitants are encouraged to conceal their provisions and cattle,

or they may demand extortionate prices for their produce if the authorities are silly enough to pay what is demanded. A vigorous unbending policy is far and away the best to start with and to continue throughout any campaign.

It will also throw a further light upon these operations if we consider the attitude of the French inhabitants of the districts through which the two German armies had to march on their way to Paris. Sentiment plays a prominent part in the provisioning of armies in the field—if the peasantry are antagonistic the difficulties are multiplied in the ratio of the degree of the hate manifested by the inhabitants. In this war the antagonism was intense, but the offensive power was wanting, the people lacked time and *matériel* for an organised resistance; the war was so sudden, and the advance of the Germans so rapid that the inhabitants were almost stupified, yet they were able to impede the German advance to some considerable extent. The *Franc-tireurs* were mainly instrumental in worrying the German supply columns, but during his retreat Vinoy was aided by a number of armed peasantry, who, on one occasion, showed a bold front to the pursuing enemy. Dr. Busch tells us in his book that these irregular troops were called *franc-voleurs* by the people of property in the country, for they plundered and devastated the countryside. He describes the peasantry of the French campaign in the following terms:—"All the villages were full of Wurtembergers, and they had stationed outposts, both of infantry and cavalry, along the road for our protection. It must still be somewhat dangerous here, for the peasants who went hobbling about with their wooden shoes, or stood before their houses, looking quite harmless and unintelligent, are capable of very wicked tricks. To speak plainly, their faces are extremely simple-looking, but perhaps the nightcaps which most of them wear give them that sleepy, weak appearance. They had, without exception, their hands in their long trousers pockets, but it might possibly be not mere apathetic indifference which made them clench their fists inside." Dr. Busch gives us an incident illustrative of the toleration extended to the invaders by the educated classes, it was during the temporary occupation of Reims by the Headquarters of the Crown Prince's army. He wrote:—"The French do not seem to look upon us all as barbarians and villains. Many of them suppose us to be honourable people. I went this morning to a shop to buy some shirt collars. The shopman told me the price of a box, and when I put down two thalers for them he handed me a basket full of small money that

I might take the change he had to give me." From these and other incidents of a like nature it may be taken as a fact that the French peasantry had every desire to resist the invader, but the means were not always at their disposition, and that the educated classes, although antagonistic to the last degree, knew their own interests better than to compromise themselves by any overt acts of hostility. Under such circumstances, and with a firm administration, the work of the German Intendantur, although exceedingly heavy, was rendered as light as the existing conditions would admit.

Before following the advance of each of the two German armies it may be as well to consider the means possessed by the Administration for feeding those armies on their march through populous and hostile districts. Early in the war the Germans had captured large supplies of food and forage at Worth, Sarguemines, Luneville, and Nancy, but these stocks would have been exhausted or drawn upon heavily by those armies in their advance towards Sedan. No doubt the stocks at those and other places would have been replenished from German sources during the temporary lull in the advance upon Paris, so that in all probability the magazines along the two lines of communication may have been refilled by the 3rd September, when the advance was recommenced. By this period the supply columns had become thoroughly organised and were hard at work along the lines, being aided to a considerable extent by the Chemin de Fer de l'Est, which could be worked from the frontier up to the neighbourhood of Toul. Beyond this fortress the railway line took a more northerly route and became available for both of the advancing armies. The supplies sent from North Germany, viâ Remilly and Pont à Mousson, tapped the line at Commercy. Mr. Winn throws some light upon the methods adopted. He writes as follows:—"My companion returned to-day, and with him an Anglicised German, a traveller for some Leeds machine manufacturer. It appears that when the war broke out some wealthy north German farmer had just invested in two steam traction-engines from this firm. These machines had just arrived at Hamburg when war was declared, and with praise-worthy astuteness Mr. Toepffer at once went to Count Von Moltke, and asked him if they would be of service to him for dragging heavy artillery into position. The Count's reply was laconic as usual: 'Why did you not come before? I will take them.' They are of forty horse-power, and capable of being used as stationary engines, possessing each large rollers on which could be

coiled five hundred yards of chain cable. Thus the two engines together could draw great weights for a distance of one thousand yards. On returning to Pont à Mousson, Mr. Toepffier found orders awaiting him direct from Von Moltke to open a line of transport for commissariat with his two engines from that town to Commercy, the route by which at that time the Crown Prince's supplies were chiefly forwarded; and on the return journeys they were to bring back the wounded." It is added that these engines could take immense trains at rates of from three to four miles an hour. General Ambert quotes from letters written by Dr. Stiebur, the head of the German police at Pont à Mousson. That officer states that supplies were so scarce at that town that a French retired colonel had to beg bread of him to keep himself and his wife from starving. He regretted that they were forced to act with some degree of cruelty to the inhabitants, as they were obliged to seize their horses, vehicles, and cattle. He adds that wine was abundant, but not food; the former was used much by the soldiery. He contended that the Germans behaved as considerately to the citizens as was practicable under the circumstances; they were forced to exert strong coercive measures, otherwise the French might have risen in their millions to expel the invader.

We will now give a succinct account of the movements of the 3rd Army under the Crown Prince of Prussia, and the 4th Army, or the army of the Meuse, under the Crown Prince of Saxony in their advance from the battlefield of Sedan towards the French capital. It may, however, be as well to recall to mind that the 3rd Army was to take up its positions on the south and east of Paris, and the 4th Army was to attack from the northward. In this manner the metropolis was to be cut off from all communications with and deprived of all help from the rest of France. As the whole of the French regular troops, as well as a very large proportion of the Gardes Mobiles, had either been killed, wounded, or captured, or were besieged in Metz, Strasburg, Belfort, and other fortresses, excepting the 13th Army Corps, which had to fall back before the German advance, it will be understood that the march upon Paris was less of a strategical undertaking than a purely physical necessity. This condition rendered the provisioning of these armies more arduous than it otherwise would have been had they been subjected to checks from day to day from formidable opposing forces. In that case the advance would not have been so rapid and the solitary railway line and the transport would not have been so pressed to carry

forward supplies over daily increasing distances. There was, however, this advantage, that the more speedily the ground was covered the less would have been the consumption *en route*. It must not for a moment be imagined that when the armies reached the environs of Paris that the call for supplies from Germany ceased; on the contrary, they only then began to assume a very serious aspect, as the country surrounding the metropolis had naturally been denuded of everything edible for the support of the large French army, which had been assembled for the defence of the capital, as well as for those citizens who had chosen to cast in their lot with the besieged garrison.

We will now turn to the movements of the army of the Meuse. The advanced troops of that army had marched on the 3rd September towards Malmé and Stonne, but the Guard Corps was directed to march upon Montmédy, which it was thought might be carried by a *coup de main*. After an ineffectual bombardment on the 4th, that corps retired upon Mouzon, where it was expected to be in readiness to join in the general advance to be made on the 5th. By the 8th September this army had occupied the following line, Sery, Chaumont, Porcien, Rethel, with the cavalry division at St. Quentin. On the following day the cavalry division was moved to Eppes, and, being supported by infantry and artillery, a summons was sent to the French commander at Laon to surrender that fortress. The place at once opened its gates to the Germans, who took immediate possession. The fortress had hardly been occupied when a tremendous explosion occurred, which killed and wounded over 400 officers and men, three-fourths of whom were French. It is said that an old non-commissioned officer was so disgusted with the surrender, and being under the impression that the French had left the town, insanely fired his pistol into the powder magazine. An attempt was made to reduce Soissons on the 14th, but the field artillery could make no impression upon its works, and the army was forced to abandon the attack and continue its advance, a small corps of observation being left to mask the garrison. By the 16th the army had moved forward to Acy en Multien, Nanteuil le Haudouin, and Lizy, with the headquarters at Crouy, and its two cavalry divisions near Dammartin and Beaumont. If reference be made to the map of France of that period it will be seen that this army marched by the country roads without any regard to the lines of railway, which could not then be made available for any considerable distances, as those on that side of the Marne were blocked by the fortresses of La Fère and

Soissons. Until the left wing of this army had approached that river it could not have obtained much of its supplies from the eastern line of railway, that line being used by both armies during the investment of Paris—a certain number of trains were allotted daily to each army. Under the circumstances the army of the Meuse must have depended mainly in its advance upon the supplies which the Intendantur was able to procure *en route*, but there is no doubt that the supply columns would have carried ample reserves to meet every possible contingency, and these were no doubt replenished by the way, or by others overtaking them from the Etappen posts in the rear and upon the left flank. As the army moved forward the Etappen staff had established a number of posts; they consisted of the following:—Damvilliers, Stenay, Mouzon, Clermont, Varennes, Grand Pré, Rethel, Reims, Laon, Fismes, Crépy, Crouy sur Ourcq, Nanteuil le Haudouin, Neufchatel, and Dammartin. Supplies were collected at these and other posts and were sent forward for the use of the army, but there is little doubt that the eighty thousand soldiers and from thirty to forty thousand horses had to depend mainly upon the requisitions made upon the country through which the army marched. This part of France had not been overrun to any serious extent; certainly Vinoy's *corps d'armée* had passed through it by rail, but the 1st Division had afterwards to fall back on foot, and the two remaining divisions were certainly fed in the district for a fortnight or three weeks, but this could not have made much impression upon the natural resources of this productive district. It is possible that Paris may have drawn to a considerable extent upon a portion of the district in making its preliminary arrangements for the maintenance of its garrison and citizens, but the country was in no sense drained of its resources, that situation was no doubt attained later in the campaign, after the Germans had been investing Paris for a month or so, when it would have become sensibly depleted by the operations conducted by General Manteuffel in the north of France.

It will be remembered that the 3rd Army under the Crown Prince of Prussia had also commenced its advance on the 3rd September, and had marched to the south-west to regain its position in front of its original lines of communication. The army of the Meuse was to advance to the north of the Marne and the 3rd Army was to move to the south of that river. The two armies and the districts from which their supplies might be drawn were separated by the Marne. The 3rd Army did not gain the left bank of that river before the 8th September, when its

corps occupied Dormans, Epernay, and Chalons, with its cavalry division at Vertus. Considering the heavy state of the country roads this was not bad marching, the troops having covered from eighty to ninety miles within six days. It was not, however, until the 10th that the army gained its true line of advance—Dormans-Sezanne. In its further onward movements great caution had to be employed when the advance became less rapid, and during the five days following the advance made did not exceed forty miles. The cavalry division was thrown out well in advance of the army, besides having to guard its left flank it had to keep up its communications with the army of the Meuse. The cavalry scouts came into collision with the enemy about twenty miles to the west of Paris on the 13th, 14th, and 15th. On the 16th the cavalry division was pushed forward to Brie Comte Robert, and a brigade was sent to cut the southern line of railway and to destroy the railway bridge over the Seine. The French had already destroyed most of the railway and other bridges on the Marne; recourse had therefore to be had to the pontoon trains for the passage of that river. The highways were torn up and blocked with felled trees, bridges were blown up, tunnels were destroyed, and railway lines torn up. Such attempts to retard the advance of the German armies was of no avail, the damages were quickly repaired, and the armies, not to be denied, continued to approach and soon surrounded the capital of France. The official account gives the following particulars in regard to the advance of these two army corps:—"During the advance of the 3rd and Meuse Armies, from Sedan to Paris, as the troops were widely distributed at the night-halts, the supplies furnished by the inhabitants on requisition, and when necessary by the commissariat columns, sufficed for the purpose. Even the daily ration of bread were so adequately provided by requisition, and by the troops baking for themselves, that tenders by contract could be cancelled. All the troops found themselves in possession of their own rations, and in addition, carried with them several days' supplies in their wagons. In order to keep up these advantageous conditions as long as possible, the Commissariat Department of the 3rd Army caused main magazines to be formed at Reims and Chalons-sur-Marne; and also put in working order, by means of the columns of the 5th and 6th Army Corps, the large bakeries found at Mourmelon."

The Etappen staff and troops had followed the movements of the 3rd Army, and had established advanced dépôts at the following places:—Meaux, Lagny, Tournau, Coulommiers, Cor-

beil, besides others. These posts were supplied mainly from Germany via Pont à Mousson, Commercy, Nancy, Luneville, and Lauterberg. The eastern line of railway was still blocked by the fortresses of Strassburg and Toul, which caused much labour and expense to the Etappen troops and increased the serious difficulties inseparable from the duty of feeding over eighty thousand men on a rapid march through an enemy's country. The most stringent orders had to be framed for the government of the municipalities on the line of march. Commandant Rousset describes these in the following terms :—" Bell-ropes of the churches were to be cut to prevent the ringing of the bells ; doors and shutters of dwellings were to be kept open night and day, and the windows were to be kept illuminated. Citizens had to surrender their arms under serious penalties for neglecting to do so. Franc-tireurs were to be shot. The country was to supply all the wants of the army. The people were to lodge the soldiers even when barracks or other public buildings were available, If the column was small the men were to be billeted on the people. They were to receive 750 grammes of bread, 500 grammes of meat, 250 grammes of vegetables or rice daily, besides coffee, half a litre of wine, and brandy as required. Five cigars at least were to be provided for each man. A money allowance of 2 fr. per man per diem could be paid in lieu of rations. All vehicles and farm servants were to follow the armies with forage, sick, wounded, and ammunition." M. Rousset evidently makes the most of the orders issued, but other writers describe the Germans as having been most humane and considerate in their treatment of the inhabitants. In Cassell's *History of the War* it is stated that when the Germans marched into Reims the soldiers were quartered upon the inhabitants, but that the commissariat provided for the soldiers when the people were too poor to provide them with food. Dr. Busch says that the beggars at Reims were both numerous and importunate, and that the stoppage of the manufactories had caused much distress amongst the labouring classes. He mentions that at Chateau Thierry the proprietor of a shop was fined two hundred or two hundred and fifty bottles of champagne because a shot had been fired at some Uhlans from his house, fortunately without doing any injury. Looking at both sides of the question we incline very much to the belief that the French inhabitants were, as a general rule, treated with much consideration by the German soldiery, who were flushed with a succession of glorious victories, and might have had some excuse for behaving with some degree of hauteur.

It does not require great discernment to perceive that the German armies in their advance upon Paris must have depended almost wholly for their provisions and forage upon the country through which their marches were conducted. These large armies, consisting of over two hundred thousand men, if the Etappen troops are included, with thousands of cavalry, artillery, and transport horses to forage, could not have been fed at a distance of from two to three hundred miles from their main dépôts in Germany, particularly when only one French railway line was available but only to a limited extent owing to the interruption at Toul. Then again, it could not be expected that the Etappen lines of communication over so long a distance, more particularly those which had recently been established, could be got into such thorough working order as to be able to keep such large armies supplied when they were advancing at an average rate of over ten miles a day for a period of two weeks. The cavalry in advance and on the flanks of the two armies naturally had to provide food and forage for themselves, as they were beyond the reach of either rail or convoys, and their movements being governed so much by circumstances, it would have been impossible to fix their probable positions for even a couple of days in advance—it was therefore impossible to supply them from the rear. Under the circumstances it is more than likely that little more than the transport needed for ambulances and the reserve artillery and small-arm ammunition accompanied the movements of the cavalry and horse artillery. As has been stated already, the German armies marched without camp equipage, consequently the transport establishment was reduced to a minimum.

As the German armies advanced and towns and villages were occupied, the mayor of each place was directed to present himself at the quarters of the German commandant or Intendant, by whom he was informed of the daily requirements of the troops temporarily quartered in each place. In case the mayor should fail to provide what was required, his reasons for such failure were heard and were considered; if, in the opinion of the military authorities they were deemed to be shallow excuses, that officer was punished and such supplies as were wanted were taken by force and no receipts were given. Receipts were given for all provisions, forage, and materials commandeered, but it is certain that the German authorities never recognised that they were in any way liable for the indemnification of those who had virtually been pillaged. To what extent the French Government took notice of the losses sustained by her citizens, either through the

depredations of their own troops or those of the enemy, it is difficult to say. Those who were sufficiently persistent, or who could bring influence to bear, no doubt succeeded in obtaining some sort of recognition of their claims, but we fear that the great majority had to accept their losses as patriotic obligations. Sir Beacham Walker casts a side light upon this subject ; he wrote :— “ I had a talk with the Crown Prince about forced requisitions on the people, which are not only cruel but impolitic. They have for result that the people hide all their provisions ; whereas, if they were paid for on the nail, and the accounts delivered to their own Government after the war, supplies would be plentiful, and there would be no discontented peasantry on a possible line of retreat.” There is no doubt that the argument is sound, but unfortunately the “ ready money ” is not always procurable, even with the very best organisation. Lord Wellington’s army was almost always in an impecunious condition, and on one occasion carts even could not be hired to bring specie from an advanced depôt to the field army. No country can boast of the same degree of national integrity as can the British Empire. The history of past wars points to the fact that almost without exception the Generals commanding the armies of the Continental powers have seized private property right and left, for which receipts have at times been given, but in most instances never honoured, and in many cases not even the semblance of honest dealing has been attempted, and receipts have often been withheld. We cannot help reflecting with pride upon the fact that receipts given by British officers in the field have never been ignored by the Government of the country. Indeed, it is to be feared that in some instances money has been paid when there has perhaps been a suspicion of fraud, rather than that the least idea should be breathed as to any approach to repudiation on the part of the British Government or their representatives.

CHAPTER XV.

BLOCKADE OF PARIS.

The news of the defeat and capture of McMahon's army at Sedan did not reach Paris until the evening of the 3rd September, when the announcement was made to the citizens by General Trochu, the governor of the city. Like all crowds, under similar circumstances, the people lost all control of themselves, and rioting and drunkenness became the order of the day. With that short-sighted policy which often characterises a weak Government, the extent of the defeat was at first concealed ; a proclamation posted on the 4th giving the French loss as 40,000, whereas the prisoners captured exceeded one hundred thousand, the strength of the victors was also stated as 300,000, when they were actually under 200,000 men. The sitting of the Chamber was brought to an abrupt conclusion on the 4th, a Sunday, by the invasion of a turbulent crowd, amongst whom were many of the National Guards in uniform. The people shouted themselves hoarse with cries of "*Vive la Republic*," and a change of Government followed. The Empress had been left at Versailles as Regent during the absence of Louis Napoleon from his capital. Upon being informed of the bad news, and of the state of anarchy which had followed its announcement in Paris, the Empress considerably decided upon an immediate flight, rather than provoke greater civil commotion by remaining in the country. Early on that eventful Sunday morning that august lady secretly left the palace in an ordinary four-wheeler, accompanied by one of her ladies-in-waiting. She is believed to have sought refuge in an English yacht at Trouville, which conveyed her to that land, which has never denied an asylum to those who have been overtaken by misfortune.

Fortunately for the French nation there are always to be found men and women in that country as level-headed people as any other country can produce, and no land can boast of a more lofty sense of patriotism as that exhibited by the French nation as a whole. The masses may be carried away by anger or excitement, but when the safety of the country is endangered even these come to a more reasonable sense of their duty as citizens.

On the 5th a self-constituted Government was at once established, consisting of members of the Corps Legislatif, and a Republic, demanded by popular acclamation, was decreed. Effective steps were at once taken by the new Government to continue the policy inaugurated by the previous administration. As we have seen, the 13th Corps d'Armée, formed under General Vinoy, had managed to evade the enemy and had got back to Paris on the 13th September. A 14th Corps had been constituted by General Renault towards the beginning of September, but from the contents of a letter written by its commander to the War Minister, it was evidently in a very inefficient state. The immediate defence of Paris depended mainly upon these two corps, upon a large number of sailors landed from the fleet, and upon those 18 battalions of Gardes Mobiles, which had been found too mutinous to admit of their being marched from Chalons against the enemy, and were consequently sent to Paris under General Trochu. Other Gardes Mobiles had been collected from the provinces as well as in the city itself, and the National Guards of Paris were enrolled for the defence of the city. According to General Ducrot's estimate, these numbers do not appear to have exceeded three hundred thousand effectives, but there were Franc-tireurs in addition; the numbers are generally allowed to have been about four hundred thousand. This was, however, a formidable force to have been held by two German armies aggregating not much over 150,000 men, but nearly the whole of the French force consisted of conscripts, and of men very insufficiently trained. J. A. O'Shea, in his *Iron-bound City*, gives the following estimate of the composition of the defenders of Paris:—He estimated the infantry at 50,000, inclusive of two regiments of the line which had arrived from Rouen, the marines and the sailors; the cavalry consisted of forty strong squadrons; the artillery for the fortifications and outlying forts reached an aggregate of about 13,000 men; the National Guards were composed of 120 battalions, each of about 500 men; the Gardes Mobiles of about 90,000 men from the provinces, and of about 25,000 men raised in Paris. In addition to these there was a considerable number of engineers, artificers, transport and supply soldiers, ambulance men, as well as a large number of other employés. The total numbers could not therefore have been much below the 400,000 given by most writers. Some writers have estimated the population of the city at a million and a half, others at two millions. Inclusive of the garrison, it is more than probable that the numbers requiring to be fed exceeded two

millions, but of these a very large proportion consisted of women and children, who would not have received full rations.

So soon as it became apparent that Paris was in danger of being invested by the German armies steps were taken by the authorities to reduce the number of "useless mouths." On its becoming evident that Paris was likely to be a very dangerous locality, thousands of the opulent classes left the city and its environs for parts which were more secure, and in this way a considerable diminution in the population was effected without the necessity for any action on the part of the authorities. This exodus was, however, heavily discounted by the large number of people who flocked into the city from the neighbouring towns and villages upon the near approach of danger—probably about 100,000 men, women, and children. It was not, however, until the 29th August that a proclamation was issued by the Governor of Paris to the effect that all strangers, not naturalised French, and those belonging to any country at war with France, were to leave the city within three days. Known bad characters were warned by the police to quit the city at once, and the members of that class known as the *demi-monde* were directed to seek pastures new. Unfortunately for the community, the laws were not rigorously enforced, and a very large number of undesirable people succeeded in evading the operations of those regulations. The neglect or obvious corruption on the part of the officials contributed largely to swell the ranks of the Communists in the disgraceful acts which were so soon to bring a lasting stigma upon the French nation.

In order to throw some light upon the working of the supply and transport during the siege of Paris, it will be necessary to take a cursory view of the works surrounding that fortress, and we cannot do better than quote the description given by J. A. O'Shea, who was resident in Paris throughout the siege. He wrote thus in his book on the 22nd September:—"The investment was now virtually completed; but Paris had within her vast resources to fall back upon, in arms and stores, and a large adult male population. The world had no greater fortress. The enceinte consisted of 94 bastions, with masonry escarps and a wide deep ditch. This enceinte was more than seven miles long in parts and five miles broad. Outside these were sixteen strong detached forts, forming a cordon of thirty two miles, which meant that the invaders should occupy a circumference of some forty-five miles, so as to keep outside the immediate range of the guns. Within the enceinte the communications were all that

could be desired, the garrison having every advantage of acting on interior lines. There was a splendid military road all round, a railway circuit inside that, telegraph wires right and left, and broad intersecting avenues ; so that it ought to have been easy to concentrate masses at any point." This arrangement of the communications between the city and its outlying works could not have been more skilfully conceived, but the defenders were not the men needed to take every advantage of works so admirably planned, as they consisted for the most part of young conscripts and of untrained Mobiles and National Guards. These men must have improved rapidly under the severity of the practical experience they would have gained in the course of the heavy fighting which followed. The admirable arrangement of communications would, however, have been invaluable to the Intendance in feeding the troops in the outlying camps and forts ; in that respect at least the working of the supply and transport would have been rendered as light as was possible in the circumstances.

We will now regard for a moment the movements of the army of the Meuse in its advance with the object of completing the blockade of the north side of Paris. That army moved forward with rapidity, occupying the small towns and villages to the north of Paris, and cutting the railway lines and roads running from that city towards the north. M. de Mazade gives a graphic account of the defensive preparations at Beaumont sur Oise :—
"On finding the town besieged, attention was first turned to the supply of the inhabitants and garrison. All the civil bakers but one had left, and there were not more than eight days' supply of flour. Steps were at once taken to make up the deficiency, and supplies of wheat were purchased and ground into flour. A list of families was made, and their daily requirements were noted, and orders were issued by the municipality showing what quantities they were entitled to daily. The issues commenced on the 15th September, the evening before the arrival of the German investing forces. The soldiers do not appear to have received their rations from the Intendance with the same regularity and had frequently to be supplied from the municipal stocks. The town surrendered to the Saxon Corps, and on the 23rd some eighty empty wagons arrived with an escort of 500 men. A requisition for flour and other supplies was presented by the officer in command. It was explained to him that it was quite impossible to comply with his demand. He abruptly turned his back on us, and ordered the men to divide into fours and requisition each house. Every citizen had to give a little peace-

fully. We were pillaged quietly." So much for German methods, which are not un instructive. The north side of Paris was thus speedily cut off from all communications with the outer world by the enveloping movement of the army of the Crown Prince of Saxony. There was very little fighting, all opposition disappeared as the army moved forward, in fact the major portion of the available forces, which then consisted of the 13th and 14th Army Corps, was encamped on the western and southern sides of Paris.

The 3rd German Army met with serious opposition in its enveloping movement, which had for its object the occupation of the southern side and the capture of Versailles. On the early morning of the 19th, a general forward movement was made by the three corps of this army, the 5th and 2nd Bavarian moving in line with the 6th Corps in support. The French, however, determined to make an attack upon the right flank of the 5th Corps, which was on the right of the line of advance. Very severe fighting occurred in the neighbourhood of Bicetre and Chatillon, a division having been sent from the Bavarian Corps in support of the 5th Corps. Eventually the French were beaten back at all points, and, according to the Germans, the defeat became almost a rout, in fact it is asserted that, had the troops pushed their success, they might have occupied one of the outlying forts surrounding Paris. In his *Défence de Paris*, General Ducrot, who was in command, concludes his account of that operation in the following words:—"The General-in-Chief immediately gave orders to cease fire, the mitrailleuse alone continued firing. But this act, apparently without significance, made a bad impression on our young soldiers. It disturbed their equilibrium and the resolution which they had displayed up to that moment. On the field of battle it often needs only a trifling incident to dissipate the confidence of the troops. Eventually towards a quarter past three, no orders having arrived from the Governor, and being satisfied that there was no intention of sending any reinforcements, General Ducrot decided to abandon the position." The French acknowledge the loss of 723 officers and men, and state the German losses at 402. The figures given by Von Moltke are 961 and 443 respectively.

Immediately upon being relieved from any serious pressure on its flank, the 5th Corps continued its march with a large cavalry force pushed forward. These troops encountered some slight opposition from National Guards and armed civilians outside Versailles, but the main body was able to occupy the town early in the afternoon, whence large forces were pushed

forward to the northward in order to establish communications with the outposts of the army of the Meuse at Poissy. The large barracks and other public buildings were at once occupied by the Germans, and the remainder of the troops either occupied deserted houses or were billeted upon the inhabitants. Dr. Busch gives some particulars of the house occupied by Count Bismarck and the staff of the Foreign Office, to which he was himself attached :—" The house which the Chancellor occupied belonged to a Madame —, the widow of a prosperous cloth manufacturer, who, with her two sons, had fled shortly before our arrival, to Picardy or Sologne, and had left behind, as the protectors of their property, only a gardener and his wife. * * * A part of the winter garden, when the severe frost began in January, was occupied by a detachment which furnished sentries for the entrance. The library was appropriated by orderlies and messengers. * * * We were waited on mainly by our servants. What had to be left to women was done by a hired charwoman and the gardener's wife ; the latter of whom was always a flaming patriot. She hated *les Prussiens* with her whole heart, and considered that Paris could not be taken, even if Favre had signed the capitulation. Bazaine, Favre, Thiers were three traitors ; of the ex-Emperor she spoke only of as a '*cochon*,' who, if he ever put his foot in France again, would be sent to the scaffold. Madame — appeared only at the end of the siege, and made several unfounded assertions as to the pillage of some of her household effects, and stated that Bismarck desired to extort a clock from her, when as a fact she had offered to part with it for the extortionate price of 5,000 fr. The Chancellor, however, declined to satisfy her demands." Dr. Stiebur gives the following information as to the work of the police at Versailles :—" At each corner is a gendarme watching every house, every window ; the doors are guarded, and whenever a suspicious individual is seen to emerge, he is rigorously examined and carefully searched. All those whose bearing displeases us we place in arrest. Our prisons are so full that there is hardly any space left for any more. But with all that we compel ourselves to act in the most amiable manner towards the French inhabitants. We pay for everything, for we literally swim in coin." A circumstance mentioned in Cassell's *History of the War*, demonstrates the carelessness of the French authorities in not sending into Paris, before the arrival of the Germans, a large quantity of forage stored at Versailles. It is stated that no less than 300,000 fr. worth of hay and oats were captured at that place by the Germans. Very insufficient

quantities of forage were stored in Paris, and so large a reserve would have become invaluable to the besieged. This incident demonstrates how necessary it was to have had more careful officers at the head of the Intendance, for none other require greater forethought and caution.

A cordon had thus been drawn around the metropolis of France by the two German armies. The situation was peculiar, for the two armies did not boast an effective of much over 150,000 men, and the besieged garrison consisted of more than double that number. The latter force was certainly composed mainly of newly made soldiers, and was therefore most unreliable. The Germans, in the absence of siege artillery, could not hope to take a serious offensive, and they were forced to be satisfied with a complete investment, whereby the introduction of men, supplies, and ammunition could be prevented. Major Blumé tells us in his *Operations of the German Armies*, that "had the German leaders been able to assume with certainty that the first supplies in Paris would not last over ten weeks, they would have confined themselves simply to a blockade, and not brought up a siege train at all. But this was just the question to which no certain answer could be given; and it was resolved, therefore, whilst continuing the blockade, to take all preliminary steps for proceeding, if necessary, to the attack by force." Von Moltke tells us that the leaders were blamed for not bringing a battering train forward earlier in the siege, but he says people were unaware of the difficulties of the situation. At this period the German army had the control of only one railway line on French soil, and this was fully occupied in the transport of supplies for the forces in the field—food, reinforcements, and arms—to bring in the wounded and sick, and to carry prisoners back. The line practically ended at Toul, and the attempt to construct a *ceinture* line outside that fortress was rendered impossible by the nature of the ground. A scarcely inferior obstacle was the complete destruction of the Nanteuil tunnel, which would probably have taken many weeks to restore. For the transport beyond Nanteuil of 300 heavy guns, with 500 rounds of shot, 4,500 large wagons would be needed, such as were not procurable in the country to be traversed, besides 10,000 draught horses. The 3rd German Army was, however, soon to be reinforced by the 1st Bavarian Corps and the 17th Division of the 11th Corps, the former reaching Coulommiers, and the latter Château Thierry on the 19th September. These arrivals added over 30,000 men to the strength of the Crown Prince's army. It is not improbable that these troops were kept

in so central a position, and near the line of railway, not only upon strategical grounds, but also in order that their supply might be rendered as easy as was practicable. The Guard Landwehr Division, numbering 8,680 men, was soon afterwards added to the forces operating on the south side of Paris.

It will be understood that under the existing circumstances, very little time was afforded the Intendance to supply the Paris army for a lengthened siege. The undertaking was gigantic, and the officers available were very few, and were not the most experienced in the service; these had naturally been sent to the front, and were either confined in Metz, or had been sent as prisoners of war into Germany. It was the same with the subordinate classes, but their special duties were ably undertaken by Gardes Mobiles, who had come from the provinces. Owing to the varied knowledge of these countrymen, they easily acquired the necessary experience to render them most useful and efficient supply and transport men. It was impossible for the officers of the Intendance to undertake the collection and distribution of the supplies to so large a population, numbering as it did something approaching two millions of men, women, and children. Paris was already divided into twenty arrondissements, and on the 4th September the municipal government nominated a provisional mayor to look after the interests of each of these sections. The mayors were respectable members of the community, such as lawyers, doctors, men of letters, shopkeepers, and so forth. Each mayor was to appoint two assistants to help him in the performance of his arduous duties. The local butchers and bakers had to be employed in the work of preparation and of distribution. The system adopted was the following:—the cattle and flour were sold to these tradespeople, who prepared them for sale to the people, the retail prices being fixed from time to time by the municipality. This system was unfortunately not extended to such necessities of life as coffee, sugar, rice, salt, vegetables, cooking oil, fuel wood, and the *vin ordinaire*, which is so essential to Parisians, but sales of potatoes were made in considerable quantities to the poor at one of the market halls. The neglect of this precaution brought untold hardships upon the poor people, who were soon unable to procure such necessities, owing to the prohibitive rates demanded by the dealers. O'Shea gives some account of the rapacity of these land-sharks:—"They held back their viands until prices rose to an exorbitant rate, and then put them in their windows. It was incontrovertible that there was as much gold in Paris now (18th November) as on the 19th

September ; but it had changed owners. Most of it had gone into the tills of the provision merchants. There have been some symptoms of rioting at their doors, and unless they change this policy before the scarcity becomes dearth, I would not give much for their personal safety." There were evidences of superior management in some *arrondissements* as compared with others ; some, we are told, were shamefully neglected, and the unfortunate people who had to form up *en queue* outside the butcheries and bakeries, were kept waiting for hours at some places, where, at others, through good management, they were served expeditiously. M. de Mazade tells us that the committee of subsistence of the 2nd *arrondissement* found it necessary to issue a special code of regulations governing the delivery of rations. The butchers were not to serve except at authorised hours. No pieces were to be kept in reserve. The butchers were not to deliver any meat at houses. People were not to assemble at the butcheries before the specified hour. The necessity which required such stringent orders points to the corruption which must have prevailed, and to the disorderly scenes which must have been of daily occurrence to necessitate the issue of such regulations.

Opinions conflict very materially as to the supplies got into Paris by the Intendance prior to the complete environment of that city. Captain Bonnet gives the following account of what was accomplished :—"The Minister for War, Count de Palikao, had taken steps to place Paris in a proper state of defence, and supplies had been collected, this had to be done by the provisional government. They had to take into consideration from the first the supply of the civil as well as the military population, as there was every prospect of Paris being cut off entirely from the outside world, their numbers represented more than two millions. On the 12th August M. Perrier, the Intendant, commenced his purchases, by the 7th September they were completed ; he had accumulated 77,000 quintaux of wheat, 210,000 quintaux of flour, 31,000 quintaux of potatoes, which were given to the municipal authorities before the commencement of the siege. Those quantities being considered insufficient, the war department made further concessions to the city aggregating a total weight of every description to 683,830 quintaux (of 100 kilos. each). These quantities were independent of those needed for feeding the 300,000 soldiers. There were not distributed during the siege less than 363,100,000 rations of every description. The meat accumulated consisted of 30,000 oxen and 200,000 sheep. When they were exhausted some 67,000 horses were eaten." These

figures are somewhat disconcerting should they be correct. If we take the rations referred to as consisting of three separate kinds, bread, meat, and vegetables, we find that the grand total given would not have afforded full rations for the period of the siege to more than one million. It follows, therefore, that a very large proportion of the community must have fed largely on private reserves or by purchases from the dealers, and that was no doubt the case, in fact the writer was informed by numbers of Parisians that they paid for all their food throughout the siege. Von Moltke records his views in the following words:—“Great difficulties attended the victualling of two millions of human beings for any lengthened period; however, the French had succeeded in bringing 30,000 oxen, 6,000 pigs, and 180,000 sheep into Paris, with considerable stores of other provisions, so that they were sure to hold out for six weeks at least.” The French were able to hold out for treble that period, so that that astute strategist was in this instance wrong in his calculations. It is obvious that the Germans were very imperfectly informed as to the steps taken by the French Intendence in the provisionment of the fortress. The German official account gives the figures as 150,000 sheep, 40,000 pigs, 25,000 oxen, and a large number of calves. Whatever the precise figures were, it is certain that by the commencement of October the meat supply began to fail at least so far as the civil population was concerned, and by the end of that month it had practically disappeared. The number of animals collected actually represented the normal consumption in Paris for a period of about four months; that these animals should have been practically consumed within less than half that period points to the fact that the very grossest mismanagement must have existed from the outset. As a matter of fact people were allowed to purchase meat without any limitation, ration cards not having been introduced before the month of October. O’Shea substantiates the fact in the following words:—“On the 19th October we assisted in the evening at the solemn ceremony of the last English dinner to be had, until the raising of the siege, at Austin’s restaurant, opposite the arrival gate of the St. Lazare terminus. The landlord told us that he would have nothing but horse henceforth, as notice had been given him at the butcher’s that he could get no fresh meat, other than the rations he was entitled to for himself, his family, and his servants.” The issue of free rations to the families of the National Guard would of course have added considerably to the ordinary meat consumers, but it is not at all

probable that the working classes, who would have had little or no money, could have purchased as much as formerly; certainly thousands of meat consumers must have left the city. It is therefore difficult on any reasonable grounds to account for the large consumption. No doubt a large number of free rations would have been issued daily to destitute persons from the first days of the siege, but it is not probable that meat constituted any considerable part of that ration, if it did, the authorities were blameworthy. There was, of course, the fact that the stock of fodder was not abundant in Paris, no more than about 6,000 tons having been transferred to the municipality by the Intendance; but the grazing in the Bois, the parks, and in the enceinte could not have been very bad in either September or October; we therefore look in vain for an excuse for any falling off in the condition of the cattle to half their original weight. No, the disagreeable truth is forced upon one—the absence of any check during the first five weeks upon the purchases made at the butcheries, and the probable issue of excessive rations to the young soldiers of the regulars, Mobiles, and National Guards will perhaps account for the serious waste of so important a factor in the resisting power of the fortress.

Then again, it should be remembered that the inhabitants of Paris received timely warning that it was essential that all householders should provide themselves with provisions for at least two months. The French are known to be a provident people, and neither the funds nor the sagacity would be lacking in providing themselves to meet every eventuality. We think it more than probable that the great majority of the well-to-do people laid in stocks to last them for a period of six months. Furthermore, every French dwelling-house of any size is always provided with excellent cellarage, so that the inhabitants would have no difficulty in storing large quantities of corn, oil, and wine. During the bombardment, when these supplies had become sensibly diminished, the citizens lived almost wholly in their roomy cellars, which were generally bomb-proof. These private supplies would not have had much effect in reducing the consumption of the bread and meat, so long as quantities could be purchased for cash. Such flour and preserved meats as might have been accumulated would have been reserved for a time of famine, in fact, it is not improbable that many a careful house-keeper would have preferred to purchase meat rather than trench on his reserves. There is perhaps some excuse for the absence of method at the commencement of the siege, but the authorities

should not have exhausted so much time before precautionary measures were adopted. The whole of their attention would at first have been turned to getting in supplies, ammunition, clothing, transport, arms, and medical requisites, as well as in the organisation of the defensive forces ; but as soon as any further action in that direction was precluded by the complete investment of the city, more attention should have been given to the husbanding of the supply resources of the fortress. We incline to the belief that the absence of any adequate regulations, dealing with the supply arrangements in regard to both the civil and military occupants of a fortress in a state of siege, was, perhaps, the chief cause of the absence of a prompt and proper organisation of the supply duties inside and outside the fortress. Nothing can be simpler in time of peace than to frame a set of regulations, not too hard and fast, as every possible eventuality cannot be foreseen, dealing in general and precise terms with the conduct of the supply and transport duties during an investment.

CHAPTER XVI.

SIEGE OF PARIS.

The supply of the garrison and the citizens of a besieged fortress has very little variation ; if the town is surrounded and cut off from the outside world, the methods must become set and commonplace ; the primary necessity is to feed the garrison and the civil population for as long a period as possible ; the alternative of an ignominious surrender owing to an insufficiency of food, or the gradual destruction of the garrison and inhabitants by the fearful ravages of slow starvation, should be avoided at all hazards. The dependence of the soldiery and the people rested mainly on the ability of the Intendance to guard Paris from so great a calamity. The question of armaments and ammunition, although equally important, is not now discussed, our subject is confined to the provisioning of the fortress. The following suggestions are submitted as among those points which should have consideration as being intimately connected with the well-being of a fortress in a state of siege :—The kind of people who should be rigorously excluded from the fortress and its environs, when there is a reasonable prospect of its being besieged ; the immediate action needed for the effective provisioning of the garrison, the auxiliary soldiery, and the inhabitants—the period of the probable duration of the siege would have to be fully considered—it would however always be wise to err on the right side by collecting too much rather than too little ; there would also be the question of the quantity of food which should necessarily be issued to each class of recipient—the soldiery would naturally receive the largest ration, next to them would come the working men employed in defensive works or in the production of ammunition or in the preparation and distribution of supplies, or on hospital or ambulance work ; then would follow the women and children, and after them those males who, from age, infirmity, or other causes, did practically nothing towards the defence. It is quite true that such variations in the rations would involve additional labour in the distribution, but ammunition for the animate beings should be apportioned in such circumstances, as with artillery, upon its powers of destruction. Then there

are other matters, which should not be left to be settled on the spot when officers are quite overborne by the pressure of heavy work; they should be brought without loss of time within the standing regulations of every army. We refer to such matters as the commandeering of provisions, particularly in regard to the description of supplies which should be appropriated by the military authorities, and the mode of payment for the same; to what extent free rations should be permitted, and under what circumstances, and it should be determined what classes of civilians should be required to pay for their rations, but under no circumstances should any class be permitted to purchase unlimited quantities over and above the regulated ration. The failure of the French to consider and adopt such precautionary measures was the direct cause of the enormous waste of supplies which occurred during the first six weeks of the siege of Paris. No regulations had been framed for the guidance of officers of the Intendance; it followed therefore that under the pressure of work the responsible officers could not find time to improvise a satisfactory scheme for the collection and distribution of the supplies, their time being fully occupied firstly in getting in supplies, and secondly in their storage, preservation, arrangement, and distribution.

In his *Défence de Paris*, General Ducrot gives us some very interesting particulars of the methods adopted by the Intendance. Upon the outbreak of the war Paris had been made the central dépôt where supplies and forage were collected from the north, south, and west of France for the feeding of the army of the Rhine; it was therefore amply provided with store-houses when the siege was so suddenly commenced. Sous-Intendant Perrier was charged with the duty of provisioning Paris. He had the help of a Commission composed of two senators and a deputy. A credit of twenty millions of francs was placed at the disposal of the administration for the purchase of the necessary supplies. Wheat was procured from the Baltic, Hungary, and the Sea of Azov. Flour and preserved meats from the markets of London and Liverpool. Coffee, sugar, wine, and brandy were procurable in large quantities in the local markets. It was agreed that the War Department should not buy any live-stock, as the agricultural department was then making large purchases of cattle, and a portion of these were handed over to that department. By this sagacious arrangement undue competition was prevented in the markets. The store-houses of the State were quickly filled, and others had to be provided without loss of time, the railway dépôts being encumbered

with a superabundance, as the railway lines had been unable to deliver the whole of the receipts from outside Paris before that city found itself in a state of siege. M. Perrier and his officers, however, managed within twenty-five days to collect supplies sufficient to last some two millions of souls for a period of over one hundred and twenty-five days. The soldiers appear to have received full rations up to the beginning of January, when the bread issue was reduced to some extent, but it was never less than half a kilogramme, even during the last days of the siege.

The opinion was properly accepted that the soldiers had to undertake heavy fighting and marching, and that it was necessary to feed them well. The siege lasted one hundred and forty days, and Ducrot estimates that the city and the State had provided sixty days' provisions for the whole population and soldiery; the commercial houses and other private stores of the people sixty-five days; and the army administration to the value of fifteen days. It will be observed that, although the army constituted about one-fifth of the total population of Paris, if the wives are included, their Intendance appears to have provided only one-eighth of the supplies collected. General Ambert tells us that it was estimated that the average daily consumption of food, merchandise, munitions, and forage aggregated about 7,000 tons. He adds, that, early in November, the Western Railway Company managed to get in from twenty-four to twenty-five thousand tons of provisions, consisting of biscuits, flour, wheat, salted and smoked beef, being about two weeks' supply for the two millions of inhabitants. No less than three thousand railway trucks were employed in this undertaking. General Ducrot admits that the soldiers' ration was maintained at too high a rate for too long a period. When it is considered that the unfortunate civilians were receiving on the 25th January only 300 grammes of bread and 30 grammes of horseflesh, it seems very disproportionate that the soldiers should have been drawing at the same time 500 grammes of horseflesh, and at the least 500 grammes of bread. No doubt they were both receiving groceries, but the civilians had to purchase them where and how they might, and had to procure potatoes as best they could from the Halles. Undoubtedly the majority of the citizens had private stores of supplies, while the soldiers had not.

One of the worst features of the defence was the refuge offered to many a worthless citizen by the enrolment of the National Guard. Numbers of artisans, who could have earned their 4 or 5 fr. a day, preferred to join that corps and

accept the 1 fr. 50 c. ration allowance paid to the soldiers of that organisation, but it was not intended to have been paid to those having good means. Certainly they and their wives purchased food the same as civilians, but the corps was too often used as a means for the avoidance of hard work. O'Shea says of them :—" When the athletic forms of out-of-door recreation, except dancing, were not popular, the National Guards resorted to such lazy pastimes as pitch-and-toss and bowls. They took to drinking too ; the hour of absinthe was never more religiously observed, although the main object should have been to appease, not to increase, appetite ; and the indulgence in cheap, coarse wine and fiery brandy was greater than the oldest inhabitant could remember. It was no uncommon scandal for men to appear tipsy under arms, and to march to duty in a crooked line. Inebriety, which is not a French vice, was rapidly attaining the pre-eminence." As early as the 20th September the Governor had to publish an order condemning drunkenness, and had to notify that the following crimes were punishable with death, viz. : For abandoning his post in the presence of the enemy ; for refusing to obey an order to march against the enemy ; for pillaging with violence ; and for destroying Government stores and supplies.

It is obvious that the conduct of these men must have been very bad indeed to necessitate the issue of such stringent orders. Later on another order was published, by which it was notified that if their means were insufficient for the support of their families, upon the production of proof, public funds would be devoted to the amelioration of their condition. The authorities had evidently to pander to the interests of these citizen-soldiers, who seemed quite ready to turn their arms against their rulers. Ducrot did not form a very high estimate of these men. He says, that during the siege they were generally employed in defending the ramparts, and we know that that part was never in any danger prior to the opening of the bombardment in January. He adds that, " their services could not be taken seriously ; their leisure hours were abundant ; many of the National Guards acquired habits of laziness and drunkenness." There was evidently a necessity for conciliating these men, who had it in their power to create serious dissensions within the walls of the city, and this may account for the absence of any really drastic measures in the enforcement of rigid discipline in their ranks.

The rationing of the troops in camps outside the walls and of those in the occupation of the various forts was undertaken by the Intendance, but the feeding of the population was managed

entirely by the mayors of the arrondissements and their assistants. The butchers and bakers of the city, as well as the Government flour mills and a few biscuit manufactories, were placed at the disposal of the civil authorities, who had a gigantic duty to carry out—the daily supply of the wants of something like two millions of human beings. It will be understood that, at first at least, the majority of the inhabitants would not have drawn regularly upon the authorities for their supplies, as their own private stores would have kept them going for some considerable time, and the shops could provide what was lacking so long as money was forthcoming. In any case some little time must have elapsed before the machinery in each arrondissement was in thorough working order, and before the people could be supplied with regularity. It was decided from the outset to sell both bread and meat at prices to be fixed from time to time by the municipality. M. d'Heylli, in his *Journal of the Siege of Paris*, has given us much information upon the subject, and has published many of the regulations in regard to the issue of bread, meat, and horseflesh.

The following orders were published governing the sale of meat :—“(1). From the 12th September a sale will be held daily, at the horse-market, of slaughter cattle for the supply of the city. (2). The butchers of Paris and other persons who purchase meat in the capital, may buy what they may require for their shops. (3). The market will open at 8 a.m., and the sales will cease at noon. (4). The prices of the animals purchased should be paid into the hands of the cashier appointed by the authorities. (5). The animals so purchased were to be driven by their owners to abattoirs at Grenelle and Villejuif, or to that at La Villette, to the extent that they may be available. (6). From the 12th September the flesh of oxen, cows, bulls, and sheep will be sold at fixed rates. (7). The prices will be established every eight days by the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce. (8). In regulating the retail prices, the meat will be divided into classes. (9). The different prices for each to be ticketed according to classification.” Then follow a few regulations as to weights and fair dealing. The first regulation fixing prices appears to have been published on the 15th September :—“1st class beef per kilogramme was to be 2 fr. 10 c. ; 2nd class, 1 fr. 70 c. ; 3rd class, 1 fr. 30 c. ; and 1st class mutton, 1 fr. 80 c. ; 2nd class, 1 fr. 30 c. ; 3rd class, 1 fr. 10 c.” These rates were maintained until the meat was completely exhausted. The butchers appear to have objected to the rates fixed, and created a considerable amount of friction by disposing of meat at higher rates, and in

many instances refused to part with it at the regulated charges. It became necessary, therefore, for the authorities to issue an order on the subject on the 19th September :—"The Government is informed that a certain number of the butchers do not conform to the order of the Minister of Agriculture and Commerce relative to the price of meat. The most energetic measures will be adopted if that abuse is continued."

The price of bread does not appear to have been fixed until a later date, although the matter was under consideration by the municipal council as early as the 30th August. The following order was published on the 22nd September, regulating the supply of bread :—" (1). The price of bread is provisionally established in Paris from the 22nd September. (2). This price will be fixed every eight days, by a Commission nominated by the Mayor of Paris. (3). The bakers are warned not to sell the kilogramme of bread at a lower rate than the price fixed. They are required to post a notice of the current price of bread in a conspicuous place in their shops." The prices of bread were fixed at the following rates from the 23rd September :—"Bread of best quality at 45 c. the kilogramme; of 2nd quality at 38 c. the kilogramme." An excellent regulation was also published under which the very poor could procure certain quantities of bread at small prices. For 10 c. 215 grammes of bread were to be given, for 15 c. 325 grammes, and for 20 c. 435 grammes. These rates appear to have been continued throughout the siege, the variation being made in the quality and not improbably in the weight of the bread. M. de Mazade tells us that on the 12th December, when the supply of bread commenced to fail, he paid 30 c. to a baker for a small white loaf for his father, and on the 25th January he was glad to give 1 fr. 25 c. for a similar quantity. As to the quality, opinions are very varied : de Mazade says the bread was dreadful in January ; others tell us that it was made of anything, including the sweepings of stores and mills, &c. In Cassell's work it is mentioned in the following terms :—"The bread produced at this period, which was made of flour, oats, barley, and rice, was dark but good." There was evidently a strong opposition on the part of the people that the issue of bread should take the form of a ration ; they would not accept any regulation which could limit the purchase of bread. Any interference in the free sale of bread by the authorities would not unlikely have caused a revolt, consequently the municipality does not appear to have dared to regulate the quantity of bread to be sold to each individual or family earlier than January, which was some time after it had

become evident that the supply of farinaceous food for the city was rapidly failing.

A great mistake was made. Had a judicious course been pursued from the outset, and if the sale of bread had been regulated, there might not have been any great extension of the duration of the resistance, but the deaths from starvation, and the sufferings endured through the want of sufficient bread by the poorer classes would not have been endured. The policy of pandering to the selfish instincts of a people by a government is certain to recoil eventually upon the heads of the former. A frank explanation of the circumstances and an explicit demonstration of the true interests of the masses would have been accepted by them in the true patriotic spirit for which Frenchmen are so remarkable. What was lacking with the Government was that true courage which should animate public men, regardless of their personal interests or private leanings. They preferred rather to adopt a middle course, allowing themselves to be swayed by popular clamour, and thus permit their own countrymen to rush forward to their certain destruction. We trust that the insensate folly of the French authorities in this particular instance may constitute a warning both to the rulers and people of other nations not to follow so insane a policy. In our own military history we had almost similar conditions at the outset of the siege of Ladysmith as those which obtained in Paris at the commencement of the siege. The relative numbers do not in any way alter the principles involved. Both cities were completely cut off from the outside world, and not a biscuit could be got into either, one solitary exception has already been referred to in the case of Paris. Both laid in enormous stocks, much in excess of what was apparently needed; this remark applies with greater force to Ladysmith than to Paris, as the former could reasonably count upon early relief, but the latter could not. The main points of difference were that all supplies and forage in Ladysmith were at once commandeered by the Army Service Corps, but in Paris they were left in the hands of the dealers, practically to the end of the siege. Again, bread and meat were rationed from the first at Ladysmith, but in the case of Paris the siege had nearly terminated, and great hardships had been endured by the civil population, before bread was rationed. Mr. Pearce, correspondent of the *Daily News*, gives us some information under this head in his book:—"Thanks to the perfect organisation which Colonel Ward, C.B. (now a K.C.B.), and the Permanent Under-Secretary of State for War), brings with all branches of the department

over which he is chief here, and the attention paid to the innumerable details by his second-in-command, Colonel Stoneman (since dead), there has never been any danger of necessary supplies being exhausted, even if this place were invested for a much longer time than seems likely now, but these two officers seem to have more than absolute necessities in reserve."

Horseflesh butcheries had been in existence in Paris since the commencement of the siege, but it was not until about the middle of October, when meat was becoming scarce, that a regular system of supply was instituted. On the 7th October the following regulations were published governing the issue of horseflesh :—" (1). Horses intended for food were to be sold on Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays at 11 a.m., at the horse-market. (2). Provides for their veterinary examination. (3). Horses purchased by the State were to be weighed alive, and not more than 40 c. per kilogramme was to be paid. The better parts were to be retailed 1 fr. 40 c. the kilogramme, and the inferior at 80 c. A fine of from 11 to 15 fr. would be inflicted upon butchers charging more than those rates." Owing to the limited supply it became necessary to vary the charges from time to time. On 15th November the prices were fixed as follows :—" Fillet cost 3 fr. the kilogramme, and the remainder of the meat was classified thus : sirloins, steaks, &c., 2 fr. the kilogramme ; sides, shoulders, kidneys, &c., 1 fr. 50 c. ; necks, briskets, cheeks, &c., 50 c." Before it became necessary for the municipality to provide horseflesh for the people, the condition of that animal had depreciated considerably owing to the scarcity of forage in the capital. M. Bourgeois tells us that on the 20th September a horse could be purchased for 20 fr. An English horse, which had originally cost 7,000 fr., was sold for 500 fr. Also that a pair of horses that had belonged to the Emperor, and had cost 25,000 fr., was sold for 1,200 fr. With regard to consumption, M. de Mazade tells us that there were twelve horse-butcheries, and that by the 2nd October the slaughter of animals had risen from 200 to 275 a day—formerly it had not exceeded 30 a day. Madame C. de Witt in her journal states :—" 9th October, Parisians are devouring horseflesh with resignation ; it is as good as beef but drier, and our horse *à la mode* gives us many repasts. We want nothing except what is required by gourmands, for ordinary living there is plenty." Others express the opinion that horseflesh is sweet ; we should have abundant expert evidence to guide us in the future from those who have gained such practical experience during the recent sieges of Ladysmith, Kimberley,

and Mafeking. Great ingenuity seems to have been exhibited by Capt. MacNalty (now Major), of the Army Service Corps, in his management of the chevril factory started at Ladysmith by Colonel Ward. Soups, extracts, and paste were manufactured with equal success, the products being both nutritious and palatable. The Parisians contented themselves with horseflesh undisguised, except so far as the skill of the members of the *cordon bleu* could metamorphose it. The strange meats used in Paris do not appear to have entered into the official menu at Ladysmith or elsewhere in South Africa; cats, rats, and dogs appear to have been considered the legitimate prey of enterprising and energetic sportsmen. We make no doubt that such creatures were consumed in considerable quantities in South Africa, if they were slaughtered clandestinely and consumed surreptitiously.

The provision of an abundant supply of water ranks amongst the very first considerations in the strengthening of a fortress, indeed, this question should have received the fullest attention of the military authorities well in advance of possible need. Water is an absolute essential for the maintenance of life in both human beings and animals, it is also required for personal cleanliness as well as for sanitation. Consequently a large supply should always be available from sources which cannot be interfered with by an enemy. It does not do to trust to the rainfall, as that depends upon circumstances over which the garrison can have no control. Paris was well situated in that respect, as the River Seine passed through the centre of that city, and there are large lakes and ornamental waters in the various parks, there was also the Ourcq Canal, which was, however, diverted by the enemy. Besides these, Paris has a large reservoir at Montsouris Park, which supplies that city with water, being brought a distance of over seventy miles from the River Vanne; another reservoir is provided in the Buttes-Chaumont, but this water is used mainly for watering purposes. It will be seen, therefore, that the water supply of Paris was and is inexhaustible. Admirable regulations were issued on the 21st September governing that supply. Water was to be turned on only for a certain number of hours daily in each arrondissement, when the citizens were required to make due provision for their daily requirements, as well as for such a contingency as the possible stoppage of the supply for a couple of days. In the event of a complete stoppage in any part of the city, the old wells would be opened and used, and water carts would be brought into use where needed. The citizens were required to collect rain water and to preserve it carefully in

cisterns, barrels, and other receptacles. The Germans do not appear to have done anything to cut off the water supply from the Vanne, and they certainly did not attempt in any way to pollute the water of the Seine.

The water supply is also largely connected with sanitation, and in Paris the surface drainage alone needs very large quantities of water. The fœcal deposits are collected in covered pits, which are situated under the courtyards of each of the larger houses ; these are pumped out periodically at night, and the excrement is destroyed by fire at certain places in the suburbs. This arrangement of the sewerage makes Paris a fairly healthy city. Fish were caught in considerable quantities during the siege, and yielded a golden harvest to the patient fishermen. An admirable picture was painted by a celebrated French artist, in which the toilers on the banks of the Seine were depicted quietly pursuing their occupation whilst the palace of the Tuileries was being destroyed by an infuriated mob at their backs. Regulations were issued enjoining upon householders the necessity which existed for keeping the domestic offices free from any accumulations, and requiring them to use ample supplies of water for cleansing purposes. No doubt the water of the river was extensively employed in such sanitary work.

With every prospect of an early bombardment it was incumbent upon the authorities to make arrangements for the extinction of the innumerable fires which must result from the shell fire then imminent. During 1833 and subsequently, when the Paris forts were under construction, it was never imagined that rifle ordnance would be introduced which could be capable of throwing projectiles three and four times the distance further than the old smooth bore of that date ; consequently the outlying forts, particularly those on the south side, were not situated at more than a mile from the ramparts of the city. It at once became apparent that the enemy's shells would penetrate far into the city proper, and that it would be necessary for the defenders to be able to combat with the fires wherever they might break out. As my readers are aware every city in France has its organised corps of *pompiers*, who are uniformed and drilled like soldiers ; they are a more military body than our firemen, who are more sailor-like in their ideas and habits. The corps of *sapeurs-pompiers* in Paris was not only numerous but was most efficient, and large numbers of these men poured into the city from many of the outlying French towns just prior to the investment. Many of them were employed in working the guns mounted on the ramparts, but their first duty

was the extinction of fires. These men did excellent work during the siege, and during the bombardment in January the city would have been destroyed by fire had it not been for the indefatigable and well directed efforts of this fine body of men. With the object of preventing the spread of any conflagration, the following orders were issued on the 21st September :—"Householders were required to store in their cellars all articles of a combustible nature not in immediate use ; to keep barrels of water constantly filled in the courtyards ready for such emergencies ; to take immediate steps, after the explosion of a shell, to extinguish any fire in its initial stage. In the case of the absence of the proprietor, the keys were to be left with the *concierge*, who was to open doors to the firemen as soon as a fire was discovered."

From what has been already stated, it will be readily inferred that the gold in circulation very soon became conspicuous by its absence ; almost the whole of the current coin had got into the hands of the local dealers. Knowing as we all do the avaricious nature of that class, it is not surprising that the Bank of France found itself forced to put into circulation large quantities of paper, having a face value of 25 fr. and of 50 fr. As early as the 29th September, so great had the dearth of money become, owing to the locking-up system of the dealers, that it became necessary for the bank to make an issue of nearly half a million of 25-franc notes, although there were already in circulation no less than nearly two and a half millions of those notes. Furthermore, arrangements had to be made for the daily issue of 10,000 notes of 25 fr., 12,000 notes of 50 fr., and 6,000 notes of 100 fr. It will be seen, therefore, that people as a rule were very averse to part with specie, gold or even silver. That being the invariable case, it is incumbent upon the authorities to make the very earliest arrangements so as to obviate the necessity for some to part with their gold and silver in order that others may hoard it. The wiser course would be for the bank to issue paper at a small discount for specie so that the specie should be held by the Government in the event of any necessity arising for making payments in coin, to any dealers outside the walls of the beleaguered city, as was the case at Belfort during the latter part of the siege, when it became necessary to procure its supplies from the surrounding districts for which cash had to be paid. We may take it as an assured fact, that, in case of any lengthened siege, the issue of a paper currency would be obligatory ; it is therefore necessary that every large fortress should be provided with the means for printing such notes, but as a matter of fact every city of any size

would be provided with such paraphernalia, and the regulations needed for such an emergency would, as a rule, alone have to be framed in advance of the necessity.

The housing of the large forces in and around Paris was a matter which required consideration, particularly with the probability that quarters would be needed during the approaching winter season. The barracks and the quarters in the forts could not provide accommodation for a quarter of the forces which had been assembled for the defence of Paris. It therefore became necessary to appropriate additional buildings as quarters for the troops, but the majority were kept outside the city wall under canvas. As a rule the men of the National Guards either resided at their own houses, or were billeted on the people. Temporary barracks were constructed for the Gardes Mobiles in the Boulevard Courcelles, in the Place du Trône, and in the Batignolles. A description of the quarters at Fort Noisy, as given by an occupant, will afford some idea of the accommodation provided in the forts. That fort was under the command of a naval captain, and the interior arrangements were very analogous to those maintained on board ship. The scale of rations was similar to those issued afloat whether to sailors or to soldiers. Large quantities of flour, biscuits, and other preserved meat, wine, brandy, coffee, sugar, salt, and other requisites were brought into the fort before the investment, and numbers of the casemates were filled with these stocks of provisions. We incline to the belief that the troops, who were fortunate enough to be quartered in the forts, were cared for better than perhaps those in any camps or quarters, for the reserves were ample and the garrisons were not excessive, and could not be increased illimitably. And when the cold weather set in, the troops in the occupation of the camps would have suffered untold hardships as compared with those living in the forts, but as a matter of fact, the pinch of starvation never at any time affected the soldiers as it did the civil population of Paris. It appears to have been considered that the fighting men should, at any cost, receive sufficient nourishment, and the citizens, including the National Guards, had to accept what remained. As the history of this remarkable siege progresses, we think it will become more and more apparent to our readers that timely arrangements would have obviated much of the hardships experienced by the citizens, and would have rendered the feeding of the soldiery more liberal and more assured.

CHAPTER XVII.

PROGRESS OF THE SIEGE.

Paris had only been invested a day or two when negotiations were commenced by the French Government, which had for their object the conclusion of an honourable peace. M. Jules Favre, as the representative of the French Government and people, presented himself at the German headquarters at Meaux on the 19th September, when he had an interview with Count Bismarck. Before the latter was willing to agree to an armistice, in order that time might be gained for the arrangement of the conditions of a peace, he demanded that the fortresses of Strasburg, Toul, and Phalzburg should be surrendered to the German forces, but this proposal having been rejected by the Assembly, all further negotiations ceased. That demand was made by Bismarck as it was absolutely essential that another line of railway should be at once available to the Intendantur in order to secure the supply of the German armies surrounding Paris during the consequent delay. The local supplies, excepting wine, were failing, and it had become necessary to transport much larger quantities of food from Germany. Had the Germans granted an armistice without adopting such precautionary measures, their army must have suffered needlessly from the want of supplies during such detention, and their reserves would have become exhausted before the winter had set in. The French gained nothing by their refusal, as both Strasburg and Toul were surrendered to the besiegers within about a week of the cessation of the negotiations.

Had greater wisdom been shown, the French nation would have gained enormously by a peace made at that epoch, when considerably over one hundred thousand of her best troops had been captured, and half that number had been placed *hors de combat*, and at the moment over two hundred thousand of her regular troops were held in a vice-like grip, from which they did not escape. Again, the German expenditure had been more than quadrupled before the French eventually sued for peace. Cooler heads would have saved France millions of money. It soon became apparent to the German commanders that with such large forces the defenders of Paris, who were working from interior lines, could

repel almost any assault which might be delivered by the investing armies ; there was therefore nothing left but to starve the citizens and garrison into submission. The German troops would have to prevent the entry of any supplies or munitions from the exterior, but with so inadequate a force this was not easy of accomplishment ; as a matter of fact the lines of environment were not occupied by more than one man for every yard of their extent. Under such circumstances it seems strange that the French troops, who were more than twice as numerous as were the Germans, accomplished so little at first. This was no doubt owing to the fact that not one-fifth of the French were thoroughly drilled, and only a very small proportion of them were seasoned soldiers ; the remainder were composed of Mobile and National Guards, who were practically undisciplined and indifferently armed.

The Germans unfortunately had no definite information as to the quantities of supplies which the French had managed to get into Paris, and their ideas of the stocks held by the tradespeople must have been exceedingly vague ; indeed the French themselves were not much wiser, so that nothing could leak out as to the actual facts. The estimates formed at the time were that the supplies might enable the city to hold out from six to ten weeks ; these figures were quite outside the reality, for the supplies were made to last for more than twenty weeks. It was essential then that other means should be adopted without any delay, in order that the capitulation of Paris should be secured at the earliest possible date. The enormous cost of the German armies, and the rapid approach of winter, demanded the utmost expedition in the reduction of the French capital. It was determined that Paris should at once be subjected to a bombardment, if that expedient became imperative. Heavy siege trains would have to be brought from Germany if this kind of attack had to be employed. Major Blumé tells us that the possible necessity for the employment of such a train had been foreseen by the middle of August, and orders had been given to prepare it. The military and municipal authorities in Paris had unquestionably exerted themselves to get in large quantities of food and forage, but we take leave to express the opinion that, in face of the surrender of one large field army and the environment of another, these officials did not adopt sufficiently energetic measures in the circumstances—nothing should have satisfied them short of getting every edible procurable into the fortress so far as time permitted. This was certainly not done. The action taken at

Ladysmith and Kimberley stands out in marked contrast—provisions and forage were got in in as large quantities and as speedily as was possible, so much so, that at Ladysmith no time was allowed for counting or verifying deliveries from contractors. It was the same at Pretoria in 1880, when the town was evacuated and the supplies were commandeered, close counting was abandoned so that the town might be cleared before the Boers could rush and perhaps fire it.

The German railway transport was, however, fully taken up in the carriage of stores, supplies, clothing, and ammunition to the front, so that little if any could at first be spared for the conveyance of the siege train. The difficulties which existed are fully described by Major Blumé:—"As we have already seen, there was no chance of getting the line clear beyond Nanteuil for some time. The siege park must, therefore, be moved at least eleven miles by road, to either the north or south of Paris. Assuming it to consist of three hundred guns of various calibres, the transport of the first allowance of ammunition (500 rounds per gun), and all implements, &c., necessary before fire could be opened, would require some five thousand four-wheeled wagons. If it be remembered that all supplies of every kind had to come the same distance—in the case of the army of the Meuse even farther, viz., from Chateau Thierry, until the line was open to Mitry—that heavily laden wagons could not do the journey there and back under eight days, and that such wagons as were required could scarcely be found in France, it will be evident that a very considerable time must elapse before the whole of the siege train could be collected." Although a large number of the guns belonging to the siege train were got to Paris during October it was not until December that the bombardment of any of the forts was commenced. No doubt much had to be done in selecting sites and in the construction of the works and emplacements before fire could be opened. There appears however to have been some halting which seems to have arisen in the hope that starvation would compel the capital to surrender before the guns could open fire, but in this the German commanders were doomed to disappointment, and they had to have recourse to the more severe ordeal of a bombardment.

At this epoch it is evident that the German Intendantur was heavily pressed to find the wherewithal to feed the troops and forage the horses. The cavalry divisions were employed extensively in scouring the country for supplies, as well as in the performance of their special duty of observing the enemy. This

duty was accomplished with marked success and large quantities of supplies and transport were brought in. The French were then practically without any troops in the field excepting the Franc-tireurs, who certainly checked the depredations of the cavalry to a considerable extent. Von Moltke gives us some interesting particulars of the situation at the moment :—" There was no lack of quarters for the men. Every village was deserted ; but the difficulty of obtaining supplies was all the greater. The fugitive inhabitants had driven off their cattle and destroyed their stores ; only the wine-cellars seemed inexhaustible. For the first few days all the food needed had to be drawn from the commissariat stores, but ere long the cavalry succeeded in obtaining fresh provisions. High prices and good discipline made traffic safe." However, the capture of Strasburg and Toul towards the close of September relieved the pressure, and opened up the direct line of railway from Southern Germany, besides removing the obstructions caused by those fortresses on the eastern railway system, upon which means of transportation all the German armies were forced mainly to rely. It was not before November that the north-eastern lines running through Reims, Soissons, and Compiègne could be made available by the surrender of Mezières, Metz, Montmedy, and Thionville. By that time the available districts had become depleted, and the provincial armies were beginning to gain strength, consequently more dependence had to be placed upon the main dépôts in Germany.

It was not long before the French Government perceived that a powerful movement from without was needed for the relief of Paris, if that city and the country were to be saved from abject surrender. M. Gambetta, the Minister for the Interior, determined to undertake that mission, and bravely took his departure from Paris by balloon on the 7th October, and succeeded in passing over the German lines in a northerly direction and arrived at the forest of Epineuse on the evening of that day. He quickly found his way to Tours where he joined the Government of National Defence in the capacity of Minister for War and of the Interior, and took immediate steps to arouse the French people to a sense of their duty and implored them to come to the immediate rescue of their capital and country. Certain measures had already been adopted by the naval and military authorities in the south of France ; regiments had been brought from Algeria to the southern ports ; sailors and marines of the Mediterranean fleet had been landed with arms and field guns ; the remainder of the Gardes Mobiles had been called out ; those soldiers who had

escaped from the various battlefields were also available, and the conscripts had been embodied ; and the people of the land were encouraged to take up arms *en masse*. The difficulty was to utilise this heterogeneous mass of humanity for the service of their country. The will to serve was present, but the capacity was absent. The men had for the most part to be disciplined, drilled, armed, and equipped to meet troops of the best quality with any chance of success. This was no light undertaking, but Leon Gambetta was no ordinary man, he had taken the matter in hand, and with the aid of qualified officers he was determined to succeed. The Government at Tours, with the help of a number of generals, admirals, and other officers, had for some time been organising the 15th Army Corps as well as other corps, which by the commencement of October were quite ready to take the field with a fair complement of cavalry and artillery. The 15th Corps numbered some sixty thousand men, who had been brought into fairly good order.

The most difficult undertaking seems to have been the improvising of an efficient Intendance for the large body of men, not far short of a million, which was being raised in the provinces. The incident points to the necessity for the enrolment of an auxiliary supply and transport service in time of peace, in order that the increased demands, which are certain to arise in time of war, may be met by a body of trained men under competent command. Men flocking to the colours could not be refused except as being medically unfit for service, they had to be accepted, and they had to be fed whether they could be armed and organised for field service at once or not ; that was a matter entirely for subsequent adjustment when the time arrived. Gambetta, as acting Minister for War, wisely determined to improvise his Intendance from such officers of that department as were procurable, but mainly from former sous-prefects, under secretaries, clerks, and town councillors—so we are informed by Louis Noir, in his *Défence Nationale*. The wisdom of this course is apparent—in the circumstances Gambetta required all his regimental officers for their legitimate work, as they were not obtainable in sufficient numbers to meet his necessities in regard to the drilling and instruction of the masses of raw material in hand.

The men employed in the Intendance were business men, accustomed to much the same kind of work which would be required of them in the field. It must not be imagined that we hold the opinion that a commissariat can be improvised off-hand to take the field, or that the department can always be advan-

tageously supplemented from civil life. We hold entirely opposite views based upon practical experience in the field. Our knowledge of such an inflation during the 1877-80 war in South Africa was fraught with disaster ; the losses through the employment of these waifs and strays amounted to many thousands of pounds, part of which was recovered, but the major portion was lost or could not be traced—the imported material was often drunken, dishonest, negligent, and generally untrustworthy, and in the end cost the country more than a properly organised establishment would have done in the first instance. What is wanted is a sufficiently large commissariat establishment, which might be augmented by young regimental and militia officers, non-commissioned officers and men who have had some technical training in time of peace. The department which Leon Gambetta managed to organise consisted of no less than four hundred officers. It is said that M. de Freycinèt stated that not one act of dishonesty was ever discovered or known on the part of any of those so organised. That statement favours the system, but the circumstances were exceptional and the appeal to patriotic sentiment was exceedingly strong. In our case the policy of these miscreants did not extend beyond their own pockets.

Louis Noir gives us some particulars of the work accomplished by this organisation between the 15th October, 1870, and the 31st January, 1871. There were collected no less than seventeen million rations of biscuits, forty millions of rice, eleven millions of pork, thirty-five millions of salt, thirty-five millions of sugar and coffee, twelve millions of brandy, and six and a half millions of oats. About six hundred thousand men were equipped during the war, each man receiving not less than one overcoat or cloak, a tunic, a pair of trousers, a haversack, two sheepskins, two flannel bands, three shirts, and three pairs of shoes. The whole of the south of France with its ports and its shipping were available for the importation of what could not be procured in the country, and the lines of railway and the telegraph in this part were never interrupted by the enemy, consequently everything contributed towards a successful issue of M. Gambetta's undertaking. That does not, however, do away with the enormous amount of energy and the unquestionable talents which were needed in the initiation of so gigantic a scheme. We are told that some four thousand eight hundred railway vans were always kept ready laden with supplies and munitions, so that the various corps might have mobile magazines ready to accompany them along any line of railway, and in case of any serious danger they could be retired

with considerable facility and with expedition. There could have been no lack of transport vehicles and ambulances as these could be procured in almost any numbers from the south, but there must have been a veritable "mixum-gatherum" of transport without organisation and without discipline; the patriotic ardour of the drivers would, however, have softened down the rough edges of so chaotic a mass.

Major Blumé tells us that "everybody in France knew of the design of secretly collecting an army behind the Loire to relieve Paris, and so it was not long before the German leaders came to hear of it. They were aware that the 15th Corps was being organised at Tours, though they did not know its composition and strength. It was very possible that other troops as well had been drawn together behind the Loire and were now advancing. There were indications, for instance, that the expected division from Algeria had joined. Anyhow the advance of a strong force from the Loire could not be trifled with." The folly of allowing that which should be kept secret to become public property is a very common error with commanders and their staffs. Such secrecy is nowhere more needed than in the supply and transport department of armies. Even the cleverest officers may be deceived into regarding spies as true friends. It was so at Ladysmith—numbers of spies had enrolled themselves in colonial corps as true and faithful soldiers of the Queen, and it is stated that even some of the Transvaal artillerymen actually passed through our lines dressed in khaki, and in the taprooms of the town picked up much useful information. Dr. Conan Doyle attributes the defeat at Stormberg to the fact "that the plan was known in camp at least two days before it was carried out."

The 1st Bavarian Corps, supported by the 22nd Division under General von der Tann, was advanced on the 6th October to Arpajon, three cavalry divisions having been directed to cover the front and flanks of the German army. This army composed a fighting strength of something over thirty-five thousand men, but it was much stronger in both cavalry and artillery than the Loire army. At the moment this army was pressed for supplies owing no doubt to its sudden forward movement and to the fact that the railways and main roads all radiated from Paris outwards; there were no main cross roads, and it would have been necessary to have made use of the country roads, which were neither broad nor too well cared for. Lines of railway were constructed by the Etappen troops, connecting this part of the

country with the main line at Corbeil. Advantage could not yet have been taken of the opening up of the line passing through Chaumont and Troyes, which would have become available after the fall of Toul, Strasburg, and Metz. The official account tells us that two German cavalry brigades were employed in collecting supplies and cattle at Toury, and in ascertaining the position of the enemy in front of Orleans, and that efforts had been made by the 2nd Army to send supplies and forage to the 3rd, but that sufficient transport was not procurable. On the 5th October several French brigades advanced with the object of capturing Toury, the German cavalry being forced to retire, but the reserves of supplies were removed in time, only one hundred and fifty head of slaughter cattle falling into the hands of the enemy. General von der Tann at once advanced his army, and came into contact with the enemy at Artenay on the 10th; the latter was forced back on Orleans, where a stand was made on the following day. After a fierce battle the French were forced to retreat after sustaining very serious losses. The Germans acknowledged a large number of killed and wounded. Von Moltke tells us that "their hard-won victory had gained security to the investing troops; and 5,000 rifles, ten locomotives, and sixty railway carriages were welcome spoil." Upon the following day Orleans was occupied by the 1st Bavarian Corps and a cavalry division, the 22nd Infantry Division and the remainder of the cavalry returning to the 3rd Army. The railway line was at once repaired by the Railway Corps so as to bring Von der Tann's army in direct communication with the main German army and the lines of communication. The official account informs us that "the capture of Orleans yielded but poor booty in respect of food, and the movement of the wagons sent after the troops by the Inspector-General of Etappen was greatly retarded." It was only by distributing money amongst the troops, who were encouraged to purchase for themselves, that serious suffering were staved off. As the French army had retired upon Bourges, distant about 60 miles, the German cavalry would have been able to forage without much opposition, except from the Franc-tireurs and the troops at Tours and Le Mans. In any case the requisitioning of Orleans and its neighbourhood would have borne fruit and would have postponed any immediate want. The line of railway appears to have been practicable as far as Longjumeau, as we are informed that the German commander brought his trains as far as that place. Upon its return march towards the north, the 22nd Infantry Division was ordered to attack Chateaudun.

After some severe street fighting the place was carried and held for the time being by that division. The forces investing the south and west sides of Paris were thus protected from attack by the army of the Loire, and the relief of the capital was indefinitely postponed.

The defence of Paris had been started with a fair show of energy, but owing to the quality of the troops the efforts made were not rewarded with any very great successes. On the 23rd September an attempt was made to push back the German lines south of Villejuif, which was situated not more than six miles from the ramparts of the city. The Germans, however, held their ground, and it became necessary to organise a more formidable sortie on the 30th September, when General Vinoy managed, under the fire of the guns of Bicetre and Ivry, with Maudhay's division, to force back the investing lines and to occupy and hold Chevilly, but he was unable to push his success any further. Ducrot admits that the French losses in this engagement were five times as great as those of the Germans, so that very little indeed was gained to compensate them for the great sacrifice of life—over two thousand were either killed or wounded.

This repulse kept the garrison quiet until the middle of October, when fresh operations were undertaken. Von Moltke made the following remark upon the existing situation:—"Throughout the first half of the month of October the garrison of Paris restricted itself for the most part to daily cannonades. Guns of the heaviest calibre were directed on the smallest objects. It was waste of ammunition, just as though their object was to get rid of the stores they had by them. If one of the gigantic mimic shells happened to fall on a picquet, the destruction was of course terrific, but on the whole they did little execution. Apart from the noise, to which they soon became accustomed at Versailles, whence none of the residents had fled, it might have been a time of perfect peace. The admirable discipline of the German troops allowed the townsfolk to pursue their business undisturbed; the hosts were well paid for the soldiers quartered on them, and the country people could cultivate their fields and gardens."

The German authorities were endeavouring to pursue a wise and humane policy in their conduct toward the French inhabitants. It is to be regretted that notwithstanding the treatment accorded, the French remained as antagonistic as they might have been had they been subjected to oppressive usage. Early in the month the besiegers were reinforced by the arrival of the 17th Division, over 10,000 strong, which had been liberated

by the fall of Toul, so that the army before Paris then numbered over 200,000 men. The siege trains were also coming forward as each fortress in the east fell, guns were also being expedited from Germany. The French generals naturally felt that some additional efforts should be made with the object of smashing the lines of environment by a further attack from within, as those made from without had failed in their purpose. Formidable sorties were therefore arranged and put into execution on the 13th, 21st, and 30th October; although the French gained some temporary successes, they were forced to retire within their lines by the stubborn fighting of the enemy, who were much exposed to the fire of the guns of the forts covering the French attacks.

These successive failures angered the citizens, and the National Guards, who unreasonably blamed the existing Government for their want of success, consequently became exceedingly discontented, and the citizen troops were ripe for any excess. It has already been stated that the National Guards had gained an unenviable notoriety for drunkenness, which increased in their ranks from the very commencement of the siege. As a natural consequence very little could be done towards rendering the citizen army, numbering about two hundred thousand men, useful as a reliable and disciplined military force. They became a source of danger to the commonweal rather than a body of defenders. There is, however, this to be said in their favour, they were reduced to their condition of almost uselessness by reason more of the existing régime than from any inherent defects in themselves. The Government was obviously fearful to adopt any measures which might be displeasing to the citizen soldiery; they were therefore permitted to do pretty much as they liked. They and their families were fed, and very little more soldiering was required of them beyond manning the walls occasionally. The result being that these men, who had been accustomed to work hard, found too much leisure on their hands and fell into evil ways. There was another and probably a more potent cause for their failure to appreciate the duty they owed to their country. As the majority of my readers are aware, the money required by the municipality of Paris and other French cities is derived by the imposition of an *octroi* or duty, which is levied practically upon all provisions and merchandise brought into each city. For years a number of unscrupulous persons had driven an excellent trade by manufacturing within the walls of Paris all kinds of spirits and wines in order to evade the payment of duty. The

basis of the manufactured article is derived from the spirit distilled from wood. The vile concoction is coloured, watered, and flavoured, the product being sham wines, spirits, and liqueurs, which can be sold at very low rates, and are therefore within the reach of the very poorest. The effects of such poison on the consumers is easily imagined. We think, therefore, that the citizen soldiers may be relieved of some portion of the blame attaching to their conduct when it is remembered that they would have been in a more or less insane condition when they perpetrated those atrocious acts which so shocked the civilised world. It is also certain that the consumption of this abominable stuff would have increased very largely as the siege progressed, particularly as the *vin ordinaire* (presumably imported) was selling at 2 fr. the litre as early as October. Furthermore, we know that wine in abundance could be procured by the Germans in the environs of Paris; it does not therefore look as if the dealers had brought in any very large quantities—they had certainly not exhausted the supply in the immediate neighbourhood. Both the civil and the military authorities appear to have stored ample supplies of wine to meet their requirements throughout the siege, but the National Guards received a money allowance for the rationing of themselves and their wives, and would not have expended more than they could help in purchasing food and wine for consumption.

The news of the fall of Metz and the failure of the French troops to occupy La Bourget on the 30th October afforded an excellent opportunity for the lovers of anarchy and socialism to assert themselves. Headed by Felix Pyat, Fleurens, and other socialists, the Commune was proclaimed on the 31st October, the Hotel de Ville having been invaded by a considerable body of National Guards and citizens, where the members of the existing Government were held as prisoners for a time, until released by a body of Gardes Mobiles, who managed to effect an entrance by means of a subterranean passage which connected their barracks with the Hotel de Ville. The disturbers of the public peace were quickly ousted from that building, and some degree of order and tranquillity secured. Madame C. De Witt gives some particulars of an assembly of the leading Communists in the *salle St. Jean*:—On visiting that hall there was every appearance that the members of that self-constituted government had held an orgie during the previous night. The hall was in the utmost disorder, the tables covered with games of loto and empty glasses, and the floor was strewn with broken bottles; to complete this filthy picture the

candles had been allowed to burn into their sockets. Such were the men who counted themselves worthy to direct the destinies of a nation ; later on in their history they proved themselves unfitted to govern even the most debased savages.

M. Thiers had undertaken a mission to the Courts of St. James, Vienna, and St. Petersburg, in the hope that one or other of the European Powers might be induced to offer their help or kindly offices to unhappy France. The mission was not productive of much good ; an armistice was proposed by the Powers with a view to the early conclusion of a peace. The French demands for an armistice of a month's duration and for the revictualling of Paris could not be entertained by Count Bismarck, and M. Thiers was forced to depart from Versailles without having effected any arrangement. It is not improbable that the demand to reprovision Paris led the King and his Staff to imagine that that city was already drawing towards the end of her resources. As already stated, the German Intelligence did not consider that Paris was provisioned for more than from six to ten weeks, six weeks of that period had already elapsed, so that the natural inference would have been that the supplies were not far from being exhausted, particularly as this was one of the principal conditions insisted upon by M. Thiers. This supposition no doubt had the effect of causing the Germans to delay their arrangement for the bombardment, in the humane hope that Paris might capitulate without being forced to undergo so serious an ordeal.

CHAPTER XVIII.

ADVANCE OF MANTEUFFEL'S ARMY.

It was not before the beginning of November that fears commenced to be entertained that the army of the Meuse, then on the north and west sides of Paris, might become exposed to serious attack from the French armies, which were mobilising rapidly in northern and western France. Hitherto the rear of that army had experienced immunity from attack excepting from small bands of *Franc-tireurs*, who had done little more than to hinder the free passage of cavalry detachments in search of provisions and forage. Now it was far otherwise; the armies assembling at Amiens and Rouen were assuming formidable proportions, and something had to be done to protect the rear of that army if it was to maintain its position before Paris. Fortunately for the Germans, the fall of Metz on the 27th October set nearly 200,000 men at liberty. The 1st and 2nd German armies had certainly to provide escorts for the prisoners, had to garrison Metz, and had to detach large forces to besiege Thionville and Montmedy, but the remainder could at once be marched towards Paris. The 1st Army was sent to support the army of the Meuse, and the 2nd Army, marching more towards the southwest, was despatched to support General von der Tann in his resistance of the repeated attacks of the army of the Loire. Such was the direful result of Marshal Bazaine's surrender, and it was the release of these forces which so angered the French nation against that General. There is little doubt that the advance of the French armies forming in the north and west, combined with the forward movement of the Loire army, would have compelled the besiegers to raise the siege of Paris. Had it been possible for Bazaine to have detained the German armies before Metz for another two or three weeks, the relief movement in contemplation must have succeeded. As has been already pointed out this was the unhappy result of an absence of foresight in and appreciation of the needs of the supply department prior to, and immediately after, the fortress of Metz was besieged. Perhaps no historical fact so completely illustrates the almost supreme importance attaching to the supply services in the field. In this instance

the fate of a nation was actually dependent upon the efficient organisation of the supply resources of the fortress of Metz. Looking at the matter from a dispassionate point of view, we cannot see any reason for doubting the probability that, had Bazaine been able to hold out for another month, Paris must have been relieved, and France could have counted upon the services of nearly a million soldiers in the field, without reckoning those besieged in Metz. And this position would, we candidly believe, have been attained had there been in Metz any competent head in charge of the Intendance, who would not have failed to lay in ample reserves for the military garrison, as well as for the civil population. Had that been done would the French Government have had to pay her five milliards? We think not. She might have lost Alsace and Lorraine, but beyond that we believe that her losses would not have been much greater.

There is very little doubt that, had Metz been able to hold out even for another fortnight, the new French armies forming in the north and west would have gained sufficient strength by such delay as would have enabled them to sweep round from the north upon the lines of communication, which were then held by a number of Landwehr battalions. Any considerable successes gained in this direction must have compelled the armies investing Paris to fall back. At that period the lines of communication as far as Reims were entrusted to the Governor-Generals of Alsace, Lorraine, and Reims, whose troops guarded the railways, roads, and depôts up to that point. These troops were composed entirely of Landwehr infantry, artillery, and cavalry, numbering something like 100,000 men; it is not very probable that, covering as they did some 300 miles of communications, they could have repulsed any formidable attacks upon any particular point delivered by masses of the new French levies. It seems tolerably clear that but for the opportune release of the 1st and 2nd German armies, the besieging forces around Paris would have had to retire on account of their inability to feed themselves at so great a distance from the frontier, but the fall of Metz opened out additional railway lines. Although Marshal Bazaine is generally blamed for the too precipitate surrender of Metz—indeed, he is charged with having accepted bribes to induce him to arrange a capitulation—we think, however, that the weight of the responsibility rests upon General Coffinieres.

His stupid excuses are a sufficient indictment of himself. He claims that he was not the General Commanding, and that in accordance with the French regulations the whole of the respon-

sibility rested on that officer. He further contended that the feeding of the army, the camp equipage, and the hospital *matériel* were entrusted to the Intendance, and the munitions of war to the artillery, and that he had no direct responsibility in regard to those services. He adds that the provisioning of a fortress like Metz, involving such a heavy expenditure, could have been undertaken only under instructions from the Minister of War, and that it should have been completed before the outbreak of the war, and that the duty of the General Commanding was only to bring the reserves up to what they had been originally. Such excuses are too flimsy for words, for it is certain that it was owing to his defeats alone that Bazaine was prevented from moving away from Metz, and it was purely an accident that he eventually became the Commander-in-Chief there. There can be no question that Coffinieres was commanding the fortress of Metz, including its outlying forts, long before Bazaine was pushed back upon that fortress; consequently the responsibility rested solely upon him to make timely arrangements, as well as to supplement the negligence of others. The fact was that he either did not understand his liability, or did not care to burden himself with what he considered should have been done by others.

The same old peg on which the world so promptly hangs its hat, the almost universal abhorrence to do some other person's work, or to supplement the deficiencies of others by personal effort. Fortunately such is not now the characteristic of either the French or British soldiers. We have already referred to the admirable work performed by Colonel Ward in provisioning Ladysmith well in advance of its dire necessity, we will now refer to the arrangements made at Kimberley. Although the Premier of the Cape Government threw every obstacle in the way of the defence of Kimberley, and assured the people that their fears of a Boer attack were groundless and without foundation, yet that far-seeing patriot, Mr. Cecil Rhodes, determined to act up to his own convictions, and the De Beer's Company, of which he was the head, was directed to lay in large stocks of supplies, ammunition, and arms. Not content with this, Mr. Rhodes, braving the serious danger of capture, threw himself into that city at the last moment, and became the virtual leader in its remarkable and stubborn defence. Colonel Kekewich, who was the military commander and whose dispositions and actions have met with the unqualified approval of his superiors, would be the first to acknowledge the admirable services rendered by Mr. Rhodes in keeping the white and black populations of that great mining

centre in excellent heart, both by precept and example. And this work was accomplished with a population of over 50,000, nearly half of whom were blacks.

There is no doubt that the neglect of the efficient provisioning of the fortress of Metz was attributable to Coffinieres, and not to Bazaine, as is generally believed. The former certainly had no very long period in which to provision Metz, but he had a fortnight at the very least, in which a very great deal might have been done, and practically nothing was done. It was not his work! So much so, that large quantities of farm products were knowingly allowed to remain in the environs of Metz, and when sorties were undertaken, in order to secure these, they were usually found to have been previously appropriated by the enemy. There was no excuse for such gross negligence, or for such outrageous apathy. The anomalous position was accentuated by further and even greater neglect. Instead of making the best of his difficult position, so soon as it became evident that Bazaine's army could not fight its way out, which was decided at Gravelotte on the 18th August, he made no attempt whatever to make the most of the supplies held for the town and garrison. Coffinieres tries to defend himself for not obliging the citizens to accept rations from the first; for nearly two months the citizens were permitted to purchase food in any quantities, nor was any reduction made in the composition of the soldiers' ration beyond the substitution of horseflesh for beef, and a reduction of the bread ration was made only in September. His excuse for making no reduction before was that he expected that Bazaine's army would have effected its escape at any moment. This was evidently a paltry after-thought. As a matter of fact, the paucity of supplies alone limited the sale of provisions in the town up to October. The waste must have been too outrageous for words. And when it is considered that a judicious arrangement of the consumption of the reserves about the middle of August would have enabled the fortress to hold out for an additional period of more than four weeks, the guilt of the Generals commanding, the Staff, and the Intendence is almost inestimable.

A consideration of the actual situation of the German armies surrounding Paris at this epoch will throw additional light upon this highly important question. We have seen that the rear of the 3rd Army was protected from the assaults of the army of the Loire by the interposition of the forces under General von der Tann. The army of the Meuse had been attacked mainly by bodies of Franc-tireurs with the object of keeping its foragers

within narrower limits, but latterly the Paris garrison had made some serious assaults upon its entrenched positions, particularly at Le Bourget. We also know that at this period the Germans had to depend mainly upon French railway lines for the feeding of their armies investing Paris, any serious interruption of that line would have necessitated the retirement of the investing forces. Major Blumé writes on the subject thus :—" In the meantime the protection of the blockade against the enemy outside had employed no inconsiderable part of the investing force, and led to a series of engagements of some consequence during the month of October." Towards the end of September the French commenced to make most formidable demonstrations against the army of the Meuse, and strong hostile bands were sent forward as far as Beaumont and Pontoise, whence they were driven back by strong detachments. Subsequently a force of 3,000 National Guards were moved to Breteuil, but were quickly driven back with considerable losses. These engagements, trifling in themselves, proved that the French were assuming an aggressive attitude at the very moment when the 1st and 2nd German armies were let loose upon them. Blumé concludes with the following words :—" The point now was to hold out against all the efforts of the enemy till such times as the fall of Metz should set the armies in that quarter free to move forward and assume the task of covering the blockade."

We believe that everyone must admit that the German investing armies were at the moment in an exceedingly precarious position ; the army of the Meuse in particular was not strong enough to resist the furious attacks hurled against it by the Paris garrison, and it had to protect its rear at the same moment from the attack of the army in course of formation. Had it not been for the timely advance of the 1st Army from Metz, that army must have fallen back upon its lines of communication. At the moment, Germany had no large army to send forward to the assistance of the investing armies, and it is not likely that these could have maintained their positions much longer without adequate support. The situation gives colour to the charge of bribery made against Marshal Bazaine by the French nation. It was certainly worth anything to Germany to secure the release of the 1st and 2nd Armies by the end of October, and it is equally certain that the Metz garrison could have held out for another week had steps been taken to secure all the supplies stored in the forts, or held by the field army, or concealed by the citizens.

We will now take into consideration the advance of the 1st Army under General Manteuffel in support of the army of the

Meuse, but before doing so it will help us to understand the supply and transport of that army, if we review the arrangements made for its supply from the start. We are indebted to Count Herrmann von Wartensleben for some particulars given in his *Operations of the 1st Army*. This army is stated to have derived its supplies at first from the Rhine, its main depôts—containing six weeks' consumption and two weeks' reserves—were organised at Cologne and Coblenz, in the expectation that the Rhine-Nahe railway would become available for traffic, or that the Call-Treves line would soon be in working order; neither expectation was realised. The army had to rely solely upon land transport for its supply; the insufficiency of this mode of transport became evident as the army advanced towards the Saar. When the army crossed the Saar the Inspector-General of Etappen commenced operations, and the base of supply was advanced to Treves and Saarlouis, where bakeries were established, and the supplies from the rear were moved forward by land transport. A wagon-park of 2,000 carts, collected by requisition from the Treves district, was organised at Saarlouis.

Field bakeries were improvised, bakers being provided by the field-bakery column, but notwithstanding every exertion made, the troops could not be fed properly, and it became necessary to use the three days' iron rations supplied to each soldier for use in emergency. It is evident that the pressure was extreme, as the rule that the ration was to be used only when it could be replaced at once, was waived, and it was only replaced by special permission from the reserves held in the fortress of Saarlouis on condition that return should be made in kind as speedily as was practicable. As long as the army was on the move, no depôts further in advance could be established, the land transport had to supply the needs of the troops. The Intendant-General immediately took possession of Courcelles so soon as the army had taken up its position in front of Metz, where a new advanced depôt was formed. It became necessary, therefore, to bring forward as speedily as possible what was needed by the several army corps. As no railway line was available, the stores and supplies had to be conveyed by road a distance of nearly thirty miles. It fell to the 1st Army to supply the 150,000 French prisoners from Metz during their transportation to the frontier, this naturally exhausted the resources to a serious extent at the moment when the army was about to commence its further advance.

The next question was how to prepare for the coming march.

An Intendant-General was assigned to the 1st Army; it was in the first instance to march to the Oise having the line Rethel-Reims as its base of supplies. In order to be perfectly prepared for the time when the troops would have consumed the provisions they carried with them, officials were sent in advance as early as the 2nd November with orders to prepare, within twelve days, magazines containing fourteen days' provisions at Laon and Rethel for the 1st Army Corps, and in Reims and Soissons for the 8th Army Corps and the 3rd Cavalry Division. The Government-General of Reims was requested to give its assistance, and the Intendant-General had sent a similar request to the army of the Meuse to afford as much help as its own surplus stores would admit of. In particular, measures were to be taken to establish a large magazine at Soissons. The result of these requests was that a store of oats at Clermont was placed at the disposal of the army, and was made use of by the cavalry division during its advance, but for the moment no further help could be given. This statement proves, if proof were required, that the army of the Meuse was hard pressed for supplies, as it could do so little to help the troops who were marching to its relief. It is evident that that army was then in a distinctly precarious situation, and, but for the timely assistance afforded by the advance of the 1st Army, would have been compelled to fall back towards Reims, its main base of supplies.

The orders issued for the supply of the army on its advance are also taken from Count von Wartensleben's work:—"Within two days before starting, the army corps will draw their necessary supply of provisions, by which it is to be understood that they complete their three days' iron portions and rations, load their provision columns with rations and breadstuffs for four days' consumption, and the wagon-park of 400 carts attached to each corps with oats for six days, and a reserve of flour and biscuit. The Inspection-General of Etappen will then assemble all wagons at its disposal, of which it is expected that it will have 1,000 within the next few days, load them with a three days' supply of oats and provisions, and send them after the army in such manner that supplies for an army corps are pushed forward on the northern Etappen lines, and for an army corps and a cavalry division on the south line. The Inspection-General of Etappen will report the number, freight, and line of march of the wagons it sends off. As a rule the troops must claim to be fed by their hosts. They will only have recourse to the reserves in cases of emergency, and will then, in the first instance, fall back upon the

provision and wagon-park columns. The empty wagons must be assembled daily, and until further orders are given, be sent to the Inspection-General of Etappen at Metz, in order that they may be reloaded there and sent after the army again. Provisions are not to be requisitioned during the advance of the army, but they may be purchased; and it is at the discretion of the corps to open markets for their sale." These very complete and explicit orders were evidently formed with the object of supplying the troops efficiently and sufficiently during their contemplated advance of over 150 miles into the enemy's country, as well as with the obvious intention of conciliating the inhabitants during such advance. The Germans had suffered severely, wherever their troops had appeared, from the attacks of the Franc-tireurs, and the evident object of the order was to minimise such opposition by drawing a thrifty and trade-loving people into more legitimate and safer methods for the expenditure of their innate energy. The more the character and temper of a people are considered in such matters, the better will it be both for the invaders and the invaded. It should be remembered that the intermediate country between the lines of the army of the Meuse and Metz was held by a comparatively small force of Etappen and garrison troops—the numbers scattered over this great extent of country did not total much over 25,000 men—and the lines of advance were not held so strongly that the 1st Army could march in perfect safety. It is true, however, that no large bodies of French troops were collected nearer than Amiens, consequently the troops were cautioned to be prepared for the sudden attacks of small bodies.

The advance was commenced on the 7th November, the line of the Oise being gained by the 21st, so that, inclusive of halts, more than ten miles daily were covered by the men. A force under General Groeben had been pushed forward to reconnoitre the passes of the Argonnes, but no traces were found of any irregular troops. The army with its convoys of wagons was able to pass through the mountain ranges without molestation, consequently both men and horses were well fed. Fortunately for the cavalry division, the fall of Verdun on the 9th November provided their horses with an abundant supply of oats, which were also available for the 8th Army Corps. The officers of the Intendantur had provided magazines of supplies and forage in Champagne, where the wagons of the army were enabled to replenish their supplies for the further advance to the north-west of France. The heaviest work now consisted in bringing up supplies and forage from the rear. Most of the work was done

by the land transport, as the only line of railway available, that from Saarbrücken via Metz, Frouard, Epernay, and Reims had to be used in common with the army of the Meuse. The principal advanced magazines for this army were established at Reims and Soissons, both being situated on the only line of railway then available. These towns were well chosen as they were beyond the reach of any serious attack from Amiens, which was the nearest French post having any considerable forces.

Both of these places would have contained military store-houses, public buildings, private warehouses, and other buildings, which could have been made available for the storage and preservation of perishable stores and supplies; they were also within the radius of the operations of the army of the Meuse, and were already flanked by the Etappen troops posted along the lines of communication of that army. Owing to the heavy requisitions already made upon the surrounding districts it was found impossible to fill these magazines on the spot, and supplies from the home dépôts had to be depended upon mainly. The two German armies now to be provided for in the north of France could not have aggregated much under 130,000 men, besides a very large number of cavalry, artillery, and transport horses. To facilitate the transport operations, it became necessary to transfer the main base dépôt from Saarbrücken to Metz, whence stores and supplies could be drawn by the advanced dépôts above mentioned. The arrangements made by the German Intendantur could not have been surpassed, but it is certain that, at that epoch, neither the French armies in that part nor the Franc-tireurs were in sufficient force to impede their operations. Nothing is more essential in war than to shorten lines of communication and thus economise the fighting strength. By that date the part of Lorraine east of Metz had become almost Germanised, and there would have been very little need of much force to guard the line of railway between that fortress and Saarbrücken. Consequently by the capture of Metz a large base dépôt was provided for the army of the Meuse and for Manteuffel's advancing army; it was forty miles nearer those armies than their former base.

Wartensleben then goes on to say that "during the days which now followed, the army crossed the wide plains of Champagne. The 8th Army Corps, now complete, marched on the left, the 3rd brigade and corps artillery of the 1st Army Corps on the right wing, the cavalry division in the centre, and in this formation the army reached the line Suippe-Vouziers on the 13th, Mourmelon-Attigny on the 14th, and Reims-Rethel on the 15th

November." Owing to the fact that all the available lines of railway converged at Frouard, it became necessary to limit the number of trains which should be allowed to pass to each army. The proportion was established by the strength of the several armies: the 1st Army and the army of the Meuse were to be allowed three trains each daily, as compared with four trains for the 2nd Army, and six for the 3rd Army—four from Weissenburg and two from Kehl. This held forth a sure prospect to the 1st Army of being able to use, at least partially, the great main line of railway for its supplies. Army headquarters therefore determined to keep in addition to this line, only the south Etappen line, Metz-Verdun-Reims as its basis, and to give up the north line Grand Pré-Rethel. This lightened the task of guarding the Etappen lines, the duty of the Government-General of Reims.

At this epoch the German authorities were evidently very hard pressed for Etappen troops to guard the lines of communication between Metz and the Oise, a distance of over 150 miles. When it is remembered that large numbers of these troops had been sent forward to aid the army of the Meuse, and that there were less than 30,000 of them to guard these lines, the Germans may be congratulated that they had to deal mainly with the attacks delivered against their communications by irregular troops, and that the French Army of the North had not then acquired sufficient discipline or stability to enable it to assume a serious offensive. However, the advance of the German reinforcements enabled the whole of the Etappen troops to resume their legitimate duty of guarding the communications, convoys, and magazines. The strength of the French Northern Army on the 15th November is given at 85,000 men; 25,000 were stated to have been assembled at Amiens, 27,000 at Rouen, and 27,000 at Lille; in addition, there were some thousands of *Franc-tireurs*, besides the garrisons of the fortresses which could have been drawn upon to some extent if a formidable attack had been contemplated upon the lines of communication. Furthermore, the French still held the northern lines of railway, which converged upon Paris and Reims, and would have lent themselves to the concentration of large forces at many points near those lines. Perhaps the want of sufficient organisation may have prevented the French Generals from seizing the opportunity offered for cutting into the German communications. In any case it is perfectly clear that had the siege of Metz been prolonged for another three weeks, some operation of this kind would have been undertaken with every chance of success.

General Manteuffel pushed his army forward with the utmost expedition, with the evident object of bringing much needed assistance to the army of the Saxon Crown Prince, which had recently suffered severely at Le Bourget, and was being threatened by the French armies assembling in its rear. From the nature of the orders given to the cavalry division it is evident that the General felt that he might get into contact with the enemy at any moment. The cavalry were to push far ahead of the army, screening its movements and taking note of those of the enemy. Flying columns were to be sent forward possessing a certain degree of offensive and defensive strength. The riflemen belonging to these were to be carried in carts to increase their mobility. These columns were to be pushed forward in the direction of Amiens, St. Quentin, Arras, and Montdidier. At this time considerable activity was displayed by the enemy; Stenay and other Etappen stations being attacked, with the result that several squadrons and companies were captured, and quantities of stores and supplies carried off or destroyed. Having reached the Oise and gained possession of the passages over that river, the 1st German Army was now in every way in a position to fulfil its defensive duty, and could even take offensive action. However, as the attitude of the enemy did not demand immediate advance on the part of the 1st Army, it was deemed not only advisable but also necessary to grant the troops a brief repose. An order was issued on the 18th by His Majesty the King, directing that the 1st Army should move in the direction of Rouen. It ran as follows:—"Whether or not, in doing so, the main forces of the army follow the Amiens road, will depend whether the considerable forces of the enemy, said to be assembling in that neighbourhood remain there, or as is most likely, retreat on the advance of the 1st Army. At all events Amiens is of itself sufficiently important a place to justify its being occupied, and held by a strong detachment in either case." Soon after the line of the Oise had been occupied, the advanced base of supplies was moved from Soissons to Compiègne, whence the supplies were conveyed by wagons to the various corps operating beyond that river.

Every effort was being put forward by the Germans in order to utilise as many of the northern railways as could be repaired and got ready for traffic. The fortresses commanding some of these lines, such as Thionville, Mézières, and La Fère were being besieged in order to remove such obstructions to the free passage of troops, stores, and supplies. Wartensleben gives us the following information:—"The French system of railways was, on the

whole, favourable to bringing up our supplies from the home country ; but the lines that had been broken up in parts occupied by our troops had to be repaired, besides which the necessary rolling stock, especially locomotive engines, had to be procured and put in order before we could use them for moving our supplies to the most important points. The traffic over Crèpy and Creil to Amiens and Rouen was attended with peculiar difficulty, for the Oise had to be crossed by a temporary bridge. For this reason the line could not be used for any very heavy traffic, but only for bringing forward such articles as were absolutely necessary for the daily consumption of the army. On the other hand, when the Reims-Laon-La Fère-Amiens railway began to be worked, this line, although it was certainly from a military point of view somewhat exposed, afforded a direct line of communication with the home country, on which heavy trains could run from Metz to Amiens and Rouen without discharging their freight." The possession of an additional line of railway, perfectly independent of the Frouard junction, became an absolute necessity as the troops surrounding Paris were being added to daily, and as the supplies in the country district became more and more reduced as the numbers to be fed were augmented.

It is abundantly evident that the utmost efforts had been put forward by the German commanders to secure the French lines of railway, for the purpose of establishing the lines of communication between their armies operating in advance of their main bases in Germany, and the further these armies moved into France the greater became the necessity for the maintenance of those lines. One of the principal hindrances to the Germans in their efforts was the opposition offered by the Franc-tireurs, who were everywhere and nowhere. In how wonderful a manner does history repeat itself ! At the time of writing the Russians are troubled by the same kind of warfare in their efforts to keep their line of railway through Manchuria intact. The Chung-chuses, so-called banditti, who are in reality Chinese, who sympathise with the Japanese cause and cordially dislike their Russian invaders, have attacked the lines of communication again and again, and have impeded the Russians wherever they could, and like the Franc-tireurs relapse into inoffensive peasantry when diligent search is made for them. Such warfare deserves to be severely dealt with.

CHAPTER XIX.

GAMBETTA TO THE RESCUE.

At this period the French nation was in a very precarious situation. It had lost the whole of its field armies by the surrenders at Metz and Sedan, and by the capture of so many thousands of prisoners during the progress of the fighting. Over 300,000 French soldiers had up to that time been captured and sent to German prisons. The only regular troops upon which dependence could be placed were the troops of Vinoy, who were shut up in Paris, the forces which were withdrawn from Algeria, the men from the dépôts, and the French sailors and marines from the fleet. A large number of fugitives from the defeated field armies found their way to the armies in the north, west, and east, which were then in course of formation under the able direction of M. Gambetta. To swell these numbers there were the Gardes Mobiles, the National Guards, and the Franc-tireurs. Gambetta's efforts were crowned with success, for by the end of November he had collected about 250,000 trained men, who were distributed amongst the French armies operating in the north, the west, and the east, but more than half a million of men had been collected altogether. Judging from the fighting of the army of the Loire around Orleans and Beaugency, of the northern army at Amiens, and of the eastern troops at Nuits, we are led to the conclusion that Gambetta had succeeded in collecting excellent fighting material, and that, had it not been for the release of the investing army at Metz, he would have relieved Paris. The assembly of the men was the least of M. Gambetta's superimposed duties. There was more especially the training of the raw material, for in a levy *en masse* most of the men would know absolutely nothing in regard to the use of rifles or artillery. Probably the most difficult matter would have been the feeding and housing of such an enormous body of men during their training, as well as the organisation of the supply and transport needed for those who were prepared to take the field. In his *Armée du Nord* M. Deschaumes tells us that Admiral Fourichon

was sent by the Delegation from Tours to undertake the organisation of the forces in the north. The Admiral very quickly sent in his resignation when he found that all his efforts were traversed by the general disorganisation which prevailed, the want of officers, and the abuse of *matériel*. It was then that Gambetta was sent from Paris—a master mind was needed to evolve order out of chaos. Contingents were cadred in haste, and as efficiently as was possible. The choice of the chiefs was often faulty, unjustifiable, and even regrettable, not that there was not time for sufficient reflection—the great necessity was to get regiments ready to march to the front. The will of Gambetta overcame every obstacle—a corps of engineers was improvised from civil life—the higher railway officials provided the material for an Intendance—and the civil practitioners constituted a medical service.

A reference to the map of this part of France will show the great difficulties which lay in the way of transportation. The country consists of elevated plateaux, which are covered to a considerable extent by forests and traversed by ravines, valleys, and watercourses. As this part of the country had been undisturbed by the enemy there could not have been much difficulty in procuring an abundance of wagons, carts, horses, and drivers suitable for the transport work in so hilly a part. Provisions could also be procured in almost any quantities from the north-west of France and from Belgium by the various lines of railways which had remained intact up to that period. To M. Testelin had been assigned the duty of improvising the national defences in the north by the delegates at Tours. M. Brund, in his life of General Faidherbe, tells us that M. Testelin's authority was badly defined; he could do everything or nothing. He was careful to profit by the ambiguity of his instructions, and so left everyone in his existing position, and was careful not to usurp the functions of anyone. He confined himself to kindling the patriotic sentiments of the administration and the zeal of the military. His moral influence, which was his unique power, accomplished everything. Concord, confidence, and goodwill were the happy results. He issued from the trial with a character for integrity, devotion, and patriotism, and with the honour of having, in a great measure, contributed towards the salvation of his country. He said of himself: "I have appropriated neither appointments nor the expenses of management, nor have I accepted any bribes for places." It is evident that irregularities of the kind referred to prevailed largely at that time, otherwise

there would have been no necessity to disclaim any participation in gains of that description. General Faidherbe felt that it was impossible to offer any resistance to the advancing Germans, for his troops were without arms, and there were no reserves of any kind. Furthermore, no sooner had a trained body of troops been collected than they were directed to proceed to Orleans, where fighting was going on. This constituted a serious obstacle, and for some time prevented the concentration of an effective force in the north; however, the arrival of some battalions of marine infantry and fusiliers from the French fleet gave backbone to the partially drilled and disciplined forces of the north. A commission was sent to report upon the armaments of the fortresses towards the front, and what was needed was to be provided without loss of time. By the middle of October Faidherbe had collected a force of at least 50,000 fairly equipped and disciplined troops, with which he had hoped to dispute the advance of the 1st German Army under Manteuffel.

The most strenuous efforts were put forward by M. Gambetta, by the Generals, and by leading civilians, who so ably seconded him in his attempt to evolve order out of chaos, and disciplined soldiers out of a motley lot of fugitive soldiery, conscripts, Mobiles, National Guards, and out of the rawest material. The one advantage was that the leaders were acting upon their own initiative, and were not hampered by conflicting orders from headquarters, or by any orders at all. The delegates at Tours encouraged the several generals and other functionaries in the efforts they were making to collect armies and to feed and equip them, and these officials were left to act as they thought best in the circumstances of their several localities or surroundings. Words of praise were showered upon them, but reproofs were seldom administered even when they were merited. There was no fault-finding, the best was wisely made of everything that was done. When Bourbaki, who succeeded to the command of the army of the north on the 22nd October, failed to accomplish anything with the troops he commanded, the delegates, as in duty bound at the request of the General himself, gave the army to General Farre, pending the arrival of General Faidherbe. M. Schautcourt wrote upon this subject in the following terms:—"General Bourbaki found fault with the absence of stability in his troops, and saw the danger of occupying posts which would soon have to be abandoned before the reinforcements of the enemy. This unfortunate decision was submitted for the orders of M. Gambetta, who pronounced in favour of the offensive."

Bourbaki was relieved of the command on the 19th November, when he proceeded to take command of a corps in course of formation at Nevers. There is no doubt that Bourbaki had very uphill work from the first. He had written to M. Gambetta informing him that the army he was sent to command was a mere rabble without any formation, and the Mobs were badly armed and equipped. Ammunition was wanting, and there were no horses or harness for the artillery. Food, forage, stores, and instruction were lacking, all the men could boast of was patriotism. General Bourbaki appears to have set to work with a brave heart to get men and stores together, and he was not without success, as was demonstrated by the admirable stand made by these very troops within a little more than a month's time against the superior forces of the enemy. By his nervousness of defeat Bourbaki robbed himself of the fruits of his labours. It was the very same spirit of indecision which so hampered many of the movements made during the operations against the Boers in South Africa. On the other hand the decision of the Boer commanders stood out in striking contrast, and they gained enormously by their determined initiative. The Boer commanders had no fear of the condemnation of a headquarter staff or of a censorious press or public, nor had they any military reputations to maintain, to make, or to mar. They were practically unfettered, and could act according to the dictates of their clear and active brains. The fault lies mainly in the system which does not attach sufficient importance to the theoretical and practical training of officers of all grades.

All armies suffer more or less from the want of experience and the neglect of a continuity of study in their profession in the higher ranks. When an officer attains high rank, more often than not he relegates professional studies more especially to his juniors than to himself, when in reality the converse should apply. The higher the rank an officer may accept the greater should the study of his profession become, both practically and theoretically—if an officer is not prepared to so occupy himself mainly, he should in honour decline the advancement. The sooner social functions are regarded by General officers as of only secondary consideration as compared with their professional duties, the sooner will the time arrive when all Generals in command will become competent to take the field with a fair chance of being able to do well, whether in the attack or defence, and in the safeguarding of the best interests of those placed under their command. In all arts and sciences, devo-

tion to that or the other alone can secure the success of the student. Why should it be otherwise in the study of the Art of War?

The absence of any true initiative on the part of Bourbaki, when it became known that the 1st German Army had been released from Metz and was making rapid marches towards Amiens, had a very prejudicial effect upon the peasantry in this part of the country. They had done all that lay in their power to aid the General in the raising of an army, and now those troops were not to advance to ward off the attacks of the enemy. No wonder they lost heart and determined to shift for themselves. M. Schautcourt gives an interesting account of how the want of action on the part of Bourbaki affected the people. He wrote as follows:—"The moral effacement of the inhabitants was such that they surrendered to the enemy almost daily, very sure that the least sign of resistance would be followed by serious danger to their lives and property. The annoyance and loss inflicted by their requisitions rendered the situation of the provinces invaded daily more wretched, particularly those overrun by both French and Germans, whose requisitions fell upon them in turn. The small coinage disappeared rapidly, and by the month of October certain communes were forced to issue notes. This paper, having a limited circulation, gradually depreciated and occasioned a serious difficulty in the smaller transactions of business. Later, supplies commenced to fail, and the communes established internal lines to prevent the deportation of all food products, firewood and lighting materials were also interdicted. Under the influence of such privations, and owing to the receipt of continued evil tidings of the progress of the war, the people lost their *morale*. With few exceptions the inhabitants of the invaded parts longed for the conclusion of peace, which would put an end to their misery." Treason was in the air, the army suspected the people, the people the army, and the soldiers distrusted their generals. Many of the affluent proprietors were accused of having reserved their stocks for the use of the enemy or with the intention of sending them over the frontier into Belgium; they naturally argued that neither the French nor the Germans paid for supplies, and that it was politic to conciliate the latter, from whom alone protection could then be obtained. Such a condition of affairs was highly prejudicial to the efficient working of the French Intendence in the field, which in great measure accounted for the shortcomings of that department. Another reason for its occasional lapses was the

want of a sufficient *personnel*: most of the officers were obtained from the railway companies, but there were fortunately several Intendants of experience to take charge of the direction of affairs. The subordinate staff was, however, lamentably inefficient, inexperienced, and defective in numbers. What wonder, therefore, that the department should have failed upon more than one occasion to carry out its duties satisfactorily.

There appears to have been a considerable amount of friction at times between the Intendance and the French General Staff, and the former was often held blameworthy when the latter was really at fault. M. Ramon gives us an excellent sample of this:—M. Bohy, the sous-intendant, had occasion to complain to General Robin, who commanded the division, of the tardy notification to himself of the destinations of troops on the march, or of the changes in their destinations. Without such information he pointed out that he could not communicate with the mayors on the line of march so as to secure the delivery of the necessary rations immediately upon the arrival of the troops. Upon another occasion the General had informed the sous-intendant verbally of a change in the destination of a brigade, when there was insufficient time in which to effect proper readjustments. There were also irregularities on the part of some of the regiments. Upon one occasion a regiment had not sent in its returns, nor had it drawn rations before marching the following morning. There was evident neglect on the part of the General in arranging that his sous-intendant should be made aware daily of the destination or cantonments of the troops in movement. It is evident that this neglect was the result of animus rather than of circumstances or accident, for M. Ramon enlightens us on the point. He tells us that in one instance a regiment on the march helped itself to 1,500 rations of bread, which was *en route* to feed other troops. The Intendant naturally complained to his General, who, in reporting the incident, stated that he considered that it resulted from inexperience on the part of the commanding officer, and that he saw nothing serious in the matter unless it was the insolence of a non-combatant officer—nothing could have been in worse form. General Farre, in his reply to General Robin, expressed his opinion thus:—"Explanations inadmissible. Severe punishment is to be inflicted on the authors of the pillage, particularly on the officers, whose names should have been stated and sent to the General Commanding." This incident occurred some thirty years ago, when common sense was not so much *en evidence* as it is at the present time. An officer's value, whether

he be combatant or not, is gauged by the way in which he executes the work entrusted to him—the description of work has nothing whatever to do with the estimate of the officer's worth. Every branch of the service contributes its quota towards the success of a campaign.

Yet another circumstance militated against the successful working of the Intendance. As the Germans pushed their way into the north of France, no village seems to have been too insignificant to escape the ubiquitous requisition. M. Ramon tells us that the village of Toucancourt, with a population of only 575, was mulcted to the extent of 223,304 fr. 80 c., which was at the rate of about 2,000 fr. on an average for each proprietor. The total values of the exactions from villages ranged from about 5,000 fr. up to about 300,000 fr., the levies being in money, oxen, horses, cows, sheep, pigs, poultry, rabbits, wheat, flour, clothing, furniture, firewood, oats, hay, straw, potatoes, wine, brandy, sugar, coffee, salt, cigars, tobacco, and other necessities and luxuries. The estimate of the values of the exactions did not always include the damage done to property, nor the extensive plundering which was at times indulged in by the German troops. Receipts were usually given for what was taken, but at some places even these were refused, not that they were of any value to the plundered, for the Germans never subsequently recognised any such obligations, and the writer is not aware that the French authorities ever took cognisance of any such scrip. In a country so systematically gutted, it is not surprising that the Intendance could not find the wherewithal to form dépôts, it had to remain satisfied with a hand-to-mouth system of feeding the French soldiery. The port of Havre was, however, the main dépôt upon which dependence could be placed in case of dire necessity, but there was the difficulty of transportation along the only line of railway, which had to convey men, stores, sick, wounded, clothing, &c., as well as supplies. Under the circumstances it is evident that the Intendance with the northern army acquitted itself with considerable credit and distinction.

We left the 1st German Army under Manteuffel on the banks of the Oise, seeking much needed rest and refreshment after its rapid march from the neighbourhood of Metz. Owing to the evident intention displayed by General Farre to defend Amiens, where he was throwing up lines of defence, that army was ordered to advance on the 24th November, after a rest of barely two days. The advanced troops of the two armies came into collision on the 24th, the French being forced to retire. The battle of

Amiens was fought on the 27th November, with a considerable loss on both sides. Considering the fact that the French had not more than 23,000 men in the field, the majority being raw troops, and that their lines of defence extended over a front of twenty-five miles, it is greatly to their credit that they were able to withstand the attacks of some 30,000 highly disciplined and seasoned German soldiers for the greater part of a day. The French were forced to abandon Amiens and retreated in some confusion upon Arras; the blowing up of a number of bridges to their rear retarded the pursuit. The town was occupied on the morning of the 28th, and the citadel surrendered on the 30th when threatened by a severe bombardment. M. Cardevacque gives us some interesting particulars of the steps taken in the defence of Arras:—On the approach of the Germans the mayor of the town required the inhabitants to provide themselves with from forty to fifty days' food consisting of fresh and dry vegetables, salt beef and other provisions. It was considered that sufficient fresh meat would be provided by the local butchers, but the pork butchers had to be requested to augment their stocks of smoked and salted provisions. The bakers and flour mills had ample reserves of wheat and flour, so that there was no need for the citizens to lay in large quantities of either. Spare cavalry stables were placed at the disposition of the owners of cattle, who could in this way keep some three hundred head in the town. A very wise course was adopted by the municipality in regard to those who could not afford the time to labour at the works of defence. They were forced to contribute money according to the value of their movable and immovable effects. The day's labour was valued at 1 fr. 50 c., and those having property worth from 25 fr. to 50 fr. had to pay for two days' labour, and by a gradually increasing scale up to 500 fr. or over when fifty days' labour had to be paid for. Faidherbe's army had fallen back upon Arras where its forces were recruited gradually, and it soon regained its strength, courage, and discipline. The mayor, however, on the 28th December, found it necessary to administer a severe rebuke to some of the citizens, who had spread reports amongst the troops to the effect that further resistance was useless, and that it had been decided to surrender the fortress upon the approach of the enemy. They were notified that the punishment for such a crime was death. The neighbouring small town of Albert was groaning under its misfortunes. It had been occupied by a German force for two days immediately after the fall of Amiens, and during that short period no less

than 12,000 fr. worth of rations had been levied on its citizens, without counting the thefts of provisions, arms, flannel, horses, jewellery, &c. This author also informs us that "the Intendants Richard and Montaudon provided clothing, supplies, barracks, lodgings, and camp equipment with much energy and celerity, so that the 1st Division was ready to march on the 15th November, and the 2nd was then well advanced towards its complete formation."

Before the close of the year nearly one-fifth of the whole country was practically held by the German armies, the capital was closely invested, most of its northern and eastern fortresses had fallen, its regular forces had been captured or destroyed, and yet the people were not prostrate. On the contrary, thousands of men, and even some women, had flocked to the standards, others contributed money towards the equipment and support of the armies in course of formation or augmentation. The patriotism and devotion of the French nation was beyond all praise, but it required a strong directing hand, and that hand was forthcoming in the day of necessity, that of Gambetta. Count von der Goltz may be quite right in his denunciation of M. Gambetta's attempt to arrogate to himself the position of commander-in-chief, but there is no denying his intense patriotism, his energy, and his remarkable ability. General Boulanger gives us his opinion of Gambetta in the following terms:—"Every day Gambetta imparted an element of power and of activity into the measures being adopted for the defence of the country against the wholesale invasion of France. We can only render a profound homage to his energy, his intelligence, and his patriotism. Without doubt he committed faults, but there was at once apparent in him an ardour which excused his errors. He pressed forward with the utmost courage. Possibly he would have ended in triumphing had he been surrounded by men equally determined to succeed. In any case, he never allowed himself to be beaten. He hoped on till the last day, struggling with adversity to the last moment. His contemporaries glorified him, posterity will ratify the acknowledgments of his country." The ovation he received from the Parisians after the war, when his horses were taken from his carriage and he was dragged through the metropolis by an enthusiastic mob, was not altogether what General Boulanger had anticipated for him. When some of his friends were congratulating him upon his enthusiastic reception, he replied, "Yes, it was very hearty, but I have not seen my horses since." The patriotism of the French nation is an example to all people.

Immediately after the fall of Amiens Manteuffel sent forward a large force in the direction of Rouen with the object of threatening the army in occupation under General Briand, and of repairing the line of railway between that place and Amiens. On approaching Rouen General von Goben found himself unopposed, the French forces having withdrawn in the direction of Havre. Manteuffel took formal possession of the city on the 6th December, a military governor being appointed, but the direction of the municipality was left entirely in the hands of the French officials. Steps were at once taken for the organisation of a systematic requisitioning of the city and the surrounding country for the support of the army of occupation. It will be easily understood that, situated as the army was at a distance of nearly 400 miles from its own frontier, great difficulty must have been experienced in feeding so large a force as 40,000 men, besides many thousands of horses, particularly when it is remembered that only one direct line of railway, that through Frouard, was available for the four German armies operating around and about Paris. There were certainly the large Etappen dépôts formed at Reims and Compiègne, but these were also drawn upon by the army of the Meuse and by troops in occupation of the more northern lines of communication, as well as by those engaged in the various siege operations. The German forces at Rouen and Amiens would have had to depend to a large extent at this period upon the contributions levied on the towns and country districts. After the capitulation of Mezières on the 1st January another line of railway would have become available, when the supply of the armies would have been less difficult.

The German commanders had not been able to lay siege seriously to Mezières before the middle of December, when powerful batteries were erected for its reduction. The heavy bombardment of the 31st December silenced the guns of the fortress, and on the following day a white flag was hoisted and its garrison of 3,000 men surrendered. This capitulation was attended by very disgraceful conduct on the part of the garrison. M. Ménard, in his *Crime de Mezières*, informs us that:—"It was reserved to Mezières to heap up disaster, for during the twenty-four hours which passed before the conquerors made their entry into the fortress, scenes were enacted which were an eternal disgrace to those who engaged in them and to those who had not the courage to repress them. The whole of the supplies were handed over to the military and civil population, who organised a hideous and shameful debauch. Those who could possessed themselves of

large quantities and satisfied their greed by selling to others, who were less fortunate, at high prices. Hogsheads of wine and brandy were staved in by the soldiery. A large part of the garrison became intoxicated, and during the continuance of this disgusting orgie the military authority was conspicuous by its absence. Almost powerless against such a mob, the prefect and other leading citizens sought in vain to restore order." We cannot help feeling that under similar circumstances it is the duty of the commander to give orders to his commissariat to destroy all intoxicants, indeed there should be standing orders to that effect, for there is always a possibility that the soldiery may get them into their possession. Certainly every precaution should be taken to prevent prisoners of war adding to their own humiliation by marching out of a fortress in a state of intoxication.

Manteuffel sent a strong force in the direction of Havre, but the inhabitants and garrison of that port had improved the old fortifications and had built others, so that it was tolerably well defended, particularly as it was then covered by the undefeated forces commanded by General Briand. The King's instructions were to the following effect: No serious operations were to be undertaken towards Havre, as there was some danger of the advance of Faiderbe's army from Arras where it was rallying, and the German army might be attacked seriously on its right flank. Dieppe was occupied without serious opposition by a detachment sent from Rouen. The energy displayed by Faiderbe in the concentration of his army on the right bank of the Somme caused Manteuffel to concentrate his forces around Amiens. This concentration resulted in the battle of the Hallue on the 24th December, when the French were again driven back upon Arras, losses on both sides were considerable, but the Germans captured 1,100 prisoners. This was followed by the investment of Péronne on the 27th December. M. Ramon gives some particulars of the investment of that fortress:—The following precautions were taken: the hospitals were emptied and the patients were sent into the country, all vagabonds were expelled, and useless mouths were got rid of. Particular attention was given to the provision of barracks and bedding, so that the men off duty might rest well. Issues of food to civilians were to be made only at the last extremity, and only to those who took part in the defence either by fighting or working. Particular attention was also paid to the provision of good storage for supplies. The citizens were required to lay in two months' provisions and the municipality laid in ample reserves. Péronne

capitulated on the 10th January after sustaining a bombardment.

The French displayed some activity from the direction of Havre about the same time, and having advanced in force upon Rouen compelled the German army to attack them; the fighting again resulted in favour of the Germans, and the French were driven back with so much loss that they did not again repeat their efforts from that direction. Faidherbe was not to be easily suppressed; he determined to march to the relief of Péronne but was met by a large German force on the 3rd January at Bapaume, where he was repulsed with a loss of over 2,000, the German loss not being much more than half that number. The French General was yet undismayed, for he again tempted Dame Fortune by the issue of a battle fought at St. Quentin on the 19th January. In this engagement his army was signally defeated and retired in the utmost disorder, and had it not been for the failure of the German supply columns to gain touch with the army, the defeat would have been overwhelming. The Germans were too exhausted to pursue before the 20th, by which time the defeated French soldiery had managed to escape; however, 10,000 of them were captured by the Germans. This engagement virtually terminated all efforts for the relief of Paris from the northern part of France.

CHAPTER XX.

VON WERDER'S MOVEMENTS.

M. Gambetta did not confine his efforts alone to the organisation of the armies in the west and north, which were destined for the relief of the beleaguered French capital, but he determined to create an army in the east as well, with which it was intended that the German lines of communication, between the frontier and the armies investing Paris, should be attacked, or, at the least, interrupted. General Cambriels was entrusted with the formation and organisation of this army. He had been wounded in the head at Sedan, and was treated by the Germans as though mortally wounded, and had thus effected his escape. He was now ready and anxious to do what he could to help his country in its dire necessity, and had placed his services at the disposal of the State. The wound, however, seems to have incapacitated that officer to some extent, as he was unable to hold the command much beyond a month, but he was seriously hampered and disheartened by the quality of the soldiers, who were little better than a mob of armed men.

We are told by M. Euvrard that the men were badly equipped, almost without clothing, at least not of the quantity or quality needed for undertaking a campaign at the commencement of the winter season; the rifles were of an obsolete pattern, there were not more than forty rounds of ammunition in hand per man, and this had often to be carried in their pockets or tied up in a handkerchief. The officers, who were picked almost anyhow, were not much better than the men, and their discipline was extremely lax. Besancon and Belfort were fixed upon as the bases from which this army should operate; the former was stocked with stores, supplies and munitions of war to some extent, the latter was also well provisioned and was occupied by a large garrison, which was then under the observation of a small German army, but it afterwards withstood a siege. Owing to its position, Besancon became Cambriels' recognised base. M. Croizet was his chief Intendant, and M. Legros the assistant.

These officers appear to have accomplished their duty satisfactorily, as we do not hear of any serious deficiencies, although the army of the east occupied that town for some months. Its railway communications with Lyons and Marseilles were uninterrupted pretty well up to the conclusion of the war, so that there was no sufficient reason for any collapse in this direction.

Cambriels does not seem to have wasted any time in getting these troops into something approaching order, for he was able to send a considerable force into the Vosges early in October. Ludwig Lohlein, in his *Operations of General von Werder*, which was translated by Lieut. F. T. Maxwell, R.E., tells us that this force consisted of from 1,400 to 1,600 men, made up of the 32nd Regiment, men from 18 different dépôt cadres, Gardes Mobiles of the Meurthe and the Vosges, and one completely formed and clothed detachment of Franc-tireurs. The artillery consisted of 10 or 12 guns of dépôt batteries from Lyons. General Dupré was in command, assisted by a considerable number of line officers. From the constitution of so small a force, it will be understood that cohesion was almost impossible, and that it is not surprising that Cambriels could not make much of a stand against the enemy, whose men were not only well trained, but were inured to and understood the art of war. Furthermore, the physique of the German soldiery was superior to that of the French; the former were also not far from their frontier whence they could procure abundant supplies, and latterly their duties had not been so heavy in this part of the field of operations, their work having been confined to the attack of a fortress defended by obsolete artillery; on the other hand, the French soldiers had been defeated and had well-nigh lost all hope, and their feeding under the circumstances must have suffered from a defective distribution, even if it was always *en evidence*, and the want of proper clothing would also have affected the spirits and condition of the men. It is to the credit of the nation that the courage of the French did not succumb in the face of so much that was disheartening. The misfortunes, caused by the apathy, negligence, and incapacity of their rulers, appear to have knit the French people more closely together; vain boastings had been replaced by a determined opposition to the further advance of the invader, the whole nation was in arms, and the courage and devotion displayed upon every side is worthy of the close attention of every student of military history.

The surrender of Strasburg on the 28th September placed a very able General and a large body of troops at the disposal

of the King. Here again was another instance of the want of any degree of forethought on the part of the French authorities prior to their engaging in a serious war against Germany. Had Strasburg been properly armed, equipped, and provisioned, and had the fortifications been properly repaired, and the outlying forts constructed in accordance with modern methods of warfare, the fortress might have held out for months instead of weeks. It was not for the want of reminders that such culpable negligence was permitted, as has already been shown in the account of the siege, which is given in a previous chapter, but must be put down to stupidity or lack of comprehension on the part of the authorities. We cannot for a moment imagine that the employés of the Government were playing into the hands of the enemy, but to leave a principal frontier fortress in so helpless a condition on the eve of war lays them open to such a charge. No blame whatever attached to the commander, who fought an uphill battle throughout with insufficient armaments and defences, and it was not until his works were breached and his provisions well-nigh exhausted that he was compelled to surrender. Had the siege continued for two or three months more, the French troops collecting in the east would have gained enormously in power and cohesion before they could have been confronted by any considerable force, and indeed the relief of Strasburg might have been effected by that army. It is difficult to estimate what might have been the resultant issues had a sensible prevision been exercised by the responsible authorities. Belfort afforded a remarkable contrast to other frontier fortresses; it was protected by outlying forts, and it was well armed and provisioned; as a natural consequence Belfort never surrendered and was able to hold out until the termination of the war.

Although the Alsatians were of German extraction they were quite as antagonistic to the invader as the French themselves; the Germans were therefore obliged to occupy in force a large number of the towns and villages in that part of the country. Capt. J. B. Dumas gives us some information in regard to these people. He says that "they were badly armed, hardly clothed, and without training; their proper education, in the midst of a nation whose military habits had become enervated, did not influence them to adopt easily the life of a soldier, but inclined them to oppose the restraints of all discipline. Then there were the Franc-tireurs, who were generally energetic and strong, better armed, better equipped, and possessing generally more knowledge of arms and marching than their civilian friends. It

became necessary to embody these men in cadres, to discipline and to instruct them; the enemy, although victorious in many big engagements, quickly appreciated the *morale* of these troops who were not only numerous but well fed." M. Grenest, in his *L'Armée de l'Est*, quotes the opinion of Von Moltke in reference to these levies. He says, "it was generally considered that with the fall of Sedan and Metz the war was ended, but during five months these improvised armies have kept ours in check. We have been fighting conscripts and mobiles for five months. They were more crowds than regiments, but these mobs held us back." It will be seen, therefore, that General von Werder had no insignificant foe to contend against in his advance from Strasburg. M. Lohlein informs us that the General was ordered to advance in the direction of Troyes and Chatillon sur Seine, that the concentration of troops was to be prevented, that the inhabitants were to be disarmed, and all possible measures were to be taken to restore, repair, and utilise the railway passing through Blainville, Epinal, Faveruay, Chaumont, &c. General Werder was at the same time to keep in communication with the general Governments of Alsace and Lorraine. He goes on to tell us that "to assure supplies on the march through the mountains during the prevailing want of provisions, the troops carried two days' rations besides their standing allowance; a provision wagon-train and 80 forage wagons followed each column. Supplies were obtained by requisitions, and were distributed regularly by Commissaries who marched with the advanced guards, made their requisitions, and then distributed the food to the troops as they arrived. To secure the safety of the columns, the cantonments in the mountains were made as concentrated as possible." The lines of communication at this period do not appear to have been in complete touch with the seat of government in Alsace, or with the German frontier; they were greatly impeded by the numerous bands of Franc-tireurs which infested this mountainous district, as well as by the open hostility of the Alsatians themselves. How history repeats itself! When Cronje's army surrendered, and after the capture of Bloemfontein and Pretoria by Lord Roberts, it was believed that the war was over, but owing to the uprising of other Boers and the large accessions of rebels from the colonies, the war dragged its weary length along for more than another year. The Germans had to defend about as many hundred miles of lines of communication as the British army has had to do in thousands. Furthermore, the British army was fighting in a comparatively barren land to which all supplies and forage

had to be brought. What wonder then that the South African War should have become so protracted.

M. Euvrard, in his work on *L'Armée de l'Est*, gives us some particulars of the advance of the 14th Army Corps under General von Werder. He says that :—By order of the General the Intendant made it known to the people that payment would be made at the undermentioned rates for all supplies brought to Gray. If the people brought sufficient supplies to feed the German army all requisitions would cease, in the event of failure they would again be employed. The following were the rates at which payments would be made :—"For every 10 kilos. of flour, 44 fr. ; wheat, 25 fr. ; rye, 18 fr. ; bran, 12 fr. ; oats, 20 fr. ; hay, 16 fr. ; straw, 7 fr. ; potatoes, 12 fr. ; beef, 60 c. per kilo. (live weight) ; cow beef, 50 c. ; mutton, 60 c. ; pork, 45 c. ; and bread at current rates." He then goes on to inform us that upon the arrival of the Baden troops at Loire on the 18th October the Intendant demanded 50,000 cigars, and from 15,000 to 20,000 fr. worth of bread, meat, forage, &c. Some pillaging was done, and pistols were held to the heads of the mayor and some of the people. At Maruay, on 22nd October, the municipality had to feed a battalion and some artillery for two days, and at Rioz a number of Baden officers demanded to be provided with dinner, and were referred to the best hotel in the town, where they were regaled sumptuously ; after paying the bill they declared that they would dine on the Sunday following at Besancon. The German Intendant quickly arrived in the town and demanded food for his men and horses to the tune of 6,000 fr., half to be delivered that evening and the remainder on the following morning. Owing, however, to an alarm, the troops were ordered to move that day, and the Intendant directed that the whole of the supplies demanded should be delivered that evening. Notwithstanding the compliance of the citizens with these requisitions, the soldiers insisted upon billeting themselves on the people, from whom they demanded both food and drink. He also tells us that Vesoul had to contribute 60,000 fr. towards the support of the German army chest, as the 200,000 fr. at first demanded could not be collected. The necessity for the almost entire dependence of the 14th Army Corps upon the surrounding districts is explained in the German official account of the war, which was translated by Major Clarke, R.A. :—"During the siege of Strasburg the magazine at Lampertheim was chiefly used ; this was replenished daily from Rastadt. After the capture of the fortress the newly formed 14th Corps was able to leave this

neighbourhood with its commissariat train filled with supplies, the expended stores being first replenished at Luneville. A reference to the map will show that the railway line and roads along the banks of the Rhine could not be made available by this army, owing to the continued occupation of Schlestadt and Belfort by the French garrisons ; it was consequently cut off from its frontier, unless a wide detour were made by indirect roads and railway lines. If M. Euvrard does not exaggerate the conduct of the Germans, we do not think the German press had good grounds for hurling its diatribes against the officers and men of the British army serving in South Africa. When Lord Roberts made his famous march to Pretoria, the severest punishment was meted out to any soldier caught in the act of plundering the farms *en route*. Private property had to be respected. Owing to the hurried nature of the advance on Pretoria, it was found impossible to issue more than half rations to the men and very little forage to the horses ; as a natural consequence the latter had to be left behind in large numbers. Had the country been ravaged right and left, the men would have fared better and fewer horses would have become exhausted. The honour of the British had, however, to be kept unsullied, and the men and horses had to go hungry. What other European army would have operated on similar lines ?

The French army, which had been detached under General Dupré, had been strongly reinforced and was numerically superior to the German brigade confronting it. A severe battle was fought on the 6th October between Etival and Bougency, when the French troops, who were almost untrained conscripts, made a stubborn resistance, but were defeated with a loss of nearly 2,000 killed, wounded, and prisoners. The Germans loss amounted to nearly 500, which was a sufficient indication of the nature of the resistance offered ; the French had, however, to fall back towards Besancon. M. Grenest makes some mention of this retreat. He says that " all the documents he had consulted upon the subject show that General Cambriels was frequently a prey to indecision, which is always a serious fault in a commander. Napoleon has said of such a one : " Indecision is the very worst fault in military matters." The General excused his retreat in his official report in the following terms :—" With 8,000 or 10,000 men badly armed, unequipped, almost without artillery, he had to hold a line of about 40 kiloms. from the crest of the Vosges to Remiremont. * * * On the evening of the 11th, being menaced on his left flank and being threatened by

an attack which would probably have driven him into the Vosges. * * * He therefore executed a movement towards his rear which brought his army around Besancon." M. Lohlein gives the following particulars in regard to the German communications at this particular epoch :—"Now, since the communications of the corps through Blainville were too confused, the reconstruction of the railway, which had been made useless by the demolition of several of the bridges, and on which a perfect communication with Blainville depends, was taken in hand at once, and in the meantime, a provisional line by road was opened with Luneville. It was the opinion of the Corps Commander that this communication with the main line, on this side of the general Government, must be secured before the march westward could be prosecuted." He goes on to say that the supply of material from the rear was very slow and difficult, owing to the want of railway communication :—"The advance of the 14th Army Corps was a difficult one ; the land on each side of the roads had become so soft from the continued rain that it could not be marched on, and the removal of the barricades on roads and bridges, some of which were skilfully constructed, and the filling up of the cuttings and the clearing away of the abatis, took an extraordinarily long time, owing to the slushy state of the ground." It will be seen, therefore, that the German advance had to be made with a considerable amount of caution and deliberation.

In the meantime, through the exertions of M. Bordone, a medical man, who had seen some service with Garibaldi, that commander's services had been secured by the sorely stricken French Government. It was at first proposed to give Garibaldi the command of the whole of the French forces being concentrated in the east, but the opposition manifested by both officers and men to such an arrangement caused the authorities to modify their intentions, and Garibaldi was directed to collect an army of home and foreign volunteers at Dôle ; he was also to place himself in communication with General Cambriels with a view to the combined action of their respective armies. In compliance with his instructions Garibaldi hastened to communicate with Cambriels, whom he met at Saint Claude on the 16th October, when it was arranged that the Garibaldian army should co-operate with the army of the east and should threaten the right flank of the German army in its advance. However, Garibaldi's army was only in course of formation, and at the moment no aid could be expected from that quarter. The

personnel of that army would not have needed any very serious training, as the majority of the men had already seen some service in the field; they consisted mainly of Franc-tireurs and Gardes Mobiles, with the addition of some 3,000 Italians and a few Spaniards, as well as waifs and strays from almost every nation under the sun. The officers were generally adventurers from all quarters of the globe, many of whom had already seen active service. From such an incongruous lot not much assistance could be looked for in combating such good soldiers as those of Germany; however, the fact of the existence of such an army on his right flank caused General von Werder some uneasiness, and a cavalry brigade was detached to reconnoitre in the direction of Dôle. The main army continued its advance towards the River Ognon, where the Germans gained a decisive victory on the 22nd, driving the French army into Besancon, where considerable reserves of provisions and forage had been accumulated. Cambriels had lost all faith in his army and determined to act on the defensive under the walls of that fortress, but in consequence of his old wound he deemed it necessary to request that he might be relieved from the command. General Michel was therefore sent to take the command of the army on the 2nd November. The supply duties appear to have been performed in a satisfactory manner by the French Intendance, for we hear very little about them. The troops in front would have lived to a great extent upon the surrounding districts as well as on what had to be sent from the supply dépôt at Besancon, and that place would have had its stocks replenished by the lines of railway which kept it in touch with Southern France and Switzerland.

M. Lohlein keeps us well informed as to the provisioning of the German army:—"It was found to be the best plan, both as regards discipline and the uniform feeding of the troops, to make requisitions and then to regularly distribute the supplies so obtained; no supplies were obtained from innkeepers: wherever troops were stationary, even for small bodies, it was found best to require the people to deliver on our demand sheets, which were made out in proportion to the population of the place. This arrangement was much liked by the men as it entailed less work. The supplies had, however, to be generally brought on by detachments, as the heads of the Communes could not, for fear of the consequences, allow them to be carried off without a show of compulsion. For the same reason the orders for delivery on immediate payment gave no result. The independent provision of food for the troops acted throughout excellently,

and its value was increased by divisions of bakers and slaughterers being formed out of the troops. The supply of the 14th Army Corps was, therefore, well managed, and the sick men also were well looked after." It is obvious that the German Intendantur at that period showed great consideration to the people of the districts in which the army was then operating, and that payments in money were made as far as was practicable. The Intendantur was no doubt guided to some extent by orders dictated from high quarters, where it was not lost sight of that the despoiled peasantry would shortly become German citizens. But it is certain that both the Generals and the officers of the Intendantur were given a perfectly free hand and were not trammelled by any restrictions, as a general rule, excepting those which could not be avoided. In forming any orders or instructions for the government of operations in the field, the fact should never be lost sight of that those on the spot, who are engaged in the work, are the most capable of judging what is best under the existing circumstances.

The 14th Army Corps, although victorious in its engagements with the French, was in a sufficiently dangerous situation. To its front was a large army concentrated under the guns of Besancon, on its left flank were the fortresses of Belfort, Neu Breisach, and Schlettstadt, and on its right flank were the fortresses of Dijon and Auxonne, where was the large army of Garibaldi, then approaching completion. General Werder therefore determined to retire upon Vesoul, and to send a division under General Beyer to attack and carry Dijon. This walled city was carried after some rather severe fighting in which both the French and Germans suffered considerable losses. Negotiations were opened between the city authorities and the General, the town being surrendered on the following day. The following were the principal terms:—"The town was to pay 500,000 fr. as a guarantee, to be returned if the peace remained undisturbed. Private persons and their property were to be respected. The city engaged to feed and maintain an army of 20,000 Germans and to supply any other needs of the army. It was agreed that only the Intendants should sign the requisitions made upon the town." The German troops in this part of France were virtually living upon the French inhabitants—the terms of the capitulation point conclusively to that fact—but this state of affairs could not be continued indefinitely as the country was beginning to feel the serious drains made upon it, not only by the forces of the enemy but by their own troops as well. Capt. Lohlein tells us that in

the neighbourhood of Belfort "the supplies in this naturally poor district, already exhausted by the fortress, were very inadequate, and necessitated the sending out of large detachments for requisitioning." A strong garrison was left in Dijon, the remainder of the army being sent on to Vesoul, where the German commander considered he could better observe the movements of the several French armies concentrating around him. About this period the German forces would commence to derive some benefit from the large dépôt which had been concentrated at Metz after its fall on the 28th October, as well as from the dépôts formed at Haguenau, Strasburg, Nancy, and Thionville, all these places being in direct railway communication with Germany. The railway lines were held by the Etappen troops of the Governments of Alsace and Lorraine, whose headquarters were then at Haguenau and Nancy, and there is no doubt that, at this period, the railway line through Epinal to Vesoul could always be depended upon for the transportation of troops, equipments, stores, and supplies from the rear. The same cannot be said of the line passing through Langres, then held by a French garrison, where the Germans would have been exposed to attack both by detached troops and Franc-tireurs. Consequently the army serving under the command of General Werder, although victorious in its encounters with the enemy, was situated somewhat awkwardly in regard both to communications and supplies.

One of the principal objects of the advance of the 14th Army Corps was to cover the troops employed in besieging Belfort, which was still being tenaciously defended by the heroic French garrison. General Werder's efforts had also to be directed towards the cutting off of the communications by rail, which had hitherto been kept open by the garrison at Besancon, and upon which that fortress depended for its supplies and ammunition. Another danger was confronting General Werder's army: a strong French division, which had been organised in Southern France, had taken the field under General Cremer and was threatening the right flank of the German army, was then on the march to relieve Dijon. To counteract this movement General Zastrow was detached with a division and arrived at Auxerre on the 20th December. In the meantime General Werder had encountered the army of Cremer at Nuits on the 16th, when, after a stubbornly fought and sanguinary battle, the French troops were forced to retire. It would be out of place to follow closely the movement of the German forces which became necessary in order that the lines of communication should be

maintained, and that a connection should be made between the armies commanded by Prince Frederick Charles and General von Werder, although those movements were intimately connected with the supply of the German army of the south. The strategy is too complicated to admit of proper treatment except from the pen of an expert.

The heavy marches of the German forces were undertaken during the most inclement season of the year, when the roads were converted into slush by the snow-water and were rendered almost impassable for wheeled vehicles. The marchings and counter-marchings were of daily occurrence at this epoch, and the Germans were threatened by attacks from almost every quarter. The utmost efforts were being put forward by the French for the recapture of Dijon, and for the relief of the besieged fortresses of Belfort and Besancon, so that the Germans had ample occupation for the moment.

It will be remembered that General Bourbaki left the northern French army towards the end of November and proceeded to Nevers, where he was entrusted with the formation of the 12th Army Corps. About the middle of December this corps had attained considerable proportions through the untiring exertions of M. Gambetta and General Bourbaki, and by the end of that month it was almost fit to take the field. Werder was then on the point of being confronted by another formidable force. We cannot do better than quote the words of a French author, M. Jaluy, who says :—" It was at the end of December that the army of the east concentrated between Chalon and Chagny. The fatigues, the privations, and the sufferings of every description had crushed these men, who had already taken part in many of the battles recently fought on the Loire. However, in marching through the less devastated district of the River Saone, food was found to be more abundant and the strength of many of the men was re-established. The equipment of the men was very defective, and was not equal to the requirements of an army undertaking a campaign at such an inclement season of the year. Their shoes were worn out and were quite unfit to march through the snow and slush. Their clothing was also in very sad plight. The heaviest misfortune to the men was that the command of the army was given to General Bourbaki. Chivalrous and sympathetic, he was the incarnation of the valour of our old army, but he had not the scientific knowledge, possessed by many of our Generals, which was so necessary in waging war against such troops as those of Germany. He was admirably adapted for the command

of a division or a brigade." The French authorities cannot be blamed for making a foolish selection, they were forced to accept almost any General officer who tendered his services. The fault lay in promoting an incompetent officer to such high rank, if M. Jaluy be correct in his estimate of the General. Others have blundered in similar fashion both before and since.

It will be seen, therefore, that the French were putting forth extraordinary efforts in order to crush the German forces operating in the east, and it became of urgent necessity that those forces should be well supported, otherwise there was the probability of the release of 20,000 seasoned troops at Belfort and Besancon, which would have been followed by an attack on the German lines of communication. Although these lines did not extend for more than 400 miles, they were liable to attack from any and every quarter as they passed through a country whose whole population was antagonistic, and burning to avenge its wrongs. It therefore became imperative that these should have adequate protection, otherwise the siege of Paris must have been raised. The enormously long lines of communication which have to be protected by Russia in her war with the Japanese, which count by thousands of miles as compared with the German hundreds, has precipitated a situation before which the very bravest may quail. The solution of this complicated problem will discover more than has ever been known before in regard to lines of communication. At the time of writing the Manchurian line has been cut at various points by the Japanese armies operating upon the Liaotung peninsula, which has resulted in the complete isolation of Port Arthur. The Japanese commanders have evidently profited by a close study of the operations carried out during the progress of the Franco-German war.

CHAPTER XXI.

GARIBALDI AIDS FRANCE IN HER EXTREMITY.

The advent of Garibaldi had given renewed hope to the French nation—on his arrival at Marseilles he was hailed as the saviour of the country, so readily did the populace catch at every straw of hope which might be wafted in their direction. Certainly Garibaldi had gained a high reputation as a brave and competent commander, but he was then an old man and was much impaired physically by severe attacks of rheumatic gout, and was unable to keep the saddle for any length of time. His energies were seriously undermined and he became the prey of a very unscrupulous person, the chief of his staff, who was a capable man but not much of a soldier. As has already been stated, he was either a doctor of medicine or a chemist, and had no sufficient training to fit him for such a position with an army numbering some 20,000 men. Garibaldi was completely in the hands of this adventurer, who was accorded the rank of colonel on the staff, although it was well known that he had been imprisoned for two months on conviction of swindling, and had been fined for other minor offences, yet the General felt he could not manage his command without the assistance of so able an assistant. M. Bordone did not fail to take advantage of the reliance placed upon him by his commander; and those officers attached to the staff, who were not in accord with Bordone, were got rid of on one pretext or another, the result being that the whole control of the army fell into the hands of this single individual, and that rapacious adventurer did not fail to make the most of his opportunities. In his life of Garibaldi, J. T. Bent tells us "that Bordone was convicted several times for disregarding *meum et tuum*, and had paid several fines imposed by the courts previously, and numerous journals," he adds, "tell us that before the war he was only a poor chemist at Avignon, but that he returned with a great deal of luggage, and from time to time gladdened the heart of his dear wife in Avignon, by sending her boxes with perquisites he had made during

the campaign—much of the robbery and pillage having been done by his avaricious subordinates, without the General's knowledge." In this man we have an instance of how much harm can be wrought by one dishonest and grasping individual, particularly if he should occupy a prominent position, with an army in the field; the men are apt to follow any lead given by their officers, which was the case in this particular instance, as will be demonstrated further on.

M. Gambetta rendered Garibaldi every possible assistance in the organisation of his army, and gave him money credits on the prefect at Lyons and on other officials. The prefect at Dôle was directed to provide horses and wagons for the transportation of supplies and equipments. Staff officers were appointed, amongst others Colonel Frapolli, and M. de Baillehache as Intendant, both these officers were objected to by Bordone from the outset, and he did not rest till he had got rid of both of them on one pretext or another. Bordone, in his *L'Armée des Vosges*, quotes the reply of the War Minister to a complaint made by Garibaldi, which indicated that much friction occurred from the very commencement. It was as follows:—"In regard to the difficulties experienced by you with the Intendants and town commandants, instructions have been sent them to facilitate all your operations; as to the funds which you have had to disburse or owe for the purchase of the necessary provisions, orders have been given to the paymasters in the Jura, the Intendants at Besancon, and to the commissioners and Sous-Intendants at Lons-le-Saunier, to pay the expenses sanctioned by you upon your personal signature." There was great apparent need for caution in sanctioning expenditure for the army of the Vosges. M. Theyras tells us "that corruption reigned amongst the staff and senior officers; a brigadier is said to have regaled himself with the best cigars, chateau-lafite, chateau-margaux, sweets, syrups, punch, cakes, partridges, snipe, hares, chickens, &c., besides treating himself to all kinds of clothing, which he did not hesitate to pay for out of the public funds entrusted to him for other purposes." Nor does he appear to have thought much of either of Garibaldi's sons, who were appointed to the command of two of the brigades. The prefect at Lyons, he says, did not hesitate to inform Gambetta that he considered he was surrounded by persons unworthy to be trusted, and that he had, up to the 11th November, paid no less than 300,000 fr. for Garibaldi's army, and that he declined to make any further payments without fresh orders from the Govern-

ment. The situation was disgraceful to the General as well as to his *entourage*.

The organisation of the army of the Vosges under the leadership of Garibaldi constitutes an object lesson to the organisers of the future, and may warn them as to some of the dangers by which they may be surrounded. Such an occasion affords ample opportunity to the dishonest to look after their own interests, and the opportunity was not neglected. A number of improper appointments were made to fill most important positions in that army, which resulted from the employment of undue influence, and was used without any regard to the duty owed to the country and her soldiery. We will quote a few of these by way of illustration :—M. Delpech, who was a merchant, was given command of a brigade by Challemeil-Lacour, and although M. Gambetta was aware of his inability to fill such a position, he did not venture to displace him for fear of displeasing the prefect of Lyons. Two sons of Garibaldi were given brigade commands. From various accounts they do not seem to have had any special qualifications for such important positions—only upon one occasion did one of the sons, Ricciotti, manifest any real military ability; they appear to have given themselves up to self-indulgence, as was the case with most of the officers holding commands in that army. Then there was the case of Colonel Bordone, who, although disqualified both in acquirements and character, was retained in his position by Garibaldi, despite the protests of Gambetta and others, for the simple reason that he was a useful man. As a matter of fact, Bordone had made himself so useful to his chief that his services could not easily be dispensed with. This no doubt resulted from the physical and possibly mental decay under which the General was then suffering. M. d'Avesne tells us that "the foreign officers surrounding Garibaldi seemed to have no higher ambition than to don the showy uniforms of their various corps." He adds that Admiral Fourichon gave it out that he considered it a great scandal that adventurers were called in to aid France. It is therefore apparent that the foreign officers of the army of the Vosges, with few exceptions, consisted of self-seekers, who had invaded the country in order to further their own ends, and without any intention of sacrificing themselves for the good of a land which was not their own. It was of course different with the officers of the irregular French troops who constituted the greater part of that army, but they were no doubt hampered by being under the command of incompetent officers and had very little opportunity for the display of patriotism.

We have had a somewhat similar experience when we employed, during the Boer War of 1880-81, a large number of adventurers who were engaged to augment the scanty cadres of the British supply and transport. A very large number of these proved themselves either dishonest, drunken or incompetent, and the country lost thousands of pounds as a result of their employment. In the last Boer war Mr. Kruger fell into a similar error and suffered equally with ourselves. Dishonesty was then rampant amongst the Government employes in the Transvaal, and Mr. Kruger did not mend matters, when dire times overtook him, by carrying off the greater part of the cash which could be collected from the Transvaal treasury, when he so suddenly took to flight and left the public debts behind him.

The men of this army appear to have been collected, trained, and equipped in a very half-hearted fashion, if we are to credit the statements of writers on the subject. M. Vuilletet tells us that some 900 Italians were detained at Lyons for a period of six weeks for no apparent reason, and that during that time they gave themselves up to every kind of excess, so much so that the prefect asked that they might be removed from the city. Mr. Bent gives some account of the assembly of these men at Dôle, which was the headquarters of the army :—" Veritable beggars passed into the town, most of them with a view to getting uniforms, which were duly provided for them by Garibaldi at the expense of the town. The chapel of the Communal College of Arc was given them as a barrack, and a horrid mess they made of it, dirtying the confessionals, and piercing the pictures with their swords, and here began that system of pillaging the churches and desecrating everything they came across, which was the great disgrace of Garibaldi's troops in this campaign." Numbers of irregular corps were directed to concentrate at Dôle, where they were to join Garibaldi's army. M. Bordone complains that "the civil and military authorities were not inclined to help Garibaldi, and after having quickly wasted his resources as well as their own, he was forced, in order to meet the exigencies of the case, to telegraph to his home at Avignon for 2,500 fr., pending the arrival of Gambetta and the opening of the necessary credits for the organisation and maintenance of the army in course of formation." Further on he expresses the opinion that M. Gambetta would have cause to regret that he had not placed more confidence in the military talents of Garibaldi and in the good intentions of the superior officers of that army. The fault really lay in the negligent utilisation of the army thus placed under the command

of Garibaldi. M. Bordone may have desired to do his duty as a Frenchman, but his avarice overcame his patriotism, and he eventually fell from his high position. Three brigades were at first formed, but a fourth was added under the command of Ricciotti Garibaldi. The absence of enthusiasm on the part of the officers and men of which this army was composed, was probably due to the absence of that virtue in the commander, who evinced no strong leaning towards the French people. Indeed, in his address to the army he merely referred to the French cause as being the same which actuated all downtrodden people ; what they were fighting for was the cause of universal liberty. The soldiery took him too literally and plundered mercilessly whenever they got the opportunity.

One of the peculiar features for which the army of the Vosges made itself remarkable was the employment of large numbers of women as officers, non-commissioned officers, and soldiers. They were not content to enroll a large number of vivandiers, but other women were permitted to take service in other grades. We have nothing to say against the employment of vivandiers in the field, who have so often rendered timely help to the wounded, but we incline to the belief that their employment otherwise, except as nurses, tends to indiscipline and perhaps to something worse. In some instances the officer commanding a corps or battalion employed his wife as his adjutant, in others some of the company officers or non-commissioned officers were women whose husbands or lovers were serving with them ; and in many cases the spirit of adventure or pure patriotism impelled others to join the colours. It is stated that an Italian countess of exceptional beauty took service as an officer in one of the corps. These women did not hesitate to don similar uniforms to those worn by the men ; if there was any difference it was in the external adornments, which were, in some cases, lavishly employed. We cannot do better than quote the comments made by one of their own countrymen on witnessing the entry of the army into Autun on the 16th December. M. Garnier wrote as follows :—" We were as much surprised as shocked at the appearance of the army of the Vosges. There was a profusion of gold lace on the uniforms of the officers, the women being in every variety of uniform : the cantinière, pretty and festive, like those of the comic operas ; the hospital nurses more serious but none the less attractive ; the female officer, whose tight-fitting costume displayed her figure to advantage, took care that her uniform carried more lace than her friend—her words of command were given briskly and were obeyed with alacrity."

If women are ever to be employed in defending their country when threatened by invasion, it is suggested that they should be enrolled in Amazonian regiments, which should be used solely for the defence of fortified towns. Women are frequently quite as brave as men, they have greater powers of endurance, their sight is as good, their intelligence is proverbial, and their patriotism is beyond question. There is consequently no reason why they should not make an excellent reserve, which might be employed in defending fortifications, and perhaps on coastguard ships. There does not appear to be any reason why middle-aged women, if trained physically and tactically, should not be constituted into an excellent reserve force for home defence in case of any national emergency. If this idea were capable of being brought into operation, there would not be so many useless mouths to fill in time of war. We know of no women who are so capable of performing hard work as the French. The female agriculturalist in France is well known and highly reputed for her enormous capacity for work. The fish-wives on the seaboard are quite as hardworking and are equally robust. Such women, if trained to the use of arms, would give an excellent exhibition of endurance, of courage, and we believe of capacity for fighting. There would always be the advantage to the defence of being able to draw upon such reserves, which could never be employed upon offensive operations by those engaged in the attack.

The brigades had no sooner commenced to assume some appearance of cohesion than it was determined early in November to concentrate them some fifty miles further to the westward at Autun, where they would be more in touch with the large army Bourbaki was organising at Nevers, some forty miles further west. It is probable than Garibaldi's army could be fed more easily at Autun, as the armies of Michel and of Cremer had had to draw their supplies from the Dijon district. There was probably another reason for the withdrawal of that army—the capture of Dijon had enabled the enemy to threaten the left flank of the Garibaldians. During its stay at Autun, we are told by M. d'Avesne that:—"The army of the Vosges gave itself over to all kinds of depredations." The following despatches show that he took no steps to remedy the situation. "The conduct of Bordone at Autun," wrote Challemeil-Lacour on the 5th December to the Minister of War, "is the complaint of all, a source of discouragement, a source of danger. He should be brought before a council of war. You should know better than I do, but from what I know it is a scandal to maintain such a

chief of the staff. Garibaldi is blind, you are not. Is there no means of dispensing with Bordone's services without wounding Garibaldi? In any case all must give way to public safety." In reply Gambetta expressed his inability to remove an officer so highly valued by his chief, and recommended Challemelet to seek to influence Garibaldi directly to rid himself of that officer. The very highest appear to have evaded their duty in this instance. M. Theyras complained of Bordone's treatment of the inhabitants of Autun, who were pillaged outrageously and often imprisoned. Armed men stole meat, wine, tobacco, and other things from the shops and private houses, without the sanction of any requisition. Officers had to make a show of interference, but the men escaped without punishment. Mr. Bent gives us some particulars of the outrages committed:—"Autun was a perfect hotbed of priests, containing nine convents and countless churches, and Garibaldi had taken advantage of this state of affairs to turn them all into barracks." The *Daily News* correspondent tells us how he found the cathedral occupied by 350 Franc-tireurs, one of whom was smoking his pipe and reading the *Petit Journal* upon the high altar. And then there was the pillaging of the archbishop's palace—a most disgraceful affair, certainly undertaken without Garibaldi's orders, but nevertheless giving opportunity to the clergy for abusing him mercilessly.

We are led to the conclusion that Bordone's efforts to rid himself of Colonel Frapolli and M. de Baillehache, the Intendant of the army, were made with the object of obtaining more perfect freedom of action without incurring the danger of being thwarted in his designs by men actuated by honesty of purpose. Colonel Frapolli, who was on the general staff, seems to have been got rid of without much difficulty, his capacity having been questioned by Bordone. He complained to Gambetta of the way in which he had been treated, and that statesman at first felt very much disposed to replace Bordone by Frapolli, but he deferred to Garibaldi's preference for the former and gave the latter an appointment with another army. M. de Baillehache was not ousted quite so easily—Bordone could not manage to bring any serious charges against that officer. He wrote of him:—"The so-called Intendant was forced upon us, that M. de Baillehache, the gift of M. Crémieux, despite our prayers and objections, who continued to travel between Lyons and Chambéry, under the pretext of helping in the organisation and of procuring arms and *matériel*, which never reached us; we had, however, no one to take his place, and we asked the Minister to replace him,

without result ; the divisional Intendants also were applied to without success, they were unable to spare any officers." In another letter Bordone complained of the fancy uniform in which de Baillehache made his début at Dôle. He seems to have been badly received by Garibaldi, and at once left for Lyons without taking leave of his chief. The start could not have been worse—de Baillehache had evidently been gratuitously affronted both by Garibaldi and Bordone, and had taken himself off in disgust to Lyons, where he might be able to do something in aid of the army of the Vosges without subjecting himself to affront. Garibaldi had no doubt been influenced by Bordone in contracting a dislike for the Intendant. The Intendant may have been imprudent as to uniform, but he seems to have worked hard and to have been honest, otherwise Bordone would assuredly have brought more weighty charges against him. He managed later on to oust de Baillehache and to replace him by appointing a Captain Foulc, who was evidently a man of less experience. The results were eminently unsatisfactory, for the army was very indifferently supplied, although it was kept stationary for the major part of that campaign. The Count de Ségur tells us that M. de Baillehache wished to employ the resources of Lyons and was obliged to place himself in communication with the local committee, but as it declined to have anything to do with Bordone, his efforts were rendered abortive. True to his chief, de Baillehache, with the concurrence of the president of the committee, exerted himself to secure the suppression of that body.

There is not much information in regard to the work performed by Captain Foulc, whose tenure of office does not appear to have lasted for any long period. A communication sent by him to Bordone at Lyons early in November throws some light upon his work. It ran as follows :—"It is impossible to execute your orders without the support of the military intendance, which refuses to recognise any arrangements but those made by de Baillehache ; equipments difficult and slow ; rifles are entirely wanting ; numbers of recognised officers are still unpaid. Please give me precise instructions, and at the same time place me in a position to carry them out promptly ; the complete organisation of Deplace's battalion will require at the least ten or fifteen days ; kindly give me detailed directions as to the horses, mules, and transport." The displacement of de Baillehache had not been tamely accepted by his subordinate staff. Notification was sent to the various authorities concerned to the effect that

de Baillehache had ceased to act as the Intendant of the army of the Vosges, and a special despatch was sent to the Minister of War by Garibaldi requesting that de Baillehache should be sent to Dôle to render his accounts. He added, "this must be done; it is very important." We learn from Count de Ségur that de Baillehache's expenditure to the extent of 212,000 fr. was passed by the examiners, excepting 8,600 fr., which were expended in such things as aiguillettes, gold lace, military boots for officers, hotel bills, and other unauthorised payments. The unauthorised payments were no doubt made by order of the Chief of Staff, for which the Intendant could not have been held responsible. M. de Baillehache seems to have been an honest man who had fallen among thieves; he was first plucked and then turned out of doors with a somewhat tarnished character, which would have been entirely due to his unfortunate association with themselves.

The Intendance of the army of the Vosges then fell into the hands of M. Baumes, who appears to have succeeded fairly well in his efforts to feed, transport, and pay the Garibaldians; there does not, however, seem to have been any attempt made to spare the public purse, as the expenditure was on an exceedingly lavish scale. M. Marias says:—"What was needed with the army of the Vosges was an Intendance. M. Baumes, the sous-intendant, whose intelligent assiduity was destined to render the greatest service, did not arrive at Autun for ten days after the army had got there. However, it was necessary to feed that army, secure the transportation of its munitions and of its magazines, and to face all the exigencies of a very complicated service. The reactionary party increased the weight of Garibaldi's responsibilities by casting every obstacle in his way, but requisitions were all powerful. Autun and its environs were not rich in produce, horses, or vehicles. The responsible officers did not, however, recognise this fact, and the drain was too heavy to be met by the actual resources of the district. At length it became necessary to append the following note to each requisition: "In case M. — objects to the present requisition, he will be punished in accordance with military law with a fine of from 250 to 300 fr." This wretched system left nothing to the unfortunate inhabitants, neither men, arms, nor military necessities. The poor young soldiers were for the most part badly clothed, and suffered greatly owing to the inclemency of the season of 1870. As severe drought had caused the grass to take fire, and forage had become very scarce, so much so that even straw was dear, and could hardly be procured in sufficient quan-

tities for the bedding of the soldiery." According to M. d'Avesne the condition of affairs had improved with the New Year. He states:—"The Intendant Baumes wrote that the expenditure for supplies in January rose to 2,100,000 fr. The army wanted nothing, not even tobacco." M. Vuilletet tells us that the expenditure at this epoch was of the most wasteful description. He mentions that a sous-intendant insisted upon being provided with silver buttons for his uniforms at the cost of the State, and that lace and bullion in large quantities were included in many of the accounts paid out of public funds. The pay of the Garibaldians was also left in great measure to caprice. M. d'Avesne, says an officer, styling himself a commandant, drew the absurd rate of 17 fr. a day. He had under his command twenty-four officers and non-commissioned officers, and only about eighty-three soldiers, but he pretended that he had three thousand. And the men of the Spanish legion drew as follows:—Cavalry 1·90 fr. a day, infantry 1·80 fr., but the Gardes Mobiles received only 1·50 fr. a day. There was evidently something very rotten in the organisation of the Garibaldian army.

Such extravagant expenditure was encouraged by the Chief of the Staff at least, for M. d'Avesne tells us that when the supply of cigars became exhausted on the 5th November, he sent the following telegram to Tours:—"Smoking tobacco is expended, and the troops suffer for the want of it. Despite the repeated requisitions on Lyons we have received none." He further informs us that when the Vengeurs were ordered to march against the enemy, Bordone escaped to Switzerland, taking with him 45,000 fr., all that remained of the public funds entrusted to him. He adds that he was convicted at the end of the war and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. M. de Ségurs also informs us that enormous frauds were perpetrated against the Government in the purchases made for the army of the Vosges: "The purchase of camp equipment was made the occasion for extracting three times its value from the State. The supply of provisions was another mine of gold for others; oxen, cows, sheep, corn, and forage, stolen from the peasantry or purchased at disgracefully low rates in the name of the Intendance, were charged for at three or four times their actual cost. Brevets were sold openly by the Staff." In conclusion it should be stated that not a breath of suspicion touched the fair fame of Garibaldi's character. He may have been weak in surrounding himself with such subordinates, but he neither participated in their disgraceful proceedings nor does he appear to have had any idea that such villainy was on foot.

CHAPTER XXII.

GARIBALDIAN MOVEMENTS.

The army of the Vosges did not accomplish very much in the field, but its organisation gives much food for reflection, and conveys a warning to the organisers of the future how such undertakings should not be attempted. One of the first serious operations undertaken by Garibaldi was his advance upon Dijon from Lantenay on the 26th November, which he attempted to enter by its eastern gate. General Degenfeld fell back upon Daix and Talant as the Garibaldians advanced; according to the German account he fell back in good order, but Bordone says that the Germans retired precipitately and in disorder. Garibaldi's army does not appear to have been very well off for supplies in that attempt, as Bordone gives us the following information in his book:—"The weather was cold, a fine penetrating rain was falling, and the village of Prénois, like all those in the environs of Dijon, was so exhausted by the heavy drain already made upon its resources by the German troops, that it was impossible to procure any supplies in that village." He informs us that after being thirteen hours in the saddle Garibaldi seized a small carriage and continued his advance upon Dijon; but, encountering the enemy at Daix, Garibaldi claims that his men drove the enemy back with their bayonets, and afterwards retired to their cantonments. Further on Bordone refers to the rout of the troops which prevented their holding the position of Lantenay; therefore the statement made by some Frenchmen that Garibaldi was the only General who was never defeated during the war is inaccurate. General Ambert confirms this view in his book on the war:—"It was proposed to attack Dijon by the Ouche suburb. For the first time since his arrival in France Garibaldi desired to remount his horse, but the animal laid down and nearly crushed the hero. Having been again put into the saddle, the horse was led by the reins. A small vehicle was, however, found on nearing the town, into which the General

was transferred. The scouts having reported no enemy in front, Garibaldi rose and said :—‘ Go on my children, advance with the bayonet, not a shot is to be fired.’ The men broke into song as they advanced, notwithstanding that it is usual to maintain silence when it is desired to surprise the enemy, but that was not taken into account by the General. The head of the column was 5 kiloms. from the gates of the city when a halt was called, and an unexpected fusilade speedily put the Garibaldians to flight. A panic had seized them and they fired upon one another in their terrible demoralisation, which extended over a distance of 28 kiloms., until the heights of Sombernon were reached. These strangers, filibusterers of all countries, without discipline, without courage, were a great embarrassment to the General.” We incline to the belief that Ambert was somewhat harsh upon Garibaldi and upon his troops, who were mostly French.

The only really successful piece of work done by the Garibaldians was accomplished by Ricciotti Garibaldi when he was detached to attack the German line of communication at Chatillon, which was really the principal object that de Freycinet and Gambetta had in view in concentrating an army of irregular troops at Dôle under Garibaldi, and it was evidently not owing to the want of urging on their part, that more frequent attacks were not made upon the German lines of communication between the army investing Paris and the frontier. Volunteers were called for to undertake this enterprise, and it does not reflect much credit upon the foreign troops that none but Frenchmen offered their services to the Italian commander. M. Grenest, in his *L'Armée de l'Est*, gives us a full and interesting account of this small though brilliant expedition. The force was composed of about 600 volunteers with a few mounted men to act as scouts. Ricciotti explained to the men that they would have to encounter serious dangers, that they would have to march at night and would bivouac in the open air, that they would be badly fed and would sleep very little, but that the love of their country would give them strength to endure all such privations. This small but intrepid band was to attack a force of Landwehr of nearly double its strength—Chatillon-sur-Seine being defended by about 1,000 infantry and a few cavalry. The march was commenced on the 14th November and completed on the 18th, a distance of 110 kiloms. having been covered within little more than four days, giving an average of about 25 kiloms. a day. An advance was made from the bivouac at midnight and an

attack was delivered at 5 a.m. The Germans were taken greatly by surprise, and, after contesting the attack street by street and house by house for an hour and a half, were forced to retire in the direction of Chaumont. The losses of the French are stated to have been only six killed and ten wounded, whereas those of the Germans amounted to some 196, of which 167 were prisoners; some horses and wagons were also captured, which showed how hasty was the German retirement. Ricciotti was, however, forced to evacuate the place at once as the enemy was certain to bring up reinforcements. On the return of the detachment Garibaldi embraced his son with much fervour, and thanked him and his men for the signal services rendered to the country. Had there been a little more such enterprise in the French armies of the east, the Germans would have found the dangers threatening their lines of communication considerably increased; their fears rested mainly upon the ubiquitous Franc-tireurs who were constantly on the lookout to capture or destroy as opportunity offered. As it was, the Germans were much disturbed by this new enterprise against their lines of communication, and Keller's division, which was pursuing Garibaldi's defeated army, had to be recalled.

So great was the injury inflicted upon small detachments, convoys, and lines of railway by the Franc-tireurs, particularly by those of Alsace and Lorraine, that the German officers frequently refused to grant these irregular troops any quarter, and this is not surprising, as it was the practice of these men to disguise themselves as harmless peasants after having attacked the German forces. The German commanders insisted that they should wear a uniform, otherwise they would be treated as spies and shot. As uniforms could not be found for large numbers of the regular troops, it was not likely that they could be provided for any considerable number of the Franc-tireurs. Probably the Germans may have insisted upon a distinctive uniform in order to reduce the number of such irregular forces, knowing as they did, that uniforms could not be provided in any large quantities. The Germans are accused by many French authors of having been exceedingly brutal in their treatment of some of the Franc-tireur prisoners, but even if that statement be true, there is no doubt that they were very seriously provoked by the actions of such men, who were under no sufficient military control to check what would have been condemned in regular troops.

A very pathetic story is related by an eye-witness, which, if true, would cast a sidelight upon this question:—In a village

of Lorraine there lived before the outbreak of the war a village maid, who fell in love with a German lieutenant who had come to the village to study French. When war was declared the officer returned to his duty, and the heroic girl quickly inspired some of the men of her village with her martial ardour, and she took to the field with twenty-five followers; this number was soon augmented to 100, who served under her brilliant and successful command. She was known as the Maid of Alsace, and soon became remarkable for her dashing exploits and for the harm done to the invaders by her daring and ubiquitous corps. So great a terror was she to isolated detachments, that the German commanders gave orders that she should be shot so soon as her capture was effected. The lieutenant, being quite unaware of her identity, had undertaken to capture or destroy her and her corps. After some very severe fighting and heavy losses this was accomplished, and her death-warrant was signed. On seeing her lover, just before her execution, she discovered herself to him when it was too late to save her life. As the firing party was preparing to carry out the dread sentence, an officer was seen to break through the surrounding crowd, and, rushing towards the prisoner, caught her in his arms. The order to fire had been given, and the lovers lay on the ground in the last embrace of death.

From this episode we can form our own conclusions as to the extent to which the patience of the German authorities was tried. The French inhabitants evidently took advantage of every opportunity to cripple the lines of communication of the enemy, and to capture, destroy, or damage convoys of supplies on the march to the German armies. And what rendered such attacks so much the less dangerous to the French peasantry was the fact that they had no sooner been delivered when the combatants disguised themselves as law-abiding agriculturalists. Actions of this kind are not warranted under any circumstances as they give one belligerent an unfair advantage over the other; and the only way to suppress such deeds is to mete out the severest punishment to those caught participating in them. The Germans had not to complain of any of the French peasantry or regulars donning German uniforms, as was the case with the Boers in their war against us in South Africa. And yet the German press and people denounced our methods in striving to put a stop to such unfair methods on the part of the Boers. We do not think there is the least difference between approaching an enemy with white flags flying and firing into his ranks at point-

blank range, than it would be to disguise men in similar uniforms and thus gain a close proximity to the foe and then open fire. In our opinion, nothing short of summary execution could safeguard any troops from such dastardly conduct, and we hope that in the near future death will be the irrevocable penalty for such murderous conduct.

The movements of Garibaldi's army during December were characterised by a great absence of activity, which was probably due in a great measure to the want of a properly organised commissariat. Had the army been properly provided with provisions clothing, munitions, and transport, it might have assumed a vigorous offensive, but this was impossible at so inclement a season of the year, particularly with an army composed of French volunteers and foreign mercenaries, who would naturally prefer ease and comfort to hardships, exposure, starvation, and dangerous work. The War Secretary complained on the 3rd of January of Garibaldi's inactivity in not having occupied Dijon which had been evacuated by the enemy. Garibaldi replied that he could not take his men to Dijon without overcoats; but the army nevertheless commenced its march to that fortress on the 5th and completed it on the 6th January, covering a distance of over 40 miles within two days. Garibaldi seems to have devoted his energies towards strengthening Dijon and securing its approaches. During the whole of January the army remained inactive; however, the left flank of Bourbaki's army was secured by the occupation of Dijon, but that General considered he might have been given greater help. M. d'Avesne tells us that:—"General Bourbaki stated that the inaction of Garibaldi's army was one of the causes which contributed towards the loss of the army of the east. He thought that the rear of his army was covered by the army of the Vosges, and when he found no supplies at Beaune sufficient to feed his army, he was forced to seek safety in the only direction open to him. Freycinet admitted that Garibaldi had carried out his orders which were to defend Dijon, but they were also that he should impede the passage of the enemy to the south of that fortress. But Garibaldi was ill, Bordone was absent, and there was no cohesion amongst the troops." His excuse that Bourbaki never asked for his aid is exceedingly weak, his duty was clearly to afford him every assistance possible. Here Garibaldi remained until the 26th January, when he was forced to evacuate the fortress upon the approach of a strong force of the enemy. Peace negotiations quickly followed this surrender, and Garibaldi soon afterwards presented himself

to the National Assembly then sitting at Bordeaux, where he tendered his resignation of his command, which was accepted. The Assembly does not appear to have highly appreciated the services rendered by the commander, as it was held that, had he been a Frenchman, a Court of Enquiry must have been assembled to investigate his conduct of the affairs of the army of the Vosges.

Bordone, who had obtained general's rank, followed his chief to Bordeaux, and was eventually placed under arrest. He states that the disbursements of the army during the campaign reached a total of 8,192,877 fr., which he considered very moderate, as the strength of the army aggregated 48,000 men at the end of January, and at the rate of 1 fr. a day per man would amount to about 1,500,000 fr. a month. The rate of pay quoted is much below the figures given by other writers. He did not, however, take into consideration the fact that during October and November the army averaged under 12,000 men, and in December it never exceeded 18,000. It would therefore appear that neither supplies nor stores were paid for—the former were probably requisitioned and the latter sent from the south. The weakness of his figures leads one to infer that there was something to hide behind such arguments, which did not represent the actual facts of the case. M. Bordone evidently merited the term of imprisonment to which he was condemned. He seems, however, to have manifested much energy and some devotion in the execution of the duties entrusted to him. Garibaldi wrote thus of him from Caprera:—"It is with pride that I say it, that during the short campaign we had the honour of accomplishing together, it required all my patience, all your activity and military capacity to surmount the great difficulties by which we were overwhelmed, particularly at the commencement of our organisation." And Admiral Penhoat in his "order of the day" thanked Bordone for his services rendered to the army during the war and during the disbandment. Bordone's work concludes with some rather original remarks upon the Intendance. He thinks it requires reformation, as he considers that a large share of the disasters were due to bickerings and disagreements among the departmental staff. One could hardly credit the self-sufficiency and the incapacity of these gentlemen, he wrote, who recognised no superiors, and who claimed that everything should give way to their pretensions. There were few exceptions, and these desired reforms as much as we do. He considered that they should be given the same position as was accorded the naval

department performing similar duties with the fleet. The accusations of incapacity made against M. Bordone do not appear to have been warranted, for Garibaldi certainly valued his services highly, and his energy and capacity, displayed in the organisation of the army, also clearly establish the contrary ; his book also, which was no doubt written in the vain effort to cover his peccadillos, establishes his ability as well as his grasp of his own work, and possibly that of others. He cannot be accused of having made the best use of the material which had been entrusted to him for the benefit of his sorely stricken country, but the responsibility for the wants of a sufficient initiative rested mainly upon the commander rather than upon the Chief of the Staff. We have here an instance of a man of ability, who might have been of the utmost use to his country in her distress, allowing himself to be diverted from his duty by greed and avarice. The beginnings were probably, as they usually are, small and insignificant, but they grew to large proportions and eventually overwhelmed this dishonest citizen. It is a well assured fact that there is only one way for every servant of the public to pursue, and that is the right way, any divergence therefrom is certain to recoil on the head of the offender, sooner or later.

At this epoch there were three other French armies in the field in the east besides that of Garibaldi. They consisted of the division commanded by General Cremer, which had fought Werder's troops so gallantly at Nuits on the 18th December, and which eventually became incorporated into the army of Bourbaki ; then there was the army concentrated around Besancon, then commanded by Michel, but afterwards by Crouzats. This army, after leaving 15,000 men at Besancon, moved towards the west in November, and was subsequently added to the army then being organised by Bourbaki, and constituted his 20th Corps ; then there was the army of Bourbaki, which was being organised at Bourges and Nevers. We will take into consideration some of the information in regard to the movements of the division commanded by Cremer, who had been captured at Metz, and is accused by Ludwig Lohlein of having given a pledge "not to carry arms on any future occasion against Germany," and with having afterwards disregarded it. These armies aggregated a very large number of men, without counting the large garrisons at Belfort, Besancon, and other eastern fortresses. The army of Bourbaki could not have numbered less than 100,000 men when it first took the field, and that of Cremer varied from 12,000

to 20,000, the Garibaldians being about the same strength. So that the French could not have had less than 120,000 men in the field at that period, and the Germans had not much more than half that number with which to oppose that force. However, the Germans had seasoned soldiers, and the French consisted merely of conscripts and free corps. It became imperative that if the German lines of communication were to be kept intact, larger forces would be needed for their protection. General Manteuffel, after he had managed to crush the French Army of the North, was therefore directed to take the command of the operations in the east, and was to bring a large portion of the 1st German Army with him. His operations could not be commenced much before the middle of January.

M. Ardouin-Dumazet, in his *Armée dans les Neiges*, gives us a very full account of the sufferings of Cremer's army after their defeat at Nuits. During their retreat, he says :—"The cold was very severe, not sufficiently so to harden the roads, which had been reduced to the consistency of mud by the passage of the army. Without overcoats we felt the effects of the north wind ; being without haversacks, we could carry no rations. At Villers la Faye, the first village on the route, we endeavoured to get something to eat, but the inhabitants, in fear of the German advance, had loaded up all their wagons and fled to Beaune. Seeing a house open we entered and asked for bread ; a doctor received us and told us that the mistress of the house was lying on her death bed. We decided to leave at once, when the husband of the deceased made his appearance and without saying a word gave us bread, cheese, and several bottles of wine. We felt much impressed by his kindness, but we had not been long on the road before we commenced to divide and eat the food." Another writer, Colonel Pouillet, who was on Cremer's staff, gives us some particulars of the inefficiency of the Intendance of that army. He says that "Owing to the carelessness of the Intendant at Chagny, who was charged with the feeding of the army, they were without any bread for a day ; his arrangements were simply deplorable." General Cremer lodged a protest against the way in which bread was supplied to his army. He asks :—"Is it fair that I should become responsible to my men for errors which I am powerless to prevent?" The bread was baked at Lyons and sent to him by train, and owing to the immense pressure of work, the railway officials easily made mistakes, and the bread intended for the army sometimes found its way to other stations, or it became damaged *en route*. Cremer

wished to have his army supplied on the spot, where he stated there were ample supplies to be procured for ten times their number for three months. The Intendant at Lyons refused to comply with his request to be supplied by local contractors. The Intendant seems to have been rather arbitrary, but he may have had good reasons for refusing to trust the feeding of the army to contractors, and Cremer may have been in error in supposing that he would have fared better under the arrangements proposed by himself. This is more than probable, as Cremer was only a junior Staff Captain at Metz, so that he could not have gained any great experience during so short a service. We also think it more than probable that Colonel Poulet may have blamed the Intendance for the shortcomings of the railway officials.

We have given some details of the supply methods adopted in the field by Cremer's division, then on the march to join Bourbaki, from which it seems to have been the practice for the troops to feed themselves to no inconsiderable extent. M. Dumazet, who commanded a detachment or company of Franc-tireurs, gives some particulars of the methods employed to secure supplies by these irregulars:—"Terry undertook to find rations for the company, which was cantoned between Messigny and Epagny without any; he was not used to such work, so I decided to accompany him to Ruffey. There we found an Intendant, but the country was already exhausted by his requisitions. We were forced to go on to Dijon, after having informed Commandant Merle as to our non-success. It took a whole day to find an Intendant, the store-houses, and the abattoir. Having requisitioned wagons we soon had good loads of meat, bread, coffee, sugar, and rice, but night fell before we could take the road. On the 19th January Vesoul presented a strange appearance. The streets were filled with men carrying on their shoulders boxes, casks, bags, sides of pork, goat skins, &c. We were informed that each one was making his own provision in case of a siege, and that the supplies came from the railway station. Two supply trains had arrived, and fearing that they might fall into the hands of the enemy, the Mayor and Intendant had allowed the people to help themselves to the contents of the trucks. Some of the corps were without food for thirty-six hours; the horses were without forage for three days, and had to pick up what they could on the roadsides." He also mentions that upon one occasion he could only procure 300 loaves of bread which had to last his 400 men for four days. He adds that "a sullen

anger seized upon the demoralised masses. A provision train was found at the St. Ferjeux station, and men did not hesitate to plunder the trucks, procuring supplies of pork, rice, and sugar, their example being followed by the inhabitants. The officers made no attempt to interfere with the arbitrary acts of the men." No state of affairs can be worse in any army; the enormous waste of supplies entailed by the plundering of the soldiery and civil population would in the end have worked irreparable harm to any preconceived supply arrangements, and the soldiery would eventually suffer by the relaxation of discipline. Quantities of the supplies so plundered would have found their way into unauthorised channels, whence the soldiery would receive not the slightest benefit. It is very evident that the Intendance had entirely failed in its duty; but that is not surprising when it is remembered that a very large number of the members of the original staff had been carried into Germany as prisoners, and that the department was then dependent mainly upon officers and men who had little if any knowledge of the supply and transport duties.

The French Intendance with the armies operating in the eastern theatre of war was evidently very indifferently administered. The major portion of the food and forage had to be collected and stored at Lyons, and had to be sent by road or rail to the armies in the field. The railway line was clearly not to be depended upon, and some staff officers were often too much inclined to order the shunting of supply trains in order that those containing soldiers should take precedence; they little thought that by such senseless acts they often sent forward more men to starve and to incommode the already over-taxed resources of the supply and transport. If men cannot be fed, neither can they fight. The consequence was that the ranks were filled with men lacking stamina, who were unfit either to march or fight. It is therefore the very worst policy to hurry men to the front unless it is certain that there are ample supplies for those already there, as well as for any considerable augmentations. There are always exceptions to a general rule, and perhaps the most notable exception in British military history was when Lord Roberts ordered the abandonment of the large convoy of wagons at Waterval Drift on the 15th February, 1900, when his army was pushing forward in the hope of cutting off Cronjé's retreating army. The troops were badly in want of supplies so abandoned, and it was not possible for the Army Service Corps to replace them at once from any quarter, yet Lord Roberts

would not spare the time needed to drive off the enemy—his men must move forward on half rations—Cronjé had to be caught. The result proved the wisdom of that decision. At the same time it should be borne in mind that the supply and transport are greatly hindered by such losses, and may be followed by disastrous consequences. It is therefore unfair to blame that department for subsequent failures. It is too much the fashion to condemn the supply or transport when there are any privations. What do people generally know of the convoys captured, of the losses of supplies and transports, and of the hundred and one accidents which beset the department in the field? The wisest course is not to condemn without knowing all the circumstances.

According to Ludwig Lohlein, the Germans were not much better off than were the French in this part of the country:—“The attempts of the Intendance to supply the wants of the troops by requisitions on the district had no result; even salt had to be brought up in large convoys. And now the provision trains stuck fast in the snow at or between the different stages. The want of forage was specially felt, as there were so many requisitioned carriages, divided into small trains, and used for various needs of the corps, which could not now be properly supplied. Even the horses of the commander himself only got half rations, and later on only quarter rations; the train horses got nothing but makeshifts; there was scarcely any more hay, and no straw at all. However, after being restricted for a few days, these difficulties were successfully overcome. Horses were so badly wanted that those of the ammunition trains had to work in the ambulance. The activity of the Intendance at this time deserves special acknowledgment; it was, however, admirably supported by the great care of the troop leaders, and by the increased experience in war of the troops themselves, who, with their bakers and butchers, had learned to be independent. We must here mention how large a support accrued to our careful and circumspect Intendance from voluntary private gifts. From this source also the troops were supplied with tobacco, which had not been procurable in sufficient quantities in the country itself since October.” It is evident that if the Germans suffered such great hardships with an experienced supply and transport staff, it is almost a matter for surprise that the French troops in the east did not suffer far more than they did with so inefficient an Intendance. The necessary food and forage was not procurable after it had been exhausted by the requisitions of both

armies, consequently no direct blame could be imputed when the roads were impracticable and railways not available. Had it not been for the help afforded by both officers and men to the Intendance of their respective armies, the troops must have retired in the direction of their supply bases, and the fighting must have been suspended in the eastern part of France. The Germans undoubtedly had the advantage of a better organisation, of more experienced officers, and of a better disciplined and more patient soldiery.

It must be admitted that although M. Bordone took advantage of his position to further his own ends, he at the same time rendered good service to his General, and did his utmost to bring his volunteer forces into serviceable condition. Had it not been for the energy displayed by this officer, it is impossible that the Garibaldian army would have accomplished what little it did. The extravagant expenditure so flagrantly encouraged by Bordone was certainly injurious to the efficiency of the soldiery, who very quickly take into account the impulses governing the actions of their commanding officers, and their conduct is greatly influenced by their example. Indifference, carelessness, indolence, luxuriousness in the officer breeds the same complaints in the soldier, perhaps in even more pronounced shape. In any case, the demoralisation of the men cannot be accomplished more effectually than by the bad example of the officer. This argument applies with even greater force to the supply and transport branch of the service, in which the expenditure of money is so large, and the necessity exists for the exhibition of the highest degree of official morality on the part of its officers.

CHAPTER XXIII.

BOURBAKI ADVANCES TO THE RELIEF OF BESANCON.

It will be remembered that after General Bourbaki's failure to satisfy the Government in regard to what it was considered should have been accomplished by the French army of the north, that officer was ordered to proceed to Nevers, where he was directed to organise an army for the relief of Paris. At the moment the relief of the capital was considered equivalent to the salvation of France, and for that reason alone every effort was being put forward to that end by Gambetta, and afterwards by the national Government assembled at Bordeaux. Although Bourbaki had not been successful in the north, he was a man with large experience gained in previous campaigns, and the Government was forced to avail itself of the services of every available officer, whatever his merits or demerits, so much so, that naval officers had frequently to be appointed to commands in the army. Bourbaki's powers of organisation appear to have been good, and his patriotic sentiments were pronounced, his energy displayed in collecting so large an army within less than a couple of months and in preparing it to take the field deserves the recognition of his countrymen. Whether he did the best that was possible with his men in the field is a controversial question, which cannot be discussed here. He was clearly hampered with half-disciplined and half-trained troops, who were badly clothed, badly equipped, and armed with strange weapons. The greater part of the rifles then being served out to the men were procured from England and America; they consisted of Remington's, Spencer's, Winchester's, Snider, Minie and other rifles, besides many of obsolete French patterns, some of them being fitted even with percussion locks. It was the same with the artillery, many of the guns being Armstrong's, but the majority were of recent French manufacture. The confusion created with the various kinds of ammunition must have been something appalling, particularly when the inexperience and overwork of the Intendance is taken into account. Bour-

baki had certainly a very hard task before him, and the programme mapped out by the Government was almost impossible with the inefficient material which was given him for its accomplishment. Grenest says that neither his mental capacity nor his attainments qualified him to command an army of 100,000 men.

The plan of the French minister of war was to send Bourbaki's army by railway to the east so far as was practicable. He was then to move upon Belfort with the object of raising the siege, after which, having been joined by Cremer's division, he would have been in a position to advance against the armies of Von Werder and Von Zastrow with a force of about 110,000 men, which must have been nearly double the numbers the Germans could have brought into the field to oppose his advance. It was naturally anticipated that this army would have swept the Germans from the south-east of France, that the German communications would have been cut, and that General Chanzy's army, then assembling at Le Mans, would have, in conjunction with Faidherbe's army of the north, made a successful effort to raise the siege of Paris. Garibaldi's army was intended to guard the left and rear of Bourbaki's army in its advance. Such were the orders of the War Secretary, and he was expected to carry them out. The remarks made in the German official account are worth noting; they are as follows:—"The task committed to General Bourbaki was very comprehensive and wide-ranging. No doubt was entertained that Dijon could be easily captured, or that the siege of Belfort must be abandoned by the Germans without a blow. The severing of the rearward communications of the enemy's armies operating in France was regarded as a certainty. The mere appearance of an army of 110,000 men would liberate the fortresses in the north. The next matter in contemplation was co-operation with General Faidherbe's army. The movements of the French army were attended with ill-luck from the very outset. The transport by rail of the troops from Bourges, Nevers, and La Charité to the Saone, which commenced on the 23rd December, was delayed beyond all expectation. In consequence of the want of preparation much confusion and delay occurred, which, irrespective of the loss of time, entailed very great hardships on the troops owing to the severe cold at the time of the year, and to insufficient food. The horses especially suffered, and it was upon these that severe strain would fall during the marches in prospect."

If the map is consulted, it will be seen that the object of the

Government was to induce Bourbaki to make a wide turning movement which would envelope the German forces besieging Belfort, as well as those watching Besancon, and, with the accessions in strength gained by the release of those fortresses, he would be in a position to overwhelm the German armies in the east before they could be reinforced. That accomplished, the German lines of communication would have been at Bourbaki's mercy, and the 2nd and 3rd German armies must have fallen back from before Paris when pressed by the advance of Chanzy's army from Le Mans. Such a movement could have been accomplished with success only by an army which was admirably equipped and had a mobile transport, and whose discipline was of the very best. Bourbaki's army certainly lacked both in discipline and equipment, the *morale* of the men was gone owing to the constant succession of reverses to the French arms, and their physical condition was not such as to enable them to undergo serious fatigue and exposure, or to resist the inroads of disease during such an inclement season of the year. The transport appears to have been fairly abundant with two of the Army Corps, but with the other it was sadly deficient; the quality of the vehicles and horses, however, left much to be desired. It was in no sense mobile, and the nature of the country roads intensified this failing. Added to such disabilities was the fact that the country through which this army had to march had already been exhausted by the demands of the French and German armies which had been operating therein during the months of November and December. This was no doubt one of the principal reasons which induced the French Intendant to protest strongly against so wide a turning movement. The conditions were not very dissimilar to those obtaining during the war in South Africa. That country was denuded of its supplies and transport by our Boer adversaries, the roads were bad, and communications were interrupted. Had we employed from the first the same methods as were used by the Germans in their conduct of that war, the operations would have been curtailed enormously. Count Sternberg in his book states that never had a war been conducted upon such humane principles as had been done by the British forces operating in South Africa.

M. Friant, the Intendant charged with the supply and transport of Bourbaki's army, had been a sous-intendant at the commencement of the war, and necessity compelled his rapid advancement to so responsible a position. He was no doubt a man of ability, but he may have lacked sufficient experience to

qualify him for the grave responsibilities so thrust upon him. We are told by Colonel Secretan, in his *Armée de l'Est*, that Friant objected to so wide a turning movement, and on the 29th December, before the transportation of the army had been completed, submitted to the War Secretary at Lyons a plan of operations, not in the direction of Belfort but of Chaumont, with Langres as the base of operations. He contended that for offensive and defensive operations there was no better point, and that as the enemy controlled the railway lines of the east, it was necessary to cut them. In the event of defeat, he pointed out that the army could retire to the protection of Langres and Besancon, and could manœuvre between those points and Belfort and Auxonne, all which places were abundantly supplied with provisions. Before the Commission of Enquiry held after the termination of the war Friant stated that—"If they had done me the honour to consult me I would have been opposed to the campaign as then proposed. It seemed to me best to remain at Dijon, for our men, although eager to do their duty, were too young and too exhausted for hard marching. Consequently it was better to follow the enemy towards Chaumont or Langres, but not towards Belfort. For if we marched towards Belfort, supposing that we gained every possible success, and that we beat the enemy everywhere, the advance of Manteuffel would have cut our communications, and we should have been caught like a rat in a trap." Colonel Secretan is entirely in accord with M. Friant's contention, and does not disguise his belief that had that plan of campaign been adopted, Bourbaki's army would not have met with the serious reverses which eventually ended in its being forced to seek refuge in Switzerland.

We are of opinion that when a plan of campaign is being discussed by the commander of an army and his superior officers, the senior supply and transport officer, as well as the senior artillery, engineer, and medical officers, should have the opportunity of expressing their views in regard to the proposed plan of action. In this particular instance it is more than probable that the direction and extent of the turning movement would have been modified upon the representations which would have been advanced by M. Friant, had that officer been given the opportunity of expressing his views in regard to the difficulties to supply and transport. And this step would have been obligatory on the General, as the success of the movement depended to a very great extent upon the completeness of the supply and transport arrangements. Bad generalship and the failure of

supplies were the chief causes which were responsible for this additional disaster to the French army. The South African campaign has accentuated this contention. The supply and transport officers in charge were invariably consulted by their commanders before any movement in force was undertaken. Half rations were often agreed upon before some of the forced marches were made. Such an understanding between the General and his supply officer tends to stifle dissatisfaction in the ranks, and to increase the *morale* of the soldiery. The mobility of an army depends almost entirely upon the efficiency of its transport and the good quality and abundance of its supplies, but there is another point which must not be neglected, and that is the determination of the officers and men to make the best, not the worst, of the hardships inseparable from campaigning. The fewer the wants and requirements of an army the more mobile will it become.

The Minister for War appears to have unduly exerted his authority, which the complicated conditions alone should have prevented—the Commander on the spot was more capable of arriving at a correct estimate of what was practicable and what was not. At the time Bourbaki enjoyed an excellent reputation as a general, he had done excellent work in many campaigns, and had done good service in the organisation of both the army of the north and that of the east ; there was no excuse therefore for distrust, and the General should have been left to exercise his own discretion in the contemplated movements of the army. Secretan says that the Minister dictated to him the movements to be made, and the General was thus relieved of much of the responsibility ; that, however, was no excuse to the General for not objecting if he really felt that so wide a turning movement was impracticable. There appear to have been some serious lapses on the part of the general staff, for the senior engineer officer also complained that he was never consulted, and that he was not even informed as to the contemplated movements ; the fault may have rested with the staff of the General, but the Commander himself cannot be entirely exonerated for such neglect. Secretan continues :—“ There were grave faults in the general staff, which were calculated to produce deplorable results, such as impeding the natural dash of the soldiery and retarding their movements, when the energy of all was required in pursuing a common object. The best army in the world must have perished under a similar *régime* of suspicions and jealousies.” M. Friant also complained that he was not kept informed of

the contemplated movements of the army; he also stated that he knew nothing of the addition of the 24th Corps before the 5th January, and that he was only informed accidentally of the arrival of the 15th Corps.

Colonel Secretan gives a lengthened description of the utter failure of the transportation of the army by rail from Nevers to Chalons-sur-Saone, a distance of about ninety miles; he gives us the following information on the subject. The P.L.M. Company was charged with having made insufficient preparations to meet the necessities of the case, and that accusation is supported by the following telegram sent by Bourbaki to the War Secretary on the 22nd December:—"The 1st Division of the 20th Corps has not finished its entraining. The operation is not advancing with expedition owing to the lack of the necessary plant. Please send what is needed as quickly as possible. If the railway administration does not produce a better result, our concentration, which should have been effectuated in forty-eight hours, will not be accomplished within six days." And on the evening of the 23rd December he again wired:—"Up to now only ten batteries, two squadrons of cavalry, and hardly a division of infantry out of two army corps has been entrained. These results are far otherwise than what was promised by the railway administration." By the 24th December the Intendance had collected no less than 1,800 truck loads of supplies, called *magasins roulants*, between Monliur and Nevers. These were held ready for despatch to any point where supplies were required; but it will be understood that such an accumulation along the sidings would have seriously impeded the working of the line, particularly when it is taken into account that this number rose to 7,500 trucks by the commencement of February. He tells us further on that:—"The transportation of the 15th Corps, which should have been completed within three days, took from the 4th to the 16th January."

M. Friant expressed himself in the following terms at a conference held on the 20th December at Bourges. He said that he was opposed to the transportation of the army by rail for so short a distance. He pointed out that much time must be wasted in entraining and detraining such a large army, much greater than the time which would be occupied in covering the distance on foot. He was not listened to, and what he foresaw came to pass, for the convoys which he despatched from Nevers on the 25th December arrived at Chalons on the 30th, in advance of the troops, although some were *en route* as early as the 22nd.

Secretan also tells us that many of the trains were detained at wayside stations for three or four days, and that the men being unable to detrain generally, as their officers expected orders to proceed at any moment, and being half famished, unoccupied, and exposed to weather ranging from twelve to fifteen degrees below zero, quickly lost any discipline they might have acquired. The most alarming rumours were circulated, treason was in the air, and the men became suspicious of everyone and everything. Furthermore, it is certain that the line of railway would have been rendered more available for the carriage of supplies and forage, which were so urgently needed at the front almost from the very commencement of the campaign. Want of railway transportation could have been the only reason for the insufficient supply of provisions and forage, as there could never have been less than three months' supplies collected along the line during any part of January.

M. Grenest, in his *Armée de l'Est*, gives a vivid description of the want of discipline in Bourbaki's army during December :—“ Nothing can give an idea of the state of misery and disorder prevailing amongst the troops which were to march with Bourbaki, on their arrival at Bourges from the other side of the Loire. Excepting in a few regiments, there was hardly a trace of cohesion and discipline, and while the army of Chanzy fought gloriously, that of Bourbaki's strayed in disorder along the roads, more like a flock than an army.” Admiral Penhoat, who commanded the 2nd division of the 18th Corps, tells us that the cold, the want of warm clothing, the irregular distribution of rations, the bad quality of the shoes, the heavy equipments carried by the men, were so many obstacles to rapid marching ; there were therefore with each corps a number of laggards, who took care to secure good accommodation for themselves in the villages, and did not rejoin their battalions before it suited them ; others marched in advance, to secure for themselves the best accommodation available ; many of the soldiery threw away the biscuits which had been issued to them as a reserve. These abuses could not be easily suppressed, particularly with mobiles, who were commanded by officers elected by the men, and who had no ideas of discipline, and regarded such acts as natural and therefore unworthy of suppression. M. Doussaint, on the contrary, tells us that he was quite pleased with his sight of the 18th Corps on their march. The soldiers he saw were alert and jovial, working like ants ; some were seeking fuel, others were making soup, others were at drill. He says that the picture filled his soul

with admiration and hope. This gentleman evidently came upon the corps at an opportune moment, the halt for a meal, when the French soldiery are at their best. No troops are so full of ingenuity in the preparation of food on the march, they usually make the best of what is, and do not look for the unattainable. Their soup is comforting, filling, and gives warmth, if it is not always highly nutritious, and they certainly march well upon it. M. Baudens tells us that:—"Soup makes the soldier." These few instances will show the sort of men which Bourbaki had to lead against a victorious and well-fed soldiery. With the incubus of successive privations and the demoralising effects of defeat, it was not surprising that even this corps fought without any great degree of pertinacity, and eventually sought refuge in flight across the frontier.

It is certain that an insufficient transport corps had been collected for the carriage of the stores, supplies, and equipments of the army. The employment of the railway line may have to some extent at first minimised the requirements, and may have given the Intendant a false impression of the extent of what would actually be required. That officer had very little time given him in which to accumulate supplies, stores, ammunition, arms, money, horses, mules, and carriages for an army of 60,000 men, which was at the commencement of the year suddenly increased to over 100,000. The whole of these arrangements had to be completed within a month, and we think that the work accomplished within that short space of time is deserving of every recognition. Secretan has given us some interesting details of the resultant issues of the preparatory work:—"But the army advanced slowly. From the commencement it had to combat the difficulties of a food supply; not that the food was wanting, but it was not forthcoming owing to the insufficiency of transport. The supplies were transported by road. By the 30th December, 900 wagon loads had been collected at Chalons. But those belonging to the 18th and 20th Corps were discharged into trucks by order of the staff, notwithstanding the fact that orders to the contrary had been given by the Intendant; and instead of arriving in compact form, the trains of both corps got seriously mixed up *en route*. The requisitioned drivers, who were unwilling employes, took advantage of the unloading of their vehicles to fly from the biting frost to the shelter of their homes. The trains were thus considerably weakened, and much difficulty was experienced in their reorganisation." This is a very striking instance of the interference of a staff officer in a matter which is

outside his own particular sphere without first consulting those whose special training gives them the technical knowledge. It is easy enough to issue an order in the name of a General, but it is not so easy to repair the mischief which may be caused thereby, and the disastrous consequences are not always attributed to their real cause. There are officers in all armies who imagine themselves born to command—when they gain a status which confers upon them certain powers, they do not fail to make the most of their opportunities for directing others. Modesty is not highly regarded by men of that class, and orders are often given for the purpose of ventilating their authority rather than for the benefit of the service ; it matters little to them whether they be necessary or otherwise ; indeed, their orders are sometimes pernicious, if not fatal mistakes. Such men are either self-sufficient and conceited, or they may be clever but obstinate to a degree, and never inclined to seek or accept the advice or assistance of others who may be more thoroughly versed upon the matter in hand. It is a marvel how officers of this description obtain responsible positions in every service, but it is even more miraculous how they manage to escape detection, and peg along until they bring those under their command to serious grief.

Secretan goes on to inform us that the two corps started from Chalons and Chagny with eight days' rations. During the first day of the advance towards Gray the supply was kept up by the railway from Vesoul, but when the army was increased by the addition of the 15th and 24th Corps, it became necessary to draw from the larger dépôt at Lyons, which was in constant communication with Marseilles. Between the 1st and 20th January the following supplies were forwarded from Lyons :—646,000 rations of flour, 1,611,400 of bread, 872,000 of biscuit, 3,000,000 of rice, 2,400,000 of salt, 1,476,000 of sugar, 2,000,000 of coffee, 1,025,000 of dry vegetables, 1,376,500 of pork, 56,560 of fresh meat, 209,600 of brandy, 8,000 kilos. of hay, 31,500 kilos. of barley and oats ; which would have afforded about half a month's rations for the whole army, with the addition of a good stock of vegetables. Very large dépôts were created at Clerval and Baume-les-Dames, which also supplied any towns garrisoned by the French. M. Friant complained that the men would not keep their reserve rations, they either eat two or three days' rations in one day, or threw away their biscuits, as they disliked them, even when they were of the best quality. One regiment wantonly left thirty-five boxes of biscuits in the snow. Although the supplies did not lack, the transport was insufficient

to convey the rations with regularity from the magazines to the troops. By the 5th January the situation had become aggravated by the bringing into line of the 15th and 24th Corps; the transport belonging to the former, some 700 vehicles, was despatched to Dijon when the corps entrained for Clerval, and that of the latter was incomplete. The Intendant was forced to demand some 2,000 vehicles from the surrounding districts. The requisitions were not responded to with much alacrity, and it was some days before any considerable number were got together. Conductors were improvised from all sorts and conditions of men, and escorts had to be attached to the convoys to prevent the drivers from deserting. The department worked night and day, but the result was not very encouraging, the two new corps having received only 200 and 400 vehicles respectively. We see therefore that instead of having a transport train of 700 wagons, the 15th Corps had only managed to collect 200.

M. Jacqmin, in his work on the French railway management, gives us some very important information. He says that the intendance had made enormous efforts to accomplish the feeding of the several armies assembled in the east of France, but the unfortunate mistake was made that the trucks were hardly discharged before the supplies they contained were required for immediate issue. Pains had not been taken to ascertain that the stations to which large numbers of laden trains were forwarded contained sufficient sidings to prevent the blocking of the main lines. He tells us that the stations of Dôle, Chalons, and Besancon were filled with supply trucks, and their discharge was forbidden. As a natural consequence the cavalry and artillery trains were unable to get into the stations, and the men and horses had to be detrained outside the stations one behind the other, thus obstructing the main line. It is stated that some of the trains remained no less than five days in the same place. The artillery appear to have pursued a similar course, and the discharge of all munitions was interdicted. From the official figures at the end of the war, the Lyons railway line had accumulated no less than 7,500 laden railway wagons. The rigorous weather was also a very serious obstacle to railway traffic, the accumulations of snow preventing the facile movements of the locomotives and wagons, and the frosty weather paralyzed to some extent the work of the railway officials, who were for the most part old men and boys, the men having been sent off to the war by the local officials. M. Jacqmin also complains that general and other officers frequently refused to detrain their

men at night, on the grounds that they were better off in the trains than they would be bivouacked in the snow; they entirely lost sight of the fact that following trains were thereby detained, and the men in them exposed to greater hardships by such selfish considerations.

It will be of advantage to examine the conditions under which the wagon train of the 15th Corps was diverted to Dijon. There is every reason to suppose that Bourbaki sent the train to that place as he expected to overwhelm the comparatively small German force opposed to his advance, and, after relieving Belfort, to march towards Nancy and the German lines of communication, when the train might easily have re-joined its corps probably at Langres. There was, however, no reason whatever why the train could not have followed its corps by road, as the nearest German forces were from 50 to 100 miles distant from Chalon.

The train could not have carried less than a fortnight's food for the corps, or about four days' for the whole army. Had that train been available, the sufferings of the troops would have been mitigated to a considerable extent. There is no sufficient reason for sending the train to Dijon instead of to Besancon, where its contents would have become available at a critical moment.

Secretan tells us that—"It is true that if the army had supplies in abundance at Clerval and Baume-les-Dames, the want of sufficient transport and the bad state of the roads prevented wagons from bringing them up to the troops. The Commander complained daily of the slow delivery of the supplies, and the following order was issued: 'The supplies must reach corps at any cost, in good time, and must be distributed promptly. Requisition all necessary transport and wire to those prefects who may be able to come to our assistance. It must be remembered that at the moment the subsistence of the troops is not really assured, although Clerval is only twenty-nine kilometres distant. To-morrow we may be thirty, and in two days fifty kilometres away.' The Intendant made the greatest efforts possible to satisfy the wishes of the Commander, but despite all the diligence and devotion exhibited, the insurmountable obstacles could not be overcome in time." Further on we learn that Bourbaki was forced to delay his contemplated attack on the 14th January for a day, owing partially to the failure of the supplies. Never were the supply and transport arrangements of any campaign so hampered by the blundering orders given for the management of that branch of army economy. Had M.

Friant and his officers been permitted to carry out the arrangements which had been initiated by them, the troops would not have had to fight the enemy on empty stomachs. Nothing can be more demoralising to any soldiery than to see plainly that they are being done to death, through the incapacity of those placed over them.

General Bourbaki had sadly overlooked the value of well stocked depôts, as well as the necessity of having an ample transport corps at hand for the distribution of supplies. Owing to the disorganised condition of his army and the want of food he was forced to retire towards Besancon, which was provisioned for no more than its own garrison, and had no surplus transport ; consequently no help could be procured from that fortress, and the army was forced to continue its retreat. The absence of sufficient preparation had wrecked a fine army, which might have rendered a very good account of itself, for the soldiery were courageous and could fight well, as was proved in more than one engagement they had with the enemy. The army was then in a half famished condition, as a consequence of the mismanagement of its commanders, and its retreat was effected with great difficulty owing to the exhausted condition of the men, who were almost shoeless. It is matter for surprise that the men were able to fight at all ; but the courage born of despair is not to be despised.

During the course of the South African War we have had several instances of the formation of depôts in bad or ill-defended positions, or the absence of any such concentrations. Taking the latter first, had it not been for the enterprise of private individuals, both Kimberley and Mafeking must have capitulated owing to an insufficiency of supplies. Then we have the concentration of large stocks of supplies at Ladysmith and Dundee, in the face of the advance of overwhelming Boer armies both from the Transvaal and the Free State ; those collected at the latter had to be abandoned owing to the advance of superior forces on its front and left flank, and the former had to be held under disadvantageous conditions, in order that the supplies concentrated should not fall into the hands of the enemy. Dr. Conan Doyle tells us that masses of supplies and transport were concentrated at De Aar junction long in advance of the efficient defence of that part, and that it was owing to the want of enterprise on the part of the Boer forces which saved us from a serious disaster.

CHAPTER XXIV.

AIMLESS OPERATIONS.

By the 6th January the 18th, 20th, and part of the 24th Corps had been moved towards Vesoul, with the object of confronting Werder's army, the 15th Corps not being then in a position to make any forward movement in support, as the greater part of it was then *en route* to Clerval. M. Genevois, in his *Derniers Cartouches*, gives us a lamentable account of their transportation : Although the railway company were informed as early as the 31st December that the 15th Corps would entrain for Besancon on the 3rd January, the management failed to make any arrangements, which naturally resulted in serious delays and in shocking disorder. "Unfortunately Bourbaki asked for and obtained permission to push the train on to Clerval on the 6th. That small station was without any platform, and without material for detraining, the result being that the overcrowding became frightful—an accumulation of laden trucks—the line of trains, of several kilometres in length, became quite immovable and unable either to advance or retire. In short, the detraining of the 15th Corps did not commence till the 8th January, and was not completed before the 16th ; great mistakes were made in the despatch of supplies, and ammunition discharged. These long delays brought heavy sufferings upon the men, and caused serious complications in the transport equipments." He gives a short description of the sufferings of the 16th Regiment of the line :—"Entrained at Mehun on the 5th January at 1 p.m. for Besancon, but the blocking of the line caused the detention of the trains from the 5th to the 9th January, during which time the regiment had to remain entrained. The temperature fell and the country was covered by a heavy fall of snow, the men suffered greatly from the cold, as they were only scantily clothed, and from the want of sufficient food, but they did not complain. The trains stopped frequently, but it was never known for how long they might be detained. The men alighted and kindled fires, trying to make a little soup or coffee to warm themselves,

but they were frequently forced to upset the pots and rejoin the trains when they were ordered forward. Many men perished under such hardships, others had their legs swollen so that they could not walk. The regiment eventually arrived at Clerval on the 9th January, and camped near Arcey on the 10th, which was then believed to be in the occupation of the German forces." When it is considered that the distance covered by this regiment was less than 100 miles, and that it took over four days to accomplish what would have been done under ordinary circumstances within as many hours, the utter failure of the railway officials to do their duty efficiently becomes very apparent. The error committed by the General in sending an army corps to detrain at a small wayside station, does not in any degree excuse the railway people for their gross mismanagement of the traffic on the line.

Secretan tells us that Bourbaki spent the 4th and 5th of January at Besancon maturing his plans. He determined to abandon his advance on Vesoul, and manœuvre further to the east towards Villarsexel, with the intention of menacing the communications between the 14th German Army Corps and Belfort. With that object in view the 18th and 20th Corps, and part of the 24th, were advanced to Montbozan and Rougemont, and Cremer's division was expected to press the right rear of the enemy in his advance from Dijon. On the 9th General Bourbaki advanced his army towards Villarsexel, thus bringing the two opposing armies within striking distance. The inhabitants do not appear to have afforded the French troops much assistance, notwithstanding the fact that they were in very superior force as compared with the Germans; but they no doubt marked the difference in the bearing and discipline of the two armies, and acted under the force of their convictions, rather than in accordance with their inclinations. Secretan writes thus :—"The inhabitants of the country did not dare to give information to our troops, which it was sad to admit. As our troops approached the enemy, we found the peasantry terror-stricken at the presence of the Germans, and inclined to give us wrong information in order to remove the fighting from their immediate neighbourhood, whilst our enemies found no difficulty in purchasing the services of any number of spies. Our soldiers received a kindly welcome and often a generous hospitality from the inhabitants of Loiret and the Bourgogne, but were met with ill-will by the peasantry of the Haute-Saone, who, fearing the resentment of the Germans, actually refused

to sell them any provisions, or made them pay two or three times their real value." It will therefore be understood how handicapped the Intendance must have been in its efforts to procure supplies locally for so large a French army—if the lamentable condition of the French soldiery could not melt the hearts of the peasantry, it was not likely that impotent threats or the money, if it were present, could have extorted supplies and transport in any large quantities from the frightened inhabitants.

General Werder had assembled all the troops he could collect at Dijon during December, but upon the advance of Bourbaki's army he evacuated that fortress on the 27th of the month, and marched upon Vesoul, in order to get more in touch with the force besieging Belfort under General von Tresckow. We cannot do better than quote from Von Moltke's work in order to demonstrate clearly the positions of the contending armies at that epoch. Owing to the advance of Bourbaki, steps were at once taken at Versailles for the formation of a new Southern Army, the command of which was to be given to General Manteuffel, but in the meantime Werder was to do the best he could with the troops at his disposal. The besieging army at Belfort was to be covered at all hazards, and the General was to await attack in the best position possible. "Notwithstanding their numerical advantage, the French did more manœuvring than fighting. General Bourbaki aimed at surrounding the left wing of the 14th Corps, thus entirely cutting it off from Belfort." Upon discovering this ruse of the French General—"Von Werder had no alternative but to follow this flank movement in all haste. He ordered the Baden division to Athéas, the 4th Reserve division to Allivans, and Von der Goltz's brigade to Noroy-le-Bourg. The trains were marched on Lure." The position taken up was about three miles to the north of Villars-uxel, the trains being about six miles to the rear. Country roads connected Lure with the positions taken up by the various divisions, and Lure was in railway communication with Vesoul, which also communicated with Nancy and Luneville. There was therefore nothing to be desired in regard to existing lines of communication with the new position taken up by Von Werder; but we are informed by Ludwig Lohlein that the supply of the army was then somewhat faulty. This arose not so much from any dearth of supplies, as from the impossibility to cook anything during such heavy fighting; the roads also were narrow and deep in snow and mud or covered with ice, so much so, that traffic was almost impossible.

It is not necessary to enter into any particulars of the severe fighting at Villarsixel on the 9th, and on the Lisaine on the 15th, 16th, and 17th. The losses were exceedingly heavy on both sides, those of the Germans being about 3,000, and the French could not have lost much under 7,000, besides a large number of prisoners. In these engagements Bourbaki was seriously hampered from the want of provisions to feed his men, who had to do so much marching and fighting within that dreadful fortnight. Secretan tells us that owing to the remote situation of the railway stations, the icy roads, the steep hills, and the want of sufficient transport, it was almost impossible to bring forward supplies. The French Intendants did not hesitate to inform their Generals that if the corps were moved they could not be fed. Movements were imperative, consequently the poor soldiery suffered untold hardships, and became so reduced in physique as to be almost incapable of either fighting or marching.

It was a fortunate circumstance for the French that the Germans had suffered considerably during the heavy fighting between the 9th and the 17th of January, and were not in a position to pursue their successes any further. General Werder was forced to halt for the purpose of recruiting the strength of his men. Ludwig Lohlein tells us that the men had had to be kept constantly on the alert, and that two-thirds of them were up all night, and that they were almost famished for the want of a hot meal. The Commander was therefore forced to halt his men during the 18th and 19th, as he was no doubt anxious to give Manteuffel every opportunity to bring his army into line before further operations were undertaken. That General was marching to his support with the utmost expedition; by the 19th January he had secured the passage of the Saone, some fifty miles distant from General Werder's army. Before the fighting on the Lisaine, Bourbaki's army had been strengthened by the arrival of Cremer's division from Dijon; these troops were comparatively fresh, and were fairly seasoned, and although they were composed principally of irregulars, they became a formidable acquisition to that badly beaten army, and carried out their duties as rear guard with the utmost devotion, valour, and skill. The division reached Besancon on the 22nd, after having shown a bold front to the Germans, who pursued them on the 20th. The 18th, 20th, and 24th Corps reached Besancon between the 21st and 23rd, but the 15th Corps, which had pursued a longer route, did not arrive until the 24th. We are informed by M. Genevois that some 230 truck-loads of supplies were

captured at Dôle, which M. Friant states originally consisted of 420, containing no less than 1,200,000 army rations, which were detained by the railway official at Dôle.

General Bourbaki had enjoyed a lofty reputation in the eyes of his countrymen and of the French army. He commanded a battalion at thirty. When Pellissier gave him the command of a regiment of Zouaves, he addressed him, according to Secretan, in the following words: "I have need of you as the Colonel, as fifteen hundred Zouaves with Bourbaki gives me three thousand men." Personally Bourbaki was a brave and chivalrous man, he had gained the Legion of Honour early in life, and naturally took command of the Army of the East supported by the prestige which he had gained in Algeria, the Crimea, and Italy. He was a Divisional General at the outbreak of the war, and was only 56 years of age, and therefore hardly past the prime of life. He appears, however, to have been very wanting in strategical ability, and in no degree imbued with the talent needed to handle large bodies of men. His abject failure to hold back Werder's army of less than half the strength of his own is a distinct and evident proof of the fact, and it was through no lack of tenacity on the part of his worn-out soldiery, who fought with a courage bred of despair. The burden of the failure fell upon the General, who had neglected the necessary precautions for securing his army against the incapacitating effects of having to march and fight almost without rations. Secretan tells us that Cremer's division was without any train, that the men had received no meat since the 13th January, and no bread since the 15th, and they had to content themselves with the flesh of the horses killed by the enemy. He tells us that the men and horses of the whole army were overcome by fatigue, hunger, and cold. Very little could be procured from the district, which had already been drawn upon by the French and German troops who had been moving between Belfort and Besancon for the preceding two months. The conditions of the roads also prevented the supply columns from joining their divisions, as in most cases they were compelled to make wide detours in order that the more direct roads might be left for the use of the men. During this retreat the men seem to have had little else than horseflesh to eat. Many of the men perished from the excessive cold, and numbers were frost-bitten. Had the German army been able to pursue their demoralised and beaten foe, the latter would have suffered even greater hardships and very serious losses, if not a crushing defeat. In his report upon those operations

General Clinchant states that the supplies supposed to be at Pontarlier were not in existence. In his opinion M. Friant had failed to carry out his promises; but he seems to have overlooked the fact that large convoys were captured during the retreat and in the neighbourhood of Pontarlier.

In his address to his troops upon assuming the command, General Clinchant naturally complained of the disastrous waste of time which had resulted in creating for him a veritable *impasse*. De Freycinet tells us that the Government wished Bourbaki either to advance in force upon Manteuffel or to retire towards Lyons, but he seems to have made up his mind to move towards Pontarlier, where he hoped to hold back his enemies, and failing that, to cross the Swiss frontier. It is true that he commanded an army composed of men exhausted by fatigue and hunger, and that it may not have been possible for him to make a forward movement upon Dôle or Auxonne. It was not so with the retreat southwards, every step led him nearer to help, and he could have retired his army southwards in sufficient time to prevent the cutting off his communications by the advanced troops of Manteuffel's army, without being exposed to any serious attack from General Werder, who did not advance before the 23rd. When it is remembered that Manteuffel's army numbered less than half that of Bourbaki's, it will be seen that every chance of success must have attended such an operation. Then again if we make every allowance for the exhaustion of Bourbaki's men, they could at least have been concentrated around Besancon, where they could have recruited their strength from that great *depôt*. There are, however, conflicting reports as to the contents of the *depôt* at Besancon: Secretan states that Bourbaki gave the limits of the supplies held for the whole army as being from fifteen to eighteen days; General Clinchant states in his official report, which should have been reliable, that the army did not find a reserve of more than seven days at Besancon; but M. Friant stated before the Commission that had he been consulted on the 23rd as to the condition of the army supplies, he would have given seven days as the limit, although he believed that there were fully ten days' in hand independently of the reserves held in Besancon, which he had ascertained to have been equal to the supply of 100,000 men for fifty days of meat, sugar, coffee, and wine, and for thirty-nine and a half days of breadstuffs.

We incline to the belief that, with regard to the supplies, there was no reason why the whole army could not have been fed around Besancon for a period of forty or fifty days, but there was,

of course, the question as to the possibility of finding sufficiently good defensive positions for so large an army around that fortress.

It may not be out of place to consider briefly the effect which Bourbaki's own ill-considered acts had upon himself. General Ambert attempts to excuse Bourbaki's attempted suicide. He says: The accusation made by the Government of his acting too slowly was very galling to him, and he replied as follows on the 24th:—"When you are better informed, you will reject the charges of lassitude which you have made against me. The men and horses are prostrate with fatigue. I have never lost an hour, neither in advancing or in retiring. Your despatch leads me to imagine that you think you have a well-constituted army. It appears to me that I have often told you the contrary. For the rest I have to inform you that the task which you have imposed upon me is beyond my powers, and you will do well to replace me." On the 26th, after witnessing the defile of the army, he returned to his lodgings, and, having sent his aide-de-camp out on some pretext, shot himself, but, although covered with blood and placed *hors de combat*, survived the incident. M. Doussaint tells us that after the serious defeats he had sustained, and owing to the utter disorganisation of his army and the want of supplies, he gave his staff the following orders:—"We will throw ourselves into the Swiss mountains. I do not want any transport or supplies or baggage with our columns. Those which impede our march will be thrown into the ditches; two guns of each battery will be left at Besancon; if the others interfere with the march, they must be left at any of the forts by the way, or they may be cast over precipices. Everyone must exert himself to the utmost, we must be prepared for privations and sufferings; at that price only can our army be saved." The opinion of De Freycinet, who was Gambetta's war secretary, is worthy of attention. He wrote:—"Bourbaki was much annoyed to find his army in want of everything, when the sidings of the railway stations in the Jura were filled with trains of supplies and munitions, which no one seemed to know where to send, and when his indecision had so compromised his army, in his despair he vainly attempted to correct his errors of judgment."

It is not surprising that, after the issue of so wild an order by Bourbaki, the army should have suffered such terrible hardships in the marches of its divisions over distances from forty to fifty-five miles before the Swiss frontier could be crossed. He seems entirely to have lost sight of the fact that his exhausted men could not cover so great a distance practically without food;

it is not surprising that he witnessed the defile with tears in his eyes, but that did not help the victims of his folly. Ambert gives us some interesting particulars of this dolorous march :—“The officers made no attempt to maintain order ; they marched in the midst of their men in sabots, slippers, or whatever could supplement their worn-out boots ; some of the soldiers had to content themselves with their coat-tails as a covering for their frozen feet. The snow was up to their knees, which greatly aggravated the difficulty of the retirement, their heads were bowed, their eyes red, and their lips swollen.”

Ambert quotes an account given by an Englishman who accompanied that unfortunate army in its retreat :—“To prevent ourselves from dying of cold, we made fires of green wood ; around these we were mixed up without any distinction of rank : generals, officers, soldiers, and even horses. The thermometer marked 18° of frost. A strong cold wind was blowing across the plateau, driving before it clouds of blinding snow, which collected around the men in little heaps, burying them up to their knees. We passed the night sitting on our haversacks, with our feet in the fire, hoping thus to preserve the vital heat. Added to these increasing difficulties was the question of food, the entire absence of everything edible completed the work of demoralisation the cold had commenced.” M. Genevois mentions this march in the following terms :—“These marches which we have just traced were pursued with slackness and confusion on the part of the French, but with ardour and precision by the Germans.” The condition of the French on their arrival at Pontarlier is thus described by Colonel Secretan :—“Everywhere carts and teams were mixed up, horses lying dead from starvation, or were being unladen as they were about to expire ; the others, thin, hollow-eyed, and famished, stumbled about gnawing all that came within their reach. There were bivouac fires everywhere—against the houses, in the squares, and in the yards ; broken vehicles, tattered clothing, boxes of biscuits, rice, and coffee, which had been plundered, abounded on all sides. The greater part of the officers betook themselves to the inns and hotels, having no care for their suffering soldiery, and seeming to care only for themselves and the remains of their own baggage. Misery and selfishness had effaced all distinctions and obligations of rank.” The march to Talavera is the nearest *replica* of this picture in British military history.

Everything points to the fact that M. Friant was an able and intelligent Intendant. He was obviously hampered by railway

officialism, and by the disregard of the General and his staff as well as by the obstructions created by them, which often resulted from misdirected energy or from their ignorance of the actual needs of the French army. Secretan tells us that Bourbaki sent for Friant on the 23rd January and asked him if he considered that the Swiss would feed the army on its crossing the frontier. He however adopted prompt measures for the supply of the army on its approach to Pontarlier, by sending two officers to collect supplies at that point. This appears to have been successfully accomplished, for we read further on that there were collected at the Pontarlier station, on the arrival of the army, considerable quantities of flour, biscuit, wine, cheese, vegetables, sugar, coffee, oats, and shoes, and that large quantities of supplies were sent from Lyons direct to Geneva for the use of the interned army. It should also be mentioned that Friant secured the despatch of ten days' rations for the army in its retreat upon Pontarlier. When it is considered that only 1,158 vehicles of all kinds entered Switzerland, some of which would have been procured at Pontarlier, and that the army of the east had originally over 2,000 wagons, the losses in wagons must have been very heavy during the three weeks' campaigning.

The Swiss Government and people were most kind and considerate to this sorely stricken army. Ambert tells us that on crossing the frontier—"the peasantry lined the roads, carrying in their hands provisions, drinks, and cigars, which they gave to the men. In the Val de Travers, where there was not sufficient accommodation for so great a number of men, the people opened the doors of their houses, barns, and stables, which were quickly filled by the soldiery. An old washer-woman gave up her room to six men, and passed the night in washing and drying their underclothing for the following day. Another poor woman, on meeting a wounded man with frozen feet, took off her shoes and stockings and gave them to the man, being quite content to trudge homewards barefooted through ice and snow for an hour. During a cold night a farmer voluntarily lodged 700 men and 100 horses, he gave them all he had, his bread, his hay, his oats, his wood; the following day he had nothing left for himself." Major E. Davall tells us that the Swiss Government sent 200,000 rations of bread and other provisions to meet the immediate wants of the famished soldiery. So soon as arrangements could be made the men were distributed throughout the country, the most populous cantons being directed to maintain the largest number.

There may be some of my readers who would like to know something of the detail arrangements made by the Swiss Government in the very trying circumstances. A French officer was appointed by each of the cantonal authorities to supervise the discipline and interior economy of each detachment. He was aided by a staff of officers, non-commissioned officers and men. The following daily ration was provided by the Government :— $1\frac{1}{2}$ lb. of bread, $\frac{3}{4}$ lb. of meat, and 10 c. worth of vegetables, which was given only to the men. Pay was issued at the following rates :—To superior officers, 6s. a day ; to captains and subalterns, 4s. ; and to the non-commissioned officers and men, 25 c. The mortality during this detention in Switzerland was only 6 per 1,000, which speaks volumes for the care bestowed on the men. The total cost amounted to over 12,000,000 fr., which the French Government paid soon after the termination of the war.

The Swiss proved themselves to be reliable friends to their French neighbours in their dire necessity. Nothing could have exceeded the sympathy displayed by the peasantry and the Government when the defeated French soldiery crossed their frontier. Their hospitality was unbounded, and their kindness could not have been greater. The good treatment of the officers and men is marked by the lowness of their mortality during their sojourn in Switzerland. The French have also to thank the Swiss for their kindness in sending a delegation to Strasburg, with the object of removing the women and children to a place of safety ; their action on that occasion resulted in the saving of the lives of many innocent people. Such amenities between nations mitigate the horrors of war, and are calculated to incline people to look to means for the settlement of political differences other than the arbitrament of war.

CHAPTER XXV.

DRIVEN OVER THE FRONTIER.

Upon the advance of Bourbaki's army against the 14th Army Corps, it became necessary for the German Head-Quarter Staff to take immediate steps to counteract the movement of so large an army, which threatened not only to overwhelm the much smaller army of Werder, but was likely to place the lines of communication of the 2nd and 3rd Armies in serious danger, in which case the position of those two armies on the east and south of Paris would have become untenable. Fortunately for the Germans, Bourbaki had determined upon a wide turning movement, which isolated the large garrisons of Dijon and Langres, and prevented them from affording any direct support to his army. Had Bourbaki contented himself with an immediate attack upon the German lines of communication at Chaumont, using Langres as his base, he would have avoided the flank attack made by Manteuffel's army, and must have effectually separated the German armies. With the support of the garrisons of Langres and Dijon he could not have failed to have repelled any attack delivered by Werder, and he could then have cut the German communications at Chaumont without incurring any serious resistance or run much risk. Blumé informs us that the repair of the section Blesme-Chaumont was begun on the 6th November. The restoration of the railway bridge as Montereau, which had been blown up, was also taken in hand by the Railway Corps. It was decided to repair this line only as far as Troyes. He adds :—" This line was certainly more exposed to hostile interruption from the south, and the possibility of an occasional interruption of the traffic had to be faced. The section Blesme-Chaumont-Chatillon was available from the 2nd December, and Chaumont-Troyes on the 7th." It will be remembered that M. Friant was much opposed to the movement *viâ* Belmont, his reasons no doubt being that that part of the country was completely " used up," and that he could not procure supplies or transport in any quantities from the peasantry.

On the other hand, the country in the neighbourhood of Langres had not been exhausted, and there was every probability that ample supplies could have been secured there. In any case, it is certain that Bourbaki's army would not have sustained such crushing defeats, nor would its men have had to endure such privations, supported as it would have been by two powerful fortresses with garrisons aggregating nearly 45,000 men. If an exhausted and beaten army could have held an enemy back as Bourbaki's did, what could it not have accomplished had it been properly fed and intelligently handled?

The 2nd and 7th Army Corps had been detached from the 1st Army, and were being hurried down to Montargis to the support of Werder. Count von Wartensleben, in his *Operations of the South Army*, translated by Colonel von Wright, tells us "that the 2nd Corps reached Nuits and Noyers on the 12th January, the appointed day, but the whole of the 7th Corps had not reached Chatillon and Montigny by that date. Under ordinary circumstances it would have been decidedly advisable to give the 2nd Army Corps some rest, and, in the meantime, to await the completement of the 7th Corps. The precarious position of the 14th Corps, however, outweighed all these considerations, and did not admit of any delay." Manteuffel had taken command on the 12th, and ordered an immediate advance for the 14th. The 2nd Corps was to advance by Montbard-Chanceux-Selongey; the 7th by Chatillon-Recey-Prauthoy and Montigni-Arc-en-Barrois-Chameroi-Longeau; the main body of the latter corps debouching from the Côte d'Or on the 16th at Prauthoy and Longeau, and that of the 2nd Corps not until the 17th at Selongey. The precise situation is given very succinctly by Count von Moltke:—"The advance was between the two towns of Dijon and Langres, both strongly occupied by the French. Wooded heights and deep ravines separated the columns and prevented any mutual support; each had to provide for its own safety on every side. The troops had severe fatigues to encounter, and badly as they needed rest, none could be granted, nor could the evil plight of their boots and the horses' shoes be in any way remedied." When it is taken into consideration that these Army Corps had been marching on an average ten miles a day during the preceding fortnight, and when it is remembered that the roads were covered with mud, snow, and ice by turns, the magnitude of the undertaking will be better understood. Such was the rapidity of the advance, that the train of the 14th Division had been left behind. And, notwithstanding the somewhat

exhausted condition of the men and horses, they were expected to make even greater efforts to reach the army of Bourbaki, which was supposed to be sorely pressing the numerically inferior army of Werder. The shoes of the men were in no condition to undertake a further advance, and the horses' shoes required roughing to enable them to carry their riders and to haul their loads, but nothing could be done in the pressing circumstances of the case, and the corps had to make the best of their way under conditions extremely trying to the commanders as well as to their men and horses.

In the exceptional circumstances it was necessary that the commanders of the several columns should be given a very free hand. General Manteuffel's order was most carefully worded, and, while giving good advice, he left the arrangements entirely in the hands of his officers. We give some extracts from these instructions :—"Our present position is such that I shall for some days be unable to give many direct orders, all arrangements will therefore lie in the hands of the generals commanding the corps and of the leaders of the different marching columns. If the enemy opposes our march, he must be driven back. Time is here everything. Finally, I beg commanding generals to neglect nothing that can in any way contribute to the comfort and better maintenance of the troops. The simplest plan would be to issue double rations ; in the present case, however, foresight is necessary, and we must on no account endanger the future maintenance of the army. Commissariat rations, combined with a strict system of requisitioning, will be the best expedient. I hereby ratify in advance all measures for which my sanction is necessary, so that the hands of the commanding generals may not be tied by any regulations." We consider this a pattern order worthy of imitation by every Commander-in-Chief in the field—no other order could have inspired each column commander with a due sense of his responsibility and of the initiative which was expected of him by his General. What a contrast was this confiding and inspiring order as compared with some of those issued by General Bourbaki, which were full of indecision, and were at times contradictory and sometimes evinced panic. The German G.O. was calculated to secure initiative action on the part of all grades, who could safely rely upon the unqualified support of their general in almost any enterprise which they might initiate.

Wartensleben informs us that a special inspection of Etappen had been ordered for the South Army, and the Inspector-General

of the 2nd Army had sent a superior officer to Chatillon for that purpose. Unfortunately that officer, by some accident, did not receive his orders until March, and no inspection of Etappen was formed for that army during its operations. Consequently from the very outset Manteuffel's army had to operate without any Intendantur at its so-called base of operations, so that all the more credit is due to the several Generals, as well as to their divisional and brigade staffs. The columns advanced at the rate of about twelve miles a day, and the banks of the Saone were gained on the fifth day. The opposition offered to the advance of the columns was nothing compared to what it might have been. Garibaldi's troops did little more than reconnoitre towards the more southern columns, but those towards the north were engaged with some show of determination by troops from Langres; no passes or gorges were, however, held by the troops from either garrison. Neither of the Commanders at Dijon nor Langres attempted any combined action. The failure to establish a supply base at Chatillon was not destined to have any prejudicial effect upon subsequent operations, as no troops could have been spared to guard the line of communication with that post. A brigade under General Kettler was left to guard the rear of the advancing army, and to protect its line of communication. The base was almost immediately changed from Chatillon to Epinal. As has already been stated, there was no Etappen organisation at Chatillon, and the organisation for the 14th Army Corps at Epinal merely needed extension to fit it for the service of the 2nd and 7th Corps.

This change of base must have thrown a lot of additional work upon the Intendantur attached to the two corps, whose prearrangements would have been thrown quite out of gear upon so radical a change of the direction from which stores and supplies were to be procured during the subsequent operations. The supply and transport of every army should always be ready to meet unexpected changes of every description. It is useless to question their necessity, it is sufficient that they are made, and it therefore becomes the duty of both officers and men to work cheerfully and to the utmost of their capacity. At the same time it is incumbent upon the public and the army to make due allowance for any shortcomings which may result from such sudden and unexpected changes. No good whatever can come from "grousing"; if an officer believes himself to be hardly used by a sudden change of base, he will adopt the wisest course by setting his feelings and ideas aside, and turn to with a

will to do his work over again. As a matter of fact no officer has any right even in his own occult mind to question the order of his superior, his duty is to obey his orders and carry them out to the best of his ability. Ill-temper and grievances do more than anything else to unfit officers or men to perform their work efficiently.

The German Official Account gives us important information upon the supply of these corps :—"When, after the formation of the South Army, in the month of January, the 2nd and 7th Army Corps proceeded to the southern theatre of war, the difficulties greatly increased. The 2nd Army Corps had left Paris at first sufficiently provided with supplies. In the 14th Corps the trains, on account of bad weather and roads, were not always able to follow. The 14th Division had not been able to bring up its trains from the north, so that the 7th Army Corps, up to the middle of January, had but three commissariat columns and two hundred and seventy auxiliary wagons at its disposal. The 14th Army Corps, in this respect, remained dependent on its own resources, while for the other two corps the Intendant of the 7th Army Corps took over the supply ; a commissariat dépôt was at the same time created at Chatillon-sur-Seine. But as an Etappen line could not be organised at first at that place, the supplies from the line Nancy-Chatillon were brought to Epinal, and with those still remaining to the 14th Corps, united here to form an army magazine. The communications between this point and the troops could only be carried on by the very difficult land road. The trains required at least ten days to replenish. In consequence General von Manteuffel found himself obliged, on the 14th January, to indicate to the generals commanding the 2nd and 7th Corps the necessity of combining supply from magazines with a careful system of requisitions ; they were allowed perfect freedom of action in arranging the details."

Many French writers complain that the peasantry in this part were willing enough to supply the wants of the German Intendantur, but that they were very reluctant to meet those of their own Intendence. This was no doubt owing mainly to the fear they had of the consequences which might follow a refusal to comply with German requisitions. It is to be deplored that the French inhabitants about Pontarlier successfully concealed large quantities of supplies from their famished fellow-countrymen in their retreat, and afterwards delivered them to their German pursuers. Nothing can excuse such baseness on

the part of a civil population to its so-called defenders ; whatever the merits or demerits of the latter, they were in duty bound to alleviate their sufferings and to assist them by every means in their power ; severe punishment should always follow such unpatriotic action. The German corps were much aided in their rapid advance by the capture of large quantities of stores and supplies—as the French army retired, large consignments of supplies were abandoned at various railway stations—the captures were undoubtedly of the greatest help to the Germans, as they were practically *en l'air*, without any base of supplies.

It is certain that Manteuffel's Army Corps could not at any time during this rapid advance have suffered to any considerable extent from the lack of supplies, for no troops could have covered from ten to twelve miles daily for a whole month, over the worst of roads, and during the winter season, if they had not been well and amply fed. The fact that they accomplished their task without suffering from exhaustion sufficiently proves the contention. Again, these corps were able to deal heavy blows at their retreating foes whenever their advanced troops could get at them—this is an additional proof that their physical condition was maintained by good feeding. By the 19th January Manteuffel had gained the banks of the Saone, but upon hearing of the great victories gained by Werder on the Lisaine, he decided to abandon for the moment any intention of forming a junction with that General's army, and determined to attack the southern lines of communication by which Bourbaki's army and Besancon had been connected with Lyons and the south of France. Wartensleben tells us that "In the end this must naturally place the German army in a position with its rear towards Lyons ; thus, in the strict sense of the word, abandoning all its lines of communication. The fulfilment of such a task taxed to the very utmost the efficiency of the troops, the faculty on the part of their leaders of acting independently in cases of urgency, and the capability of the commissariat to provide for a time the necessary means of subsistence without supplies from the rear, and yet to maintain the army in perfect readiness for action. General Manteuffel was inspired with full confidence on all these subjects ; his trust was not deceived." In the meantime General Kettler, who had been left behind with the 7th Brigade, was directed to menace Dijon, in order to keep the Garibaldian army from making any attempt upon the flank of Manteuffel's columns in their movement to the southward. The advance occupied Dôle on the 21st, where it captured two hundred and

thirty truck loads of provisions, and on the following day the cavalry reached St. Vit, where thirteen additional truck loads were taken. After a battle at Dannemarrie on the 23rd, in which the French were forced to retire, Dompierre and Quingey were occupied, and the communications with Lyons effectually cut.

General Werder's army had moved towards the Doubs, and was now pressing Bourbaki's army from that direction, while Manteuffel's had cut off his retreat towards the south and west; he had therefore no way open to him except in the direction of the Swiss frontier. As has already been stated, Bourbaki's army commenced its retirement on the 26th January towards Pontarlier. The advance of Manteuffel's army was marked by the greatest care; cavalry were despatched as far south as Lons-le-Saunier, as a protection to his right flank in the turning movement. The cavalry would no doubt have raised supplies and transport as they advanced, and would have sent them to the corps by the roads converging upon their positions. Manteuffel was in pursuit of an army of more than double his numerical strength, he was not in touch with Werder's army, which was numerically inferior to his own, and it was quite on the cards that the French in their desperation might attack either army in detail. They were, however, too exhausted to undertake any such enterprise. The actual condition of the enemy's forces could not then have been known to the German commander, who did not take full advantage of his opportunity, and the general advance was not ordered before the 29th.

In accordance with his instructions, General Kettler, although his force mustered no more than 5,000 men, bravely advanced upon Dijon, and became engaged with the enemy on the 23rd January. Von Moltke tells us how well those orders were carried out during an attack upon a factory building:—“When all the senior officers had been killed, a first-lieutenant, whose horse had been shot and he himself wounded, took command of the 2nd Battalion. No sooner had the 5th Company, only forty strong, appeared from the neighbouring quarry, than they came under a hot fire from all sides. Their leader was at once wounded, and the sergeant who carried the colours fell dead after a few steps; so did the second-lieutenant and the battalion adjutant, who again raised the standard. It was passed from hand to hand, first to the officers, then to the men; every bearer fell. The brave Pomeranians nevertheless rushed on the building, but there was no entrance on that side, and at last the under-officer retreated on the quarries with the remnant

of the little band. Here, for the first time, the colours were missed. Of their own accord they went out again in the darkness to seek them, but only one man returned unwounded. It was not till afterwards that they were found by the French, shot to ribbons, in a pool of blood under the dead." These were the only colours captured by the French during the war. It was an honour to lose them in such a fashion. As Kettler was waging a very unequal fight, General Han was sent to aid him with a considerable force detached from Werder's army; he had no sooner arrived at Varris, than Garibaldi determined to evacuate Dijon, marching out on the 1st February. By this means Manteuffel's rear was practically cleared of the enemy, and his army could be supplied with food and forage without serious interruption. This duty could not have been accomplished at that epoch unless stupendous efforts had been exerted. The South Army had been operating for more than a fortnight without any base of supplies, without supply columns, and with scant, if any, reserves of food or forage; the army was in a mountainous district, sparsely inhabited, with few farms, and therefore almost destitute of food for man or beast. To intensify the difficulties of the situation, the German army had been forced to follow in the wake of the French army right up to the Swiss frontier. This part of the country had been eaten up by the irruption of the 83,000 famished soldiery of Bourbaki's defeated army. The situation of Manteuffel's army was at the moment extremely critical so far as its supplies were concerned, and it was only extricated from its difficult position by the admirable work done by the German Intendantur.

It is very evident that Werder's army could not afford any material assistance to that of Manteuffel, for we read in the official account that "the 14th Corps was specially dependent for supplies on transports from the rear, as the district to be traversed during the advance had been already exhausted. The halting day, on the 22nd January, was employed to regulate the details of the situation. Notwithstanding this, the rations between the 25th and 27th were very sparing. It was not until sufficient supplies could be sent from Dôle, and all the columns of the Army Corps had reached Dampierre, on the 30th, that the state of affairs improved again." However, Manteuffel's situation was thoroughly appreciated by the authorities at Versailles, and steps were at once taken to render him every assistance possible. The Intendant of the 2nd Army was directed to secure ten days' reserve of supplies along the line of railway

extending from Blesme to Joigny. Sufficient transport could not at first be collected for the transfer of the reserve supplies from Epinal to Vesoul, but by pressing into the service the regimental transport that object was accomplished. In the same work we are told that—"Towards the end of the operations the supply of oats and forage was difficult, especially with the troops of the South Army. The opening to traffic of the line Blesme-Dijon, which took place on the 11th February, enabled serious embarrassments to be avoided." Upon the re-occupation of Dijon a large magazine was organised for the supply of the German Corps operating in the South.

Although every effort was being made by the Head-Quarter Staff and the German Corps Commanders to meet the necessities of the army of the south, it naturally took time to accomplish what was intended to be done. Fortunately for Manteuffel's men, a large number of provision wagons, which could not keep pace with the retreating French soldiery, were captured at Pontarlier in the nick of time, otherwise the German soldiers must have suffered seriously from the privation of food. It is true that a considerable quantity of supplies were procured from the inhabitants in and about Pontarlier, but it is certain that these supplies alone could not have provided what was necessary for the maintenance of some 40,000 men and several thousands of horses during this very trying week. Owing to the rapid advance of the German army, and the consequent occupation of every road converging upon Pontarlier, it would have been impossible for the remnants of the supply columns to keep up with the advance, and the German Intendantur would have been forced to depend upon the local supplies and captures for the feeding of the army. General Manteuffel published the following order on the 2nd February :—"Soldiers of the South Army! your marches and combats amidst the snow and ice of the High Jura have not been fruitless; two eagles, twelve cannons, seven mitrailleuses, 15,000 prisoners, including two generals and many officers, several hundreds of provision wagons, and several thousand Chassepots are in your hands." The estimation in which this bold and hazardous march was held by the German Head-Quarters is best explained in Von Moltke's own words :—"General von Manteuffel had achieved the important success of his three weeks' campaign through a succession of fights, but without a pitched battle since quitting the Lisaine, simply by forced marches; such marches, indeed, as none but well-seasoned troops could have accomplished, under bold and skilful leadership,

under every form of fatigue and hardship, in the worst season of the year, and through a difficult country." He goes on to say that—"Manteuffel aimed at no further tactical results; he was anxious to save his troops from further losses, and to afford them all possible respite after their unusual exertions. Not till now was the baggage brought up, even that of the staff officers being left behind during the advance through the Jura."

The admirable mobility of Manteuffel's army was obviously secured by the abandonment of almost the whole of his baggage; he permitted nothing to be brought forward except what was absolutely indispensable; he was therefore able to advance rapidly, as his transport train had been reduced to the utmost limit. A valuable lesson is taught by this gallant and enterprising officer, but it does not appear to have impressed itself upon the minds of some of our British commanders, who during the last Boer war permitted some of the columns to encumber themselves with much that could have been left behind with advantage to mobility. One of the most notable exceptions was the march of General French's cavalry division to the relief of Kimberley, when the men marched practically as they stood up. During the initial stages of the Russo-Japanese war, the great mobility of the Japanese armies has been very apparent. This characteristic is attributable mainly, we believe, to the very moderate requirements of the Japanese soldiery, who dispense with articles of camp equipment, which are considered indispensable in other armies, and march and fight upon the most moderate allowance of food. This kind of economy may be overdone, and disease may follow and carry men off more rapidly than the fire of the enemy, but it is always a wise precaution to feed the soldiery well whenever the opportunity presents itself, so that a reserve of strength may be acquired for expenditure in the future.

CHAPTER XXVI.

SIEGE OF PARIS.

Towards the middle of October the inhabitants of Paris and its garrison commenced to feel the pinch of necessity, but the authorities do not appear to have then arrived at a sense of their true responsibility, for after experiencing nearly a month's siege, we are informed by Mr. H. Labouchere, who was correspondent for the *Daily News*, that the Government had only then instituted a new system for the distribution of meat. "Between 450 and 500 oxen and 3,500 sheep are to be daily slaughtered. This meat is to be divided into twenty lots, one for each arrondissement, the size of the lot to be determined by the number of the inhabitants. The lot will then be divided between the butchers in the arrondissement at 20 c. the kilo. below the retail price." The authorities had only then commenced to economise, but beef had become almost entirely exhausted by the end of October, and their action was really taken too late. Under date 19th October the same author continues:—"Each person now receives 100 grammes of meat per diem (3½ ounces), the system of distributing being that every one has to wait on an average two hours before he receives his meat at the door of the butcher's shop. I dine habitually at the bouillon; there horseflesh is eaten in the place of beef, and cat is called rabbit. Both, however, are excellent, the former is a little sweeter than beef, but in other respects much like; the latter something between rabbit and squirrel, with a flavour all its own. It is delicious; I recommend those who have cats with philoprogenitive proclivities, instead of drowning the kittens, to eat them; either smothered in onions, or in a ragout, they are excellent." Mr. Labouchere has not changed his opinion in regard to the edibility of cats, for in reply to an inquiry he says:—"Cats seemed to me to be much like rabbit, and I should have no objection to make my dinner of one. The best of those unusual meats, however, was donkey. This was soon perceived, and donkey's meat rose to about three times the price of horseflesh."

Upon the same subject he wrote as follows:—"In the Rue Blanche there is a butcher who sells dogs, cats, and rats. He has many customers, but it is amusing to see them sneak into the shop, after carefully looking round to make sure that none of their acquaintances are near. A prejudice has arisen against rats, because the doctors say their flesh is full of trichina. I own for my part I have a guilty feeling when I eat a dog, the friend of man. I had a slice of a spaniel the other day, it was by no means bad, something like lamb, but I felt like a cannibal. Epicures in dog's flesh tell me that poodle is by far the best, and recommend me to avoid bull-dog, which is coarse and tasteless." It is certainly useful to know what kinds of meats are edible, and which are preferable. One never knows when such information might prove of almost inestimable value to oneself, if one should ever be reduced to such straits as those which were so bravely endured by the unfortunate Parisians.

There are unmistakable indications that there were very grave faults on the part of the authorities who were responsible for and initiated the orders under which the husbanding of the reserves should have been instituted and the daily issues made. The Government authorities either did not understand their responsibilities, or they did not appreciate the necessity which existed for the exercise of their authority with the civil population in regulating the daily consumption of the necessaries of life. It is clear that the majority of the local mayors failed to grasp the magnitude of the duty entrusted to them. The work of distributing the supplies in each *arrondissement* was confided to these officials, who generally lacked the necessary experience for the efficient discharge of such important functions. An Officer of the Intendance should have been attached to each *arrondissement*; but this was impracticable in the circumstances, as they were not sufficiently numerous to meet the requirements of the army alone. The administration in some of the *arrondissements* was excellent, but in the majority the work was faulty, and the people suffered greater hardships than should have been entailed by the situation. Citizens were generally kept waiting for hours outside the issuing places awaiting their turn, and oftentimes they had to return to their homes without having secured anything, the daily supply having been exhausted before all had been satisfied. This in itself was an evidence of faulty organisation; if the daily supply was insufficient to meet the necessities of all, the quantity of the detail issue to individuals should have been proportionately reduced. The

authorities may have been well-intentioned enough, but they certainly failed to grasp the importance and magnitude of the duty entrusted to them, otherwise the people would not have had to undergo additional hardships. When the rank and file see that a bond of sympathy exists between those placed over them and themselves, they will endure far greater hardships than if that feeling is not present. During the siege of Ladysmith we have good grounds for knowing that no distinction whatever was made in regard to the issue of food and forage, whether to officers or men, they all fared alike. When Sir George White was taking leave of his men, before taking a sea voyage in order to recruit his shattered health, he apologised for having been forced by circumstances to reduce their rations, but he promised never to do so again.

M. Bourgeois informs us that on the 28th September, about forty days after the commencement of the siege, there were remaining in Paris no less than 25,000 oxen, 150,000 sheep, and 6,000 pigs. The daily issue for slaughter is stated to have been 500 oxen and 4,000 sheep, which was intended to yield rations of 500 grammes for the men, 250 for the women, and 125 for the children. These numbers should have fed Paris for 50 days at least; but we find that before the end of October the ration had been reduced to 60 grammes, about 2 ounces per head, and before the end of November there was practically no fresh beef in the city. As early as the 8th November, when it became apparent that the meat supply was on the point of failing, notwithstanding the reduction of the ration to 50 grammes, the Government decided to requisition some 2,000 of the 6,000 cows in Paris, which had hitherto been allowed to be retained by their owners, the milk being needed for the sick and wounded, the infirm, and the children. This addition should have given twenty days more meat at current rates, but it is certain that the issue of meat had practically ceased in December. If we consider the figures given and the reduction of the ration, it is certain that with proper management the issue of meat should have lasted into the new year. There was evidently something exceedingly faulty in the administration, or the speculations must have been on a very extensive scale. There are probably no circumstances in which dishonesty has greater scope than it has when associated with the issue of meat in the field.

The Government succeeded in laying in large stocks of cattle and farinaceous food. At first these reserves appear only to have been drawn upon by the poorest classes, but it is evident that the

citizens of every class soon began to avail themselves of the opportunity afforded them of purchasing bread and meat at fixed rates, even when they had ample reserves laid by in their own houses. Where the Government was at fault was in not limiting the quantities which individuals were permitted to purchase from the outset; it was only when the siege became prolonged, and the stocks showed a sensible diminution, that the authorities became alarmed, and measures were adopted for reducing the issues of meat, and of limiting the individual purchases of bread. When, however, the meat ration was reduced on the 10th October, no restriction whatever was placed upon the quantities of horse-flesh sold. With regard to the issue of bread, the authorities did not limit its issue before the middle of January, when only 300 grammes could be afforded as a full ration for adults, and half that for children. Had that rate of issue been instituted from the 1st October, it is certain that the farinaceous food could have been made to last till the end of March. Bread is very much esteemed by the French people, and there were from time to time strong expressions of discontent at the possibility of bread being rationed. The authorities were no doubt influenced to a great extent by the feeling which pervaded all ranks in regard to any curtailment of the sale of bread. We think, however, that had the question been laid before the public, there would have been not one dissenting voice raised had it been explained that the successful defence of Paris depended upon the ability of the authorities to feed the citizens. The French have their faults, but lack of common sense is not one of them.

We have here a flagrant example of the absence of back-bone on the part of the authorities, and of a desire to pander to the wishes of the people, who were ignorant of the direction in which their true interests lay. The absence of pluck on the part of the authorities to explain the precise situation was largely responsible for the capitulation. Had the Paris army been able to resist for another two months, there were indications that the Germans would have been very glad to have brought the war to a conclusion long before that term had expired. It is a very natural weakness to desire to please others, but when that inclination degenerates into a vice it should be disregarded. The authorities, both civil and military, were disinclined to run the risk of annoying either the citizens, the army, or the National Guards by a limitation of the sale of bread, meat, groceries or forage in the initial stages of the siege, although there was not even a prospective chance of relief from the outside. From the very commencement of the

siege it was an obvious conclusion that Paris would have to depend entirely upon its own powers of resistance. In the circumstances the failure of the authorities to act as they should have done aggravates their shortcomings. Many persons in authority would sacrifice their country or their countrymen rather than lose their individual popularity. This was the case with the Parisian authorities, they refused to issue so unpopular an edict directing a curtailment in the sale of supplies; they preferred to maintain their popularity at the expense of the nation. Pandering to the appetites of one's fellows at the expense of the country, is an exceedingly cheap way of purchasing popularity.

Although the prices at which beef and mutton were to be sold at the butcheries were published as late as the 9th November, we are informed that before the middle of that month all ordinary meats had disappeared from the shops, and that horseflesh alone could be procured. M. Bourgeois tells us that by the end of November a kilo. of *filet de bœuf* cost 15 fr., a fowl 25 fr., turkey 80 fr., and a rabbit 25 fr.; these high prices make it perfectly evident that the meat supply had practically become exhausted. In some souvenirs written by A.C. it is stated that about the middle of November steps were taken to reserve the remainder of the fresh meat for the sick, the wounded and the old people. It seems rather odd that meat should have been reserved for old people, who required it least of all, but A.C. may have been in error in making that statement. The same writer states that on the 8th December milk was almost exhausted, and that only 60 litres could be allotted to each arrondissement for the use of the sick and the children.

Cassell's *History of the War* tells us that the food question was discussed at a socialist club toward the end of October; the topics were touched upon in somewhat florid language:—"It was deplored that the Parisians had no longer any milk for their morning coffee; eggs are 1½d. and 2½d. apiece, salt butter is very dear, and fresh is no longer to be had. The butchers can only supply ½ or ⅓ the quantities of meat ordered by their customers; and charcoal is 6d. a bushel; while a host of working men have no other earnings than the 3d. a day paid them as National Guards. The club found fault with certain shopkeepers for concealing or raising the prices of their goods, and it appeared that a coal dealer at Montmartre was visited by a vigilance committee for the purpose of examining his stores, and obliging him to dispose of them. The club unanimously resolved that the whole population ought, like the army, to be restricted to certain

rations." It is strange that a socialist club should have advocated the vital step which the Government feared to enforce; their resolution would undoubtedly have been forwarded to the proper authorities, and yet it was not until the 15th January that bread was rationed. Meat was certainly rationed by compulsion on the 10th October, but horseflesh was then unrestricted. The club is however silent as to the fact that the National Guards declined to work, although employers were anxious and willing to engage labour, and as a result of the impossibility of procuring workmen a large number of industries were paralysed during the siege.

The situation in Paris at this epoch is very well described in Cassell's *History of the War*:—"Paris rather gained than lost confidence as day after day and week after week went by and yet the enemy refrained from opening fire on the city. It was true that some descriptions of food were getting scarce and dear, and that others had quite run out; but there was no want of absolute necessities. The food question every day pressed itself more and more upon attention. Prices became higher week by week; horseflesh, to which the Parisians had been accustoming themselves for some years, was largely eaten; and the flesh of asses was sold at 80 c. the kilo. and was very scarce. The daily supply of meat early in October was curtailed to 2½ ounces for every person in the city, and people began to talk of the nutritious qualities of bullock's blood. Holders of wheat and flour were summoned to make a return of their stocks to the Government. Beef and mutton were sometimes quite unobtainable, for although the authorities were prepared to serve out 500 oxen and 4,000 sheep a day, the butchers did not see their way to make a profit at existing prices." The *Times* correspondent wrote as follows:—"We are henceforward to be rationed for butcher's meat. This rule is to be enforced rigidly, cards being delivered at the Mairies for each household. Horseflesh is abundant, and you may indulge in that without limitation at the rate of 16 sous a pound for the choicest morsels." Horseflesh had therefore come into general use by the end of October, although horse-butcheries had been established almost from the commencement of the siege. No doubt the cheapness of horseflesh as compared with meat commended its use to the poorer classes. It is however to be feared that the majority of the carcasses that were at first on sale had been obtained from the battlefields.

We extract from M. Heylli's work an order of the Minister of Agriculture in regard to the sale of horseflesh, dated 29th October:—The prices ranged from 1·80 fr. a kilo. for fillets down

to 50 c. for the coarsest parts. The butchers were to be fined from 11 to 15 fr. if they sold at lower than the fixed rates. Only 600 horses were to be slaughtered daily. Up to this date the sale of horseflesh had not been limited, and the consumption was large even when the supply was becoming exhausted. The actual situation was accentuated by an order issued on the 29th November, under which all salt pork, hams, sausages, &c., held by the dealers and merchants were requisitioned. Declarations as to the quantities held were to be made within twenty-four hours of the publication of the order, otherwise they would subject themselves to fixed legal penalties. The prices to be paid were to be fixed by arbitrators named by either side, with reference to a third, who would be named by the president of the Chamber. We see therefore that the Parisians were in serious want of animal food by the end of November, but it is certain that in other articles well-to-do families were provided for another two months at least. The Parisians had plenty of warning as to the probabilities of a lengthened siege, and so provident a people could not have failed to lay in ample stocks of all kinds of farinaceous, vegetable, and preserved foods, besides salted meats, as well as good stocks of wine and oil. These private stocks were either unsuspected or ignored by the Government, all requisitions having been made upon dealers, except perhaps in the case of milch cows, horses, asses, and mules.

The French are an exceedingly provident and industrious people, and this trait came prominently to the front during the siege of Paris. There were of course a large number of market gardens in the environs of the city, as there are in all large towns; these afforded an ample supply of vegetables throughout the siege, assisted as they would have been by the existing stocks. The country growers were unable to bring their produce to the metropolitan markets, and the vegetable supply had to come from the environs; that supply did not fail much before January. Every square yard of ground available was utilised, both inside and outside the walls. The prices obtained distinctly prove that where the consumption of some two millions of people were concerned the rates obtained did not indicate that the scarcity was excessive up to January. The prices of turnips and carrots during October were about 2 fr. *la botte*, cauliflowers brought 2 fr. and cabbages 1 fr. apiece; but the last two rose in December to 3 fr. and 4 fr. respectively, and onions were then sold at 15 fr. a bushel. Mushrooms were sold in December for 2 fr. 40 c. a pound; they outlasted every other vegetable,

as they were grown during the cold months in cellars. Carrots were quoted at 2 fr. 80 c. a pound before the end of December, and onions were worth about 20 fr. a pound—they had been as low as 4 fr. a pound in October. It was the same with haricot beans, they had been as low as 1 fr. a pound, but rose to about 3 fr. in October, and to 5 fr. in January.

The French Government had fortunately laid in a good stock of potatoes, which were sold to the poor at about a penny a pound, which was a low rate as compared with that paid in the markets. In January the prices paid for this vegetable were from fivepence a pound upwards, until there were no longer any more to be purchased. In the matter of vegetables generally the poorer classes must have suffered very great privations, for the Government stock would hardly have lasted much beyond the end of December. There does not, however, appear to have been any serious outbreak of scorbutic affections during the siege, which points rather to the conclusion that the supply of vegetables was sufficient although not ample. The ordinary mortality arose principally from the absence of sufficient clothing during the inclement weather, which resulted in thousands of deaths from the effects of exposure to the cold and wet.

Another very important question was the supply of fuel wood and charcoal, both for cooking and heating purposes; large quantities of coal were also needed for the use of the flour mills and the manufactories of cannon, arms, shot, shell and large and small-arm ammunition, as well as for those manufactories which were able to continue working. M. Bourgeois tells us that the Government provided a reserve stock of 3,000 tons of coal to meet such requirements, but this did not contemplate any provision for the manufacture of gas, the supply of which was quickly exhausted, and Paris had to be lighted by oil lamps. With its well planted boulevards and parks Paris was not likely to find itself destitute of fuel, and when the cold weather set in these ornamental portions of the city suffered to a considerable extent. Had prompt and timely measures been adopted for the cutting down of timber with a view to its being stored at suitable dépôts for issue when needed, the boulevards and small parks would not have suffered as they did, nor would the troops and people have had to use green wood, which was not of much use either for heating or cooking purposes. The steps taken by the authorities to make good the deficiency in fuel when the supplies of the regular dealers failed, do not appear to have been taken before the immediate necessity confronted them.

Much time would naturally be consumed in the provision of depôts, the cutting of trees, the sawing of timber into convenient lengths for carriage and issue, its transportation and storage, and the issue of orders regulating its distribution. All such arrangements seem to have been left to the last moment, and the issue of fuel was made without much method or economy. The correspondent of the *Daily News* gives some information on this particular point: "The cold also produces its victims. The deaths from bronchitis are this last week" (towards the end of December) "172, those from pneumonia 147. There is plenty of warm clothing to be had, but there is a lack of fuel. Coal there is none, except for the uses of the Government; and the supply of firewood is running so short that it has been resolved to cut down the trees in the woods of Boulogne and Vincennes, and if need be in all the gardens about Paris and on the boulevards. It is better that the trees should burn than that the people should perish from cold. Part of the fatality which had pursued the Parisians was this, that when the siege began the firewood in store was about half the usual supply. The summer had been very dry; the Marne and the Seine had been unusually low, and the rafts of wood which are transported to Paris by the rivers could not be delivered in time. So it came to pass that Paris has been threatened with starvation from cold as well as with starvation from hunger." These facts must have come to the knowledge of the authorities long before it would have become necessary to meet the requirements of the case. It is therefore apparent that either carelessness or neglect was responsible for much of the sufferings which overtook the citizens in this direction. There is also reason to believe that when the wood was collected in the depôts that the arrangements made for its security were ineffective, as night after night the greater part of the wood collected in the yards was carried away by dishonest people, and sufficient did not remain to meet the requirements of the remainder. M. d'Heylli informs us that the Government appealed to the people on the 28th December to come to the assistance of the authorities in putting down such brigandage mainly in their own interests. That does not, however, dispose of the obvious fact that the yards were insecure and badly selected, and were quite unfit for the purposes for which they were intended.

The fighting around Paris during November was not very severe excepting towards the end of that month, when an attempt was made by the imprisoned army to cut its way out. Major

Blumé in his work gives some particulars of this part of the siege :—"The war party was a good deal strengthened by the news that the army of the Loire had appeared in the field and regained possession of Orleans. The news came just as the Parisians were beginning to despair of getting any help from the provinces, and served to revive a certain amount of confidence in the ultimate issue. This confidence did not, however, seem to be universally felt ; for while from the middle of November the blockading army noticed that the besieged showed a constant inclination to attempt active measures, it could not fail to notice that they were marked by a good deal of hesitation, which did not bespeak much confidence of success." A supreme effort was made to break out towards the east on the 30th November, a second attempt being made on the 2nd December. The struggle was most severe, but ended in the complete repulse of the French, whose losses, according to the German account, could not have been much under 11,000 officers and men, some 1,600 of whom were made prisoners. The German losses were not more than half those of the French, which was natural, as the latter were the more numerous, and they were attacking positions which had been rendered well-nigh impregnable. The French, however, give their losses at not much beyond 6,000 killed and wounded. Both belligerents evidently suffered severely, which would account in some degree for the period of inaction which followed.

CHAPTER XXVII.

PARISIAN INTERNAL ECONOMY.

There was perhaps no circumstance connected with the defence of Paris which cast the same measure of blame upon the Government, as the absence of foresight exhibited by that body in its conduct of a proper system under which the inhabitants and the troops might have had secured to them an unfailing supply of bread for as long a period as might be possible. Bread is the staple food of most people, but more particularly the French; it is as necessary to them as rice is to the Chinese. About the middle of December the rumour was spread that flour was failing and that the issue of bread would have to be restricted, in fact that it would have to be rationed as was then the case with meat. A Staff Officer gives an account of the panic created by this report:—"Crowds of people rushed to the bakeries of the second arrondissement seeking to be supplied. The first arrivals made provision for several days in advance, thus exhausting the stock in hand, and the later applicants had to do without any bread. This selfish exhibition compelled others to besiege the bakeries from soon after midnight, the people remaining *en queue* during the biting cold of the small hours of the morning in the hope of securing a supply of bread." The panic fortunately did not last for more than two days, as the Government issued a notice informing the people that the supply of flour was far from being exhausted, and that there was no intention of rationing bread. About six weeks later the Government was compelled to adopt that measure, when the issue had to be fixed at 300 grammes for adults and children over five years of age. The fact that the allowance had to be made as low as twelve ounces, when the usual army ration was over two pounds, sufficiently establishes the contention that the Government refused to recognise what was essential and put off the rationing of bread to the very last moment. An effort was made meanwhile to prolong the durability of the stocks of flour and wheat in hand, by the admixture of rye, bran, rice, barley, and even the sweepings of the storehouses in the

manufacture of the bread ; the result being that a very inferior article was produced, and the people grumbled accordingly. However, a Prussian officer, who managed to secure a piece of this much abused bread, stated that he found it good and palatable. It is tolerably certain that when the authorities found themselves in a hole, they were not very particular as to the methods employed in order that they might extricate themselves with some show of having really accomplished their duty to the people.

The consideration of this question brings more and more to light the fact that the Government was sadly negligent in the duty it owed to the nation in at first neglecting to secure an almost unlimited supply of cereals, and afterwards in not taking the necessary steps for preventing waste and for economising the supply in hand to the utmost. The authorities had ample knowledge of the existing stock of cereals, for as early as the 28th October it was forced to requisition all the breadstuffs held by private people in Paris. From an order issued on the 11th December, by which bakers were forbidden to manufacture biscuits of all kinds for private consumption or sale, it is evident that the moneyed classes were purchasing stocks of biscuits in order to meet future necessities. Such wastage cannot be too severely condemned, in all probability the major portion of the secreted reserves could never have been consumed during the continuance of the siege, and amounted to nothing short of the reckless waste of valuable defensive material. Again, on the 17th January the bakers were forbidden to sell bread to any but those having cards, and only to the extent of the quantities therein directed. From that order it is apparent that sales were being made as the bakers felt inclined, or more probably according to the amount of bribery and corruption. Up to the middle of January no method had been established for either the sale or the equal distribution of bread. It was a case of first come first served, and those who possessed the means could outbid and rob those who were not so favoured. The ration card for bread was not required before the 17th January; it contained the number of rations sanctioned daily to the individuals named, and whether for men, women, or children. The issues made were noted under the dates by the issuing baker. Anyone convicted of fraud in connection with the card would be liable to imprisonment for from six months to three years. The precautionary measures adopted by the Government cannot be regarded otherwise than as most severe, but they were unfortunately put in force about four months too late. Nothing can excuse the negligence and want of

prescience on the part of the authorities, who must have been perfectly well aware that during the first three months of the siege the cereals were becoming rapidly exhausted by extravagant consumption and waste ; it was their duty to check such wholesale consumption, but they preferred to effect a suicidal conciliation of the masses rather than do their duty. There was absolutely no excuse in the fact that no one anticipated that the siege of Paris could have been maintained for a period of more than two months. The duty of the Government was plain, it had to provide for every possible contingency, not for probabilities. It was within the range of possibility that Paris might be besieged throughout the following winter, and when, on the 27th October, Metz surrendered, the only remaining French field army was captured, it became an absolute certainty that the siege would be prosecuted indefinitely ; still the Government stirred neither hand nor foot to prolong the resistance so far as food could contribute to that object. Certainly all cereals were commandeered on the 28th, but no steps were taken to enforce economy in their use or distribution. The Republican Government was even more to blame in its conduct of the war than the Imperial was in precipitating it. One cannot help feeling some sense of gratification when the want of preparedness on the part of the French is compared with the absence of sufficient preparation on our part for the contest in South Africa. We were forced into the war to repel the invasion of our South African colonies, and were obliged to carry our men, munitions and supplies a distance of about 9,000 miles ; in the circumstances there was obvious and sufficient excuse for our being taken somewhat unawares, particularly as the Government did not expect an outbreak of war. In the case of the French it was otherwise—they were the invaders at first ; they were the makers of the war, and should have made their arrangements with that object in view—they were fighting in their own country, and the over-sea transport was entirely eliminated. Yet the press and people of the Continent generally have condemned the Government and people of this country for having neglected to make efficient and sufficient preparations before entering upon that war.

During December, owing mainly to the coldness of the weather, both belligerents refrained from embarking in any warlike operations. The French built up their hopes upon the efforts Gambetta was making to organise armies to march to the relief of Paris, and the Germans were busying themselves with the preparations which were being at length rapidly advanced

for the effective bombardment of that city ; in the meantime it was hoped and expected that the provisions stored in that great fortress must very shortly become exhausted, and that a bombardment would not be needed. Meanwhile the citizens and troops were suffering more from the cold weather and lack of fuel and clothing than from want of food. Mr. O'Shea gives us some interesting particulars of their sufferings in his *Iron-bound City* :—"The pinched worn faces of begging children made appeal at every street corner and at the door of every restaurant. Only one diminutive plate of meat (so-called by courtesy) was to be had for each customer at Duval's well-known houses. A couple of carcasses of wolves were to be seen outside a butcher's stall in the Faubourg St. Honoré ; the herd of antelopes at the Jardin d'Acclimatation had been sold off at a rate which took one's breath away to hear ; water-rats and the domestic cat fetched fancy prices ; a friend of mine had been offered 100 fr. for a fat poodle ; and the man who can have a pound of marbly steak cut from the rump of a horse on his table for Christmas dinner, will be a niggard if he does not invite at least one friend to handle a fork with him." He gives a vivid description of his being *en queue* outside a baker's shop waiting to purchase his allowance of bread. He had taken his place behind a woman who whiled away the time by chaffing those who arrived later than herself, and for whom she predicted no bread. When it came to her turn the door of the bakery was slammed to and she was told that the bread for the day was exhausted. The poor woman swooned away, exclaiming :—" *Mes pauvres enfants.*" She was soon restored to consciousness, and a little man, who had been served before her, quietly put his bread into her pocket and disappeared. He adds that upon one occasion he was almost famished, when a friendly lady gave him a large piece of bread. M. de Ponchalon gives us a description of his New Year's dinner :—"The superior officers of the Moulin-Sequet invited several friends to dinner in the evening, which was passed gaily. Our cook surpassed himself : with horse, with rice, and biscuit *pilé*, he discovered a way of making dishes which we found excellent, even a *bombe glacée à la Sebastopol.*" A Breton Mobile tells us that the officers of his corps gave a dinner on Christmas day in Paris. The menu was as follows :—Potage tapioca—sardines—Borcelli aux tomates—Andouillettes—Vol-au-Vent champignons—Filet de Cheval—Dindonneau truffé—Petit pois—Salade—Fromage—Pommes, Raisins, Amandes—Bordeaux, Zucco, Pomard, Champagne, Curaçoa, Anisette. The Sergeant Major of the battalion dined

with the officers, and the *sous-officiers* were asked to drink punch and hot wine at 8 p.m. The instances are quoted as giving an illustration of the best that could be done in the circumstances of a close siege by those who had the best opportunities for securing the choicest viands which were procurable. What a dreadful aspect the other side of the picture must have presented ?

Towards the end of December the situation became more and more acute. Meat had entirely disappeared, and horseflesh was not too plentiful, and in order to add to the meat supply, the animals in the Jardin d'Acclimatation had to be slaughtered for food. Elephants, lions, tigers, giraffes, deer, and other animals were handed over to the butchers, but the monkeys were spared for obvious reasons. Mr. O'Shea assures us that as much as 80,000 fr. was asked for the hippopotamus. Elephants' flesh was also in great demand so long as it was procurable, and the same may be said of all the other strange foods which were then universally used in Paris. M. de Mazade tells us that it was estimated that by the 11th November 27,523 cats had been eaten, which after all is a very insignificant quantity of food amongst so many mouths ; so large a number of the feline species could not have produced sufficient meat to afford more than about one ounce for every individual. He also states that it was estimated that on the 26th November there were twenty-five millions of rats available for consumption, but they had to be caught. If any reliance could be placed upon that estimate, the rats constituted an appreciable factor in the resisting force, as the food derived from this mass of rodents would have kept Paris in meat for nearly a fortnight on the reduced ration which was in force in December. So large was the consumption of the flesh of dogs, cats, and rats, that the Government deemed it advisable to warn the people that scientists quite approved of the consumption of the food produced from these animals, but it was considered advisable that the meat of rats should be well boiled in water before being prepared for the table, in order that any trichinossæ should be destroyed in case they existed. Dogs' meat sold at from 2 fr. upwards a pound ; cats meat brought about 5 fr. to 12 fr. for the carcass, according to its weight and condition ; rats were sold at about 1 fr. a-piece. M. de Mazade tells us that the menu cards at the restaurants were embellished with the heads of horses, camels, elephants, dogs, bats, rats, and strange birds. He describes the soups as peculiar, the *entrées* usually consisted of dogs, rats, *cheval*

à la mode, &c., the roasts were of antelope, mule, horse, ass, and elephants' flesh. Vegetables were then rare, consisting mainly of *petit pois* in various stages of decomposition. The entremets and dessert are stated to have been more than peculiar. The restaurants were forced to close their doors towards the end of December, owing to the impossibility experienced in obtaining anything to cook. Up to that time tolerable dinners could be procured at about 5 fr. a head and upwards. A citizen gives the following prices as ruling towards the end of November :— Potatoes were scarce, and were worth 1 fr. 50 c. the *boisseau* ; eggs about 50 centimes apiece, a fowl 20 fr., a goose 50 fr., a rabbit 30 fr., a turkey 50 fr., salt butter 16 fr. a pound., a hare 40 fr., a pheasant 45 fr., gudgeons 6 fr. a pound, tench 4 fr., bream 15 fr., and carp 16 fr. a pound ; and milk cost from 60 to 70 c. a litre when it could be procured. It will be seen therefore that up to and inclusive of December the inhabitants of Paris were able to procure a fair enough change of diet if they possessed the means to invade the restaurants, whither the greater part of the best provisions found their way.

The German forces surrounding Paris had two principal duties to accomplish—firstly, the complete isolation of the fortress, with its two millions of defenders and inhabitants, from the outside world ; secondly, sufficient troops, in addition to those employed in the investment, had to be collected to prevent the French from raising the siege by attacks from the north, south, or west, all of which quarters were for a lengthened period open to the French field armies. Those attacks, as has already been shown, were successfully warded off by the armies of Manteuffel in the north, by Von Werder in the east, and by the Duke of Mecklenburg and General Von der Tann in the south and west. During December the armies of Bourbaki and Garibaldi were giving employment to large German forces in the eastern theatre of war, and in the west a large French army was being concentrated under General Chanzy. The German Headquarters Staff found their time fully engaged with the efforts which it was necessary to put forward to stop the advance of the armies sent for the relief of the besieged fortress, and the prosecution of the siege operations was proportionately neglected ; it was still hoped that the want of provisions would compel Paris to surrender ; but the Germans had miscalculated the available resources of that fortress and the extent of French pertinacity. Had the French authorities exercised the same qualities of mind in their preliminary arrangements as they did in those towards the termination of the siege, it

is more than likely that the resources of France could have been strengthened and augmented by the additional force which would have been gained thereby, and that in the end the Germans would have become so worn out as to be glad to make almost any terms, certainly more favourable than those which were eventually accepted, when France was virtually on her back. An immense amount of work had to be undertaken by the investing army before the siege artillery could be got into position, many of the guns had to be brought from Germany, but a large number became available after the fall of Metz. The transportation of these and the necessary ammunition involved considerable delay, and it was not before the last few days of December that the investing army found itself in a position to commence the bombardment.

The duties which devolved upon the German Intendantur towards the end of the year must have been stupendous, as the army in the field then numbered nearly a million of men, besides a large number of horses, which could not have totalled under two hundred thousand head. These numbers would have required the daily collection of about 4,000 tons weight of food and forage, the major part of which had to be brought over a distance of about 400 miles of railway from the German frontier dépôts. General Pierron estimates the daily weight required for the armies surrounding Paris, exclusive of meat, as nearly 1,800 tons. The German official account tell us that magazines were established for the 3rd Army at Versailles and Corbeil, and for the Meuse Army at Chantilly. The country was requisitioned as much as was found practicable, and purchases for cash were made the rule. Thrashing machines, mills, and bakeries were worked, and by ready money payments, opening markets, and by keeping open the communications as much as possible, such an impulse was given to contracts, that from the end of October the current supply, so far as it was not brought by rail or delivered by the contractors (presumably German) into the magazines direct, could be regarded as secured. Moreover, the issue of preserved rations, for which a new factory had been established at Frankfort-on-the-Maine, in addition to those at Berlin and Mainz, was materially increased. This description of food had the advantage in being light for transportation, and the troops, especially those on outpost duty, were more easily able to prepare it for consumption. The unavoidable sameness of the ration was mitigated by the large stores of wine found in the neighbourhood of Paris, which were issued liberally, and an occasional issue of an extra ration of

brandy was made. The feeding of the troops was considerably facilitated by the opening towards the end of November of the traffic by rail to Gonesse, Mitry, and Lagny. The relief thereby given to the wagon park chiefly served the purposes of the siege artillery, but it was not until the end of the year that the constant blocks on the railway could be prevented, and the trade carried on with the regularity desirable. It was stated by some of those who passed through railway junctions in both France and Germany at this epoch, that masses of supplies and forage were detained in sidings for weeks, and in one instance a train of trucks laden with oats or wheat had become so damaged by rain and exposure, that during a spell of warm weather the grain sprouted, and the sprouts penetrated the coverings and presented all the appearance of cultivated fields. Losses of this description are often attributed to the neglect or incapacity of individuals, when, as a matter of fact, they result from the exigencies of the service; and that unfortunate army department, the supply, is as a rule blamed for every loss of like description; it boots little whether the damage may have been incurred in order that the line of railway might be kept clear for the passage of troops, siege trains, ammunition, clothing or stores, the conclusion has always been the same—"A rotten Commissariat"! We believe that the spread of knowledge in matters concerning the constitution and working of the Army has tended to mitigate, if it has not entirely stopped, the formation of such unreasonable and fallacious opinions.

The position of the German forces surrounding Paris was infinitely preferable to that of the French field armies who were seeking to relieve Paris, during a very inclement season, without any sufficient camp equipment. The Germans were in the occupation of Versailles, St. Germain, Argenteuil, Le Bourget, Champigny, Choisy-le-Roi, and other smaller places, where large numbers could procure comfortable quarters, the majority of the inhabitants having fled to other parts of the country. Hospitals were established in the roomy palace at Versailles, and it should be stated to the credit of the German soldiery that there were very few instances of the wanton destruction of either private or public property. The works of art collected in that palace were preserved to the French nation by the feelings of humanity which pervaded all ranks of the German army. With the German troops there was no lack of fuel or food, they were living upon full rations, whereas, towards the end of the siege, the poor French soldiery were reduced to feeding upon half rations of bread

and a few ounces of horseflesh. That condition of affairs was sufficient to secure the success of the German arms, without taking into account the effects of the severe bombardment to which Paris was subjected at the end of December and during the first weeks of January. The success or non-success of military operations depends, much more than is generally supposed upon the commissariat arrangements in the field. An army which is well fed can do twice the work that an ill-fed army can accomplish. The marching and fighting capacity of the men and horses and their mobility is increased by good and regular feeding. Troops should not be over-fed or pampered in the field; sufficient good, wholesome food, varied by changes of diet, is all that is really needed if mobility is desired. Anything of a luxurious character is hurtful to the soldier, and likely to impair his capacity for fighting and marching.

There are probably no events which may occur during a campaign which will throw more light upon the management of supplies than the truth as to the way in which the soldiers were actually fed. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us the menu of a German Major's mess serving in the advanced posts on Christmas day, Soups: Liebig's extract, fish sardines, caviare. Entrées: goose sausage, ham sausage, a variety of undistinguishable sausage. *Pièces de résistance*: boiled beef and macaroni, roast mutton, and potato salad. Divertissement: *schrinken*, compôte of pears, ditto of apples, preserved sour kroust, cheese, fresh butter, fruits, nuts, biscuits, tarts, &c. The potables were a barrel of Frau Majorin's beer, good red wine, and iced champagne. A German officer gives us a vivid description of the way his men were regaled on Christmas day by the officers of the battalion in a large hall in the city of Versailles. A huge tree was decorated in the usual manner with candies, gilt balls, parcels of sweets, nuts, fruit, &c. Great cauldrons of punch were prepared for the refreshment of the men. The entertainment was opened by the singing of a Christmas hymn, which was followed by loyal toasts and patriotic songs. This was succeeded by a lottery, the prizes consisting of warm woollen socks and mittens, tobacco, cigars, and other things which had been sent from Germany by kind sympathisers. Before leaving the hall each man was presented with a huge German bun, which had been manufactured out of French flour and sugar. It is certain that the German soldiery as a rule received full rations throughout the operations; there were no doubt short intervals of want, more particularly at the commencement

of the campaign, when the railway lines had as much as they could do to carry the soldiers to the frontier, as well as the ammunition and ambulances, the supplies and transport trains had for the moment to be abandoned, and afterwards when forced marches had to be undertaken, the comforts of the soldier had to be sacrificed. On the other hand, towards the end of the siege the French soldiers had to live on less than a pound of inferior bread, about a couple of ounces of horseflesh, a pint of wine, little if any vegetable food, and a very diminishing grocery ration. A Parisian tells us that in the utilisation of the horse as food nothing was lost: black-puddings were manufactured from the blood and sausages from the offal. The feet, noses, and ears of the animals, which were then deemed fit for human food, were then considered the tit-bits. He gives the menu of his dinner about the middle of November:—"Tapioca soup, fillet of horse, fried cauliflower, apples and pears." The soldiery rarely fared as well as the civil community, who had store rooms for laying in stocks, which the soldier did not possess. For that reason alone the personnel of the commissariat of every army should be ample and as efficient as possible, and the utmost latitude should be given its officers in order that they may secure for the men ample provision.

Major Blumé in his book gives us a very full account of the preliminary arrangements made by the Germans for the bombardment of Paris. The initial difficulties appear to have been the distance of the railhead from Villacoublay, where the park was to be established, some eleven miles, and the difficulty in procuring four-wheeled wagons in France, the two-wheeled carts being either too heavy in draught or too light to carry heavy ammunition. The ammunition for 230 siege guns had to be brought to the front, which involved the carriage of 125,000 rounds, which was no light matter, considering the very bad state of the roads from snow, rain, and frost. No more than 300 serviceable wagons could be collected from the surrounding districts, 84 of which were four-wheelers, whereas 1,750 vehicles were needed for this service and for the supply of the several batteries from the park. It became necessary therefore to procure from Germany perfectly equipped ammunition columns, twenty-four of which were despatched from that country during December; they each consisted of forty-four horsed wagons. Previous experience had shown the Germans that Frenchmen were not to be depended upon for employment with their ammunition columns, and it became necessary to organise train

companies in Germany in order that the transport, requisitioned in the district, should be manned by Germans and not by Frenchmen. A relay service had been established between Nanteuil and Villacoublay, so that by the end of the year the first supply of ammunition had been established at the latter place, and the regular arrival of a sufficient supplementary supply was secured. A correspondent of the *Daily News* says :—" Highly creditable to the German besiegers are the friendly and indeed cordial relations which they have contrived to establish with the villagers around Paris. These indeed are mostly of the humbler classes, either labouring folk or the servants left in villas, and nothing could exceed the kindness with which they are treated by those whom circumstances have so strangely placed among them ; while they, on their part, appear to feel and appreciate this kindness. They are all picking up some German, while the German soldiers are becoming quite proficient in a guttural broken French." This observer seems to have been somewhat deceived by appearances, the practical experience of the Germans proved that they were playing their own game, and were ready to " round " on their protectors whenever occasion offered. It is distinctly an unwise policy to employ one's enemies in any position where it may be in their power either to retard military operations or to inflict serious injury. It is, however, a wise policy to conciliate the inhabitants of an invaded country, and to give them such employment as it may be possible to trust them with, without jeopardising any military operations. If due caution be exercised in utilising the labour of the enemy there will be little danger of any evil resulting therefrom, but that labour should be paid for at fair rates. By such methods bitter enemies may be converted into complacent foes, and their opportunities for inflicting harm upon the invader would become minimised, if they were not entirely eliminated. In any case the military operations could not fail to gain much by such labour judiciously employed.

CHAPTER XXVIII.

BOMBARDMENT OF PARIS.

By the last week in December the German Headquarter Staff considered that their arrangements were sufficiently advanced to admit of the commencement of the bombardment of Paris and its forts. Fire was opened on the 27th December upon Mont Avron and the forts on the east side of the fortress, which were situated about three miles in advance of the enceinte, consequently the shot and shell of the enemy's batteries were not likely to penetrate beyond the ramparts of the city. The largest guns employed by the besiegers were rifled twenty-four pounders, but rifled mortars of about 8½ inches calibre were also used. When however this formidable armament was employed from the batteries on the southern face at Clamart, Chatillon, and Bagneux, against the forts d'Issy, Vanvres, and Montrouge, the result to Paris became very changed, as the forts named were not a mile and a half in advance of the walls of the fortress. Thus were the inhabitants of Paris brought face to face with a new and terrible danger; to the pangs of hunger, and to the ravages caused by the cold owing to the want of a sufficiency of food, fuel, and clothing, were added the dangers arising from the vertical fire of shot and shell. The French patriots in the Provinces were using every possible means in their power in the organisation of a relief force for Paris, and it was only natural that the Germans should exert themselves to obtain their main object, which was the reduction of the French capital. It may seem to have been a somewhat severe form of coercion to have employed, but the Germans had already failed to bring about the capitulation by starvation, owing to the enormous accumulation of supplies which had been concentrated within the walls of the fortress, mainly by private individuals. The Germans had effectually closed all approaches to the city, and very little, if anything, could be got into Paris after the investment was undertaken by the armies of the Crown Princes of Prussia and Saxony. No other course was open to the German Headquarters but to direct that the arrangements for an immediate bombardment should be advanced as quickly as was possible.

The Parisians, as well as the beleaguered French army, were beginning to feel the serious hardships and the irksomeness of the siege, which had lasted over one hundred days, but the horrors of a bombardment seriously added to their woes. By the middle of December the poorer classes, who had exhausted what little stocks they had managed to lay by, were entirely dependent upon what food it was then possible to procure from the distributing agents of their several arrondissements. From the various statements made, which are not always entirely in agreement, it is tolerably clear that at that period no adults received more than one and a half pounds of food daily, inclusive of bread, meat, vegetables, and groceries, and many, it is to be feared, received considerably less. With the object of reducing the risk of starvation, and in order that the poorest might be afforded the chance of obtaining a hot meal, soup kitchens were instituted in several parts of Paris, where a bowl of so-called soup could be obtained by the destitute. It is more easy to imagine of what that soup was not manufactured than of what it actually was composed; the usual ingredients employed in compounding that article of diet were conspicuous by their absence, as meat and vegetables were not procurable at that period of the siege, and the heads and bones of horses had to be depended upon mainly for the production of that kind of food. From seven hundred to eight hundred horses were killed daily for the feeding of the people and the army, and it is certain that nothing of what was not fit to issue was kept out of the soup, excepting perhaps the very worst of the offal and the iron shoes. The bombardment added enormously to the miseries of these unhappy people; women and children were slain in the streets by the explosion of shells, houses and public buildings were ignored and destroyed by the continuous dropping fire. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us an amusing incident of the bombardment:—The *gamin* of the streets did not fail to gain his share of amusement out of what became a serious hardship to others. “When they see a man or woman particularly well dressed, say a man glorious in furs, that argue an extraordinary care of his person, they cry out, ‘Flat, flat, a shell, a shell! Down on your faces.’ The man, gorgeous in furs, falls flat on the ground—perhaps in the gutter—and the Parisian urchin rejoices with exceeding great joy.”

The same writer gives us a very full description of the effect of the German shell fire upon the city and its people. Shells burst in the gardens of the Invalides, upon the Observatory, upon the Boulevard d’Enfer, and upon the Pantheon, where the

Germans imagined a powder magazine had been secured. Unfortunately this building, with other public buildings, had been used as a refuge for scores of men, women and children.—“A cantinière is in her bed, sound asleep, and dreaming doubtless of her gallant regiment; a shell kills her in her sleep. A dozen people are drinking in a cabaret; a shell comes to scatter them. A mother is sitting at table with her two daughters; a shell smashes into the room, but does them no harm. In a house hard by it bursts on two babies in their cradles; the mother rushes in terror stricken, and swoons with joy to find that her babies are unhurt. In one of the houses some soldiers are cooking their dinner; a shell comes tumbling into the pot, and the dinner is dissipated, but the soldiers are untouched. In another house a celebrated painter is working at his easel; a shell plunges into his studio, destroys his pictures, but does him no bodily harm.” The series of wonderful escapes recorded by that correspondent in some degree bears out the contention that artillery fire does not cause the amount of harm with which it has usually been credited. In the days of the Peninsular war the trajectory was much lower and the ranges were shorter than they were during the Franco-German war, which may in some degree account for their somewhat lessened destructive results; the mowing down process by either shot or shell has entirely disappeared. The moral effect of the bombardment upon the French was enormous; their capital was being destroyed by the bombs of the hated Germans, the lives of their citizens were being imperilled at every hour of the day and night; the situation was intolerable to a proud and confident people. Anything was better than the wholesale destruction which was being wrought, and capitulation suddenly presented itself as the only means by which a change could be effected in the situation; but a last desperate effort had to be made by the French army on the 19th January before the terms of a capitulation could be seriously entertained.

Much dissatisfaction was felt that no efforts had been made by General Trochu to either cut his way out of Paris with the field army, or to harass the enemy during the first three weeks of December. No doubt the coldness of the weather and the exhaustion caused by short rations had induced the Generals not to call upon their men for any extraordinary exertions, but the people being angry and discontented were inclined to find fault with anyone. A safety valve was needed, and General Trochu was obliged to do what he could to allay the discontent;

hence the grand sortie of the 21st December, when the German garrison in the occupation of the Bourget was suddenly attacked without any satisfactory resultant issues to the French. As the French were working from interior lines, they could concentrate large forces at any given point with the utmost expedition, so that advantage in attacking lay entirely with them. On the other hand, the French soldiery were much exhausted by exposure to cold and hunger, and had become even more inferior to the Germans in physique than they were at the commencement of the war. Furthermore, the French garrison, although numbering some 400,000 men, were composed mainly of National Guards and Mobiles; the former constituted one-half the fighting strength, and had been almost unemployed during the siege, excepting for the defence of the walls and bastions of the city. As a matter of fact these men led a lazy and in many cases a dissolute life, but it was now determined to make use of them as real soldiers. The Mobiles had done excellent service for their country in the forts, batteries, and trenches surrounding Paris, it was now the turn of the National Guards to show that they could fight as well as they could agitate and grumble. The French soldiers were to be given a last chance of turning the tide of war which had set in so persistently against the country, and the National Guards were to play a conspicuous part in the attempt to improve the existing condition of affairs. An army of 100,000 men had been collected to the rear of Mont Valérien during the night, and under cover of its guns the several divisions were moved in the early morning against the German lines on the western face. The French gained some temporary successes, as they at first managed to overwhelm the Germans by superior numbers; but on the arrival of reinforcements the attack was met successfully, and the French were forced to retire in a somewhat exhausted condition, after fighting for twelve hours. The half-starved condition of the French troops no doubt prevented them from putting forward the efforts needed for the retention of the positions gained, and they were forced to retreat. The losses of the French were exceedingly heavy as compared with those of the Germans; this would be partly accounted for from the fact that the French attacked well-selected positions, and their physical weakness would no doubt have caused many to succumb from exhaustion or from slight wounds.

We regard this incident as demonstrating the disadvantages a half-fed army is likely to experience when engaged with a

properly fed soldiery. The losses sustained by the French were about 10 to 1 as compared with those of the Germans. We incline to the belief that our heavy losses in South Africa from sickness and wounds resulted in no insignificant degree from the inferior physique and youth of a large proportion of our soldiery, combined with the heavy work, forced marches, disturbed rest, and short rations which were entailed by the exigencies of the service during the first six months of the war. And their physique is not surprising when we remember that the great majority of our men are recruited from the populace of our large cities. We have every reason to expect that the increase of pay will draw a better class of men to the colours, and that all the recruits of the future will be efficient in every respect. One intelligent and efficient soldier is worth half a dozen weedy men who neither march nor shoot as they should. From an economical point of view it is better to feed an army of efficient well, than half a dozen armies of inefficient badly. Mobility is gained by the employment of the former, and the reverse with the latter. The Boers enjoyed a distinct advantage over our soldiery in regard to bringing up; they were used to campaigning, even the boys were accustomed to live in the saddle, and their out-of-door life fitted them eminently to endure the rigours of life in the field. As a natural consequence the Boers were a stronger and healthier body of men than our own; the filthy condition of their encampments could not have been withstood except by men having an enormous reserve of health to fritter away; under like conditions our men would have died like rotten sheep. The improvement in the physique of the French soldiery, or, to be more correct, of the whole nation—for all are soldiers—has made great progress during the last thirty years. The Frenchman of to-day is quite as robust as his German neighbour—no two average Germans would now equal three Frenchmen in weight. We candidly believe the universal drilling of all Frenchmen is accountable for much of this remarkable improvement in the race. May we follow so good a lead.

Every effort was made to raise the drooping spirits of the Parisians; some of the theatres opened their doors to the public. Mr. O'Shea tells us that the Ambigue Comique was the first to set the example, and others quickly followed suit, but the majority had lost most of their actors and actresses, who had fled from the city so soon as it became certain that a siege was imminent. An artist, who made some characteristic sketches during the siege, depicted an actress studying her part in a

cellar surrounded by barrels of wine and other stores—the picture was illustrative of the shifts to which most of the inhabitants were put during the siege. It was a fortunate circumstance for the Parisians that almost every house was provided with extensive cellarage for the storage of wine, wood, and coal, as this afforded them ample accommodation for their reserves of supplies, and gave those living on the south side of the Seine good protection during the disastrous bombardment. French people are naturally light-hearted, but there were many causes which tended to depress the Parisians in addition to the serious reduction of the food supplies during December and January. The weekly death rate was increasing by leaps and bounds towards the end of the year, owing mainly to the want of sufficient food, clothing, and fuel. The deaths from bronchitis, pneumonia, diarrhoea, and other kindred diseases increased enormously. Again, the usually brilliantly lighted boulevards and streets were plunged into comparative darkness at night, except for the flickering light given by an occasional oil lamp. Gas could not be manufactured owing to the lack of a sufficient stock of coal, so that at night Paris was no longer gay with its wonted illuminations. The destruction of parts of the city by the bombs of the enemy, and the cutting down of the trees lining the boulevards, would alone have been sufficient to have embittered the lives of a much less sensitive people. The Parisians were rendered well-nigh desperate by their reverses, and their cup of bitterness overflowed when the hated German desecrated the sacred precincts of their beautiful city by his presence. All these circumstances contributed largely towards the development of that insurrection which was shortly to work more evil to beautiful Paris than the guns of her enemies.

The advance of the 2nd German army under Prince Frederick Charles was somewhat delayed after the fall of Metz by the despatch of the large number of French prisoners to Germany, and by its having to march through a country which had already been depleted of its supplies by the other German armies, as well as by those French divisions and *Franc-tireurs* who had already drawn so heavily upon its resources. There was the fear that the French armies operating in the eastern theatre of war under Cambriels, Garibaldi, and others might seriously threaten the left flank of that army in its advance upon Paris. Indeed, the Etappen troops belonging to the 2nd Army were driven out of Chatillon on the 9th November by a portion of Garibaldi's forces, and later on the advance of the army was

menaced when Bourbaki's army came into the field. Had that General been content to make a more contracted turning movement, he would certainly have seriously threatened the left flank and rear of Prince Frederick Charles' army, and might have cut his communications. The apathy of the Garibaldian forces, and the bad generalship of Bourbaki, saved the 2nd German army from an opposition which would have further impeded its advance at a period when delay would have had a highly prejudicial effect upon its supply operations, which were even then greatly hampered by the dearth in the country and by the difficulty of bringing forward supplies from the frontier. As it was, Prince Frederick Charles was able to advance almost unmolested, notwithstanding the fact that there were considerable French forces available to attack his flank, and he was able to attack the large French army being massed in advance of Orleans. The great battle of Beaune-le-Rolande was soon fought, and although the French were numerically superior, the Germans managed to gain a decisive victory, and Orleans again came into their possession.

This victory completed the despair of the inhabitants of Paris, and very little hope was left to them of relief after the fall of Orleans on the 4th of December. This defeat compelled a portion of the French southern army to cross the Loire, which constituted the nucleus for what afterwards became the army under Bourbaki; the remainder of the defeated army eventually became augmented into a very powerful force in the west under Chanzy. It was the defeat of this army by Prince Frederick Charles which destroyed the last vestige of any possible relief of Paris which the Government at Bordeaux could organise. The resistance in sorely stricken Paris was almost at an end, with a starving populace, and a discontented soldiery, its staying powers were ebbing fast; but what was to be deplored even more than the hardships suffered by the inhabitants, was the effect which those calamities produced upon a very large section of the community; instead of bowing their heads to the inevitable, these people kicked against their misfortunes, and in the end succeeded in aggravating them outrageously. With a population on the verge of revolt, with exhausted storehouses, with increasing mortality from cold, want of clothing, and insanitation, the local Government had nothing before it but to capitulate upon as favourable terms as might be procurable.

Accordingly M. Jules Favre proceeded to Versailles on the 23rd January to negotiate terms. An armistice of three weeks

was arranged. The city was to be re-victualled at once. We are informed by the official account that the German Intendantur was ordered to aid the French as far as possible, and that on the 28th January considerable quantities of supplies were placed at the disposal of the authorities, who, however, did not draw more than 35,000 cwts. of flour and four million rations of preserved meat and bacon, equivalent to about two days' consumption for both soldiers and civilians. From the context it is inferred that the French Government would have had to pay for whatever supplies were handed over by the Germans. However, one of the conditions stipulated was that the city of Paris should pay a war contribution of two hundred million of francs, equal to eight million pounds sterling. There is therefore every indication that Paris was very quickly provisioned by the lines of railway from the southern parts of France, and by the farmers and gardeners in the surrounding country districts.

Some people have insisted that the supplies in Paris were not at so low an ebb as to necessitate an immediate surrender; but it should be remembered that it takes time to collect sufficient provisions to feed some two millions of human beings, and had the capitulation been put off much longer, there might not have been time to accumulate sufficient supplies to avert widespread disaster. The collapse had to come, and under the existing circumstances the sooner the better. There is every indication that so soon as the armistice was arranged large quantities of secreted stocks were at once exposed for sale, in the fear that the high prices would speedily collapse; apart from these, the city could not have contained more than two days' supply of bread and meat. There were certainly still about one-third of the horses with which Paris commenced her defence, some 33,000 out of 100,000, but the majority of these were needed for artillery, cavalry, transport, ambulances, sanitation, and the distribution of rations, if the resistance had to be continued. Paris was practically without horseflesh towards the end of January; indeed O'Shea puts the issue at one-tenth of an English pound for an adult in the ninth arrondissement. He says that horseflesh cost 6 fr. a kilo. in December, and that fresh butter was worth 70 fr. a kilo. M. de Ponchalon tells us that the forts surrounding Paris were well provisioned up to the last; they no doubt kept their reserve stocks intact as long as possible, as the commanders knew that the staying powers of the men depended mainly upon their food reserves. It is more than probable that the several commanders, some of whom were naval officers,

would have kept dark as to their available resources, and would have drawn all they could procure from outside their several forts. He tells us that quantities of reserves fell into the hands of the German forces to whom the forts were surrendered. He continues thus :—" We were at the head of all that was luxurious, of well-being and of pleasure ; we have looked for material progress at the sacrifice of all other considerations, even of religious life. We have forgotten that society derives its power from intellectual and moral order, rather than from material considerations. Riches, when they are not employed properly, create sensuality, selfishness, false pride, and, as a natural consequence, social antagonisms. The corruption of morals and low tastes invaded all classes of society, and it is thus that material progress has resulted in general decadence." We must, however, recognise with feelings of satisfaction the intense patriotism exhibited by all classes of society in the country. The men were patient under privations and misfortunes, they were full of self-sacrifice and of devotion to their country, and had it not been for the selfishness and incapacity displayed by some of those placed over them, and the bad advice of others, they might have emerged from the very trying ordeal to which they had been subjected with more credit to themselves and to France.

In its march towards the Loire the 2nd German Army had to depend for its supplies upon the magazines established at Bar-le-Duc, Commercy, and Toul, and afterwards upon those created further to the front at St. Dizier, Joinville, and Neufchâteau. A daily train laden with supplies was despatched to Blesmé, whence the transport columns could carry loads to the army. The official account also informs us that the 3rd Army was directed to create at Etampes and Malesherbes dépôts for the 2nd Army, each consisting of 300,000 rations of provisions, and 60,000 rations of forage, but owing to the insufficiency of transport this could not be carried out in its entirety.—" Of much greater importance for the 2nd Army was the permission given on the 29th November for it to use the line Blesmé-Lagny ; to this latter town the wagons of the columns were sent to receive fresh supplies, which in all the army corps had been rapidly emptied after the passage of the Loing. Notwithstanding this, comprehensive measures were required on the part of the commissariat to protect the troops from real want, especially as the requisitions yielded little, and at first also purchase for cash was by no means successful." We learn from the same authority that after the capture of Orleans it was only by the most strenuous

efforts on the part of the authorities that the people were induced to bring the produce of the harvest to the markets established at Orleans, Etampes, Joury, and Chartres, where the sales were strictly for cash, but the prices demanded and paid were very high. The necessity of the German was the Frenchman's opportunity, but the latter had to pay very heavily for his temporary advantage in the food markets. We very much question the wisdom of such procedure—the French were no doubt influenced partly by vengeance and partly by avarice, but it is clear that they had to smart for their greed in this and other similar instances. Under such circumstances it would have been well for the authorities to interfere and to insist upon fair dealing as the course best suited to the interests of the whole community. We also learn from the same source that by the time the advance on Le Mans was commenced the army was again adequately fed and its train was well filled with provisions. However, the condition of the roads was such as to retard the movements of the laden wagons, and the troops were frequently forced to depend solely on the iron ration.

On the march towards Le Mans there is no doubt that the army of Prince Frederick Charles suffered very great hardships, owing mainly to the inclemency of the weather. Blumé tells us that "frost had set in again on the 8th January, and was succeeded during the night by a heavy fall of snow. The roads became very slippery, and added excessively to the difficulty of the march in that hilly country, more particularly for the artillery and train." This army of about 60,000 men, with an enormous force of cavalry and artillery, had to cover more than fifty miles of country within a week, and had to fight day after day, often without any adequate supply of food and forage. It is not surprising therefore that, when the final battles took place on the 11th and 12th January, the German soldiery were too exhausted to reap the full fruits of their successes. The official account makes the following remarks on the fighting:—"The late hour at which the Germans attacked had essentially favoured the retreat of the French. It was a general peculiarity of the expedition against Le Mans, that the engagements for the most part only commenced in the forenoon, and the shortness of the day then prevented the full benefit being derived by pursuit. The inclement time of the year rendered it impracticable to bivouac. The troops were obliged to seek shelter, and for the most part only found it at a considerable distance in rear of the battlefield. Their ammunition had to be issued and the scanty food cooked. Part of the infantry were

marching in linen trousers and ragged boots. The officers were in no better case. For a long time past they had been deprived of their baggage, as the wagons had been unable to follow along the bad roads. But the goodwill, the perseverance, and the discipline of the troops conquered all the difficulties which successively presented themselves." What a lesson of patient endurance, of courage, and of self-restraint on the part of both officers and men! These are the lessons which all ranks in every army may take seriously to heart as some of the sacrifices which every country expects its soldiery to bear cheerfully for the sake of the Fatherland, and no officer or soldier should accept service unless he is prepared to undergo these and even greater hardships with equanimity and without grumbling.

It is to be feared that, in almost every Continental service, a very large percentage of the young men, joining the various armies in every grade, are actuated by purely selfish motives in selecting the army as their profession. They either enter the service because they think that there is less work and more play than can be secured in almost any other walk in life, or they may imagine that less personal effort is needed to get on in the army than is required in other professions, or perhaps they have neither the ability nor the energy to grapple with the world in the serious struggle for existence which is entailed in every profession, trade, or calling to a far greater degree than is the case in the various armies. The sooner such an impression is removed the better will it be for themselves individually, and for those whom they serve. We are impressed with the firm conviction that every Government is duly alive to the necessity for the encouragement of a true soldierlike spirit of self-improvement in all ranks, but much has yet to be accomplished in establishing a healthy spirit of keen emulation. It is an obvious fact that professional duties and responsibilities are of the very first importance, and that even legitimate recreation should not be permitted to take a first place in the lives or inclinations of true soldiers. The painful fact that so pernicious a system as "ragging" and brutal treatment of soldiers still obtain in more than one Continental army establishes our contention. Great internal changes are needed before armies can reach that degree of perfection which is so essential to perfect efficiency. Why should earnestness and persevering effort be so much more apparent in civil than in military life?

CHAPTER XXIX.

CHANZY TAKES THE FIELD.

By the month of December the French field armies had been practically annihilated. The army surrounded at Metz had been forced to capitulate; that in the north had been defeated and forced to retire; the army of the Loire had sustained a serious reverse at Orleans, and had been divided, the left wing of the army retiring upon Beaugency and Marchenoir, and the right upon Nevers and Bourges; in the eastern theatre of war the French forces were at cross purposes, the want of combination resulting in great waste of strength, and in ineffective operations. At this epoch France was without any field armies, they were, however, in course of reconstruction under that distinguished patriot, Leon Gambetta, who was straining the resources of France to the very utmost in men, money, and munitions. A *levée en masse* had been decreed, a large number of men had been got together in camps in remote parts of the country, where the majority could neither be drilled nor armed nor properly fed. All semblance of organisation had disappeared; with the capture and annihilation of nearly the whole of the regular troops it was no easy matter to introduce order and discipline amongst raw levies, when so very few regular officers were available. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us particulars of the arrival of some of these men at Rennes. He says:—"The first detachment, which arrived about a week ago, when the temperature was even colder than it is now, were received by the military authorities, who had been informed several days beforehand of their coming, with the most shameful neglect and inattention. They reached Rennes in the afternoon, and until late at night rambled about the streets, cold and hungry, without any quarters being assigned them." He mentions the arrival of a regiment of Mobiles, who had been transported in cattle trucks and arrived half frozen and much fatigued. They were ordered to camp out, although the municipality had prepared public buildings for their reception; it was found that the ground was frozen too hard to plant the tent poles, and that attempt had to be abandoned. Fortunately for the

men the inhabitants opened their homes to them, and gave them shelter if only by their hospitable firesides. He continues :—" To see these brave young fellows, their uniforms in disorder, and covered with dirt, wearing ponderous sabots, wandering at hazard through the streets, all apparently overcome with *ennui*, some coughing so badly that they could hardly stand, is indeed a pitiable sight. Out of these sinewy and robust young fellows the finest soldiers in the world might have been formed ; but official neglect and mismanagement have so generally debased them, that it would be far more prudent to predict their utter ruin and incapacity, than to assert that they are capable of sustaining any serious engagement." The French had been beaten at all points, their country was overrun by the invaders, who were drawing, equally with the French, upon the resources of the country, and the ordinary duties of the Staff and Intendance had to be entrusted to inexperienced men, whose hearts were probably not in their work. The mismanagement referred to would have resulted from the action of inexperienced officers, who, probably through ignorance, persisted in asserting their authority and in carrying out their preconceived and ill-considered ideas.

As has already been stated, the original army of the Loire had been split up, one portion having retired across that river was assigned to General Bourbaki for its reorganisation. Having followed the fortunes of that army already, we will now turn to the doings of the second army of the Loire, which was placed under the command of General Chanzy, and was composed of the 16th, 17th, and 21st Army Corps. It was intended originally that so soon as these two armies had been reorganised they should move upon the armies of the Crown Prince and Prince Frederick Charles in order to effect the relief of Paris. Chanzy found himself entirely dependent upon his own resources, which consisted of three beaten army corps, which were augmented gradually by such men as have already been described. It will be seen therefore that General Chanzy had a very serious task before him with such materials. Any attempt to relieve Paris had to be abandoned, and he was forced to act on the defensive, as the offensive was no longer possible. General Chanzy was filled with patriotism and was full of energy ; he seems to have been a very able and intelligent officer, but his staff would hardly have been sufficient in numbers. M. Bouché was appointed the Intendant of the army, and seems to have had hard work to supply the troops during the first weeks of December. The disruption which must have followed the decisive defeat of the army at Orleans

must have disorganised all supply and transport arrangements, but these do not appear to have been very much advanced, for we are told that the Germans found very small stocks in the army magazines of that town.

General Chanzy had taken up a position about sixteen miles to the east of Orleans, the line being Beaugency-Marchenoir-Vendôme. Steps were immediately taken to secure the positions by the erection of batteries and by the disposition of the available troops. Owing to the exhaustion of the men and horses, they were directed to secure quarters and stables in the neighbouring villages and farms, and points were to be fixed upon for their prompt re-assembly in case of attack. General Chanzy's book gives us the instructions he issued to his Intendance; they were as follows:—"Each division will ascertain, in all the villages and farms in the immediate neighbourhood of their cantonments, what are their resources in corn and forage which might be made available for the army. Guards will be placed over such supplies in order to prevent pillage, and with the help of such information the Intendants can make proper requisitions. The corps will not upon any pretext make requisitions directly upon the people." The General gave orders that stock should be taken of the armaments, munitions, clothing, and shoes, and that all deficiencies should be reported with a view to their being made up. Every precaution appears to have been taken to get the army into good working order and into fighting trim, but it is more than doubtful whether the demands made upon the Provisional Government at Bordeaux were complied with in their entirety. The line of railway *via* Tours was still open to the army for supplies and munitions of war from the south, but it is evident that the supply columns and the wagon transport generally were exceedingly weak, owing to the scarcity of all kinds of vehicles and draught animals. The want of sufficient forage, the overworking of the horses and the badness of the roads all contributed to exhaust the animals; the French were consequently dependent mainly upon their lines of railway for their supply of food and forage. It is therefore not surprising to learn that during the first fortnight's fighting in December the French soldiery were very badly fed; during that period, although fighting with the utmost pertinacity, they were driven back a distance of between sixty and seventy miles, and were only occasionally in immediate touch with any line of railway. Such are the vicissitudes of war with which a commissariat has often to contend; in this particular instance the Intendance for the supply of from 120,000 to

150,000 men had to be entrusted to three principal officers, assisted probably by a few other officers of the Intendance and a number of attached officers and some civilians, who had no knowledge whatever of the technique of that service, and supported by a crippled transport, to carry food and forage to the troops—how could such a handful have carried out so gigantic a service? What wonder is there that an Intendance so badly manned and horsed should have broken down? General Chanzy paid particular attention to keeping his line of retreat clear of every obstruction. The wagons were always kept some miles to the rear of the several positions held by the troops. This precaution was dictated by a desire to remove every obstruction out of the way of the troops in case of retreat; this, however, threw much additional work upon the already hard worked transport.

On the other hand, the German armies, although perhaps inferior in numerical strength to the French troops they were pursuing, had the advantage of possessing an excellent supply and transport establishment, and were consequently well fed and foraged. The army of Prince Frederick Charles found itself in a somewhat difficult situation after its occupation of Orleans. The army of Chanzy was being augmented to the westward near Beaugency, and Bourbaki was reorganising his army at Bourges to the southward. In order to secure the safety of his army from attack from either quarter, strong detachments were posted near Gien and Blois. So soon as it became evident that no immediate combination of the two French armies was contemplated by the respective commanders, the Prince determined to attack Chanzy's army and force it back, so that a greater interval might separate the two armies. It is not necessary to follow the movements of the two contending armies in the many battles fought with so much pertinacity on both sides; the French were gradually forced back upon Vendôme, which had been made their chief dépôt for supplies and munitions during the fighting. When it became perfectly clear that the army would have to continue its retirement, General Chanzy issued instructions that the contents of the magazines should be removed to Le Mans, which position he had determined to hold if that were possible.

During his retreat General Chanzy tells us in his book that he telegraphed to Bourbaki to come to his assistance, as the Germans were menacing his lines of communication through Blois and Tours, as well as on the left flank of his army, and asking him to advance on Blois in order to relieve the great pressure thereby brought to bear on him. Bourbaki replied, that owing

to the state of his army he was unable to undertake any serious operation, but he would do everything in his power to send a force to Blois, but that it could not reach that place for six days. He goes on to say that the weather was very bad, the rain falling in torrents, melted the snow. The roads were thus rendered very slippery, and the fields were too soft for the passage of horses and vehicles. That day, the 12th December, was the hardest in the whole campaign. Nevertheless the march was effected with regularity, and by the evening all the corps were assembled in the positions previously assigned to them, which is highly creditable to the courage and discipline of the French. There were of course a large number of stragglers along the roads, and some of them are said to have died in the ditches; this is not to be wondered at, when it is considered that the men were only half fed, and that they were quite exhausted by the heavy fighting and marching.

Large captures of rifles had been made by the Germans from the French, and the stock of chassepot rifles had become almost exhausted, consequently the Provisional Government had to import large numbers of foreign arms, such as Remingtons, Sniders, Martini-Henry, and other rifles. These rifles were infinitely superior to the German needle-rifle, or even the chassepot in range and striking force, which was a distinct gain to the French soldiery in this hard-fought campaign. Some writers describe this retreat as having been most disheartening; owing to the slippery nature of the roads, the transport and artillery horses were constantly falling, wagons were overturned, and the roads were sometimes blocked by struggling masses of men, horses, wagons, guns, and slaughter cattle. The men on foot were often deep in snowy mud, than which nothing is more trying to the wearied soldier. To add to his many other hardships, the unhappy conscript had to face the cold, the wind, and rain insufficiently clad, and often without any protection to his feet, the soles of his shoes having been quite worn out by the incessant marching. It is certain that the General did all in his power to clothe his men properly, but he does not appear to have been helped to the extent that was needed. Either the officials charged with the duty of providing clothing for the army did not comprehend the magnitude of the work required of them, or the contractors who provided the articles furnished clothing and shoes of inferior quality, which might easily have been passed undetected by the inspectors, who were probably overworked. Such are the opportunities given to rapacious

contractors and corrupt officials, who callously waded through the blood and sufferings of their fellow-countrymen in order that they may reap a little more gain to lavish on their worthless carcasses.

The great want of food in the 2nd Army of the Loire does not appear to have been severely felt after the battles fought near Vendôme about the middle of December, as General Chanzy tells us in his book that the Government at Bordeaux was sending munitions to the army with the utmost expedition :—"Thanks to the foresight of Intendant-General Bouché, well seconded by Intendants Bron, Coste, and de la Grandville, of the 16th, 17th, and 21st Corps, as well as by all the personnel of the administration, whose energy during the campaign deserves great praise, the supplies have arrived constantly in sufficient quantities, and the distributions could be made regularly, and the divisional convoys always carried the reserves varying from three to six days' supplies. It is as well to notice the undeserved attacks made upon the administration of the 2nd Army by persons who have not taken the trouble to verify their charges before they were made. These complaints have been made generally by men who had deserted the field of battle, and preferred to rove about the country spreading false reports in regard to the sufferings and want amongst the soldiery, and thereby gaining the pity of the inhabitants of the villages and farms. We state distinctly that the provisions never failed during the four months of the campaign, notwithstanding the difficulties experienced in procuring and transporting them. If the distributions were not always regular, it was owing to unavoidable circumstances which retarded the movements of the convoys along roads often found impracticable; or possibly the troops may have been forced to fight and march without any respite. To say the truth, in a great many of the new regiments, particularly the mobiles, the officers did not exercise a proper supervision in regard to this most important service; when the distributions were made to the men, many of them ate at once more than the whole ration for the day, the remainder being often thrown away to avoid the trouble of carrying it." In his remarks General Chanzy referred partly to the work of the Intendance during the operations of the original Army of the Loire under General d'Aurelle de Paladines. That officer had evidently paid great attention to the organisation of the supply and transport services of his Army, for M. Deschaumes tells us that he raised the soldier's ration in his army to 400 grammes of meat, and that he gave orders that as much wine and brandy as could be afforded should

be issued to his hardworked soldiery. Whatever the faults in the organisation may have been, Chanzy seems to have been perfectly satisfied that the officers and men of his Intendance did all that was possible for men to do in the adverse circumstances in which they found themselves during their retreat towards the Loire.

Quoting from General Chanzy's own account of the further retreat after the severe fighting about Vendôme, in which the French troops appear to have held their positions generally, there are fair grounds for assuming that had the French troops been fed as well as those of the German armies, they might have held their positions for a longer period, which would have given the Government time to send reinforcements in support. The General thus describes the *morale* of his troops at that time :—
“The nights afforded very little rest to the troops, who had to encamp in the mud and snow without being able to light the bivouac fires, they therefore suffered much from the cold and wet. Consequently the lassitude which followed did not allow the officers to expect any degree of vigour on the part of the troops in the event of an attack in the early morning.” He appears only to have made up his mind to retreat at five on the morning of the 17th December, when Admiral Jaureguiberry came to him and stated that he did not consider that any further serious resistance could be made in the positions then occupied by the army. The General seems to have at once taken advantage of the early morning fog to withdraw his advanced posts and set the army in motion towards Sarthe. As has already been stated, preparations were always made well in advance to meet a sudden retirement. A heavy train was despatched without any loss of time to Tours, which was laden with the sick and wounded, and military stores, munitions and supplies. It succeeded in getting away, as the German artillery opened fire only when the fog lifted. The train reached Tours safely, and was then sent on to Le Mans. As the forces retired across the Loire the bridges were blown up, and the railway line towards Tours was destroyed for some distance. The supply and ammunition columns, being well to the rear, took the lead in the retreat; nothing could have been more orderly than the retirement of the army, which was hardly molested by the enemy, although the fog lifted early and revealed the intentions of the French General. The retirement over a distance of more than forty miles was accomplished in four days, which was not bad going for exhausted troops, and points to the admirable prevision of those

charged with the various arrangements. Advantage was taken of every road leading from the Loire to the Sarthe with a front of about eighteen miles, and by this means any blocking of the troops by the transport or artillery was avoided. With the same forethought the wagons carrying the reserve ammunition, stores, and supplies were sent at once to the right bank of the Sarthe, where they could have again been put in motion if a further retreat became necessary.

Prince Frederick Charles did not continue the pursuit of the retreating French beyond the Loire, where the major part of his army took up its position, between Vendôme and Illiers, the head-quarters being established at Orleans, and it was not until the 6th January that a further advance was undertaken. This movement seems to have been provoked by an attack made upon Vendôme by a detachment from the 2nd Army of the Loire under General Jouffroy on the 31st December. At the same time it was necessary for the Prince to ascertain in what direction General Bourbaki proposed to move his army before pursuing the 2nd Army any further, and it is probable that his own troops would have been glad of the respite after the very hard and persistent fighting they had had to encounter during the preceding month. It was only when it became evident that Bourbaki's army was in motion towards the east, that it was considered advisable for the 2nd German Army to continue its forward movement. In the refusal of General Bourbaki to march to the assistance of Chanzy or to co-operate with him, there is a distinct indication of a feeling of jealousy which manifested itself upon more than one occasion. Almost every general seems to have had the wish to arrogate to himself the credit of having saved his country, and in the end the majority succeeded in bringing untold hardships upon their countrymen. Bourbaki could certainly have done precisely as he wished, as he was untrammelled by orders. Had he marched to Chanzy's help, his army would not have been lost to France as it was, and who knows what the combined armies might not have effected, even after Paris had surrendered. In any case the terms would have been made more easy for France in the face of a large and powerful army, which would have been added to daily.

During the three weeks' interval General Chanzy had ample time to recruit his exhausted men and horses, and to provide fresh clothing and shoes for the worn-out soldiery, so far as they were procurable at the moment; large stocks had evidently been sent in too late for distribution, as we know that large

quantities of stores, arms, and supplies were captured by the enemy at Le Mans and Conlie. It was anticipated that large reinforcements would join the French army at Le Mans from Northern France ; Chanzy tells us that 60,000 mobilised Bretons could have been provided had they been organised, but that only from 9,000 to 10,000 men actually joined him. They were badly organised, badly clothed, and half starved, and on their arrival at Le Mans were destitute of the necessary equipments. Nine battalions of mobiles joined him from Mayenne, who were better organised and equipped. So confident had Chanzy become of the ability of his army to resist any forces which could be brought against him, that he sent a direct challenge to the German commander at Vendôme, in which he claimed that his army was unconquered, and would continue the struggle to the bitter end against the devastating hordes of Germany.

This declaration was supported by an advance in force against Vendôme under General Jouffroy, who, after fighting a battle on 31st December, was pushed back, fighting almost the whole of the way to Le Mans, which was reached on the evening of the 10th January, in time for the division to take up its position for the battle of the morrow. As might have been expected, these troops were in no condition to take part in a general engagement. Chanzy tells us that their fatigue was extreme, and owing to a mistake in the direction taken by the convoys, full rations could not be issued to the exhausted men that evening ; it was, however, incumbent upon them to take up their positions during the night or early morning. It was the same with other divisions sent out either in support or to meet the advancing enemy. Those under General Rousseau are thus described in Chanzy's book :—"The fatigue of these men was extreme ; by 9th January the weather had been very bad for several days, the men wet and unable to dry their clothing, and it was with difficulty that they could find time to cook and eat their rations. The enemy was concentrating more and more, so much so that the division was unable to offer any further resistance to their advance." General Chanzy had evidently become too confident in the ability of his badly organised and half-starved battalions to hold back the advancing German forces, which consisted of well seasoned and well-fed men ; he had now to experience another reverse, which must have shaken his faith in his sorely tried and battered soldiery.

Notwithstanding his apparent confidence in his men, General Chanzy had the memory of the surrender at Sedan constantly

before his eyes, and every precaution was taken to ensure the expeditious and safe retreat of his army. M. Martin gives us the following particulars, from which it will be gathered that the roads were kept clear for the passage of the troops in the event of their having to retreat suddenly :—"The train was situated about eight kilometres behind Le Mans ; the wagons were parked on either side of the road leading to Laval. In the fields on the right and left of the road a large number of oxen and cows were kept ready for slaughter. An enclosure had been formed at the further end of the line, where the animals were slaughtered and dressed ready for issue. So great were the demands, that the meat had to be issued to the troops still hot and quivering." This author seems to think that corruption prevailed to some extent amongst the army butchers, whom he describes as covered with blood in the field of carnage, favouring their friends or those who had made it worth their while to serve them first and with the best meat. This state of things is accounted for in some degree by another author, Arthur Chuquet, who informs us that the Intendance was officered principally by subalterns, who had no knowledge of the duties entrusted to them. We know that the major portion of the older officers of the Intendance had found their way as prisoners of war into Germany, and that the higher duties of that department had had to be entrusted to some of the juniors. It is not surprising therefore that corrupting influences should have found a congenial soil amongst those who for the most part had been pitch forked into the department.

The French had taken up a very strong position at Le Mans, and were attacked resolutely by the German forces on the morning of the 11th January ; the latter appear to have been numerically inferior, but after a very hard day's fighting many of the French battalions were put to flight, and altogether 28,000 prisoners were captured. The orders given for the retreat on the night of the 11th contained the following important clauses :—"All vehicles should always take the route they have to follow sufficiently in advance of the troops not to hinder their marching towards the rear. The supplies distributed, those carried in the haversacks and the reserves with the divisional convoys, should be sufficient to last the troops for at least eight days." Such were the supply arrangements made in advance to meet the feeding of the troops over a distance of something over fifty miles from Le Mans to Mayenne. We are told, however, that the transport wanted a complete reorganisation after the army reached the line of the Mayenne, as the majority of the drivers had left

the line of retreat with their wagons, and gone to their homes. It is not surprising to read the following statement made by Chanzy in regard to that retreat :—"The weather was exceptionally cold, the snow did not cease to fall, the country offered very little shelter, the convoys moved with great difficulty, the distributions of rations were irregular, and the men, badly clothed and shod, were always wet. We had, however, to face the enemy, who presented themselves on all our lines of retreat and threatened the capture of the whole army." Their great activity in pursuit accounts for the capture of so large a number of prisoners, and accentuates the disorganised condition of some of the brigades, whose men were straggling all over the country. Nothing can demonstrate the recuperative powers of the French nation and the patriotism of her soldiery, more than the fact that by the 27th January an army of nearly 150,000 men had been collected on the line of the Mayenne by General Chanzy. Had Bourbaki's army been added to it, what might not have happened ?

Chanzy affords us an object lesson on the proper management of the supply and transport of an army in the field, and demonstrates how the intelligent handling of those services may contribute to the mobility of an army. The admirable precision exhibited by that General and his Intendance deserve the closest study of all students of the art of war. We have had good grounds for congratulation in our successful administration during the late war in South Africa, but there was certainly something left to be desired in the direction of mobility in supplies. The Japanese in their war with Russia have exhibited marvellous mobility during the initial stages of the war now progressing, and that mobility has been attained mainly through the self-sacrificing instincts and devotion of all ranks in their army. Their pack and coolie transport has managed to keep pace with the rapid movements of their divisions, but the secret of their remarkable mobility lies in the fact that their soldiery are self-reliant and helpful, and are contented to accept with equanimity the hardships inseparable from campaigning. On the other hand, we know that the sluggish movements of the Russian divisions are brought about mainly in consequence of the gross mismanagement and corruption in their commissariat, which has always been a serious hindrance to Russia in her former wars, and she is now suffering under the same lash of mismanagement and corruption.

CHAPTER XXX.

CAPITULATION OF PARIS.

Towards the end of January the resistance offered by the French nation to the German field armies was practically at an end ; the Germans were in the occupation of more than one-third of the whole country, the French armies had been badly beaten in the north, west, and east, and the last great sortie from Paris had been repulsed with heavy losses ; nothing was now left to the nation but to secure as good terms as might be obtainable from the victors. With that object in view, as has already been stated, M. Jules Favre, one of the members of the Local Government, proceeded from Paris to Versailles to negotiate a peace on the 23rd January on behalf of that Government. The negotiations were concluded on the night of the 26th, and an armistice was entered upon for three weeks from the 28th January, but this was not to affect the operations of war then proceeding in the eastern part of the country, where Bourbaki's army was promptly defeated, and only escaped capture by seeking refuge in Switzerland. M. Favre had to accept the terms dictated by Count Bismarck, as any further powers of resistance were not available in the country, and the largest organised force, which was in Paris and its forts, was at the point of starvation from the want of sufficient food ; the men were then receiving only 2 ozs. of meat and 10 ozs. of bread daily. It is true that arms and munitions in abundance were not wanting in Paris, but that greatest of all necessities, food, for the fighting men and horses, as well as for the civil population, was nearing extinction. The provisions in hand might have enabled the fighting men to continue the defence for another two months, but the civilian men, women, and children must have starved if the German forces had refused to permit them to leave the city, which they most assuredly would have done. M. Favre was consequently forced to accept the terms dictated by Bismarck, which, although hard, were as good and better than he had any right to expect in the very serious position in which the French found themselves. They were without any field armies capable of relieving the beleaguered fortresses, and were at the end of their resources. M. Favre had

to accept almost any terms in order to save the brave defenders of the capital from annihilation.

A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives an excellent account of the precise situation in the French capital in regard to the food supply :—"The French Government had been brought face to face with the food question, which could no longer be put off. On the 27th January there were in store 42,000 quintals of corn, barley, rye, rice, and oats, which, reduced to flour, represented, in consequence of the short yield of oats, only 35,000 quintals of flour that could be made into bread. In ordinary times Paris requires for its subsistence 8,000 quintals of flour daily, 2,000,000 pounds of bread ; but after the 18th January, when the flour was rationed, this consumption was reduced to 5,300 quintals. Thus, placing the figure at 5,300 quintals, the total quantity of provisions on hand represented a supply of seven days." It is certain that the correspondent was not then aware that the forts contained large reserves of supplies which had not been drawn upon to any considerable extent, and the corn stored in the forts would not have been included in those figures. The situation was bad enough even if the supplies secreted by the military and the inhabitants be taken into account, and it is perfectly evident that the Government was forced to accept the terms offered in consequence of the impending failure of the food needed for the support of the troops and the civilians.

A German officer, writing after the evacuation of the forts surrounding Paris, tells us that before evacuating Valerien the French troops exercised marvellous ingenuity in destroying all they could ; chairs and tables were smashed, windows broken, walls and staircases wantonly and disgustingly soiled, whereat the Germans were not a little disgusted. These senseless acts recoiled upon the heads of the soldiery, as within a few days the forts were returned to them. Such acts of spite are unworthy of any soldiery, and bring them into contempt, if they do not work serious harm in concluding a peace ; they certainly are not likely to promote any feelings of sympathy which so often lurk in the hearts of the enemy. The *Daily News* correspondent says that everybody was bent on seeing Valerien, around which so much heavy fighting had been undertaken. He states that :—"The Emperor, in a carriage, with four black horses, preceded by a few hussars and followed by dragoons, came swiftly up the approach to the gateway. The grand guard presented arms, and stragglers of all sorts along the road came rigidly to attention. His Majesty seemed to be in excellent health and spirits, and returned the

greeting of the troops in his usual hearty manner. A smile well becomes the victor's face. This entry into the French stronghold was a token of conquest won by much patience and perseverance, by cold nights of watching and gallant repulsing of sorties ; and the Emperor might be proud of his soldiers." The barracks had not been burnt like those of Issy and Montrouge by the shell fire of the German guns. The work of destruction wrought by the guns upon all the forts was very apparent, particularly in the case of Issy, which was very greatly damaged, but its magazines were intact. Large quantities of food were left in the forts owing to the want of time to destroy or remove them, they therefore fell into the hands of the enemy.

The next point of pressing importance was the revictualling of Paris ; this appears to have been commenced on the 2nd February. The German Emperor placed large quantities of military supplies at the disposal of the municipal authorities, but only a small portion of these were made use of for which money payments were made. Great sympathy was shown towards the French people by the British public, who despatched without loss of time hundreds of tons of food supplies for the use of the starving inhabitants of Paris. The country people were permitted to bring their products into Paris, and the city by such means was soon amply supplied with food. A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us some details in regard to the treatment of the French by their German conquerors :—" The peasant can now circulate freely around Paris, except in the forts and batteries, with just two lines of armed men to pass to make him as free as in time of peace. He must get through the line of Prussian sentries on one side of the demarcation, and through the guard which is kept by the French on the other side, and then all Paris lies before him. The peasant with butter or vegetables, bread or poultry, will be welcome among the hungry citizens if he can only get through. The hungry people on the bridge at Neuilly afforded a sight not soon to be forgotten. Here were the soldiers keeping guard, and other soldiers off duty staring at the crowd, and there were the citizens clamouring for bread. The Prussian end of the bridge was held by the Landwehr of the Guard, who stood up tall and strong before their foes, a fine specimen of the conquerors for the Parisians to begin by seeing. Carts and wagons, trucks, omnibuses—all kinds of vehicles which could be called into service were assembled at the Prussian end of the bridge to bring passengers and provisions to the boundary line. Bread was the article most in demand. Bread would fetch a good price and could not

be quickly enough supplied. The French crowd was neatly dressed—neatly, at least, for such a crowd in any country; and its avidity for food was out of all proportion to its respectable appearance. Young women with clean white caps and pleasant rosy faces were leaning over the barrier, basket in hand, to beg the Landwehr to fetch them some bread—‘Would *monsieur* be so obliging? *Les Militaires* were always so polite. Ah! thank you; two loaves; three, if possible; as much as the money will buy.’ So went the stream of talk, with plenty of rough jokes from the Prussians.” M. Lehautcourt tells us that the revictualment proceeded very quickly, so much so that the people were not without bread for even one day. But other writers say that it was some considerable time before the supplies sent into the city reached the lower orders in sufficient quantities to raise them above the want of even the ordinary necessities of life. There was evidently great consideration shown by the conquerors to the conquered.

A correspondent of the *Daily News* gives us some further particulars of the state of affairs in Paris. He wrote:—“The pinch for food is worse than ever, pending the result of the negotiations for its supply. The day before yesterday the hungry broke into the reserved store of potted provisions in the Halle, smashed all obstacles and looted the place. From one who has paid the prices himself, and has the figures down in black and white without exaggeration, I have the following list:—2 fr. for a small shrivelled cabbage; 1 fr. for a leek; 45 fr. for a fowl; 45 fr. for a rabbit; 25 fr. for a pigeon; 22 fr. for a 2-lb. chub; 2 fr. for each pound of potatoes; 40 fr. for a pound of butter; and cheese 25 fr. a pound when procurable. Meat other than horseflesh is absolutely not to be procured. I was assured that if I offered £50 down in shining gold for a veritable beefsteak, I could have no claimant for the money. The last cow that changed hands for an ambulance fetched £80. Those left cannot be bought for money. The bread is not bad—the difficulty is to get it. Last evening I looked in on a party that had been experimenting in dining. They had eaten ostrich, cat, dog, rats and mice. This seems to me a hard-hearted mode of extracting a new sensation out of the times. Far better to dine on horse, and give the price of dainty viands to put bread into the mouths of the poor suffering women and children. Yesterday neither bread nor meat was distributed in this arrondissement. Those who had no money have simply had to hunger. The sins for which Paris used to be famous all belong to the past. She has been half-starved, half-beaten into

morality, or it may be that other than physical influences have led her to wash and be clean."

From the above account it will easily be understood that as the greater portion of the food supplies in the revictualment of Paris was brought in by the country people and sold for cash, and for some considerable time at high prices, it followed that the poorer classes, who numbered about one-half of the entire population, felt themselves neglected, and determined to take the law into their own hands, with the result that riots were of frequent occurrence; consequently the Halle was broken into and bread shops were sacked. It will be remembered that the Halle, or principal market-place of Paris, was the building devoted during the siege to the storage and sale of potatoes and other vegetables to the poor of Paris. The mayors and their assistants in the various *arrondissements* had evidently become too much absorbed with their own private affairs, now that the war had suddenly come to a termination; they may have been rather inclined to neglect the duties entrusted to them and the people's interests would have suffered. The utmost care is needed upon the occasion of an absolute change in the political situation, which was the case in this instance—a state of war was exchanged for a humiliating peace. No doubt the minds of the upper classes were much disturbed by the humiliating results of the disastrous war into which the country had been plunged by the ambitious designs of incompetent leaders, but that was no sufficient reason for the obvious neglect displayed by many of the officials in taking no steps to secure a sufficient supply of food for the inhabitants of their respective *arrondissements* in the trying situation. Society permitted itself to become disrupted by the sudden change, and instead of sticking to their self-imposed duties, they were either swayed by self-interest or they discarded their obligations before they had been thoroughly completed. It is true that the Provisional Government continued to pay the National Guards after the fighting had terminated, but that act did not secure their loyalty to the country, as they were amongst those who headed the revolt which was so soon to plunge Paris into even worse misfortune than she had already experienced. The policy of scuttle was markedly in evidence, as it so often is when hostilities are brought to a conclusion. Very few are inclined to stick to their duties, they prefer that others should complete what they have left undone. They want to scuttle off regardless of their obligations, and they generally manage to do as they desire.

In the course of this narrative we have referred to the

probability that large quantities of supplies had been secreted by the Parisians and had been kept for their own use during the siege. And it is to be feared that such people did not fail to avail themselves of the opportunities afforded them by the authorities for purchasing supplies intended mainly for those in real want. A correspondent of the *Daily News* confirms this view by the observations he made in Paris just after the conclusion of the armistice. He tells us that—"It surprised me to see so many well-appointed vehicles still in the streets of Paris, with well-conditioned horses. Nor were the omnibuses either few or far between, and their horses were in the best of condition, as were the horses ridden at break-neck speed through the streets by officers who looked, and who probably were, transmogrified *petits crévés*." It is more than probable that the omnibus company was permitted to retain its reserve of forage, and possibly to purchase in the markets early in the siege, as it would have been almost impossible for the public to get from one quarter of the city to another without the help of those vehicles upon which they had been accustomed to depend for such locomotion, but the fit condition of private horses was quite another matter. The same author mentions another circumstance which throws a further light upon this question. He states that a person who kept an hotel in Paris boasted that he had never had any horseflesh cooked in his house throughout the siege, and that a gentleman who had resided there lived better than any other man in Paris. We know that such matters may be managed in two ways: either very high prices had to be paid for the food so procured, and the hotel reserve stocks would no doubt have had to be of a large and varied description, or those who had charge of the distributions, whether to the public, the soldiery, or the hospitals, had to be subsidised to secure preferential treatment. When such a course is pursued by any one, it is not only unfair to others, but it undermines discipline and creates disorganisation in the subordinate ranks, upon whom the efficient distribution so entirely depends. Such irregularities cannot be too severely repressed when discovered, but it is to be feared that sometimes those who promote them are too highly placed to be within the reach of the law—the exposure would often be too serious in its consequences.

One of the articles of the convention provided for the exchange of prisoners, which was to be effected as soon as possible. A number had been captured during the siege of Paris, and some account of their treatment may be of interest to the readers of

this book. Mr. O'Shea, in his *Iron-bound City*, gives us some particulars :—"There were German prisoners in Paris, not many certainly. The children of the Fatherland were caged in the Roquette, that low, square, repulsive block of buildings in front of which Troppman and so many other miscreants had been guillotined. The ordinary military prison is in the Rue du Cherché-Midi ; but the candidates for admission there being in excess of what it could accommodate, the Roquette was set apart as an auxiliary establishment. Its inmates were divided into two classes : the French, consisting of deserters and marauders ; and the Germans, all prisoners of war. The former were naturally treated with much more severity, being kept in solitary confinement and very poorly fed. The Germans, of whom there were 77, had a day-room, where they assembled to chat, read, and play cards, and amuse themselves as they pleased. They were deprived of nothing but liberty. Their diet was quite as good as the majority of the defenders of the city, and they seemed astonished and gratified at the excellent treatment they received. Many of them imagined they would have been shot when captured." Apart from motives of humanity it is not surprising that the French treated their prisoners well, as the Germans had about 400,000 Frenchmen, whom they had captured mainly at Metz and Sedan, who were distributed all over Northern Germany. These prisoners also seem to have been treated well ; there were certainly many charges made against the Germans of ill-treatment, but where any great severity was employed there was generally sufficient reason adduced to warrant the act. Some officers and men were shot for various acts of insubordination or for a breach of the regulations laid down, but as a rule it may be accepted that the Germans were merciful to their prisoners. The latter had of course to work on fortifications, works, roads, &c., but their hours of employment did not exceed six hours daily, which cannot be considered as excessive ; they were fed far better than the Germans who were languishing in French prisons, who had to be kept in close confinement, otherwise their chances for escape would have been great, as the French could not afford sufficient guards to look after them. On the other hand the French prisoners were permitted to move about the towns where they were imprisoned, so long as they reported themselves at the appointed musters. The policy of treating prisoners well is distinctly wise ; it is in the first instance humane and is likely to command similar treatment for one's own prisoners ; secondly, it tends

to minimise resistance to capture and consequently reduces the number of casualties on both sides ; thirdly, it is certain that every army contains men who would prefer to spend most of the period of warfare in a fairly comfortable enemy's prison rather than in the field fighting their country's battle, and enduring the great hardships always inseparable from a serious campaign.

The people and the soldiery were willing to accept the decrees of Providence with resignation—they had resisted the enemy to the utmost of their power, the failure was from without not from within their walls. Their compatriots had failed to raise the siege and starvation stared them in the face, they were therefore compelled to open their gates to the enemy. A correspondent of the *Daily News* describes the Parisians as he found them on entering Paris immediately after the armistice was concluded :—" You see some drunkenness, but far less than I had looked for, among men whose clock, so to speak, had run down. A decent gloom is everywhere apparent. Some assert that the gloom is as much theatrical and assumed as had been the previous valorous seeming. I don't think so. I think you can see the iron eating and burning into the hearts of these men—silent with unwon'ted silence ; moody as they never knew how to be before ; and as the downcast faces pass I draw a good augury from them for France and Paris. The great and beautiful feature of the siege has been the absence of crime. No murders, no robberies, but a virtue in which, to me, there is something pathetic. The half-lit streets are empty by half-past nine. The midnight air is not tortured by the sound of revellers, although there are no police to keep order. I woke up between twelve and one in the night, and the silence made me for the moment think myself back at Morgency."

The intelligent expression of an opinion formed on the spur of the moment often gives a reliable impression of the actual situation. The observations thus made and the opinions then formed give much credit to the Parisians and the defeated soldiery. The rioting at Sedan on the night preceding its surrender stands out in marked contrast to the conduct of the garrison of Paris. In the former instance the men had reason to be dissatisfied with the generalship, which had obviously been exceedingly faulty, as the army had been allowed to drift into a hole where it was surrounded by the artillery of the enemy and compelled to surrender or fight a hopeless battle. Furthermore, the soldiers were without any food and the evil side of their

natures was aroused, so that they believed themselves betrayed by the Emperor and his Generals. On the contrary, the soldiers defending Paris knew that their Generals had done everything that it was possible for mortal men to do to extricate them from their hopeless position, and no odium attached to them personally for the want of success. General Trochu was certainly blamed for not adopting sufficiently active measures during December, but he was expecting relief from without, when he would have been ready to co-operate with the relieving forces. Opinions were very much divided as to the advisability of his sacrificing more men in ineffectual attempts to break out of Paris, particularly when there was really no French base of operations to which he could fight his way. Furthermore, had it been possible for the army to fight its way out, the question of supply and transport would have at once paralysed any success of the kind, and surrender must have soon followed. Herein have we placed before us object lessons which demonstrate how much depends upon the capabilities of a commander who is entrusted with the command of an army in the field. The responsibility for the lives and well-being of his officers and men rests mainly upon the commander. Such lessons should impress themselves upon all Governments, and show them the absolute necessity which exists for having always at their disposal a few competent, patriotic, and whole-souled soldiers as the commanders of armies prepared to take the field, otherwise they may experience the same serious calamities which overtook the French armies at Metz, Sedan, and upon many battlefields in the east and west of France.

A correspondent of the *Daily News*, who visited Paris on the 8th February, tells us that by that date supplies had come in so abundantly that visitors could find excellent fare at any of the public restaurants, and found it difficult to believe that the Parisians had been reduced to any serious straits in regard to provisions. He wrote thus :—"There is no want of food now in St. Denis ; where the want lies is as regards the money to buy the wherewithal. A few rich inhabitants are trying what they can to stem the torrent of misery, but they are utterly unable to cope with it with any success. You can buy mutton for fifteen sous a pound, and beef for twenty sous ; but then if you have got never so much as a single sou, the prices might as well be ten times as much. In their rough hearty way the German soldiers are doing a great deal to stave off starvation, but the place is full of misery of the most abject kind. The station of St. Denis is already in

full working order, and passengers are forwarded from it, although the class of carriage is not guaranteed. I saw a batch of people start for the La Chapelle terminus on a train of flat open trucks. No tickets are as yet issued on the Northern Railway nearer than Villiers le Bel ; but as long as you are allowed to travel, a ticket is not one of the necessities of life." From this account we gather that Paris was rapidly resuming its normal state, that the prices of provisions had fallen enormously, and that the only want felt seriously was a lack of money amongst the working classes. The local Government wisely or unwisely had continued to pay the National Guards, although their active employment had ceased with the armistice. It is, however, obvious that the labouring classes must have found it very difficult to procure work, even if they had really endeavoured to procure it, which may be open to doubt. It is probable, therefore, that by the 18th March, when the revolution broke out in the ranks of the National Guards, and amongst the very lowest classes in Paris, the city had quite resumed its normal state, and that the markets and shops were stocked as nearly as possible as before the siege. And it is not at all unlikely that private individuals would also have renewed their stocks, as far as possible, as there was some idea of a possible resumption of hostilities on the termination of the three weeks' armistice. It follows therefore that the Communists would have experienced no difficulty in filling their magazines with provisions for their two months' conflict.

M. Gambetta, who had been the War Secretary of the Provisional Government at Bordeaux for two months, was much opposed to the conclusion of the armistice by the Government at Paris, which had been ratified without any reference to the authorities at Bordeaux. Nothing could have been more unreasonable than such a contention. Paris was on the point of starvation ; Gambetta's levies had been defeated in the west and north, and were being sorely pressed in the east ; the only field armies were composed of about 250,000, who were either the remnants of the defeated soldiery or were raw recruits, from whom no speedy help could be expected by the Parisians. The objection was prompted probably more by chagrin than by deliberate reflection. Gambetta was undoubtedly an enthusiastic patriot, and could not bring himself to believe in the defeat of his beloved country. He had laboured for France as no man ever did before or since ; he stirred his countrymen to fresh exertions at a time when all the field armies of France had been either destroyed or captured by the invaders, and when one-third of the country

was in their occupation. It was due to his exertions that the remnants of the defeated army of the Loire were organised into two separate armies, which were intended to relieve the capital, but through the obstinacy and incapacity of one of the commanders, one of the armies might just as well have had no existence. His efforts to secure food and clothing for both these armies is beyond praise. As Bismarck said of him, he had only to stamp on the ground and armies of 150,000 would issue therefrom. His great fault lay in the fact that being a civilian with little, if any, military experience, he interfered too much in military questions which he could not master. He was, however, a great patriot and a well-intentioned man, and his countrymen owe him an undying debt of gratitude.

How remarkable a contrast presents itself in comparing the conduct of the majority of the French Generals with that of Gambetta. Had the former been imbued with half the energy and ability of that great patriot, how much more might not have been accomplished in protecting the suffering French people. It is obvious that the system under which French Generals were then produced was faulty; no sufficient tests of efficiency and knowledge appear to have been enforced before promotion was accorded, and the result has been that round men often found themselves in square holes. Have other Governments generally profited by the unhappy spectacle, and have means been adopted to prevent such obvious mistakes? Facts demonstrate that the lessons of the past have not yet been sufficiently appreciated by the majority of the European Governments, otherwise so many serious blunders of the kind could not have been perpetrated in recent years.

CHAPTER XXXI.

THE GERMAN OCCUPATION.

The first object to be secured, after the conclusion of the armistice, was the establishment of a representative Government. A Government of National Defence had been constituted in Paris, and the Provisional Government, which had been sitting at Bordeaux, could, in no sense, be regarded as fully representative of the French nation ; it therefore became necessary to appeal to the whole people in order that a new Government should be formed capable of making terms of peace which would be binding upon the French people. Elections were therefore held throughout France, and representatives were elected and sent to Bordeaux in order that a Government should be formed and a President placed in authority. By the middle of February the National Assembly had been summoned to Bordeaux, and M. Thiers was duly elected the President of the Republic. Delegates were named to accompany the President to Versailles in order that the terms of peace should be arranged with Count Bismarck. The latter was at first very hard in his demands, which are stated to have included a demand for an indemnity of eight or nine milliards of francs ; the surrender of Alsace and a considerable portion of Lorraine ; and the continuance of an armed occupation of the country until the indemnity was fully paid, and the German troops were to be fed at the cost of the French people during such occupancy. The negotiations occupied nearly a week, but the German authorities were obdurate and would only concede a reduction of the indemnity to five milliards of francs, equal to two hundred millions of pounds, and the remaining conditions were to be carried out in their entirety. The terms were subsequently ratified by the National Assembly by a majority of over 400, more than a hundred voting against the motion. There are good grounds for thinking, if one is to gauge the opinion of the people by the German press, that had the German negotiators imagined that France possessed resources sufficient to pay off so heavy an indemnity within a period of thirty months, a larger sum would have been insisted upon. M. Thiers did his country

a great service in procuring so great a reduction, for it is certain that France would have experienced no difficulty in paying double that sum within an additional twelvemonth.

It must be admitted that the Germans showed very business-like methods in their negotiations with the French. Those points which were of no importance, such as a lengthened occupation of Paris, were waived, and it was only insisted that a very small portion of that city should be occupied by 30,000 German soldiers for a period of two days. That force marched into the city on the 1st March, passing through the Arc de Triomphe and occupying that part as far as the Place de la Concorde; these troops evacuated the city on the 3rd, when the mob gave vent to their feelings by lighting fires all over that quarter as a sort of purification. Mr. O'Shea, in his *Iron-bound City*, gives an interesting account of this occupation:—"Suddenly rose on the sunny air the strain of magnificent brass music. The Germans were approaching. What a solid stately array of puissant legions thundering by with gallant mien, their war-worn silken battle flags waving over their heads. In they marched with steady ranks, strong, and straight as spears, bearing with pride for well-nigh two hours—grenadiers, jagers, dragoons, lancers, and giant cuirassiers—to spirit-stirring notes, clash of cymbal and beat of drum, and anon clattered past at a gallop a battery of field artillery. The spectacle was one of the most thrilling I had ever witnessed." The same author also makes some mention of the treatment accorded to a regiment of Landwehr, which was encamped near the Arc de Triomphe:—"The veterans were already making themselves at home, they had laid their knapsacks on the ground, piled their arms, and were smoking and eating. A group of French blouses of the lowest class and street urchins had collected, and as an officer stepped out to take a closer view of the Arc de Triomphe, these blackguards surrounded him, and one spat on the back of his uniform. A young Prussian *gendarme*, who was at hand, spurred his charger into the mob, laid the flat of his sword on the caitiff's shoulder, and quickly dispersed the roughs and rescued his countryman. The officer calmly directed a file of the Landwehr to fix bayonets, and as they charged the civilians the latter fled with marvellous celerity. As we strolled along we noticed a café open and entered for a cup of coffee. A party of Bavarian officers were breakfasting there. A group of indignant Frenchmen gathered outside, and as soon as the Bavarians left they proceeded to demolish the windows with volleys of stones." Such acts should be repressed by the military authorities; nothing

tends to make things more dire for the conquered than **attempt** to insult a powerful enemy.

From an account given by a Prussian officer some of the German troops appear to have been quartered upon the inhabitants of that part of Paris during the two days' occupation. Objections were made as usual, but the orders given were that they should be housed and well-fed, and in the result, although obeyed with evident reluctance, the men were always well treated; the majority, we believe, marched in with their camp equipment and camped mainly in the open spaces about the Champs Elysées and Place de la Concorde. The same writer tells us that in the gardens of the Tuileries, just beyond the line of demarcation, a number of French men and women collected, and showed their pent up feelings by vainly spitting on the ground in full view of the German soldiery. Others behaved in so indecent a manner that he did not feel disposed to give the details. He adds—"Few accepted the inevitable with manly dignity, and they generally refused either to give or sell food and the men often went hungry." He also tells us that when Fort Valérien was returned to the French by the Germans, that the officer commanding the French relieving force declined to pay the usual compliments entailed upon such an occasion. Some people may wonder what the attitude of the French people may have had to do with the supply and transport services. The writer contends that the conduct of the people has everything to do with those services as applying to an army in occupation, and that it is absolutely necessary to ascertain their temper before any accurate idea can be formed of the advantages or disadvantages surrounding the efficient working of that part of the army's economy. It is for that reason that such subjects are touched upon in this narrative, as also in order that the sequence of events may be brought before his imagination as clearly and graphically as may be needed.

Now that the conditions of a peace had been established upon a firm basis, it was competent for the major portion of the German armies to return to the Fatherland. The German Emperor with his staff was amongst the first to take his departure from the country which had been brought to its knees by his victorious legions. He left Versailles on the 6th March, and making a cursory inspection, en route, he quitted France on the 15th of that month. Alsace and a portion of Lorraine had already been subjected to a German Military Government for several months, that part of the country had, therefore, become incor-

incorporated with the German Empire some time before the peace had been concluded. Certain portions of northern and eastern France were to be occupied by German troops so long as the indemnity remained unpaid, the troops being removed in proportion as portions were paid from time to time. As the French people were charged with the feeding of the German army of occupation, and as the Government had to pay at the rate of 5 per cent. per annum on the amount of the indemnity remaining unpaid, it was only natural that the Government and the people of the land should have exerted themselves to the utmost to rid the country of their hated conquerors.

In this the inhabitants of every grade vied with each other in their efforts to rescue their country from the grasp of the enemy. The monied institutions of the country, the rich proprietors, the merchants, the professional men, the commercial classes, the middle and lower classes, and above all the small landed proprietors—these and many besides came to the aid of their sadly afflicted country and poured the money, which had been earned by the sweat of their brows, into the coffers of the State. It is remarkable that the whole of the debt was honourably discharged within little more than two years; and it is all the more creditable to the people when it is remembered that the country was in a state of disruption, and the Government had to be re-constituted. The finances of the country had to be rehabilitated after the terrific depletion of the public resources. General Boulanger estimated the war expenditure and losses sustained during the war as very little short of four hundred millions of pounds, which would average a cost of about two millions for each day of the war. The repairs of all public works had to be at once undertaken, the repair of road and railway bridges, tunnels, lines of railway, rolling-stock, telegraphs, fortifications, &c.; then there were the half million of destitute soldiers returned from Germany and Switzerland to be fed and cared for; the sick and wounded had also to be looked after, and the destitute amongst the civil population had to be assisted. The Government must have had its hands very full indeed, and it is certain that it would never have fulfilled its task had not the patriotism of the French people been thoroughly aroused.

The French nation has profited by the lessons so dearly purchased. Each year a better understanding is apparent between the French people and their German neighbours, and we may look forward to a time when mutual respect and commercial interests may draw these two nations more closely

together. The maintenance of peace is the earnest desire of every civilised European Government, and there is no doubt that sentimentality will have little, if any, influence in promoting wars in the future, as it has so often done in the past. Modern warfare has become so very destructive of life, that all nations regard it with horror, and every effort will be exerted by diplomacy at this epoch before recourse is had to arms. Gigantic armaments still continue to rule in all lands, and the enormous expenditure of money necessitated by the maintenance of such armaments must continue to impoverish nations until such time as this terrible nightmare of mutual dread is removed. The Hague Conference has had no practical result. May some powerful European alliance soon be formed, which will dictate disarmaments to the remaining European Powers whilst reducing their own armies and fleets.

It is to be deplored that sections of the community allowed base motives to influence their conduct when their country was prostrate and still held by their conquerors. It will be remembered that during the siege of Paris the National Guards to the number of about 200,000 men were called upon to take their part in the defence of the city. These men were drawn from what are usually termed the working classes, that is to say, those persons in a community who work more with their hands than they usually do with their brains. The writer has the greatest respect for the honest working man who seeks to earn his daily bread by the best work his hands and brains can produce, but the craven who shirks his fair share of work and strives to put it on the shoulders of his fellows deserves the contempt of all honest workers. These citizen soldiers were not required to do much fighting before the last days of the siege, and they soon fell into lazy dissolute ways during the progress of the siege. They were paid a franc and a half daily with which to purchase their subsistence, and their wives received half a franc for the same purpose. When the siege terminated their loafing life was ended, but the local Government was weak enough to continue the money allowances; this concession did not, however, prevent these citizens from turning their arms against their supporters.

Socialism had for a long time been rampant in Paris, but the surrender at Sedan and the overthrow of the Empire strengthened the hands of the agitators; the local socialistic clubs became centres of the organisation where sedition was preached and men's minds were inflamed. No doubt some few of their leaders were influenced by the desire to help their fellows and to effect what

is an impossibility—a dead-level in humanity ; for it requires very little knowledge of the world to rest perfectly satisfied that so long as brain power differs in individuals, and so long as some increase and develop their mental and physical powers and others enfeeble and destroy them by drink and other baleful habits, so long must social differences exist. If we look to the brute creation we find the same distinctions in existence. We have digressed in some degree from our subject, but the argument applies directly to the National Guards during the siege. Every citizen must be protected in the enjoyment of the fruit of his labour, whether it be gained by mental or physical power. What reason can there be in the cry that all men are equal, and that all people, whether they work or whether they idle, are entitled to be fed. This is socialism, which may commend itself to the indolent and the ignorant, but not to the honest worker, or to any man with a spark of independence or ambition.

Another motive was at work with the National Guards—they had had no work to do and they had been fed and clothed ; the idea of a return to work was revolting to these lords of creation. They felt like the Zulus, that fighting was their *métier*, work was not. These men had degenerated to the condition of the savage and they behaved accordingly. Excuses were easily found for a breach of the peace. A number of cannons, which had been paid for by public subscription having been parked in the Parc Monceau, were seized by the National Guards and carried off to Belleville on the 18th March, where they were placed behind barricades. The cannons belonged to the people, but the probabilities are that not one franc had been subscribed towards their provision by the men who had removed them. They had constituted themselves the champions of the Parisians, who had every reason to cry : “ Save us from our friends ! ” As early as the 22nd March a number of the leading citizens of Paris made a great effort to stay the progress of the revolt against law and order, which was dignified by the name of the Social Revolution. Some four thousand citizens had assembled and marched to the Place Vendôme, where the insurgents had erected barricades, their object being to persuade their countrymen to cease all opposition to the constituted authorities. These people had assembled in good faith and approached the insurgents without arms, so that the latter had no excuse for their subsequent conduct. They had no sooner confronted the rebels when they were warned off with rifles levelled at them, but being bent upon a parley with the citizens in revolt they stood their ground, and the misguided

mob opened fire upon them, the result being that a considerable number in the assemblage were either killed or wounded. As a natural consequence a large number of the more respectable citizens left the city, but numbers did not wish to abandon their property or their interests, and had therefore to remain at home exposed to the ill-treatment of a disorganised rabble. It is stated that over 100,000 people quitted Paris in order to avoid compulsory service in the rebel ranks, or in order to preserve what little property they could carry away with them.

It is hardly credible that there could exist men and women in any civilised community who are at all times ready to make capital out of the misfortunes of their country. People of this description existed in Paris to no limited extent, and it was these renegades who were ready to profit when their country had been devastated by the enemy and was still in his grasp. No political sin is greater than this, desertion to the enemy is infinitely less disgraceful. But when there is added to so heinous a sin the wanton destruction of public buildings, monuments, works of art, which were the property of the people, and the ruin of the private property of their fellow countrymen, the iniquity of such action is greatly aggravated, and degrades the participants to savagery. There is no excuse whatever for the socialistic leaders in precipitating a conflict at such an epoch. Civil war could merely aggravate the situation bad as it was. The Empire had certainly wrought much evil for France, but Napoleon was no longer the ruler of the country, and with him had disappeared the last vestiges of Imperialism. A Republic had been formed under the guidance of M. Thiers, and it was due to the new Government that it should be given the opportunity of showing whether it was worthy of the confidence of the people or not. The socialists declined to give it any chance of showing its capacity for governing France; the fact was they desired no stable Government, they wished for nothing but anarchy, spoliation, murder, and destruction, and in their madness they imagined that the people of France would join them in their senseless designs. The fallacy of their conduct needs hardly to be argued at the commencement of the twentieth century, all are agreed that "if any would not work neither should he eat." No command is better appreciated at the present day than that quoted; the less that divine law is transgressed the better will it be for humanity at large. In the instance under consideration, those who set that law at defiance lived to regret their temerity and eventually suffered severely for their misdoings.

The revolt did not break out until after the German forces had left Versailles. The Paris garrison had been removed and was concentrated in and about that place, to which the Government of the country had proceeded pending further developments. The available troops did not consist of more than 40,000 men, but these were obviously insufficient to oppose the Paris mob, which had been greatly augmented and strengthened by almost the whole of the 200,000 National Guards, as well as by a considerable number of deserters from the Mobiles and the line regiments. It is satisfactory to know that very few of the French navy joined this monstrous organisation. The French army was not in a position to take the field against the insurgents much before the 2nd April, by which time it had become augmented by detachments from Chanzy's army, and by the returned prisoners who had arrived from Germany to the number of 20,000; it was not then deemed prudent to release more. The fighting became of a very sanguinary nature, as is invariably the case during a civil war, but the insurgents were careful not to direct any attack upon the forces of the common enemy, who were still occupying positions to the east and north of Paris in large force. Attacks were made upon the regular French troops in the occupation of Versailles on the 2nd and 3rd of April, which were severely repulsed, and the Government forces occupied a position on the western side of Paris. As a natural result of the outbreak, the German troops did not continue their movement towards the frontier, but on the contrary those on the east took up positions within the neutral zone and threatened the insurgents from that quarter. Fortunately there had to be no appeal to arms on the part of the German troops, otherwise the whole country might have risen in open rebellion against the peace which had been made by the duly constituted authorities. Great credit is due to both the German and French executives for keeping cool and collected under such very trying circumstances; the greater shame therefore rests upon the leaders of the insurrection, who had created such an *impasse* in order that their own ends might be served, certainly not with any object aimed at the amelioration of the condition of the people. On the contrary, their acts throughout were marked by ignorance, corruption, brutality, and a bitter hatred of everything that tended to elevate the nation.

A Central Committee was formed by the leaders of the revolt who consisted for the most part of men of low origin, consequently some of their acts were of the very worst description; others were, however, remarkable for the business-like methods

they displayed. Their most revolting acts were the arrest and assassination of Generals Thomas and Lecomte, who were done to death by the infuriated mob. These were followed by the arrest of the Archbishop of Paris and others of the clergy, who were subsequently brutally murdered. The suppression of the press soon followed, the *Figaro* being suppressed on the 30th March; the abolition of the oath; the interdiction of religion and of religious orders; the conversion of churches into clubs; the suppression of the grade of general; and the interdiction of mendicity, which was perhaps the most ludicrous of many senseless decrees. As early as the 29th March a commission of seven was appointed to supervise the collection, storage, and distribution of supplies for both the soldiery and the people. M. Viard was at the head of this department; he probably received much assistance from the original staffs charged with that duty during the siege in the several arrondissements so far as they could be made available. The same sub-division of the community was continued, and it is likely that many of the same butchers and bakers were employed; there would therefore have been very little reorganisation needed. It should, however, be borne in mind that the Central Committee had set itself a most difficult task—their intention was to feed the whole of the people of Paris, whether military or civil, which could not have totalled much under one and three quarter millions of human beings. The probabilities are that not much more than a million of the people would have had to depend upon the committee for its food, as all the residents who were possessed of means would, after their experience of the rigours of a siege, have lost no time in replenishing their stocks of corn, wine, and oil, particularly as there was no immediate guarantee of a cessation of the war after the expiration of the three weeks' armistice.

The Supply Committee found its hands pretty full in all that it had undertaken to perform. It had to take stock of all things edible which the shops and storehouses of the city contained, and it was charged with the duty of bringing into Paris sufficient supplies to last the whole population for a period of three months. Under the circumstances, it is certain that no hindrances were placed in the way of the committee or of private individuals in regard to the introduction of food into Paris, as the large majority of those residing in the city were not in rebellion; the belligerents consisting mainly of the socialists, the disaffected National Guards, and the deserters from the army, numbering probably not much over a quarter of a million, if the rebellious

women be excluded. It is evident that notwithstanding the widespread system of requisitioning which was at once instituted and the pillaging which commenced on the departure of the regular troops, the committee evidently found itself in dire need of food by the 4th May, for on that date an order was issued for the seizure of all bread baked that night at all the city bakeries. The moral side of good government was not neglected by these would-be benefactors of their kind, as one of their earliest acts was the appointment of school instructors of both sexes for the educational institutions of the city, but certificates of morality were not *de rigueur*.

The financial side was managed by another committee; the purchase of stores and supplies and the pay of the troops had to be provided for, money had therefore to be collected somehow. The committee was not particular as to its methods; those involving the least trouble seemed to be most affected at first, consequently the banking institutions and the railways were the first to suffer from their exactions. They were also charged with the collection of the octroi at the city gates. The money which eventually found its way to the public treasury is stated by M. Ollier as having averaged only 80,000 fr. a day when the usual yield was 300,000 fr. It is evident that there must have been very extensive peculations, as the takings, filtrated through numerous palms before they reached their destination, for it is certain that goods of every description must have poured into Paris in large quantities after its serious depletion, consequently the takings must have been quite as large if not larger than under normal conditions.

The Comtesse Pia St. Henri gives us an amusing instance of how money was raised. She wrote :—" One evening a body of fifty communists presented themselves at a rich merchant's house and demanded the sum of 40,000 fr. which was required for the public service." The man feigned pleasure at the thought of contributing towards the National finances, and requested his friends to accept his hospitality while he went to procure the sum demanded. Leaving his guests to regale themselves on the best his cellar could produce, he quietly carried his money to a place of safety, and on his return, as he had anticipated, found his requisitionists dead-drunk and so oblivious to everything that they had quite forgotten for what purpose they had come, and left quite satisfied with themselves and with things in general."

The Central Committee was most generous to its adherents, and its expenditure was profuse—it is stated that the cost of the

Commune during its two months of existence averaged over a million pounds a day. That figure may not be an exaggeration when the enormous damage wrought is taken into account. The National Guards were paid 1 fr. 50 c. a day and their wives 50 c. daily in addition, and it is probable that like everyone else they received rations without payment. In the event of death, the widow was to receive 600 fr. a year, and every child over eighteen years was to be paid 360 fr. The officers were paid at various rates, ranging from the Commander-in-Chief at 500 fr. a month down to a Sous-Lieutenant at 150 fr. a month. Those rates cannot be considered extravagant; they, however, have their merit in not discriminating too much between the pay of the higher and lower ranks of officers. Not the least amusing part of the regulations issued is the very confident wording in which they were framed. They might have been the orders of the most stable government in existence so far as their tone was concerned. No doubt the confidence displayed by the Communal authorities was intended to give the impression of the permanency of that Government. We cannot conclude this chapter without lamenting that sloth and self-indulgence can work such havoc in civilised communities. It is greatly to be feared that the commencement of the twentieth century, inaugurated as it has been by strikes for more money and less work, does not show any very great improvement in the social condition of the masses, who may at any moment adopt violent measures at the instigation of those agitators, who prey so unscrupulously upon their species. Our conviction is that some sort of universal service and increased facilities in education can alone stem the torrent of falsehood and misrepresentation which is sweeping over every country. The men of the present generation need discipline more than at any previous epoch, and the more extensively that is inculcated, the sooner will they think for themselves and become good and useful citizens.

CHAPTER XXXII.

THE COMMUNE.

It will easily be understood that money was of the very first consideration to the Central Committee of the Commune; it was required to provide the necessaries of life for the vast numbers congregated in Paris, who had virtually allowed themselves to become dependent upon this body of persons for everything they needed. The people had voluntarily relinquished their independence in order that they might be dry-nursed by a set of men, who, for the moment, imagined themselves the preservers and benefactors of their fellow citizens. Enormous sums of money were needed to meet the disbursements connected with such an undertaking, and in addition, the rapacity of the leaders and their employés had to be satisfied. We cannot think that the daily requirements of money could have averaged much under a quarter of a million of pounds sterling. As we have seen, plunder was resorted to for the purpose of procuring sufficient money to meet all such requirements. Cassell's *History of the War* gives some particulars in regard to this momentous question:—"The difficulty experienced by the Commune in raising funds was increased by the endeavour of the wealthy to convey as much money out of the city as they could. The *Assistance Publique*, which managed estates and collected moneys for the hospitals of Paris, smuggled out of the town on the 1st April no less than 75,000,000 fr. The money and securities were hidden in potato sacks, and removed through the gates in potato carts. A few days later the Jesuits made an attempt to get off 4,000,000 fr., but they were not successful, for the money was seized at the Lyons railway station in strong boxes." The same book adds that the private houses were plundered mercilessly, and that a ransom of a million francs was demanded for the release of the Archbishop of Paris, who, with some three hundred of the clergy, had been arrested by the Commune. Such was the result of the support given by an insurgent soldiery to a number of mischievous and irresponsible persons, many of whom added ignorance to their other faults, and who had combined mainly with the idea of exerting an unlimited power over the people, in some degree,

perhaps, with the object of improving their condition ; at least that was their declared intention, but the results proved that their desire was to benefit themselves personally and to be avenged upon those who wished to govern the land with a due regard to the rights of all classes of the community, and who were opposed to everything tending to promote anarchy, spoliation, and to disregard of the property and lives of the citizens.

The fundamental principles of the Commune were based upon the idea that the wealth of the land should be distributed equally amongst its inhabitants, but there is every indication that the majority of the members considered that they should not come into the same category as the common herd, for numbers of them took care to provide themselves against any future contingency, and did not scruple to destroy the public property of the nation. They were also possessed with the insane idea that the inhabitants of every country were each entitled to a share of the arable land without payment of any kind, and that the rich alone were to pay Government taxes. Such were the tenets of the members of the Commune ; they aimed at the unattainable, and they came to utter grief, and in their anger they wrecked everything, including themselves. The memory of the doings of the Communists of Paris, of their utter failure to work good out of evil, should act as a deterrent for all time to those people whom the professional agitator will always be endeavouring to persuade to think as he would have them act, although, as a rule, he has no faith in his own propaganda.

One of the worst features of the Committee was the determination to force men into their service. Numbers escaped from the city in good time, others seeking to escape were arrested and thrown into prison, and were released only upon the payment of such fines as could be levied from those who were exempted from serving. No dwelling was considered sacred to these people, who respected nobody ; the habitations of the religious orders were invaded without compunction, the priests and nuns being subjected to the greatest humiliations and insults. In such instances the visits seem to have been provoked more by curiosity than by any expectation of finding persons concealed on the premises. The Comtesse de St. Henri gives us the words which a commandant used in addressing his men on this subject :—
“ Citizens, there is no need to waste your words ; a good slap of the hand will make things hum, for see you, citizens, that we must lose no time in convincing these idiots ; if they will not join us willingly we must seize them ; a blow from the butt of a rifle

on the back, or a kick in the — will make them jump, my boys.” The same authoress gives the following pathetic account of an attempt made to force a man to join the insurgent ranks :— “ A search party entered the house of a young married woman, who had just given birth to her firstborn, whom she was holding in her arms. The men demanded to know where her husband was, and knowing their purpose she assured them she did not know of his whereabouts. Her interrogator promptly seized her baby and declared that he would kill it if the mother did not tell him where her husband was, swinging the child the while at arm’s length in the air. At that moment a shot was fired by the husband from a back room, and the inhuman wretch fell to the ground dead. A comrade at once pierced the infant with his bayonet in revenge, whereupon both husband and wife attacked the band in a frenzy. The unhappy couple was quickly overpowered and four dead bodies were all that remained to record this cowardly massacre.” This incident may be taken as a fair sample of many others of the same kind, many of which have never been brought to light. It is certain that the brutality of the socialists was of a kind to condemn them as far greater enemies to France and of their countrymen than were their German conquerors.

Probably the domiciliary visits in the never ending search for food, which was often made an excuse for plundering private houses, was often conducted with severity and harshness, but sometimes with some show of consideration—the character of the searchers was what regulated the treatment accorded. The aid of any neighbouring body of soldiers might be called into requisition where resistance was offered or where opposition of any kind was shown. The searchers were therefore armed with a great deal of power and were able to do pretty much as they felt disposed. Some of the Parisians informed the writer that they were favoured with domiciliary visits of this description, but they found the men most reasonable, and ready to give credence to what they were told, which was generally to the effect that they had barely sufficient to meet their own necessities. After a perfunctory search the party would take its departure, but it is not improbable that in many such cases the commander may have been softened by a bribe, or may have been an acquaintance of the proprietor, or perhaps the better treatment may have been due solely to good nature on the part of the particular band of insurgents. At first there was much disorder in the methods employed for procuring food ; bakers’ shops were broken into and sacked of their contents, but, as the so-called Government

asserted its authority, more worthy methods were adopted. M. Ollier tells us that upon one occasion the fish market was taken possession of and its contents, valued at 20,000 fr., were appropriated for the use of the insurgents. On another occasion a flock of sheep, coming into Paris, was seized by a body of National Guards. It is obvious that such conduct would speedily work irreparable evil if persisted in, as the fishermen would cease to toil, and the salesmen could not purchase if they had no protection; in the same way the farmers would cease to send animals to market if they were liable to capture *en route*.

It is very much to be deplored that the insurgents behaved badly in their treatment of public and private houses, when it was necessary for them to be utilised as quarters. The churches so employed were profaned, everything of value was removed and no portion of the sacred edifices escaped desecration of a kind too revolting to relate. When nunneries were occupied the nuns were subjected to gross insults, from which their sacred calling should have protected them. The Comtesse de St. Henri gives us a shocking story under this head:—"In one of the houses near the convent lived a poor man, his wife, and their daughter, a pretty and chaste girl of seventeen years of age. One day a number of the Federals entered the house and requisitioned all they could find in the way of money and provisions. On taking their departure twelve of their men were left behind in billets, and very quickly made themselves quite at home. The parents did not succeed in satisfying the demands of their rapacious guests, who threatened violence if their demands were not met. To satisfy them the key of the cellar was given up to the monsters with the usual result that they became so drunken as to be hardly accountable for their actions. The men left the house in the early morning after a brutal night's work. The daughter had been ravished forcibly by more than one of the inhuman wretches, and was left in a dying condition, the unhappy parents having to mourn over the corpse of their beloved child." This and other incidents do not redound to the character of those people who had lent themselves to the propagation of socialistic doctrines, which have for their main object the so-called rights of man.

The supplies required for the civil community were evidently provided by the committee of subsistence, and there do not seem to have been any deficiencies under that head; the people were evidently well provided with food, as there was an entire absence of real want, certainly no starvation, but it is certain that they

did not all live equally well. The chiefs of the insurrection took great care of themselves and their friends, but the community had to be contented with what they received—a scant subsistence. We can imagine that such a state of things might satisfy people for a time, but there could be no permanence to such a condition of affairs had it been possible to prolong it; men would tire of indolence, license, immorality, and brutality. However debased they might become, the longings of their souls could not be denied and their animal natures must in the end be overcome. It was so with the inhabitants of Paris, after gaining their purpose they very quickly sickened and tired of the debauched lives they were leading, not so the women whom they had debauched. When it became evident that the end was approaching, the unsexed women became veritable furies, they were ready to take up arms and defend the barricades; if the men desired to surrender, they would fight to the death. And it was to these furies that the sacking and burning of so much property in Paris was subsequently due. What a triumph for socialism! The weapons turning upon their employers—the insurgent hoisted by his own petard. The leaders generally stuck to their colours to the bitter end, but their dupes suffered far greater punishments in the long run than was the case with their commanders.

There appears to have been a separate organisation for the feeding of the troops of the Commune, although the department no doubt drew their supplies in bulk from the large magazines, which were stocked by the Committee. The following report, published by the *Revue de France*, made by Intendant May, who had charge of this department, throws some light upon the management, but it has to be borne in mind that the officer was reporting upon his own work to no permanently constituted authority. He reported to the following effect:—He was appointed on the 27th March, and requested his brother and some other people to assist him in the organisation of the department. As all the books and documents had been removed by the regular army Intendance when the troops moved to Versailles at the moment of the outbreak, everything was in the utmost disorder, and an entire reorganisation had to be instituted. The manager of the large bakery establishment had absconded, and, as M. May remarked, “without bread you can have no soldiers,” so he at once took steps to reorganise that establishment, and placed a friend in charge. The distribution was also arranged for, probably much on the same lines as had been done previously, according to the position of the various corps.

M. May, however, mentions that magazines of food and forage were established at Asiniers, Neuilly, Avenue Uhrich, Port Dauphine, Parc Wagram, Parc Monceau, and at forts Issy, Vanves, Mont-rouge, Ivry, &c. They were all supplied from the central bakery, and from the other large magazines established in the heart of the city. He asserts that he and his officers effected huge economies, and states that the bakery turned out one-third more bread than when managed by the Government officials, and adds that the workmen were paid higher wages. The horses and vehicles dispersed among the different branches were got together, and so businesslike was the rearrangement that many of the omnibuses and other hired vehicles could be dispensed with, thus creating a saving in expenditure of 2,000 fr. a day. M. May does not, however, show that the transport requirement had been enormously reduced owing to the withdrawal of the regular troops, and to the fact that the Germans objected to the occupation of the forts on the eastern face, and notified the insurgents that if they were occupied fire would be opened upon them. As a natural consequence, the non-occupation of those large and principal works reduced the transport requirements enormously, as did also the almost total cessation of true ambulance work, for we are told that the major portion of the dead and wounded were left where they fell, particularly in the last stages of the revolt, when there was so much and such bloody street fighting. It is quite certain from the tenor of the report that M. May was quite satisfied with the work done by himself and his assistants. The probabilities are that the supply duties were performed well for the very simple reasons that there was no accountability, no responsibility, and only a nominal surveillance, if there was any at all. Men thus left entirely to themselves must have been dolts had they not been able to keep things running smoothly, even if they were not feathering their nests meanwhile. Of course any system of the sort is impossible under ordinary circumstances, but there may be occasions when accountability and liability may have to be cast to the winds in the face of urgent necessity, such as the hurried victualling of a fortress suddenly threatened, or the provisioning of a field army in an emergency. In such or similar circumstances, so long as the officer can adduce sufficient cause for the initiative taken, he should be supported by his judges, whoever they may be.

The Government at Versailles found itself placed in an exceedingly difficult situation by the outbreak of the revolution, as it had only 40,000 regular troops to employ against enormous

insurgent forces. The German army was quite ready to lend its support to the party of order, but there were obvious reasons against those forces again taking the field. Consequently permission was given for the augmentation of the French regular forces, and the command of the army charged with the suppression of the revolt was given to Marshal McMahon, who had been released by the German Government. This distinguished officer adopted effective measures for the subjugation of the rebels; the forts occupied by the insurgents were attacked, and some of them were captured, and a bombardment was opened on the northern, western, and southern sides of Paris. On the 21st May the attacks had so far succeeded that the Government troops were able to effect an entrance into the city, where the insurgents resisted the advance from street to street, from house to house, and from barricade to barricade with the utmost pertinacity. The stubborn fighting naturally exasperated the regulars, who showed little mercy to those who were opposing them; the slaughter was something too dreadful; insurgents of both sexes were shot down almost ruthlessly; the French soldiery could not feel that such renegades, who had converted their country's dire misfortunes to their own profit, were deserving of any mercy. After overcoming the most serious opposition, and after the capture of many of the leaders and large numbers of the rank and file, quiet was at length restored to much afflicted Paris, and some degree of order was obtained for the large majority of the Parisians, who had submitted to the dictates of an insurgent minority with great patience and fortitude.

So soon as the insurgent leaders perceived that their cause was quite hopeless they determined on a policy of revenge upon the capital of France in their anger at the failure of their abominable enterprise. Messrs. Cassell's publication gives us an interesting account of the destruction of the Vendôme Column, erected in memory of the brilliant victories gained by Napoleon Buonaparte, which all true Frenchmen would have gladly shed their blood to protect:—"Accordingly the official journal on the morning of the 16th May announced that the Column would positively fall that day at 2 o'clock in the afternoon. At the hour named a large crowd of spectators assembled. The members of the Commune and their Staff, amounting to two hundred, appeared on horseback. Bands played, and everything was done to give the occasion a festive character. At a quarter to three the first attempt was made to pull the Column down; but it failed, owing to the breaking of the snatch-block. Some time was lost in

repairing the machinery ; fresh ropes were added, and Colonel Meyer, commanding the Place Vendôme, ascended to the top of the column and waved a small tricolour flag. He then tore the flag, crying, 'Long live the Commune!' He then tied a flag-head to the rails at the summit of the pillar, and descended. When the ropes were tightened for the second time the bands struck up the 'Marseillaise,' and all eyes were fixed on the doomed monument. This time the attempt was successful. As it fell it broke up into pieces in the air, and struck the ground in four portions." Had these ruffians contented themselves by wreaking their vengeance upon inanimate objects, they would not have brought so much disgrace upon themselves as by their thirst for blood. These cowardly wretches sought out the most inoffensive of their countrymen, in the persons of the Archbishop of Paris, the Curé of the Madeleine, and other clerics, whom they most barbarously shot, by order of the Communal authorities, in the cemetery of Père Lachaise. The vile character and objects of the rebel leaders were emphasised by such acts ; for the murdered men were well known to have devoted their lives to the alleviation of the hardships and sufferings of the poorest classes of the French metropolis.

To the very last moment of the abortive defence the work of destruction and spoliation was continued, and even after the last remnants of any organised opposition had died out, the people, more particularly the women, continued the active destruction of public and private buildings by fire. So deliberate and diabolical was the determination to destroy, that many women were caught red-handed pouring petroleum down the ventilating shafts of some of the dwelling-houses, to which the torch was applied, regardless of the probable destruction of human life by their outrageous conduct. What aggravated the diabolical nature of such acts was the fact that official written orders were found upon the bodies of some of the insurgents who were engaged in this revolting operation. It is evident that the devilish work did not result alone from the irresponsible acts of an infuriated half-maddened mob, but was prompted by the leaders in a spirit of vengeance on account of the failure of their impracticable and impossible scheme. In this way were so many of the palaces, public buildings, and private houses committed to the flames by these champions of the people—these self-styled protectors, who were devoting the property and art treasures of the public to the flames. Damage to the extent of over fifteen millions sterling is calculated to have been wrought by these misguided people.

Was there ever so much duplicity and low cunning on the side of the leaders, and so much gullibility on the part of those led? The Comtesse de St. Henri gives us an account of how the Cathedral of Notre Dame was saved to the French nation and to the world at large. A man had been deputed to light the fuze attached to a mine which had been constructed for the purpose of destroying that historic building. After igniting the match and leaving the building he was wounded by a rifle shot, and asking for a priest he confessed what he had done. That ecclesiastic bravely ran to the Cathedral, and just managed to extinguish the fuze in time to save the sacred edifice. It is regrettable to know that many of the leaders in this rebellion were treated too mercifully, some of them escaping with various terms of imprisonment. Their tools do not appear to have escaped so easily as the principals—thousands were killed during the two months' fighting, the actual numbers were never known, but the regulars lost some 7,000 in killed and wounded. Numbers were shot down in cold blood at the instance of the infuriated soldiery, and many more were put to death after trial by hastily constructed courts. Many suffered imprisonment for various terms, and when justice had become appeased a merciful stage succeeded, and hundreds, who were perhaps more guilty than those who had been condemned, escaped without being punished at all.

The war had now drawn to its close, the fighting had terminated with a disastrous civil war, in which men and women's fiercest passions had been aroused and excited by a number of irresponsible individuals, many of whom were not Frenchmen. It is satisfactory to know that although there were one or two Americans mixed up with the Commune, there was not an Englishman among the members of the Committee; and yet almost every other country in Europe had one or more representatives. On the contrary the British nation became conspicuous by the good feeling displayed by all classes of society—from the Crown to the labouring man—all contributed of their substance and of their means to help the suffering French nation. Many individuals, either those resident in France or others who went over purposely, sought to relieve the distress of the afflicted people of Paris and of the parts of the country which had necessarily been devastated by the millions of soldiers of both armies. A correspondent of the *Daily News* wrote on the 9th of February as follows:—"They were unable to imagine the condition of men and women who had been feeding for months on the same kind of food, which had become nauseous to them, and had too

much self-restraint to express any craving for fresh food, to which they knew perfectly well that other sufferers were still better entitled—men and women who had been absolutely starving.” Large numbers of thinking people in France feel the utmost gratitude to England for the sympathy and substantial help afforded to France at this trying epoch, and we think the better understanding which has subsisted between the two nations in recent years owes its existence in part to the memory of that heartfelt sympathy. That sympathetic feeling has ripened into something of a more substantial nature, and has culminated in an amicable agreement between the two countries over outstanding differences. May that friendship extend still further, and may the two countries become firm allies in the promotion of peace and good-will universally. We would rejoice to see their united efforts directed towards the universal reduction of naval and military armaments, the expenditures upon which have brought so many nations to the verge of bankruptcy of late years. We contend that disarmaments could be enforced by such a powerful combination, provided always that the combining powers were themselves willing to reduce their own armaments proportionately with other nations. Sea power alone can, we believe, accomplish so great a revolution in the armaments of the world.

CHAPTER XXXIII.

GERMAN EXPLANATIONS.

When an attempt was made by the Government to negotiate a peace with the German authorities soon after the surrender at Sedan, the popular cry was "not an inch of the soil not a stone of our fortifications." Now on her knees, France had to relinquish the whole of Alsace and a considerable portion of Lorraine, besides a large number of frontier fortresses. The Government has been charged with being too exacting in its demands, but the memory of the hardships put upon their country by the first Napoleon had not faded from the minds of the German people, nor was it forgotten that the provinces claimed had been forcibly wrested from Germany in past times. The people as a rule sympathised with the French and desired to remain French notwithstanding their German origin, but that was not to be. The right of conquest had given the Germans the option, and no blame can attach to them for the exercise of that right. The conquered provinces are yearly becoming more and more Germanised and the people are getting more contented with German rule, but it is a fact that numbers of the young men still continue to cross the frontier and throw in their lot with the French conscripts. Time and the complete disappearance of the older generation, which had taken part in the war, can affect a radical cure.

The German Government exercised a wise discretion in insisting that the French people should bear the cost of feeding the army of occupation so long as it was forced to remain in France. As it was foreseen, the people would make every possible effort to rid themselves of their unwelcome guests; they desired firstly to get them out of the country, and secondly to save their country the expense and humiliation of feeding them. By the terms of the convention the army of occupation was not to exceed 50,000 men after two milliards of the indemnity had been paid, and those troops were to be concentrated near the frontier in several departments in the north-eastern portion of the country. The demobilisation of the German army had commenced immediately upon the notification of the terms of peace by the National Assembly, but the revolt of the Communists had

retarded its execution to some extent. Considering that at the termination of the war, about the middle of May, there were more than a million German soldiers on French soil, it is highly creditable to the organisation of the German Administration that little more than one hundred thousand men were left in the country by the 1st July following.

The army of occupation was placed under the command of General Manteuffel. The official account informs us that:—"In virtue of full powers conferred upon him by the supreme authorities, the General agreed with M. Thiers with regard to the details of the quartering and feeding of the German troops, as well as with regard to their relations with the inhabitants of the occupied districts. To facilitate further communications, the Chief of the Executive Power had delegated the Count de St. Vallier and the Intendant Blondeau to the headquarters of General V. Manteuffel." It will be seen, therefore, that the French Government had to provide quarters as well as rations for the army of occupation; this obligation entailed some considerable expenditure, as in some instances where barracks were not available in sufficient quantities, huts had to be constructed for the use of the German soldiers. In a case of the kind neither public buildings nor churches could have been utilised even as a temporary measure, as the people would have resisted such an encroachment. The utmost caution had to be employed upon both sides in order to prevent any serious ebullition on the part of the people, who felt themselves very aggrieved by the terms of the Convention.

The withdrawal of the German forces commenced in the districts immediately surrounding Paris, which were gradually reoccupied by the French troops. It is evident that the object of the two Governments was to place in the hands of the French executive the direction and control of the whole government of the country, so that a normal condition of affairs might be restored as quickly as possible. There was always the danger that the war might be recommenced by accident or design on the part of some of the Franc-tireurs or others. Half a million of regular soldiers had recently returned from Germany and Switzerland, and were not too well pleased with the causes which led to their capture or internment, and were quite disposed to seize any opportunity which might demonstrate to the world that they were still unconquered. Then again there were many of those spirits still at large who had aided in fomenting the Communistic risings in Paris and Lyons. There were, therefore, considerable

elements of discord abroad which required good management on the part of the French executive. On the other hand, much discretion was needed on the part of the German officers and soldiery to prevent any vexatious treatment or domineering spirit on their part. It is certain that the utmost forbearance was employed on the part of the Germans—they were the conquerors and could afford to be generous. The German official account states as follows :—“ In respect to the exceptional task of this army and the dangerous position in which it might be placed should war break out, not only was it maintained in a condition for the field, but detailed arrangements were made for the employment of the different parts in the event of a concentration becoming necessary.” The indemnity having been paid much more rapidly than was anticipated by either the French or German Government, the final departure of the German forces was much expedited.

The German Intendantur was seriously handicapped from the outset by the awful suddenness of the declaration of war by the French Government. The railway lines had to be given up mainly for the purpose of bringing the army corps with all expedition to the frontier, and the supply and transport were of necessity neglected for the moment ; it is not surprising, therefore, that there was much suffering amongst the German soldiery at the commencement of the campaign, when numbers of men died from exposure, exhaustion, and the want of sufficient food. Then there was the rapid progress of events, which alone would have been sufficient to have upset the calculations of the most experienced and able supply and transport officers. Furthermore, although the portion of France first invaded was rich in agricultural and other products, the officers of the Intendantur would have required time to organise a system of requisitions for both supplies and transport. General Pierron tells us that they had to feed 982,064 men and 209,403 horses from the commencement of August. Then there was the work connected with the concentration of the stores and supplies as well as ammunition in magazines along the frontier.

We think that a quotation from the *Edinburgh Review* of April, 1871, will throw some light upon the way in which this work must have been accomplished. The quotation is from a work on the war by Colonel Borbstaedts, and is as follows :—“ In the Prussian administration, every commander, down to the captain of a company, is entrusted with and responsible for the administration of his allotted force of men. The battalions and

regiments have associated with those individual paymasters, with the rank of officers, to co-operate in the administration; the divisions and army corps have other officers, with grades corresponding to their importance, who watch over the paymasters below them. These are doubly responsible, to the general regulations of the service, and to the orders of their immediate commanders. The Ministry of War has reserved to itself only special portions of the higher part of the administration, and with the general control of the whole. Its bureaux, provided separately for the good supervision of the payments, the rationing, the transport, and the clothing of the army." The intention was evidently to throw the onus of feeding their men and horses in the first place upon the battalion and company commanders. When there was any danger of their not being properly fed in the ordinary way, those officers were to see that they were fed by some means or other, and in emergent cases they were expected to improvise those means. Decentralisation was insisted upon by the highest army authorities, and the officers on the spot were not expected to see men crippled through want of food and to do nothing to aid them; or, as is so frequently done under such circumstances, sit down and abuse everybody. In his *Nation in Arms*, Baron Von der Goltz gives us some information of the difficulties encountered during the Franco-German War, he says:—"The military authorities displayed the greatest activity; they acted without solicitude or pedantry in respect to the employment of all useful means when the troops were in actual want. In this feeling of self-congratulation lies the tacit recognition of the great difficulties with which the commissariat of an army has, even under the most favourable circumstances, to contend." We have also the opinion of General Kraft, quoted by General Pierron:—"It is a great error to imagine that the feeding of the troops in the advance should be entrusted to the Intendance. Many generals take that view of the matter and place their whole reliance upon that corps. During war the Intendance follows an army with its trains and cannot be expected to provide for the troops engaged at the very front, who should provide for themselves by requisitions or otherwise."

The Germans have been accused, principally by French writers, of having often been very brutal in their treatment of the peasantry in those portions of the country which were occupied by their troops. After a fairly close review of something in the neighbourhood of a hundred different works, we are certainly inclined to think that the French soldiery often treated their

compatriots much more harshly than did the Germans. So much so was this the case that supplies were generally forthcoming when they were demanded by the Germans, which was not always the case when the demand was made by the French. Sir Beachamp Walker in his Diary does not give the Bavarians a very high character as soldiers ; he says :—" We are eaten up by a swarm of Bavarians, who loll over the town (Allonville) in all directions, and sit in the place where meat and drink are to be obtained all day long, therefore a nuisance of the first water. I never saw such dawdling sloppy people in my life. Their clothes looked as if they belonged to someone else, their accoutrements as if they belonged to anyone else than the man who wears them, and they march as if they had pins in their toes. However, they are quiet and well behaved, and are civil in their manners."

During the four-and-a-half months siege of Paris it would have been impossible for the German Intendantur to find food and forage for the armies surrounding Paris had they not been assisted by the local civil population, who were encouraged by every possible means to bring their produce for sale to the German camps and quarters. There could not have been on an average less than ten German army corps in the immediate neighbourhood of Paris ; at the commencement of the siege there were not more than five or six corps, but towards the conclusion of the siege there must have been considerably over a dozen present. In Cassell's *History of the War* the daily consumption of a German army corps is given as follows :—" 18,000 3-lb. loaves of bread ; 120 cwt. of rice or barley ; 70 live oxen ; 120 cwt. of bacon ; 18 cwt. of salt ; 30 cwt. of coffee ; 12 cwt. of oats ; 3 cwt. of hay ; 3,500 quarts of spirits ; 3,500 quarts of orange essence taken with the spirits ; also 60 cwt. of tobacco ; 1,100,000 cigars and 50,000 officers' cigars every 10 days." This would give an average of over 400 tons of provisions and forage required daily for the feeding of ten army corps, besides the 700 oxen required for the meat supply, which would require quite as many railway trucks for their transportation. It is obvious that so large a quantity of supplies could not have been carried daily over what was practically a single line of railway, when there were large quantities of stores, ammunition, guns, projectiles, &c., to be conveyed by the same line. The greatest credit is due to the officers and men of the German Commissariat for the way in which they carried out their duties under exceedingly trying circumstances. In his *Tactical Deductions*, Capt. A. Von Boguslawski says :—" The supply of the army before

Paris was managed excellently well during the siege. During the first eight days only there was a great scarcity of meat. After that the author does not remember a single day on which each man failed to receive from three-quarters to one pound of meat with vegetables, bread and coffee in abundance, often with the addition of a quantum of Schnapps or wine."

It was the habit of the German Commissariat to make money payments for all the purchases they made in the markets, which the French peasantry had been encouraged to provide in the neighbourhood of Paris, Reims, Rethel, Orleans, and other occupied cities. The *Quarterly Review* of April, 1871, tenders some excellent advice upon this subject:—"As to the German requisitions, it cannot be denied that they have in many cases exceeded all reasonable limits. Eight millions sterling extorted from Paris may have been within the means of so wealthy a city; and perhaps Chalons could afford its £64,000, Reims its £12,000, and Nancy its £200,000; but requisitions of 25 fr. a head in country villages, besides exhaustive demands of provisions of all kinds, cannot be called otherwise than exorbitant. Indeed, the whole system of forced requisitions, except for absolutely necessary supplies when the inhabitants refuse to give them in return for a fair price, is wrong in principle, and of very doubtful policy." As a correspondent well argues:—"Whenever an army pays the fair market price for supplies furnished to it by its inhabitants, a spontaneous action sets in for replacing those supplies. In exchange for the provisions they furnish, the inhabitants receive the means of replenishing their stores, and the certainty of a market and security from requisitions encourages importations from neighbouring countries. The requisition system, on the other hand, puts a stop to all voluntary importations from neighbouring districts; and therefore when the existing supplies are exhausted the inhabitants are in danger of starvation, and the armies must be supported by what their own Commissariat can bring them from home or from other districts."

According to Baron Von der Goltz the Commissariat of an army about to take the field should lay in from two to three times as much provisions and forage as are positively required for the actual numerical strength of that army. The science of supply will enable professional officers to distribute their supplies with such discriminating ability that there should never be so much with the army as to seriously hamper its movements, nor so little as to endanger its vitality and power of assuming

the offensive. The Germans undoubtedly sustained enormous losses of supplies either through deterioration or from capture or destruction by the enemy, but it was only occasionally that the troops suffered from lack of food, and that was usually when they had outmarched their supplies, or after an engagement during which the supply columns had to keep well to the rear and clear of the line of retreat. The official account concludes with the following remark upon the conduct of the supply and transport services during the war:—"Owing to the foresight and loyalty of all the Intendance and supply officials, and of the officers and men employed in the train, and the never-failing initiative of the troops, those periods of difficulties of supply were tided over without endangering the health of man and horse in a way that had never been attained in any previous great campaign. If in isolated cases, as for instance, on the days of battle, the food was deficient, or the rations could not be issued in the regulated proportions, this was due to circumstances which can never be entirely under control in time of war. The German troops have, however, shown that they are able to bear the hardest privations without detriment to their soldier-like qualities."

In concluding our remarks upon the conduct of the supply and transport of the German army during this highly instructive and interesting campaign, we do not feel that a better use can be made of the information gained from others, who have written upon what the majority have actually seen for themselves, or have gathered from eye-witnesses, than by endeavouring to form some deductions from the information, which may be of some service to the officers, non-commissioned officers, and men of the British army, more particularly to those belonging to the Army Service Corps. If the remarks made should provoke others from those who are more in touch with such matters, some advantages may accrue to the service generally.

We hold that the German officers of the Intendantur assumed an initiative quite unknown in the field up to this war. They accepted the responsibilities which pertained to their duties with great courage, devotion, energy, and patriotism. There was no shirking of responsibility, no endeavour to shift their burden on to the shoulders of others, perchance the commander or his staff officer. Those officers had been trained in their profession, and were more capable than any other of knowing what was best in most circumstances, therefore they were not disposed to make useless appeals for help or advice when the necessity was non-existent. They were perfectly satisfied that so long as they acted

in a reasonable common sense way, their action would be endorsed by their commander. There are abundant occasions upon which the General must be consulted before action can be taken, such for instance as the creation of new advanced dépôts, the location of the supply columns before, during, or subsequent to a battle, the districts upon which requisitions may be made, and so on. Baron Von der Goltz gives excellent advice under this head :—
“ The courage of responsibility and the wish to bear it are necessary to a General, but are rare gifts. Very many men dash thoughtlessly into the greatest perils when another has to bear the responsibility for them ; but they are irresolute when they have to undertake it themselves.”

The system inculcated being the responsibility of each and every individual member of the army to do his very best and to contribute to the utmost of his power and intelligence towards the defeat and eventual subjugation of the enemy. A direct liability was imposed upon the company officers in regard to the fighting condition of the men under their command ; in the event of failure in food, their duty was to make every effort to fill up the hiatus, the causes could be enquired into afterwards, their present duty was to keep their men in good fighting trim, and their whole energy was to be directed towards that end. It was well recognised throughout the German army that each branch had its own particular work to accomplish, if success was to be attained ; there seems to have been a kindly feeling subsisting between the several branches by which the body was supported, it was indeed a huge mutual benefit association. No single branch despised or depreciated any other, nor were there any distinctions or definitions from the Emperor commanding to the humblest drummer ; they worked harmoniously together for the benefit of the Fatherland.

We must all admire the rapid assumption of the offensive when it was anticipated that, for some time at least, the German armies would have been acting on the defensive. The practical abandonment of the greater part of the German transport in the initial stages of the war, owing to the rapid progress of events and the necessity to push forward troops, horses, guns, and ammunition to the fighting line.—The great mobility of so many of the German corps.—The admirable utilisation of French lines of railway by the Germans.—The maintenance of their extended lines of communication.—The formation of base and advanced dépôts in the enemy's country.—The utilisation of the resources of the enemy's country in the provision of supplies and transports for the use of the various German armies. The remarkable achieve-

ments of the German armies resulted mainly from the admirable organisation of the war administration and of the preparations made in advance to meet the outbreak of a war with France.

It is worthy of note that since that epoch, some thirty years ago, no European power has emulated the example of preparedness for war shown by the German Government. It has fallen to an Asiatic power to follow very closely the example given to the world by Germany. In its war with Russia, Japan has demonstrated how completely she has prepared her army and her navy for the gigantic efforts she has determined to make with the object of securing her very existence. The Japanese authorities have not been trammelled by precedents; when it was decided to adopt Western methods of warfare, the military and naval traditions of the past were relegated to obscurity, and the best of our Western methods were accepted in their entirety. The Japanese have studied military science as understood in Europe for over a quarter of a century, and their experts have profited largely from the study of the successes and the failures of modern warfare. Military history and the study of the physical features of most lands have been assimilated to some purpose by Japanese students, otherwise so young a military nation could not have commanded so many successes in the initial stages of a great war.

The initial successes, such as the methodical landings effected on the Korean and Manchurian coasts, and the victories gained by the Japanese navy, sufficiently established the contention. No landings could have been accomplished more expeditiously and with less fuss or excitement. Although the organisers and the executive officers are the principals in the carrying out of such achievements, the rank and file are either helpers or hinderers, and upon them rests much of the glory of success. We learn that the Japanese soldiers and sailors have the utmost faith in the capabilities of their officers, and that their affection and respect for them is unbounded. These officers have evidently done all they could to fit themselves for the responsible positions entrusted to them by their Government and country, and the men knowing this respect them accordingly. The Japanese have certainly given the Western nations an instructive lesson—they have profited more by Western successes and blunders than appears to have been the case with ourselves. Russia has shown a marked unpreparedness for the contest upon which she has entered. Her contempt for her adversary has cost her many lives and some of the best of her ships. May we endeavour in the future to profit to some purpose from the mistakes made by others.

CHAPTER XXXIV.

FRENCH EXCUSES.

There is not much information to be gained in the study of the campaign as conducted by the French War Minister and his Generals during the war. When, however, M. Gambetta threw himself into the gap, there was something to be learnt by the study of the energetic methods employed by that patriot in his praiseworthy efforts to extricate his country from the terrible plight into which it had been plunged by the ignorance and incapacity of some of the leading officials, who thought much less of the interests of the country than they did of their own advantage or popularity. Indeed, previously to the entry of M. Gambetta into the arena of strife, very little happened beyond that which it would behoove every military student to regard as best to avoid in time of war.

Paris had always been regarded as the great military centre of France ; orders, troops, munitions, supplies, transport, guns, equipments, and all *matériel*, radiated from this inconveniently situated principal dépôt. The capital being situated so far toward the north-west, and at so remote a distance from the enemy's frontier, rendered it inconvenient as the point of general concentration ; indeed, it is very evident that there was a considerable amount of countermarching before a large portion of the men and materials reached their eventual destinations. The Quai d'Orsay was expected to provide the brain power needed to regulate the masses of men, horses, and *matériel*, which poured into Paris during the first days of the concentration. That department does not appear to have formed any true conception of the magnitude of the duties which would fall upon it when war was declared, and very insufficient prevision had been exercised in making ready to carry out the onerous work which it had to undertake. The only redeeming feature seems to have been the management of the railway lines, which were worked ceaselessly so long as they could be kept intact. The railway companies

had the advantage of a regularly trained staff of officials, and these were augmented in the emergency. This was probably the only organisation in France which was upon a thoroughly sound and good working basis, but it must not be forgotten that the employés were as a rule trained soldiers.

The work by Capt. Bonnet of the Artillery gives the following views :—"The organisation of the French army did not admit of its passing rapidly from a state of peace to that of war. The formation had been prearranged but on paper only, and the changes made at the last moment upset the first plans. The army corps were still in course of formation, and their commanders were quite ignorant of their composition or place of assembly. The roads were thronged with soldiers on their way to Paris, at which place alone their eventual destination was known. Their march seems to have been directed toward Paris, as they could be assured of subsistence only at that centre. On their arrival neither officers nor men were inspected or paraded, they were unceremoniously hustled off by some unseen commander to be dispersed at stations along the frontier. Soldiers, ammunition, and supplies were in chaotic confusion, and needed much labour in their disentanglement. But precious time was being lost, and from the very first day of the campaign vacillation and precipitancy usurped the place of order, and revealed the seat of our weakness." When a French officer, who is a well-known writer on military subjects, expresses so decided an opinion we may be perfectly satisfied that the censure conveyed is deserved. It should be remembered that the French War Department is and was composed of military men from the Minister down to the junior officers. Marshal Leboeuf was the War Minister at the outbreak of the war, and it was he who protested so vehemently and assured the Emperor that not a button was required to complete the efficient equipment of the French army. Subsequent events proved how untrue was the statement made.

An article which appeared in *Blackwood's Magazine* of February, 1871, has thrown some further light upon the sudden collapse of the French offensive. The writer contends that the reasons for the disasters from which the French nation was then suffering arose from three main causes :—"The gross corruption which prevailed in high places, as well as in low ; a policy of centralisation carried to such an extent as to render the army machinery quite unmanageable ; and a bad system of transport and supply." He also throws much blame upon the

shoulders of both staff and regimental officers, who, he considers, were generally unfit for the positions they filled, and their incapacity had a very demoralising effect upon the men placed under their command. "Bad officers make bad soldiers." The Intendance broke down as soon as the first strain of war was put upon it; this he attributes to the fact that the officers of that department were drawn mainly from the worn-out old officers and soldiers. In his *History of the War*, Colonel Borbstaedts tells us that—"As a principle, the higher posts of the Intendance are in France occupied by officers from the regular service, and there is not the least pains taken beforehand for their training as officials of the Intendance; there must come to pass in time of war that the additional posts would have to be filled by officers who had not the least knowledge of administrative work."

There can be no question of the inadvisability of having drawn the major portion of the officers and non-commissioned officers of the Intendance from the worn-out officers and men of the army. It may be taken for granted that the army would not have spared its best soldiers; the probabilities are that the commanding officers would have encouraged those they were not sorry to lose to leave their regiments for the purpose of joining the Intendance. Old soldiers cannot be considered suitable for such duties, they would either be physically incapable of doing hard work, or they would be disinclined to undertake it for the simple reason that age does not as a rule increase the energy of the individual. No doubt the system was not a bad one in the piping times of peace; the French army was able to provide for many deserving soldiers; that class of man was no doubt able to accomplish everything which might be required of him in garrison or in camps of manoeuvre, but when it came to the hard work of field service a younger man was needed. If corruption is rampant in an army, it is certain to invade the ranks of the department charged with the disbursement of the large sums of money which are needed for the purchase of transport remounts and supplies, and on that account alone we think that no misfits or failures should be allowed to find their way into a department which depends for its success upon the rectitude and energy of its members. The old soldier, whether French or of any other nationality, is not in any degree regarded by the writer as unreliable—on the contrary, he has every reason to praise both seasoned officers and men—his contention is merely that the most efficient officers and men can be procured for commissariat

work from the youth of the country, rather than from amongst those who may have expended the best years of their life in the performance of other duties.

Probably no opinions are worthy of greater consideration than those emanating from the ranks of an army in the field. It is true that there are always growlers abroad and that nothing can ever satisfy the requirements of that particular class. The following extracts from publications by French soldiers are worthy of credence. M. Delorme, who was a quartermaster-sergeant, complained very bitterly of the way in which the detail issues of supplies and forage were mismanaged in the field; the distribution of rations to the various corps was conducted without method and was therefore slow in its operation. The mismanagement in this respect was the subject of universal complaint. Supply officers were appointed to each corps, either a lieutenant or a sub-lieutenant—probably corresponding with the British quartermaster—and that officer was charged with the duty of procuring from the Intendance the supplies in bulk for their corps, and had afterwards to distribute them to the companies, squadrons, and batteries at such hours as were most convenient to the troops and were fixed by the colonel-commanding. These officers were empowered, in the event of any failure in the delivery of supplies, to purchase in the district or to requisition what was needed for the feeding of their several corps. According to the account given by this non-commissioned officer, a proper distribution of rations had not been inaugurated in the peace garrisons, but was employed only during the annual manœuvres. There does not appear to have been much attention given by the authorities in regard to those details which are so necessary for the comfort and well-being of the soldier in the field; indeed, when matters of so great importance, such as the provisioning of frontier fortresses are overlooked, it is not surprising that matters of detail should be disregarded. A Garde Mobile gives some particulars of how he and his comrades were treated in the eastern theatre of the war:—"Sometimes we had nothing to eat, and sometimes we had too much, that was owing to our having given to us from three to four days' rations at once. We therefore ate as much as we could, as many of us had not been supplied with haversacks; food was often thrown on the roads or given to the peasantry, so that by the following day nothing remained of our rations. In some villages neither bread nor meat could be procured, as other regiments in advance had already taken all that was available, but we were not in Bourgogne for

nothing, as there was always plenty of wine to drink, when the inhabitants chose to produce it."

These statements, emanating as they do from those who were most concerned in the effective organisation of matters of detail, upon which the well-being, indeed the very life, of the soldier so much depends, do not attempt to disguise the true facts of the case. The same writer condemns the shameful neglect which characterised the whole of the preparatory organisation of the French army for taking the field, whether it be in the direction of the provision of a sufficiency of equipments, or stores, or supplies, or whether it be in regard to those matters which are so necessary for the promotion of discipline, efficiency, good temper, and comfort amongst the rank and file of an army. This *Garde Mobile* animadvertes upon the scandalous waste of provisions caused by the throwing away of surplus rations by some of the soldiery, and justifies their action by stating that many had no haversacks and were therefore unable to carry what they could not eat. We cannot help believing that some of the men could have devised some means of carrying extra rations even if they had no haversacks; and from other statements upon the same subject, we are led to the conclusion that it was not infrequently the case that the French soldiery disburdened themselves of extra rations, particularly when they had to make forced marches, and sometimes, it is to be feared, they threw away rations, or ate them in advance, out of pure "cussedness." Whatever may be the causes of any deficiencies in equipments, stores, or supplies, the soldier is expected to help himself, not to add to the difficulties of a sufficiently dire situation by showing temper and losing his head. If the soldier desires to have his grievances redressed, he must wait patiently until the termination of the campaign, when, if there is any real fault to be found, he may rest assured that his sympathetic countrymen will not allow his avoidable sufferings to pass unnoticed or unavenged. He cannot right himself in the field or during the conduct of active operations, he must possess his soul in patience and make mental or other notes for use later.

There is no room for doubt that the disorganised condition of the French Intendance at the commencement of the war constituted one of the principal causes which led to the rapid annihilation of the regular forces of France by the German armies, whose administration on the contrary was almost perfect. It is not contended for one moment that, had the French army been provided with as efficient a commissariat as were the

Germans, the tables might have been turned. In the other existing conditions, we do not think that the French nation could have had the least chance of coming off victorious, notwithstanding the superior range and striking force of the Chasse-pôt over the needle-rifle. In most respects the German army was superior to the French—the officers were better trained and had a superior knowledge of the art of war, and had gained more practical experience of actual warfare—the men were then of superior physique—two German soldiers are said to have weighed as much as three Frenchmen, but we do not believe that the Germans are now much heavier men than the French, the latter have unquestionably improved enormously in physique during the last thirty years. The Germans also had a preponderating force of field artillery—their equipments were as complete as the exigencies of the service and the rapid moves would permit—the German officers, as a rule, had a better knowledge of the topography of the country than was possessed by most French officers—they were provided with better maps of the country; indeed, the French officers were given, or to be more accurate, had sent to them after they had gone into the field, maps of Germany only. Without particularising any further, it will be sufficient to add that the feeding of the German troops was based upon common sense principles.

M. de Freycinet, who became Secretary of State for War, gives us his opinions on the causes which led to the failure of the Intendance. The following is extracted from his work, *La Guerre en Province*:—"The service of the Intendance is that which has excited my heartfelt condemnation; it was to this service that the public attributed the responsibility for our disasters. We fully recognise the sufferings to which the soldiery were frequently subjected, owing to the want of sufficient food, the absence of blankets and clothing, and the bad state of their shoes. The facts, although exaggerated, were only too real; however, it was not in the power of anyone to prevent them. The administration had collected supplies in sufficient abundance, even more than was needed, and had distributed what would have met the requirements of a far larger number than it had to provide for. The surplus so issued did not, however, prevent frequent, although only partial, sufferings, for the distribution was badly carried out, not being always ready when and where required; besides, there was great loss and waste. These circumstances combined to destroy the organisation of this branch of the service. Independently of the existence of the supplies, there are two conditions which are indispensable for the proper care of the

soldiery: Firstly, the necessary instructions must be given by the officer commanding to the Intendance in order that the supplies may be sent to certain fixed points; secondly, it is necessary that the officer commanding should cause a careful supervision to be exercised over the distribution, in order that it may be carried out in a proper manner, with discretion and without error of any kind. Both these essentials were often wanting."

He continues in the same strain to condemn those commanding officers who neglected to give the Intendance information of the contemplated movements of the troops or of their destinations. He also states that supplies were frequently sent to wrong points through the absence of proper directions to the railway officials or through the errors of the latter. The initial defeats of the French armies caused serious complications in regard to the original intentions of the Intendance. He also attributes to the lack of discipline in the French army, and the wasteful propensities of the French soldiery, a considerable amount of the difficulties which overtook the Intendance in this very disastrous campaign. We are also informed by M. de Freycinet that when they were heavily laden and had to perform long marches they did not hesitate to throw away their blankets, their spare shoes, and even their rations; so much was this the case that during the disastrous retreat of Bourbaki's army towards the Swiss frontier it was ascertained that not less than 30,000 blankets were discarded by the troops along the line of march. It is hard to understand how men perishing from cold could have imagined that they were helping themselves by throwing away the only covering they had as a protection against the bitter cold of the nights and early mornings; the very few extra pounds weight so carried could not have retarded their retreat to anything like the extent that their frozen feet must have done. This is one of those incidents which displays the serious results that are likely to follow a relaxation of discipline, or the neglect of the company officers to look after their men properly. Indeed, the officers and men were inextricably mixed up with other regiments, such had been the hot haste of both officers and men to escape from the pursuit of the victorious German troops. An exception should, however, be made in favour of the division under the command of General Cremer, by whom the retreat of the defeated army was covered.

M. de Freycinet admits that friction existed between the Generals and other officers commanding and the senior officers of the Intendance, and he throws the onus upon the former. How could the supply and transport officers be expected to make

adequate provision for troops on the move if they were not aware of their destinations? Nor could the Intendant be held responsible for any lapse if his information did not reach him before it became too late for him to make the necessary preparations. There was an evident disinclination on the part of some of the commanders to communicate their intentions in regard to the disposition of their troops to the Intendance. Perhaps they felt that their dignity would be lowered by notifying junior officers as to their proposals; it may perhaps not have occurred to these high and mighty *signiors* that by giving timely notice to their Intendants they would have adopted one of the principal means at their disposal for securing a successful issue. It is now a recognised fact that the art of war compels the commander to utilise his whole machinery with knowledge and discretion, he cannot neglect one component part of his war-making machine without damaging the remainder. Consequently, if a General proposes to move a division or an army corps in a certain direction he at once sends for the senior officers who manage the various parts of his gigantic machine—from one he gets full information and advice about the topography of the country to be traversed—from another the particulars of the defensible positions—from a third the probable strength of the enemy and the likelihood of flank attacks, &c.—a fourth assures him of the necessary transport—a fifth gives particulars in regard to the methods of supply, and so on with the other heads. Without utilising the information placed at his disposal the General relegates mainly to chance the lives of those entrusted him. The sun of the military autocrat has set; the science of war has become too specialised to be mastered by one brain, despite its size, weight, or quality; a combination of brain-power is now needed with the controlling master-mind.

Although M. de Freycinet with good reason defends the Intendance, that department was no doubt responsible for some of the friction which worked so much evil to the French army. M. L. Doussaint, in his *L'Armée de l'Est*, gives us an example of the kind:—"Conductorships in the mule trains were those usually filled by old soldiers, but it was not easy to get the soldiery to accept such appointments, as the work was held somewhat in contempt as compared with the actual fighting in the field. And to such a degree did this abhorrence prevail in the ranks that upon one occasion an order to a conductor was enforced by pulling him by the nose. One of these appointments had been given to an experienced non-commissioned officer who had served in the Crimea. This individual was very methodical,

and acted up to the letter rather than to the spirit of his instructions. He had been ordered by his General to send 150 mules to bring in the wounded, and as no harness or equipment was mentioned he sent the mules in a drove. They were of course sent back for the *cacolets*, but as drivers were not mentioned in the requisition only a few were sent, not sufficient to carry out the service. This disciplinarian was so tenacious of his sense of duty that he would not move his train until his orders had reached him, although the troops were already in motion." A man of this description is a distinct obstruction to the service, and the less such men are tolerated the better will it be for any and every army. Most officers and men now-a-days are quite ready to act under the dictates of common sense, whether with or without orders, and they can always rest assured that so long as reasonable cause can be shown they will be supported in what they do. In any case, the officer has always a commander to whom he may look for counsel and advice, but as he should be an expert in his own particular branch, the onus of the action taken must naturally rest with himself.

M. de Freycinet condemns the system under which the Intendance was worked, rather than the lack of energy and devotion on the part of the officers and men. Indeed, the subordinate branch of butchers, bakers, clerks, smiths, issuers, and labourers was almost non-existent on the outbreak of the war; it is therefore not to be wondered at that the distribution of provisions and forage was exceedingly defective. It is clearly indicated that there was an objection on the part of the young soldiers to give up the more glorious work of fighting the enemy face to face. He could not bring himself to believe that he could render his country as good service by concerning himself with the munitions, which were destined to supply the strength needed by the soldiery for opposing the enemy with effect. The outcome of so absurd a prejudice was that the Intendance had to accept old worn-out soldiers, who were probably unfit to accomplish such hard work as was required of them.

Physique may not be so essential a requirement in the soldiery of the administrative corps during peace times, but in time of war, youth, health, and strength are indispensable where so much hard work has to be done if the troops in the field are to be kept in good fighting trim. There is no doubt that the Intendance failed lamentably in the duty it was expected to accomplish. To improvise supplies, forage, and transport without the aid of contractors was indeed a novel situation; some officers would probably be unable to discriminate between the various grades of

cattle or dead meat, nor could they exercise much, if any, supervision over the butchers and bakers, who would practically exercise the real control, as seems to have been the case during this war. How could such officers purchase flour, oats, or hay without any previous experience? Such failures would recoil upon the unfortunate soldiery, not upon the incompetent officers, and the fighting capacity of the army would become sensibly diminished. If an army is expected to take the field in an efficient condition it must be furnished well and thoroughly in all its component parts, and in none more so than in regard to its supply and transport equipments. It is impossible to improvise a staff of officers and subordinates on the spur of the moment; a liberal nucleus has to be organised in time of peace, and the establishment has to be worked as far as may be practicable on field service lines, otherwise when the augmentation has to be instituted prior to taking the field there would be no instructors to guide those joining the corps.

It is but fair to note what a striking contrast presented itself in the admirable management of Chanzy's supply and transport as compared with that of any other French army. That army was able to move rapidly and without being obstructed by its baggage trains owing to the admirable foresight exercised by General Chanzy and his Intendants. Vinoy's army also made an excellent retreat from Sedan after the defeat of McMahon's army, but he moved practically without baggage trains. The peasantry became his commissariat for the time being, which increased his mobility enormously. Contentment on the part of the soldiery will lighten the burden which must fall upon every General's shoulders in the field; the acceptance of the inevitable with a good grace will add to the fighting capacity and mobility of every army. What hampers Generals in the field, more even than the enemy, is the inordinate desire which sometimes seizes both officers and men to campaign upon as luxurious lines as possible. The fact is often lost sight of that the increase of baggage decreases mobility, and as a consequence striking force is diminished. The greater the mobility the sooner will a campaign be brought to a close, and casualties will be reduced to a minimum. The best policy for every army is to put up with the hardships inseparable from campaigning, to forage with the object of feeding themselves upon the country and thus sparing the reserves with the first line transport, and to economise and make the rations in hand last as long as possible. Troops who work upon those lines are certain to command success in the end.

CHAPTER XXXV.

CONCLUSION.

Before concluding this work it is proposed to consider some of those circumstances which have redounded to the credit of the French Intendance, which cannot claim to have succeeded to any very appreciable extent. M. Jules Claretie gave great praise in regard to what he saw of the working of the Intendance; the officers appear to have worked not only with method, but with the utmost energy and activity. Indeed, that gentleman was filled with admiration for them, and as he is a man of experience, his judgment is worthy of the respect of everybody. What might have happened in regard to the French supplies and transports had these officers been able to keep the field instead of being interned or captured at Metz, Sedan, Paris, Strasburg, &c., it is difficult to imagine, but it is certain that the almost universal failure of the Intendance would have been considerably abated. Efficient as those officers may have been, they were shackled by the tremendous obstacles they had to encounter on every hand. Pitchforked into a strange part of the country, they found themselves overburdened with men and horses to feed, but without the means of feeding them. The magazines were empty, the transport was defective and insufficient, and there were no contractors from whom provisions or forage could be drawn, it was no wonder that M. Claretie admired the activity and energy of these half-distracted officers. The fault lay in the absence of any preliminary arrangements by the French War Office—they expected their officers to make bricks without straw. As a matter of fact the major part of the supplies and forage, needed for feeding the French Army Corps assembled in the neighbourhood of Metz, was sent by rail from Paris. The huge concentration of food at the capital as a consequence became enormously reduced, which afterwards constituted a very serious deprivation to those large numbers besieged in the metropolis.

The fortresses to some extent fulfilled their rôle—they detained the enemy in greater or lesser numbers for longer or shorter periods, and they impeded the lines of communication needed by the enemy. Belfort at the head of the list made an excellent defence, owing to the excellent arrangements made by the

commander, an Engineer officer, who not only managed his armaments admirably but had the sagacity to lay in large stocks of supplies in good time, and to replenish them from time to time by his enterprise and business capacity, which he possessed in no ordinary degree ; the same may be said of Bitche and its commander. M. Bonnet makes the following philosophical remark :— “ Notwithstanding the number of fortresses which have fallen into the hands of the Germans, permanent fortifications have shown of how great value they are ; and none can now question the real value of strong places. Nevertheless, Metz and Paris have, by their actual existence, independently of their defensive works, demobilised the German armies.” Although Metz and other fortresses were only blockaded, they detained large numbers of the enemy under their walls and forts, and gave the remainder of the country time to organise its latent strength ; the fault lay in the fact that the detention was not of sufficient duration for the French to profit to the same extent as they might have done under more favourable circumstances. The resistance, such as it was, did credit to the commanders generally, but in most instances they were hampered by the absence of adequate preparation, and in some cases by inefficient subordinate officers, and the country suffered proportionately.

In the case of Strasburg, the neglect of the French Government to construct outlying forts and to provide an adequate armament were the main causes which led to its speedy capitulation. The fault was not with the troops in this instance nor with the much abused Intendance ; the soldiery were both numerous and efficient, but the guns were generally of obsolete patterns and unable to cope with the modern artillery employed by the Germans, nor was there any lack of provisions for both the garrison and inhabitants ; the place was forced to yield to the superior organisation and strength of the Germans. That so important a frontier fortress should have been so neglected by the French War Office, when war between the two countries had been foreshadowed for years, is highly condemnatory of that department of the State, and we know that this state of things arose from no absence of warnings from the local responsible officers. And what accentuates the infamy of such neglect is the fact that the plan of campaign contemplated that the invasion of South Germany should have been made a little to the south of Strasburg, which would naturally have become the principal advanced base for the army of invasion, and should have been strengthened to the very utmost, and stocked with large reserves

of ammunition, stores, equipments, supplies, and **transpo** animals and carriages, besides having extensive **hospital** bakeries, and other indispensables necessary for a large army.

So gigantic an effort seems to have been beyond the ken of such dabblers in the art of war ; they could hardly have imagined that the invasion was impracticable and doomed to failure ; the concentration of the army of invasion, some hundred miles to the northwards, points somewhat to that conclusion, but it is more likely that the affairs of the War Office were in so tangled a muddle that the officials hardly knew what they were about. In any case, had Strasburg been properly fortified it could have fulfilled an important rôle by detaining General Von Werder's army for so long a period that Bourbaki's army might have become thoroughly organised and strengthened, and would undoubtedly have become a serious menace to the German lines of communication between Paris and the frontier.

The successful equipment of the army of the Loire was mainly due to the indefatigable exertions of M. Gambetta, but the defeat of that army was due entirely to faulty generalship and the superiority of the German troops. The majority of the French conscripts at that time consisted of men who had received very little training indeed, and hardly understood how to use the weapons placed in their hands. How could such men effectually resist the attacks of those well-seasoned soldiers, who had been recruiting their strength outside Metz for nearly two months ? After the defeat at Orleans it will be remembered that the French army became divided, one half retiring to the westward under General Chanzy, and the remainder moving to the southward under General Bourbaki. The supply and transport arrangements for the 2nd Army of the Loire under Chanzy seem to have been most ably conducted, as that General was always able to fall back in good order upon a well defended and well supplied line in the event of defeat. Probably General Chanzy was the most able French strategist the war produced, but he must have depended very much upon his Intendance to second his efforts in safeguarding his army in the event of its being forced to retire. Perhaps there are no circumstances in which the transport may become a help or hindrance to an army as when a retreat has to be effected. During the masterly retreats of the 2nd Army of the Loire, the transport was never in the way of the retreating forces, and as a consequence the supplies were distributed as punctually and as regularly as the circumstances of the case would permit, and the transport was also preserved intact to the army.

Probably the gravest failure was connected with the abortive defence of the fortress of Metz. Situated as it was close to the frontier of North Germany that place should have been sufficiently armed and equipped to resist attack from every quarter. It seems to have been regarded as quite sufficient that Metz was well armed, was well provided with ammunition and projectiles, and was defended by strong outlying forts of modern construction. Germany was to be invaded, consequently it was supposed that Metz would only play a subordinate part in the future campaign. As to making any preparations in case that fortress might have to withstand a lengthened siege, the idea was simply absurd, and so it was left without anything much beyond the ordinary provision made for peace times. It does not appear to have occurred to the authorities that the Germans might become the invaders. The most ordinary rules of strategy, such as the arming, the equipping, and the provisioning of the fortresses in alignment along the enemy's frontier were wholly or partially neglected. We consider that neglect of this kind is more often the result of negligence through the lack of interest in their work, rather than from the want of ability. The happy-go-lucky system has surely worn itself out in every land. Devotion to the service is needed from the highest to the lowest, and the fulfilment of duty should be the first and main object of those who take service.

The primary liability for the absence of preparation to place Metz and the other frontier fortresses in a proper state of defence rested upon the Government, but that did not absolve the Generals and other officers commanding from their responsibility. They were on the spot and could therefore appreciate the necessities of each case, and it was incumbent upon them to do everything in their power, without loss of any time, to repair the neglect of their superiors. The defence of the fortresses, the safety of their men, and possibly the integrity of the land depended upon the amount of energy they might display. The officers of the Intendance were unable to act without the countenance and support of their immediate commanders. They had unfortunately become imbued with those paralysing influences which are certain to follow a system of centralisation; the Quai d'Orsay had been regarded as the centre of all that had to do with military affairs, and reference had had to be made to that department in regard to all but the merest details. An intelligent initiative was practically unknown to almost every class of officer in the French army. The Intendant of Bazaine's army, M. Lebrun—of Chanzy's army, M. Bouché—and of Bourbaki's army, M. Friant, appear to have

been among the few solitary exceptions. Some few of the commanders, such as Colonel Denfert at Belfort and Commandant Teyssier at Bitche, accepted the responsibility which was perforce thrust upon them with a manliness which cannot be too highly commended.

In the case of Metz, the lack of any power to initiate measures for self-preservation were exceedingly marked both on the part of the municipality and of the Military Governor. It was obvious to the meanest intellect that, in the circumstances, the town could not have had too much concentrated within its walls; indeed, whatever was got into the city was saved from the enemy, who were then sadly in need of all the food that could be obtained in the surrounding districts. General Coffinieres seems to have been too good natured to destroy the supplies in the surrounding districts, but he crowned his incapacity by admitting numbers of the peasantry who sought protection within the works, many of whom were unprovided with food. To add to the evils of the situation, no attempt appears to have been made by the Governor to economise the issues of provisions either to the inhabitants or to the garrison troops, and it was not until nearly two months had elapsed that any real effort was made in this direction.

There are no grounds whatever for casting blame upon Marshal Bazaine for the lack of foresight in not collecting large reserves of supplies and forage within the walls and outlying forts of Metz. Bazaine was at that time fully occupied in providing supplies for his large field army, in its organisation, and in fighting his country's foes in the environs of Metz. His field army would have been much better supplied had it not become necessary to destroy large quantities of provisions to prevent their falling into the hands of the enemy after the battle of Gravelotte. Consequently, the onus of unpreparedness at Metz did not rest upon Bazaine but upon the Military Governor and the municipality. Marshal Bazaine must, however, bear his share of the blame in the serious waste of supplies, which was allowed to prevail both in camp and quarters for the first month of the siege. The field army constituted more than two-thirds of the whole numbers requiring to be fed. Had Bazaine possessed the sagacity to reduce the bread ration from the very first, at least three weeks' bread would have been gained for the total numbers.

In consequence of censures passed upon the administration of the Governor by the Marshal, the former sent in his resignation, which does not appear to have been noticed by the latter. Coffinieres displayed great ignorance of the actual condition of the

available supplies within the walls of Metz when he stated that those supplies would not feed the inhabitants beyond the 20th, for, on the 27th, Bazaine's Intendant informed him that with what could be collected from the inhabitants, that is presumably leaving sufficient for their subsistence, the army could be fed for another eight days. Consequently, Coffinieres was more than a fortnight out in his calculations ; in other words he estimated that the town supplies would last for only eight days when in reality they were able to last for more than three times that period. It did not redound to Bazaine's credit that he refused to listen to his Intendant when that officer informed him that the French army could be fed for another eight days. A day even was of importance to those who were endeavouring to reorganise the shattered resources of France, and the Marshal must have been perfectly well aware that such was the case when he declined to prolong the negotiations in reference to the capitulation.

Capt. Bonnet wrote as follows :—" It may be said that the defence of Metz was totally defective, that not a single ordinary precaution was taken as required when a fortress is about to undergo a siege. A large number of strangers were allowed to seek shelter within and under its walls without bringing with them a sufficient quantity of provisions ; and the authorities did not even cause the supplies, which were under their very walls, to be brought into the fortress, under the pretext that this would cause some fighting and a few casualties. During the siege the army was kept in disastrous inactivity, and each time that there was any wish to relieve the monotony, the orders and counter-orders succeeded each other so rapidly that no better measure could have been employed for stifling all energy and spirit in the soldiery." The latter charge is aimed directly at the Marshal, who was cordially detested by the army and the country for his hurried surrender ; indeed, rightly or wrongly, he was generally considered to have sold his country. However, if the supplies were under the walls early in the siege, they were there before the siege commenced, and Coffinieres should at least have brought them inside the walls.

The preparatory measures needed to meet the requirements of the inhabitants of Paris during the contemplated siege were made by the municipality of that city. The Military Governor had nothing to do with those arrangements, beyond giving his advice when asked for it, the city not being under Martial Law. It is the fact that Paris was not provided with a sufficient reserve of supplies, live cattle or forage. There was ample time in which to get in all that was needed, for there was quite a month to spare

in carrying out this obvious duty, and it should have been performed rigidly and with determination and expedition. There is always that absurd nightmare, the fear of getting in too much. Let us take Baron Von der Goltz advice :—"Get together two or three times as much food and forage as you think you may need, you must reckon with what may be lost from captures, from deterioration, from fire, and from exposure. What an ignominious situation it is for the soldiery to find themselves starved into surrender when they are amply provided with works, guns, small arms, ammunition, projectiles, &c.—that was the case with the metropolis of France." A little more foresight, a little more courage to face responsibility, a determination on the part of the authorities to do the best for the country, and the exclusion of private sentimentality in dealing with their fellows would at least have secured a more lengthened duration of the defence of Paris, if it had not given the provinces time to come to the rescue of their metropolis.

We feel that it will be advantageous to quote Capt. Bonnet's views in regard to some of the reasons which tended to place the metropolis at the mercy of the invader. He wrote as follows :—"The investment of Paris was made by forces which, under other circumstances, must have been ridiculously inadequate for the purpose. What rendered the attack efficacious was the bad quality of the troops charged with its defence. The affair of the 18th September demonstrated too clearly their abject weakness and inefficiency. The attack was well conceived and was executed with rapidity in the direction where it had the best chance of success ; a miserable panic seized a portion of our troops at the sound of the first gun, and the remainder were forced to fall back upon the fortress. During the two months following no serious enterprises could be undertaken, as the interval had to be devoted to instruction and to enable the men to regain confidence in themselves. Unfortunately, there abounded in that great city every virtue and every vice ; in such troublous times the unhealthy elements were apt to come prominently to the front, and were likely to develop the germs of indiscipline and debauchery. In many instances, as the physique improved the moral side of the soldier's nature decreased. Politics turned the defenders from their legitimate work and caused them to lose sight of the object of their real presence in the fortress. Thus the military art found little to study during what should have been highly important operations ; the siege of a small place like Belfort was a thousand times more interesting to the military student."

The humiliation of France was clearly due to the insane precipitancy with which the Government and the nation plunged into a war with an antagonist who was more powerful and was much better prepared to undertake a campaign than was the case with the French. In Cassell's *History of the War*, M. E. Ollier does not spare his countrymen:—"If the French people were betrayed, it was by their own inherent vices and follies, which were in truth far more active and conspicuous under the Republic than under the Empire. Incompetency and dishonesty were rife. Army after army was led forth to defeat, and the fault was not so much with the Generals as with the poor quality of the men, and the execrable way in which the armies were appointed. Shoes with pasteboard soles were supplied to the troops to the extent of many thousands, a fact which sufficiently explains the barefooted condition of the men after a long march."

M. Ollier gives us some particulars of the way in which the people of France responded to the call of their country in her sore distress. He dwells upon the unbroken state of her credit in the financial world, the patriotism and the unity of the afflicted nation no doubt being the cause. The Government had asked for eighty millions of francs by the end of June, 1871, two hundred millions were offered. A loan of three milliards was called for a month later, and was subscribed for twelve times over, the people of the country being the principal tenderers, but large sums were offered from abroad. "A small farmer went from Grenoble to Lyons to subscribe to the loan. He presented a large canvas bag to the clerks at the branch of the Bank of France, stating that it contained £15,000. The coins were emptied into the scale and weighed, and it was found that the weight was in excess. An examination into the cause showed that the coins were clogged with damp earth, owing to their having been buried in a garden; and none were of a later coinage than the reign of Louis Philippe—they had probably been buried for several years." Here was a true patriot, a man who preferred to bury his hoard rather than trust it to either bankers or other business men, probably in the hope that the money would prevent his becoming a burden to friends in his old age; yet this man was not deaf to the call of his country in her need. *La belle France* came before the love of self or family in the heart of this patriotic Frenchman. So long as any country has such sons to come to her aid in time of need, there can be no danger of complete conquest or subjugation.

The careful study of the operations carried out during this interesting and gigantic war has afforded great help to military

students of other lands, but it is contended that the knowledge to be gained has not yet become exhausted, and that further study is needed to reveal information yet unearthed.

The revelation of the preparedness of Germany and the unpreparedness of France should constitute a sufficient warning to other Governments not to neglect preparation for war. We do not require to look very far afield to note the neglect of more than one Power in the not very remote past. On the other hand, it is evident that the Japanese have not engaged in their war with Russia without adequate preparation. That Power has understood the advantage of gaining a dominating power at sea, and the whole of her initial successes have followed its development. France unhappily neglected to utilise her sea power, whereby serious injury might have been inflicted upon German ports and marine, and a portion of her army might have been retained in the north. A large number of French naval officers and men were certainly utilised in the land armies, and were employed in the forts and gunboats in the defence of Paris, but they could have been used to greater advantage at sea.

We do not imagine that the French army was able to contend successfully against the disciplined and well organised forces of Germany, but, taking into account the superiority of the Chassepôt, had their transport and supply been efficient and sufficient to enable the French to invade, there is little doubt that the resultant issues would have been far otherwise. The negligence displayed in regard to the frontier fortresses was one of the principal causes of the utter collapse of the French. Had all those fortresses been properly armed, provisioned and equipped, the siege of Paris might never have been accomplished, and the French nation could not have been so humiliated and despoiled.

If Governments are ever to profit from the experience of others, or from that gained by themselves, it is time that they took such lessons to heart, and that such steps were taken as would impress the facts upon the minds and consciences of the people. The study of such questions, which are of vital importance, should not rest with officialdom alone, but should be mastered by all patriotic persons of ordinary intelligence. At the same time, it is very evident that Governments are too often swayed by the opposition of their political foes, by the dictates of the Press, and by popular clamour, and are thus forced to act in opposition to their convictions and to the true interests of their respective countries.

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
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